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Urban  upgrading  of  low-income  areas  in  developing  countries  has  a  limited  impact  on  the 
inhabitants'  lives  if  it  simply  means  the  physical  improvement  of  housing  and  its 
surrounding  environment.  If  upgrading  is  to  be  `sustainable',  it  should  incorporate 
`empowerment',  such  that  the  beneficiaries'  are  able  to  act  independently  and  to 
participate  in  future  activities  with  the  state  and  civil  society  organisations  after  a  project's 
completion.  The  institutionalisation  of  sustainable  upgrading  is  understood  as  a  range  of 
processes  by  which  local  government  and  community  participation  ensure  the  continuation 
of  valued  neighbourhood  outcomes. 
The  achievements  of  urban  upgrading  are  analysed  through  pilot  urban  upgrading  schemes 
promoted  by  the  Department  for  International  Development  (DFID)  and  the  German 
Agency  for  Technical  Co-operation  (GTZ)  in  the  Egyptian  cities  of  Ismailia  and  Aswan. 
Their  respective  project  objectives  and  management  systems  provide  comparative  insights 
into  the  potential  of  alternative  conceptual  and  legislative  approaches.  A  multi-method 
approach  is  employed  through  a  multi-disciplinary  framework  owing  to  the  paradigm  shift 
in  planning  and  foreign  aid  over  the  period  of  these  projects. 
A  conceptual  framework,  `accountable  bureaucratic  capacity'  is  utilised  to  investigate  the 
ability  of  local  government  to  institutionalise  collaborative  urban  upgrading  measures  in 
partnership  with  civil  society  organisations.  The  main  argument  is  that  the  latter  cannot 
contribute  to  sustainable  development,  democratisation  or  to  protect  citizens'  rights  in 
low-income  neighbourhood  without  accountable  representation  from  their  side,  a 
reciprocal  and  active  representation  from  the  citizens  concerned,  and  an  accountable  public 
sector.  The  capacity  of  urban  governance  and  the  extent  to  which  participatory  initiatives 
can  exploit  the  potential  within  existing  structures  and  systems  are  examined.  This 
examination  allows  an  evaluation  of  how  far  a  participatory  project  rated  as  `good- 
practice'  can  enhance  citizens'  awareness  of  opportunities,  political  participation  and  local 
government  performance,  while  building  collaborative  and  institutionalised  planning 
capacity. 
The  research  concludes  that  the  sustainability  of  urban  upgrading  depends  on  the  form  of 
citizens'  participation  and  the  management  styles  of  cities.  Successful  participation  during 
_ 
an  upgrading  project  may  have  `transformative'  potential  to  encourage  citizens'  political 
participation.  If  citizens  are  not  active,  even  though  they  reject-  the  government's 
development  agenda,  or  have  to  depend  on  `informal'  networks  to  provide  their  needs, 
they  may  be  characterised  as  `free-riders',  who  withdraw  from  urban  governance  and  its 
collaborative  decision-making  processes.  Legal  recognition  of  squatter  settlements  is  the 
first  step  required  to  institutionalise  upgrading  policies,  particularly  for  indigenous  or 
customary  groups  trying  to  survive  in  a  world  characterised  by  increasing  interdependence 
and  escalating  threats  to  local  ties.  However,  although  this  recognition  strengthens  a 
group's  ability  to  negotiate  and  interact  with  non-group  members,  it  may  also  have 
detrimental  effects  if  it  is  not  supported  by  additional  legislation.  Local  government  needs 
institutional  reform  and  a  strafegiccäpacity-building  programme  to  forge  partnerships  and 
the  joint  responsibility  of  the  public  and  private  sectors,  as  well  as  of  civil  society. 
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CHAPTER  ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"Give  someone  a  fish,  they  will  eat  for  a  day,  teach 
them  how  to  fish,  they  will  eat  forever" 
(Chinese  folk  wisdom). 
The  above  Chinese  wisdom  serves  to  outline  metaphorically  the  new  essence  of 
the  paradigm  shift  in  planning,  foreign  aid  and  institutional  capacity-building  discourses. 
Planners  are  no  longer  required  to  act  purely  as  technical  experts,  nor  as  mediators  or 
negotiators,  but  as  enablers  of  community  self-empowerment,  while  citizens,  themselves, 
are  in  the  driver's  seat.  The  purpose  of  development,  according  to  this  paradigm,  is  to 
empower  all  citizens,  especially  those  `marginalised'  by  living  in  squatter  settlements  and 
who  have  been  systematically  excluded  by  structural  inequalities  of  income,  class, 
ethnicity  or  gender.  Unfortunately,  many  official  attempts  sponsored  by  international 
agencies  or  national  governments  have  failed  to  provide  healthy  and  sustainable  living 
spaces  for  growing  urban  populations  because  of  institutional  barriers  and 
inattentiveness  to  this  paradigm  shift,  rather  than  to  financial  constraints.  The  reliance  on 
overly  simplified  economic  concepts  in  recent  debates  on  urban  changes  has  tended  to 
neglect  the  key  importance  of  the  institutional  dimensions  to  the  processes  under  way, 
which  are  the  focus  of  this  study. 
The  conceptualisation  of  the  'development'-urbanisation  relationship  in  purely 
economic  terms  is  inadequate  to  shed  light  on  the  state  of  urban  housing  or  to  explain 
the  successes  and  failures  in  the  creation  of  viable  neighbourhoods,  or  the  sustainability 
of  improvements  in  existing  ones.  Economy,  society  and  politics  are  more  transitional 
than  ever  in  developing  countries  (DCs).  The  reality  of  urban  change  involves  a  more 
complex  interplay  between  forces  of  various  dualities,  such  as  localisation  and 
globalisation,  structure  and  agency,  fragmentation  and  integration,  contingent  and 
general  forces,  and  economic  and  political  factors,  than  has  tended  to  be  suggested  so 
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far.  Urban  restructuring  and  collaborative  policy  making  is  thus  extremely  dynamic  and 
varied  process  which  makes  reliance  on  a  single  duality  untenable. 
`Development'  is  difficult  to  define.  The  relationships  between  development  and 
urbanisation,  as  well  as  in  particular  forms  of  urbanisation  and  urbanism,  are  complex 
with  perceptions  ranging  over  time  and  place  from  positive  to  negative  causal 
interrelationships.  What  these  have  had  in  common  is  that  `development'  has  caused 
rapid  urbanisation  in  DCs  and  insufficient  investment  in  reproduction,  as  opposed  to 
production;  much  of  the  population  has  been  unable  to  participate  in  capitalistic  land  and 
property  markets.  Thus,  concentration  on  production  alone  does  not  constitute 
development  for  the  majority  of  civil  society;  economic  gains  do  not  `trickle  down'  to 
generate  effective  demand  in  market  terms.  Despite  `development',  these  failures  have 
given  rise  to  the  overcrowding  and  degradation  of  the  existing  stock,  while  constraints 
on  legal  access  to  land  for  housing  the  poor  have  resulted  in  the  spontaneous  creation  of 
large  numbers  of  `informal'  and  `squatter'  settlements.  Despite  `development',  global 
poverty  has  been  growing  again  during  the  1980s  and  1990s  in  many  countries,  reversing 
a  trend  that  those  countries  had  experienced  in  the  twenty  or  thirty  years  before  1980: 
"The  total  number  of  people  living  on  less  than  U$1  a  day  has  risen  in  Latin  America, 
South  Asia,  Sub-Saharn  Africa,  Eastern  Europe,  Central  Asia,  the  Middle  East  and 
North  Africa"  (World  Bank  1999).  Moreover,  at  least  one  billion  human  beings  still  lack 
adequate  shelter  and  are  living  in  unacceptable  conditions  of  poverty,  mostly  in  DCs 
(UNCHS  1997).  Of  course  the  negative  impacts  of  such  widespread  poverty  go  beyond 
just  creating  an  environment  of  social  tension,  high  inequality,  inefficiency  and  personal 
insecurity;  they  threaten  social  and  individual  interactions  as  a  whole. 
In  a  similar  vein,  the  conceptualisation  of  institutionalisation,  in  the  context  of 
social  change  and  the  fear  of  disintegration,  is  also  a  complex  issue.  The  dominant 
challenge  of  institutionalisation,  which  is  understood  as  a  range  of  processes  by  which 
local  government  and  community  participation  ensure  the  continuation  of  valued 
neighbourhood  outcomes,  is  not  only  to  reform  public  policy,  but  to  reduce  the  claim  of 
the  state  to  exclusive  control  of  a  definite  territory,  and  knit  together  the  myriad 
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institutions  involved  in  the  governing  process  and  the  salience  of  democratic  processes 
(Jewson  and  MacGregor  1997).  Institutionalisation  requires  ideological  thinking  and  a 
set  of  tools  of  reform,  must  consider  the  existence  of  participatory  processes  and  the 
consent  of  those  who  are  governed,  particularly  those  active  citizens  who  are  engaged  in 
deliberation  to  influence  public-sector  decision-making.  It  must  also  consider  the  existing 
structure,  environment,  competence  and  capacity  of  government,  at  macro  and  micro 
levels,  to  formulate  `appropriate'  development  policies.  Yet,  the  reformed  institutions  of 
merit  selection  and  professional  administration  may  delegitimise  citizen  involvement  with 
the  administrative  side  of  governance.  Moreover,  the  institutionalisation  process,  as  a 
whole,  may  act  as  a  barrier  to  finding  solutions  because  of  the  inadequate  premises  that 
still  exist  in  the  conceptualisation  of  `development'  itself. 
Despite  development,  official  attempts  to  provide  sufficient  housing  repeatedly 
fail  and  `informal'  practices  continue  to  provide  the  majority  of  the  low-income  housing 
stock  illegally.  Government  policies  towards  `informal'  housing  vary,  from  one  time  to 
another,  and  from  one  country  to  another,  according  to  the  political  and  economic 
policies  that  each  country  follows.  They  may  range  from  outright  support  and  genuine 
charitable  concern  for  the  reduction  of  visible  human  suffering,  to  extreme  hostility  and 
suppression,  stemming  from  a  concern  for  order  and  cleanliness  in  the  city.  Such  views 
may  be  voiced  by  radical  community  organisers,  stressing  the  right  of  the  poor  to  stay  in 
the  city  and  their  right  to  share  in  its  wealth,  or  by  military  rulers  wishing  to  prevent 
street  riots  and  insurrections.  The  issue  may  be  adopted  by  politicians  appealing  for 
votes  in  squatter  settlements,  or  by  industrialists  wishing  to  keep  the  cost  of  housing  low 
so  that  wages  can  remain  low.  However,  the  failure  of  conventional  housing  and 
inefficient  `anti-slum'  administrative  measures  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  the  concept  of 
upgrading  by  some  DCs  (Turner  and  Mangin  1969).  They  recognised  that  squatter  and 
informal  housing  is  a  permanent  feature  which  requires  permanent  solutions  and  not  just 
`stop-gap'  measures.  More  enlightened  governments  now  perceived  squatter  and 
informal  housing  as  a  form  of  development  which  should  be  incorporated  into  plans.  But 
they  have  also  recognised  that  they  cannot  do  this  alone;  to  be  effective  they  need  the 
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integration  of  global  and  local  civil  society  organisations  and  the  exchange  of  urban 
experience.  Following  this  doctrine,  several  genuine  remedial  policies  have  been 
introduced  and  accepted  world-wide  and  on  an  increasing  scale  (Eiweida  1997).  This  has 
resulted  in  the  gradual  acceptance  by  other  DCs  and  a  continuous  search  for  the  most 
appropriate  means  to  upgrade  this  stock  and  its  environment  to  a  standard  conducive  to 
good  health,  and  to  sustain  this  process  through  an  empowered  civil  society. 
Civil  society  includes  various  `communities',  whose  actions  have  become  widely 
recognised  as  crucial  for  democratisation,  poverty  reduction,  environmental  upgrading 
and  sustainability.  Yet,  similar  to  `development',  `civil  society'  is  still  a  messy  concept:  it 
is  a  general  and  far-reaching  entity  within  which  the  most  important  grouping  is  the 
associations  of  beneficiaries-  namely  membership  groups  or  Grassroots  Organisations 
(GROs)  (Mitlin  1997).  Definitions  of  civil  society  are  often  broadly  drawn  and  include 
many  kinds  of  non-profit  or  voluntary  Non  Governmental  Organisations  (NGOs)  and 
associations,  referred  to  as  the  third  sector,  which  may  also  encompass  `informal' 
organisations  and  trade  associations  for  commercial  enterprises.  Thus,  the  term  embraces 
all  organisations  that  are  neither  part  of  the  government  nor  part  of  the  private  sector. 
Accordingly,  not  all  components  of  civil  society  are  implicated  in  urban  development. 
The  two  with  most  immediate  relevance  are  the  local  NGO  sector  and  the  formal  or 
informal  GROs.  The  importance  of  defining  civil  society  in  the  contexts  of 
`institutionalisation'  and  `development',  centres  on  its  ability  to  define  the  institutional 
conditions  which  create  a  network  of  non  governmental  institutions  intermediary 
between  the  family  and  the  state  that  can  facilitate  the  upgrading  process  while, 
meantime,  fortifying  social  cohesion  in  society.  The  existence  of  civil  society  is  thus  a 
pre-requisite  for  a  coherent  social  order  and  an  active  democracy  by  which  state 
domination  may  be  controlled  and  called  to  account. 
The  complexity  of  civil  society  and  its  hierarchical  links  in  space  are  seen  to  go  in 
parallel  to  those  of  the  state,  local  government  and  the  market.  Civil  society  relies  on 
local  government  as  a  source  of  power  and  protection  against  the  incursions  of  an 
increasingly  powerful  state  (Walzer  1995).  It  is  imperative  that  power  relationships  at  a 
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range  of  scales-  international,  national,  regional,  local  and  community-  and  their  role  in 
shaping  urban  processes  be  understood.  The  prevailing  perspectives  on  urbanisation 
often  ignore,  minimise  or  inadequately  address  the  web  of  relations  that  increasingly 
synchronises  the  lives  of  people  on  a  global  scale  (Smith  and  Tradanico  1987:  92).  This 
entails  greater  analysis  of  the  origins,  functions  and  internal  working  of  formal  and 
informal  institutions  so  as  to  appreciate  their  potential  to  harness  resources-  financial, 
social  and  organisational-  and  to  improve  collectively  the  quality  of  urban  life  by  and  for 
the  majority. 
Much  of  the  DCs'  structures  encapsulating  civil  society  deliver  the  rather 
excessive  power  exercised  by  internal  and  external  competing  agents,  namely  nominally 
democratic  but  authoritarian  national  governments,  who  hold  power  through  a 
centralised  system,  and  a  subaltern  local  government  that  is  appointed  to  execute 
commands.  Civil  society  organisations  strive  to  project  their  interests,  yet  the  power  of 
`the  state'  is  all-encompassing  and  restricts  `democratic  space'.  Furthermore,  global  and 
multilateral  organisations  have  imposed  harsh  Economic  Reform  and  Structural 
Adjustment  Programmes  (ERSAPs)  on  DCs  on  the  one  hand,  while  loans  and  foreign  aid 
to  alleviate  the  citizen's  sufferings  are  offered  on  the  other.  As  a  consequence  a  vast 
proportion  of  society  is  suffused  with  harsh  economic  burdens  which  make  daily  life  a 
continuous  struggle.  This  asymmetry  in  power  relations  is  replicated  within  countries. 
The  institutional  systems  through  which  national  governments,  international 
Donor  Agencies  (DAs),  local  governments,  and  communities  `supposedly'  work 
collectively,  have  a  significant  bearing  on  the  success  and  sustainability  of  any  process. 
The  relationships  among  these  agents  change  and  the  strengths  of  such  partnerships 
fluctuate,  specially  when  their  interests  are  contradictory  in  the  `real  world',  while  the 
concrete  mechanisms  that  mediate  the  interplay  between  global  economy  and  local 
culture  have  not  yet  been  conceptualised.  Community  struggles  over  the  collective 
consumption  of  services,  when  combined  with  grassroots  demands  for  cultural  control 
over  urban  space  and  political  control  of  local  government  jurisdictions,  reshape  and 
redefine  both  urban  space  and  the  socio-political  character  of  urban  life  (Castells  1983). 
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Yet,  the  voices,  experiences  and  political  activities  of  men  and  women,  advantaged  and 
the  disadvantaged,  the  poorest  and  the  better-off  in  squatter  settlements,  are  all  still 
largely  unrepresented  in  urban  political  analysis  (Singerman  1997). 
Thus,  this  study  aims  to  assess  how  specific  low-income  communities  in  DCs 
perceive  their  needs  and  articulate  them  to  outside  bodies,  such  as  external  DAs,  NGOs, 
and  the  state,  through  formal  and  informal  channels.  It  examines  two  externally-funded 
urban  upgrading  projects,  in  which  residents  and  local  government  departments 
participated.  It  focuses  on  the  systems  through  which  national  governments,  DAs,  local 
governments  and  civil  society  can  work  collectively  to  establish  sound  and 
institutionalised  urban  upgrading  policies,  and  examines  whether  or  not  the  capacity 
acquired  is  sustainable  and  transferable  to  other  projects.  The  framework,  through  which 
the  major  actors  involved  in  this  study  operate,  shapes  the  new  landscape  of 
participatory  development  at  global/local,  and  within  the  country  at  the  micro  level. 
A  widespread  doctrine  believes  that  development  of  a  community  can  only  be 
fostered  through  the  improvement  of  individuals',  groups'  and  institutions'  problem- 
solving  knowledges  and  skills  (Castelles  1983;  Rakodi  1997).  Yet,  it  has  also  been 
argued  that  any  institutional  reform  must  be  guided  by  theory  and  understanding  as  to 
why  present  institutions  are  failing.  "Without  such  a  theory,  attention  tends  to  focus  on 
funding  programmes  that  treat  the  symptoms  of  failure  whilst  neglecting  their  underlying 
causes.  The  resulting  actions  are  almost  inevitably  overly  expensive,  fragmented, 
incomplete,  often  contradictory  and  ineffectual"  (Korten  1996:  36).  Meantime,  it  is 
equally  important  to  start  the  process  of  structural  reform  from  the  micro-level  of 
strengthening  the  local  government  system  and  community  awareness,  as  well  as  at  the 
macro  level  of  central  government  structures.  Therefore,  the  importance  of  issues  such 
as  empowerment,  collaboration,  participatory  planning  and  capacity-building  have  been 
appreciated  by  foundations  and  neighbourhood  organisations  alike.  A  localism/globalism 
approach  can  link  the  economic  issues,  at  local  level  (state/city)  and  global  level  (forces 
of  globalisation),  with  the  local  and  global  political  arena  and  brings  them  together  in 
sensitive  micro/macro  institutionalist  perspectives  of  urban  restructuring  and 
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governance.  This  can  establish  the  type  of  `good'  performance,  practices  and 
experiences  that  might  be  sustainable  and  replicable,  and  the  matrix  of  collaborative 
urban  governance  processes  that  should  be  institutionalised. 
1.1-  Field  of  research: 
Development  studies  are  currently  constituted  and  reproduced  in  the  literature 
within  a  set  of  material  relationships,  activities  and  ideologies-  political-economic  and 
socio-cultural-  and  dynamics  at  the  local,  as  well  as  at  national  and  global  levels.  Yet,  in 
order  to  explain  the  real  mechanisms  of  development  operating  outside  the  market,  it  is 
necessary  to  place  it  first  within  its  operational  institutional,  historical  and  geographical 
context.  Development  is  the  central  metaphor  and  the  paradigmatic  focal  point  which 
links  non-profit  making  DAs  and  civil  society  organisations  with  the  other  two  key 
agents  associated  throughout  research-  namely  national  and  local  government-  in  the 
context  of  sustainable  and  institutionalised  urban  upgrading  policies  and  community 
participation.  The  term  `civil  society'  is  employed  within  this  research  to  refer  to  these 
specific  components  of  civil  society  organisations.  When  a  particular  type  of  civil  society 
organisation  is  meant,  the  specific  term  which  defines  it  best  will  be  used.  Similarly,  the 
term  NGOs  is  used  as  a  shorthand  for  all  non-governmental,  non-profit  developmental 
organisations.  The  terms  international  NGOs  or  Northern  NGOs  refer  to  those  which 
have  their  headquarters  in  Developed  Countries,  such  as  Oxfam  or  Save  the  Children. 
`Intermediary  NGOs'  refers  to  Southern  or  local  NGOs,  which  support  grassroots  work 
through  funding,  technical  advice  and  advocacy.  The  term  GROs  refers  to  various  kinds 
of  `non-profit  membership  support  organisations'  which  are  run  and  controlled  by  their 
own  members.  This  includes  various  kinds  of  Community  Development  Associations 
(CDAs),  and  Member  Based  Organisations  (MBOs). 
The  eradication  of  poverty  through  `sustainable  development',  "development  that 
meets  the  needs  of  the  present  without  compromising  the  ability  of  future  generation  to 
meet  their  own  needs"  (WCED  1987),  has  been  identified  as  the  overriding  development 
goal  subscribed  by  all  multilateral  and  international  agencies,  such  as  the  United  Nations 
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and  the  World  Bank.  The  global  nature  of  the  situation  is  breaking  down  the  barriers  that 
in  the  past  separated  the  conceptual  interpretation  of  processes,  and  the  strategies  to 
cope  with  them,  between  developed  and  developing  countries.  On  the  contrary,  there  is 
now  new  understanding  of  the  similarities  and  differences  between  the  North  and  the 
South.  There  is  an  awareness  of  the  benefits  of  pooling  the  wide  range  of  resources  of 
these  societies  in  the  common  task  of  defeating  poverty  through  safety  nets  for  the  most 
vulnerable,  providing  opportunities  for  households  to  increase  their  assets,  and  the 
creation  of  a  policy  framework  as  well  as  legal  and  physical  context  favourable  to  the 
particular  activities  of  the  urban  poor  (Rakodi  1995). 
The  Habitat  programme  gave  special  attention  to  these  issues.  A  special 
programme,  the  `International  Forum  on  Urban  Poverty  (IFUP)'  has  been  set  up.  The 
IFUP  is  a  partnership  of  national  governments,  local  authorities,  civil  society 
organisations  including  NGOs,  experts,  academics,  bilateral  and  multilateral  agencies 
working  for  the  eradication  of  poverty  according  to  a  strategy  based  on  sound 
governance,  partnership  and  the  participation  of  people  living  in  poverty  (UNCHS 
1998).  The  central  principle  of  IFUP  recognises  that  interventions  on  the  eradication  of 
poverty  need  the  participation  of  the  people  living  in  poverty,  in  partnership  with  the 
agencies,  institutions,  social  movements  and  communities  active  in  this  field.  Thus  global 
institutions  enhance  the  possibility  of  global  DAs  and  NGOs  to  alter  the  conditions  of 
local  civil  society  by  altering  their  structures  with  their  own  governments,  while  at  a 
national  level,  many  DCs  are  taking  transitional  steps  towards  democratisation. 
A  great  many  DCs  are  currently  subject  to  another  global  process,  the  ERSAP, 
which  sought  to  integrate  national  economies  in  market  systems,  promote  private 
enterprise  and  encourage  international  trade  and  investment.  But  despite  its  application 
for  more  than  a  decade  now,  the  problem  with  structural  adjustment  policies  remains 
how  to  transform  planned  economies  into  market  ones,  while  the  global  market  itself  has 
been  unable  to  address  the  problems  of  increasing  exclusion  and  inequalities  (Rondinelli 
1993).  Poverty  is  still  dominant  and  the  globalisation  of  political-economic  activities 
have  weakened  the  central  role  of  the  state  in  driving  development,  so  that  it  is  seen  as  a 
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hindrance  to  development  more  than  it  is  a  help  by  its  own  citizens  and  DAs.  Such  a 
global  dilemma  has  resulted  in  a  strong  need  to  enhance  decentralisation  and  bottom-up 
planning,  as  well  as  a  requirement  for  strong,  open  and  accountable  local  government 
institutions  working  in  partnership  with  all  interested  parties.  Consequently,  there  is  an 
increasing  concern  from  both  national  governments  and  DAs  to  review  the  performance 
of  local  government  as  a  result  of  three  main  types  of  pressure,  which  act  at  different 
scales:  on  the  state,  to  be  accountable  for  the  aid  it  receives;  on  local  government,  to  be 
accountable  for  the  services  it  provides;  and  on  public  spending,  generally  at  a  time  of 
declining  resources.  In  addition  to  the  requirement  for  increased  accountability, 
pressures  on  public  spending  have  meant  a  sharp  decline  in  capital  spending  on  the  one 
hand,  and  in  research  into  how  to  achieve  greater  efficiency  in  current  services  on  the 
other. 
Accordingly,  there  has  been  a  global  paradigm  shift,  supported  by  all  financial 
and  donor  agencies,  to  promote  good  urban  governance  through  clusters  which  link 
operational  and  normative  activities,  focusing  on  urban  management,  urban  environment 
and  urban  safety.  It  is  understood  that  the  forces  of  globalisation  are  not  enough  to  alter 
the  development  landscape  over  the  next  several  years,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to 
integrate  human,  economic  and  technological  resources  in  any  efficient  way  without 
considering  the  forces  of  localisation  during  the  setting  up  of  collaborative  urban 
governance  processes  (World  Bank  1999).  Confused  governance  and  top-down  policies 
only  lead  to  severe  environmental  degradation,  increased  poverty,  low  economic  growth 
and  social  exclusion,  particularly  of  women  and  the  less  advantaged.  Thus,  Habitat's 
global  campaign  on  Urban  Governance  (UNCHS  1999)  supports  city  consensus-building 
processes  between  local  governments  and  civil  society  to  establish  priorities  for  social 
development  and  urban  finance  strategies.  It  also  actively  promotes  the  initiation  of 
international  legal  frameworks,  policy  reforms  and  enabling  legislation  which  are 
required  to  ensure  good  urban  governance.  Other  activities  include  support  to  partners 
for  the  systematic  collection,  analysis  and  dissemination  of  urban  indicators,  statistics, 
best  practices  and  good  policies  in  support  of  sustainable  urban  development.  However, 
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all  successful  experiences  reveal  that  improved  management  critically  depends  on  the. 
active  participation  of  public  and  private  partners  in  urban  affairs. 
In  this  context,  attention  has  shifted  from  housing  per  se  to  the  context  in  which 
it  is  produced  and  to  collaboration,  empowerment  and  community  participation,  so  as  to 
harness  resources  and  the  delivery  of  services  to  satisfy  basic  needs.  The  central  feature 
of  community  participation  is  the  duality  between  the  community  and  the  state,  which 
implies  that  the  former  cannot  function  satisfactorily  when  it  operates  as  an  integral  part 
of  the  state  structure;  it  should  operate  autonomously.  Participation  has  been  widely 
recognised  as  essential  to  ensure  that  proposals  are  appropriate  to  and  supported  by 
beneficiaries.  This  is  achieved  when  participation  empowers  the  community  to  define  the 
shape,  priorities  and  form  of  implementation  of  a  development  project.  Yet,  civil  society 
empowerment  requires  a  very  different  approach  to  the  passive  acceptance  of  a  ready- 
made  proposal.  The  most  common  assumption  made  about  urban  upgrading  projects  is 
that  participation  leads  to  sustainable  `empowerment',  such  that  beneficiaries'  are 
enabled  to  act  independently  and  to  receive  serious  consideration  by  the  state  after  a 
project's  completion.  Thus,  community  participation,  in  its  ultimate  form,  becomes  a 
struggle  to  give  rights  to  communities  and  to  enhance  the  power,  the  self-confidence  and 
the  self-respect  of  communities.  Awarding  a  key  role  to  civil  society  organisation  in  the 
democratisation  process  is  also  essential  to  the  success  of  empowerment.  Local  NGOs 
are  seen  as  an  integral  component  of  a  thriving  civil  society  and  an  essential 
counterweight  to  state  power,  opening-up  channels  of  communication  and  participation, 
providing  training  for  activists,  and  promoting  pluralism. 
A  great  many  DAs  and  NGOs  have,  indeed,  carried  out  a  large  number  of 
development  projects,  of  which  many  have  successfully  supported  self-reliance  at  the 
local  level,  integrating  `marginal'  populations  within  the  national  economy.  But  local 
development  should  lead  to  `sustainability'  when  official  foreign  funding  is  involved. 
Great  dependence  on  such  funding  may  compromise  the  performance  of  local 
governments  and  civil  society  organisation,  including  NGO  and  GRO,  in  key  areas, 
distort  their  accountability  and  weaken  legitimacy.  Though  pragmatic,  such  a 
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compromise  requires  additional  resources.  While  it  is  argued  that  such  a  compromise, 
will  not  be  sustainable  if  used  as  a  mechanism  to  `take  over'  and  reduce  local  groups  to 
clients  defined  in  political  terms,  there  are  few  analyses  that  explain  the  process  of 
empowerment,  and  whether  the  capacity  acquired  by  local  government  and  civil  society 
is  transferable  to  other  local  institutions,  which  is  the  focus  of  this  research. 
1.2-  Stance  of  research: 
The  research  focuses  on  sustainability  of  urban  upgrading  of  low-income  housing 
at  the  local  level,  both  in  the  context  of  collaborative  participation  for  community 
development  and  of  accountability  of  local  government.  It  starts  with  the  premise  that 
the  upgrading  of  `informal'  and  squatter  settlements  does  not  simply  mean  the  physical 
improvement  of  the  area  and  its  surrounding  environment.  Sustainability  is  a  process 
with  specific  institutions  and  incentives  that  ensure  the  continuation  of  valued  benefit 
outcomes  and  the  availability  of  services  to  the  citizens.  It  is  also  a  process  which 
provides  services  that  people  want  and  need  (Mayfield  1996:  232).  Hence,  it  requires 
awareness  from  both  the  community  and  the  local  government  as  to  how  the  capital  to 
provide,  operate  and  maintain  services  might  be  obtained.  At  community  level, 
sustainable  and  successful  upgrading  must  entail  the  `awareness'  of  beneficiaries,  raise 
their  socio-economic  status  and  intensify  community  self-reliance  by  means  of  effective 
participation,  empowerment  and  job  creation. 
Hence  one  of  the  basic  objectives  for  sustainable  urban  upgrading  is  the 
participation  of  target  groups  within  all  processes  of  planning,  implementation  and 
evaluation  of  improvements.  Only  then  will  they  identify  with  the  project  and  be  able  to 
build  on  this  experience.  Thus,  it  is  essential  for  institutions,  government  or  private,  to 
understand  how  to  assist  communities  to  articulate  their  needs  and  priorities  in  order  to 
achieve  such  a  goal.  Self-help  activities  contribute  to  the  development  of  collective 
consciousness,  which  is  the  basis  for  a  community-action  long-term  programme.  Without 
community  involvement,  maintenance  of  the  services  and  social  infrastructure  gained 
cannot  be  guaranteed.  In  addition,  the  payment  capacity  and  the  propensity  of  the  target 
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groups  to  participate  are  the  preconditions  for  generating  investment  to  embark  on  and 
sustain  urban  upgrading  projects. 
Development  of  community  awareness  of  opportunities  and  collective  action  are 
seen  as  a  crucial  starting  point  for  any  examination  of  sustainability  in  urban 
development  policies  and  will  be  adopted  as  the  means  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of 
urban  upgrading  strategies.  But  it  cannot  be  a  one  sided  process;  the  research  is  designed 
to  examine  the  change  in  awareness  of  the  main  beneficiaries-  community,  including  its 
civil  society  organisations  (as  target  actors),  and  local  government  (as  enabling  actors). 
Even  so  such  a  model  must  also  consider  the  structures  and  factors  acting  at  global, 
national  and  local  scales,  as  they  affect  these  diverse  groups  (Figure  1.1).  Identification 
of  those  factors  which  make  a  community  level  beneficiary  a  more  successful  participant 
are  obviously  of  paramount  interest.  While  clearly  the  more  education  and  capital  the 
beneficiaries  have,  the  more  able  they  are  to  meet  goals  through  greater  awareness  of 
their  structures-  which  is  easier  to  ascertain-  the  focus  is  on  how  empowering  attitudes 
are  fostered  by  the  context,  the  family,  expectations  from  the  project  and  what  is  seen  as 
their  `community'  and  its  influence  and  contribution  to  improving  living  conditions.  The 
research  attempts  to  identify  the  causal  factors  which  may  either  enhance  the  individuals' 
awareness  of  opportunities,  or  cloud  and  suppress  them.  Factors  such  as  intrinsic  social 
attributes  and/or  acquired  personal  characteristics  and  experiences  lead  to  particular 
mind-sets  or  specific  understandings  of  the  scope  for  action.  These  mind  sets  might 
embody  issues  which  are  embedded  in  culture,  ideology,  customs  and  aspirations. 
Consequently,  the  research  examines  the  options  open  to  squatters  and  the  extent 
to  which  they  can  be  pro-active  and  co-operative  with  an  urban  upgrading  project. 
Possible  actions  are  examined  within  two  frameworks:  their  relationship  to  an  upgrading 
project  and  people's  self-initiatives.  It  is  argued  that  sustainability  is  only  achieved  when 
individuals'  actions  are  pro-active  and  reciprocal;  if  they  are  indifferent  and  do  not 
participate  during  a  project's  duration,  sustainability  is  jeopardised.  The  research 
attempts  to  test  different  configurations  and  impacts  of  causal  factors.  The  sustainability 
of  citizens'  actions  is  viewed  as  a  political  rather  than  a  mere  administrative  process, 
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which  requires  transformation  from  individual  to  group  awareness  of  the  scope  for 
action  within  a  particular  context.  Sustainability  is  also  reflected  in  terms  of  the 
relationship  constructed  between  the  community  and  the  local  government  and  the 
degree  of  the  community's  self-administration  and  its  ability  to  form  collective  actions. 
One  of  the  most  important  issues  pertaining  to  sustainability  at  local  government 
level  is  the  need  to  develop  mechanisms  for  replicating  successful  local  area-based 
projects  elsewhere.  Sustainability  of  vigorous  urban  policies  forces  local  government  to 
appreciate  their  role.  Since  urban  policies  do  not  operate  in  a  vacuum  and  cannot  be 
reformed  in  a  vacuum,  it  is  necessary  to  assess  the  capacity  of  the  municipal  bureaucracy 
to  play  a  dynamic  role  in  meeting  the  economic  challenges  confronting  DCs  now.  It  is 
argued  that  sustainability  of  collaborative  planning  and  good  governance  cannot  be 
granted  without  decentralisation  and  strategic  municipal  capacity-building  programmes 
for  participation.  Planning  is  a  service  with  an  impact  far  greater  than  its  expenditure 
might  suggest.  The  total  planning  process  is  fundamental  to  the  overall  vision  of  the 
local  authority  and  the  council's  strategy  for  the  future.  Nonetheless,  planning  is 
embedded  in  structures  and  needs  to  negotiate  its  role  and  build  collaboration  within  the 
state.  This  is  crucial  to  its  effective  performance  and  sustainability.  The  quest  for 
improvement  in  public  sector  performance  has  been  a  long  one-  embedded  in  wider 
social,  political  and  cultural  contexts  into  value  systems  attuned  to  status,  communal 
obligations  and  other  personal  and  business  relationships.  However,  improvement  and 
progress  in  any  organisational  environment  require  that  these  problems  and  constraints 
be  identified,  analysed,  and  reflected  on  in  terms  of  what  can  and  should  be  changed. 
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Figure  1.1:  Actors  involved  in  the  urban  upgrading  and  the  institutionalisation  processes 
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1.3-  Aims  and  objectives  of  research: 
The  specific  aim  of  this  research  is  to  examine  the  mechanisms  by  which  the 
processes  of  urban  upgrading  and  community  participation  can  be  institutionalised.  The 
general  aims  are  to  analyse  the  community's  evaluation  of  their  participation  and  the 
forms  it  took,  and  the  views  of  the  local  government  officials  after  the  project's 
completion.  These  perceptions  will  be  assessed  with  respect  to  the  form  and  degree  of 
participation  across  a  range  of  circumstances,  such  as  in  specific  upgrading  projects, 
`formal'  political  processes,  and  `informal'  collaborative  and  neighbourhood  problem- 
solving  activities.  The  research  investigates  whether  the  upgrading  experience  has 
inculcated  attitudes  and  skills,  i.  e.  knowledge,  behaviour  and  capacity,  in  the  direct 
(households)  and  indirect  (municipal)  beneficiaries  that  is  transferable  to  other  arenas.  A 
concomitant  analysis  will  focus  on  the  perceptions  and  actions  of  local  government 
concerned  with  the  form  of  urban  upgrading  and  its  sustainability.  The  specific  objectives 
of  the  research  are: 
1.  To  review  the  existing  literature  on  development,  empowered  civil  society,  and  the 
theoretical  structures  of  urban  governance  so  as  to  conceptualise  a  pertinent 
framework  that  can  investigate  local  government  accountability,  citizen  political 
participation  and  the  level  of  consensus  capacity-building  needed  for  a  collaborative 
model  of  urban  governance  in  DCs. 
2.  To  analyse  the  political  and  urban  post-ERSAP  challenges  that  DCs  are  presently 
facing,  as  exemplified  by  Egypt,  with  particular  reference  to  the  ways  in  which  they 
impact  upon  local  government  and  participatory  initiatives. 
3.  To  examine  how  DA  support  confronts  such  challenges,  as  explored  through  two 
DA-funded  upgrading  projects,  and  the  extent  to  which  these  projects  have  achieved 
their  objectives. 
4.  To  assess  community  perceptions  of  participation  in  specific  upgrading  projects,  and 
to  attempt  to  identify  the  causal  factors  and  attitudes  which  may  enhance/suppress 
how  individuals  participate. 
5.  To  evaluate  the  reality  of  post-project  community  empowerment.  This  is  assessed 
through  examining  the  transformative  potential  of  participation,  i.  e.  the  translation  of 
participatory  practices  during  the  project  into  potential  political  participation,  as  well 
as  communal  and  familial  `informal'  networks  of  collaborative  actions  to  facilitate 
access,  or  provide  alternatives,  to  the  formal  resources  of  the  state. 
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6.  To  evaluate  the  sustainability  of  the  capacity  acquired  by  government  departments 
through  participation  in  such  upgrading  projects.  The  analysis  focuses  on  the 
accountability,  perceptions  and  action  of  local  government  concerned  with  urban 
upgrading. 
7.  To  evaluate  whether  the  capacities  acquired  by  government  departments  have  been 
institutionalised,  and  are  sustainable  and  transferable  to  other  projects  at  local  and 
national  levels. 
This  research  provides  evidence  to  test  whether  the  presumptions  about  the  effective  role 
of  civil  society  organisations  in  sustaining  development,  enhancing  democratisation  and 
protecting  citizens'  rights  are  legitimate.  Although  the  scenario  will  be  limited  to  two 
intermediate-sized  cities  in  Egypt,  it  is  hoped  that  the  research  will  shed  light  as  to  the 
processes  which  achieve  positive  results  that  may  be  replicated  elsewhere. 
1.4-  The  setting  of  the  research: 
The  research  takes  a  broad  perspective  on  the  development  of  local  participation 
as  exemplified  by  the  detailed  case  studies  of  two  projects,  in  which  the  participatory 
upgrading  experience  or  municipal  capacity-building  has  been  relatively  extensive.  The 
practices  of  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP)  in  conjunction  with  the 
Department  for  International  Development  (DFID)  (previously  the  British  Overseas 
Development  Association,  ODA),  and  the  German  Agency  for  Technical  Co-operation 
(GTZ),  to  promote  pilot  urban  upgrading  schemes  with  their  respective  municipal 
counterparts  in  the  Egyptian  cities  of  Ismailia  and  Aswan  are  reviewed  and  compared. 
Their  respective  provincial  programme  initiation  and  management  systems  provide 
comparative  insights  into  the  potential  benefits  and  pitfalls  of  different  project  conception 
and  legislative  approaches,  particularly  in  light  of  the  diversity  of  techniques  that  DAs 
and  local  government  have  tried  in  both  projects  over  the  years. 
The  Ismailia  case  study  focuses  on  the  Hai  El-Salam  project  (1977-date)  which 
was  embedded  in  the  Ismailia  Physical  Master  Plan  (1976).  Although  the  major  physical 
activities  were  completed  10  years  ago,  the  land  sale  programme  and  maintenance 
activities  are  still  on-going  processes  operated  by  a  specially  established  Project 
Management  Unit  (PMU  Ismailia).  The  project  focused  on  the  `provision'  and 
improvement  of  housing  and  services  and  was  actually  a  mix  between  sites  and  services 
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and  upgrading  projects  on  land  identified  in  the  course  of  the  earlier  Ismailia  planning 
studies.  The  project's  main  aim  was  to  enable  householders  and  land  developers  to 
participate  in  the  development  process  and  consequently,  develop  improved  versions  of 
informal  sector  land  development  practices  as  a  model  for  development  elsewhere.  In  the 
other  example,  Aswan  focuses  on  the  case  of  the  Nasriya  upgrading  project  which 
involved  local  people  in  a  government-NGO  led  initiative.  The  Nasriya  project  was  also 
embedded  in  the  Aswan  Master  Plan  (1986-2017);  it  was  originally  scheduled  to  last  3 
years  from  1987  to  1990  but  was  subsequently  extended  until  the  end  of  1998.  One  of 
the  project's  key  objectives  has  been  the  development  of  community  capacity  to  take 
over  some  functions  that  have  previously  been  assumed  to  be  the  responsibility  of 
government.  It  was  also  managed  through  a  special  PMU,  which  enjoyed  a  fair  degree  of 
autonomy. 
Although  there  is  a  degree  of  similarity  in  the  access  to  resources  in  both 
projects,  policies  of  intervention  vary  with  location,  population,  nature  of  each  enabler, 
and  the  degree  of  political  support.  The  difference  of  a  decade  in  time  between  the 
instigation  of  each  project  witnessed  changes  in  socio-economic  status  and  attitude,  the 
DAs'  policies  and  agendas,  and  the  government's  treatment  of  `informal'  housing.  The 
Government  action  has  usually  been  triggered  by  specific  events,  which  gave  them  a 
matter  of  urgency.  Ismailia  was  growing  fast  because  it  was  part  of  a  national 
programme  to  rehabilitate  the  Suez  Canal  cities  after  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  of  1967- 
73.  Citizens  started  to  come  back  from  nearby  cities  after  seven  years  of  evacuation. 
Such  rapid  resettlement  and  urbanisation,  along  with  the  devastation  of  the  war, 
prevented  the  government  from  supplying  either  quick  and  efficient  legal  plans  or 
sufficient  `formal'  housing  units.  The  outcome  was  the  formation  of  `informal'  housing 
areas,  most  of  which  were  on  government-owned  land.  Aswan,  located  in  the  south  of 
Upper  Egypt,  also  faced  a  sudden  rapid  influx  of  population  in  the  1960s  in  unusual 
circumstances.  The  socialist  government  policies  (1952-1970)  targeted  issues  of  national 
economic  and  social  development  and  initiated  large-scale  infrastructure  and  industrial 
schemes.  The  construction  of  the  High  Dam  and  a  fertiliser  plant  in  Aswan  were 
examples  of  the  effort  to  increase  social  benefits,  expand  goods  and  services  and  increase 
regional  equality  in  income  distribution.  Such  schemes  resulted  in  rapid  rural-urban 
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migration,  while  housing  estate  projects  failed  to  offer  adequate  provision  in  quantitative, 
or  qualitative  terms.  The  occupation  of  government  land  in  Nasriya,  and  many  other 
areas  in  Aswan,  was  thus  the  only  option  for  many  migrants. 
These  two  cases  are  selected  because  of  their  reputation  as  `successful'  projects, 
thereby  providing  an  opportunity  to  examine  the  processes  in  what  are  reputed  to  be  the 
best-run  schemes,  not  only  in  Egypt  but  also  among  other  DCs'  experiences;  both 
projects  were  selected  as  examples  of  `good  practice'  at  Habitat  1996.  They  have  tried  to 
accomplish  vigorous  urban  upgrading  policies  and  mobilise  the  beneficiaries  to 
participate  efficiently.  The  fundamental  question  about  projects  such  as  Nasriya  and  Hai 
El-Salam,  which  received  substantial  external  support  and  were  limited  when  compared 
with  the  overall  scale  of  the  `informal'  housing  problems,  is  the  extent  to  which  they  can 
be  replicated  within  mainstream  government  structures.  Hence,  the  research  endeavours 
to  explore  the  processes  of  such  collective  initiatives,  the  participatory  actions  to 
strengthen  the  capacity  of  local  governments  concerned  and  their  degree  of  success.  The 
research  also  examines  how  directly  and  indirectly  both  projects  have  influenced 
government  attitudes,  policies  and  structures  as  whole.  This  examination  can  provide 
theoretical  and  practical  guidelines  for  optimal  intervention  in  the  future,  supplying 
impartial  assessment  on  the  utility  of  foreign  aid.  It  also  defines  the  scope  of  DAs' 
influence  on  governments  to  enhance  urban  capacity  and  favour  policies  to  combat 
discrimination  against  the  poor  by  means  of  sustainable  urban  development.  The  ability 
of  local  governments  to  sustain  such  programmes  while  external  inputs  are  declining  by 
the  end  of  the  projects'  duration  is  also  evaluated. 
However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  success  and  sustainability  of  Ismailia  and 
Aswan  projects  have  varied  widely  due  to  internal  and  external  institutional  barriers 
(Chapters  6-10).  Although  participatory  experiences  had  not  been  well-conceptualised  in 
the  1970s  when  the  Hai  El-Salam  project  was  initiated,  the  project's  success  was  to 
insert  informal  sector  housing  practice  into  an  official  project.  While  the  project 
succeeded  in  physical  structural  terms  and  in  introducing  municipal  capacity-building 
initiatives  with  multiplier  effects,  including  establishing  quasi-independent  urban 
institutions,  its  approach  to  participation*  was  limited  to  consultation.  Accordingly,  this 
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research  will  deal  with  both  case  studies  in  an  unsymmetrical  way.  The  aim  is  not  to 
determine  which  scheme  has  been  more  successful,  but  rather  to  evaluate  variations  in 
the  role  of  internal  and  external  institutions  as  enablers  in  the  housing  process.  There  are 
many  forms  of  conditionality,  and  the  aim  is  to  examine  the  circumstances  under  which 
they  have  been,  or  are  likely  to  be,  successful  and  sustainable. 
1.5-  Role  of  the  researcher: 
The  researcher  has  played  a  multiple  role  in  the  field  which  made  him  aware  of 
the  impact  of  the  beneficiaries'  own  perceptions  and  stand  points  towards  the  projects  as 
well  as  of  those  towards  themselves  as  participants.  Numerous  levels  of  representation 
occurred  from  the  moment  of  `primary  experience'  until  the  completion  of  this  research, 
including  the  level  of  participants'  experience  during  a  project,  telling  it  to  the  researcher, 
transcribing  and  analysing  what  was  told,  which  have  all  played  a  significant  role  in 
shaping  the  content  and  context  of  this  research.  Issues  of  `inside'  and  `outside'  a 
researcher's  positionality  have  been  particularly  important  owing  to  the  range  of  formal 
positions  held  by  the  researcher.  The  researcher  worked  as  an  architect  and  urban 
planner  for  the  German  GTZ's  Nasriya  upgrading  project  for  four  years  (1989-1992); 
this  introduced  him  to  the  residents  as  a  professional,  one  associated  with  a  beneficent 
development  project,  and  narrowed  the  social  distance  between  him  and  the  community 
through  their  daily  contact.  This  was  particularly  useful  during  the  fieldwork  survey  in 
Nasriya,  where  an  overwhelming  majority  of  interviewees  showed  interest  and  trust, 
easily  understood  the  questions  and  did  not  try  to  mislead  the  researcher  in  their 
responses  intentionally. 
In  1992,  the  researcher  was  employed  by  the  government  to  work  as  the  Co- 
ordinator  of  the  Urban  Development  and  Land  Management  Unit  of  Aswan  Governorate 
(1992-1994).  He  was  repeatedly  in  the  company  of  the  Governor  which  gave  him 
invaluable  chances  for  `informal'  discussions  with  key-actors,  participation  observation 
and  relatively  easier  access  to  official  data.  Advantageously,  local  government  officials 
viewed  the  researcher  as  a  colleague,  which  generated  a  positive  impact  on  their 
perception  and  degree  of  co-operation  during  the  interviews.  Of  course,  being  a  member 
in  the  primary  group  of  Nasriya  and  Aswan  local  government  contributed  to  knowledge 
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about  the  phenomenon  under  study  and  as  to  the  type  of  questions  to  be  asked 
(Appendix  1  and  2).  The  case  of  Ismailia  was  different,  as  the  author  had  no  previous 
connection  with  the  local  residents  or  the  local  government.  Fortunately,  a  web  of 
previous  relational  resources,  developed  through  various  stakeholders  involved, 
introduced  the  researcher  to  the  directorship  of  the  UNDP-funded  Sustainable  Ismailia 
Project  (1993-date),  who  was  also  the  former  Director  of  the  Hai  El-Salam  project. 
Although  this  helped  a  great  deal  to  introduce  the  researcher  to  the  project  area,  to  meet 
with  senior  government  officials  working  in  Ismailia  and  to  obtain  secondary  data,  many 
households  in  Hai  El-Salam  were  suspicious  of  the  real  purpose  of  the  interview  during 
the  pilot  survey  in  1996.  Although  the  project  has  been  in  operation  for  more  than  two 
decades,  some  households  have  not  acquired  land-titles,  while  others  have  extended  their 
house  without  a  building  permit;  it  was  thought  that  if  information  was  passed  to  the 
municipality,  they  would  be  in  trouble.  This  problem  was  only  overcome  after  a  local 
urban  planner,  who  used  to  work  for  the  project  and  was,  therefore,  familiar  to  the  local 
population,  he  accompanied  the  researcher  voluntarily  and  introduced  him  to  the 
community  leaders  in  the  area  during  the  main  fieldwork  survey. 
However,  because  of  the  unfamiliarity  of  the  researcher  with  the  details  of  the 
project,  it  was  impossible  to  treat  some  secondary  and  primary  data  as  straightforward 
`pictures'  of  an  objective  reality.  It  was  necessary  to  understand  how  `reality'  is  being 
represented  in  words  by  different  people.  In  addition  to  reconnaissance  of  several  areas 
in  Hai  El-Salam  and  Nasriya,  taking  photos  and  producing  a  video  tape,  large  numbers  of 
additional  interviews  took  place  with  local  and  external  consultants,  who  had  either 
worked  for  the  projects  or  were  knowledgeable  about  their  development  and  pitfalls 
(Appendix  3).  These  investigated  the  realities  of  the  subject  and  broke  down  any 
erroneous  preconceptions.  Finally,  the  fact  that  the  author  has  studied  multiple 
disciplines-  namely  architecture  (BSc.  ),  regional  and  urban  planning  (Pre-MSc.  )  and 
human  geography  (MSc.  ),  has  also  helped  a  great  deal  to  overcome  boundaries  which 
sometimes  segregate  the  appreciation  of  the  social,  political  and  economic  dimensions 
evident  in  studies  of  squatter  settlements,  local  governance  practices  and  urban 
geography  theories. 
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The  research  starts  with  reviewing  the  existing  literature  on  development  and, 
civil  society.  After  analysing  influential  concepts,  e.  g.  globalisation  and  postmodernism, 
community  development  paradigms  and  approaches  are  reviewed  and  the  discourse  of 
participation  is  discussed.  Chapter  3  reviews  the  theoretical  structures  of  urban 
governance  and  local  government  so  as  to  conceptualise  a  framework  that  can 
investigate  local  government  accountability,  citizen  political  participation  and  the  level  of 
municipal  capacity-building  needed  in  DCs.  The  methodology  chapter  reviews  different 
epistemologies  and  methodologies  associated  with  the  issues  addressed  in  this  research, 
and  selects  the  best-fitted  formula.  It  also  discusses  the  constraints  encountered  during 
the  fieldwork.  Chapter  5  analyses  the  political  and  urban  post-ERSAP  challenges  that 
DCs  are  presently  facing,  as  exemplified  by  Egypt,  with  particular  reference  to  the  ways 
in  which  they  impact  upon  local  government  performance  and  participatory  initiatives. 
The  subsequent  Chapters,  6  and  7,  examine  how  DA  support  confronts  Egypt 
urban  challenges,  as  explored  through  two  Hai  El-Salam  and  Nasriya  upgrading  projects, 
and  the  extent  to  which  these  projects  have  achieved  their  objectives.  Chapter  8  assesses 
community  perceptions  of  participation  in  the  Nasriya  project,  and  attempts  to  identify 
the  causal  factors  and  attitudes  which  may  enhance/suppress  how  individuals  participate. 
Chapter  9  evaluates  the  reality  of  post-project  community  empowerment,  also  using  the 
Nasriya  example.  This  is  assessed  through  examining  the  transformative  potential  of 
participation,  i.  e.  the  translation  of  participatory  practices  during  the  project  into 
potential  political  participation,  as  well  as  communal  and  familial  `informal'  networks  of 
collaborative  actions  to  facilitate  access,  or  provide  alternatives,  to  the  formal  resources 
of  the  state.  Chapter  10  analyses  the  accountability,  perceptions  and  action  of  local 
government  concerned  with  urban  upgrading.  It  evaluates  whether  the  capacities 
acquired  by  government  departments  have  been  institutionalised,  and  are  sustainable  and 
transferable  to  other  projects  at  local  and  national  levels.  Finally,  the  concluding  chapter 
provides  a  thematic  and  conceptual  overview  of  the  central  issues  of  participatory 
upgrading,  and  offers  policy  implications  in  terms  of  institutionalising  the  processes  of 
urban  upgrading  and  community  participation  in  Egypt. 
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Urban  development  and  shelter  policies  have  witnessed  radical  changes  in  practice 
and  theory  during  the  past  two  decades  in  the  DCs.  On  the  one  hand,  the  globalisation  of 
political-economic  activities  has  weakened  the  central  role  of  the  state  in  driving 
development,  while  the  reluctant  receding  of  its  control,  in  the  face  of  the  global  and  new 
market  economies,  has  influenced  the  evolution  of  urban  development  and  governance 
processes  disproportionately  (Burgess  et  al.  1997).  On  the  other  hand,  the  general 
retrograde  outcomes  of  development  in  the  economic,  socio-cultural  and  environmental 
arenas  are  ascendant.  The  gap  between  rich  and  poor  countries  and  strata  has  widened, 
while  the  global  market  seems  unable  to  address  the  problems  of  increasing  poverty, 
exclusion  and  inequalities.  The  impact  at  the  regional  level  can  be  seen  in  uncontrolled 
urbanisation,  while  top-down  central  planning  has  failed  to  solve  the  problems  of  the 
housing  deficit  for  the  urban  poor.  Rapid  rates  of  physical  and  demographic  growth  have 
resulted  in  drastic  local  transformations,  urban  and  environmental,  leading  to  global  and 
local  `environmental  crises'  (Burgess  et  al.  1997).  This  raised  an  exigency  for  a  vigorous 
civil  society  to  carry  out  long-term  plans  and  to  legitimise  the  priorities,  rights  and  needs 
of  poor  citizens,  especially  the  marginalised  urban  proletariat. 
While  it  has  not  yet  been  clear  to  national  governments  whether  to  regulate  or 
liberalise,  to  support  or  resist,  private  sector  flows  of  investment  to  and  within  DCs  have 
tripled  and  seemed  more  efficient  in  delivering  traditional  state  functions  (Curtis  1997:  4). 
Although  these  financial  flows  are  now  four  times  as  large  as  aid  flows,  it  seems  unlikely 
that  the  market  can  replace  development  co-operation  completely.  In  such  a  climate, 
institutional  changes  are  needed  to  build  urban  municipal  capacity  and  enhance  civil 
society  empowerment.  This  has  raised  a  new  DAs'  policy  agenda  (Robinson  1993)  and  an 
urge  for  multi-lateral  institutions  to  review  their  rules  for  guaranteeing  the  welfare  of 
citizens  and  the  fundamental  rights  of  present  and  future  generations.  This  chapter  aims 
to  discuss  the  changing  development  discourse  and  its  paradigmatic  and  hermeneutic 
terms.  A  number  of  concepts,  such  as  globalisation  and  post-modernism,  assist  us  to  make 
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sense  of  the  failures  to  make  an  impact  on  urban  poverty.  The  discussion  will  then  focus 
on  community  development,  community  participation  and  civil  society  organisations, 
which  form  the  core  of  this  thesis. 
2.1-  Development  discourse: 
The  contemporary  development  critique  is  characterised  by  `confusion',  as  both 
the  meaning  and  the  purpose  of  development  look  rather  `marshy'  and  more  often 
`practically  chaotic'  (Crush  1995:  2).  Development  can  best  be  analysed  and  discussed  as 
a  discourse  of  power.  The  post-structuralism  framework  has  recently  conceptualised 
development  as  an  interwoven  system  of  `practices'  and  `languages'  which  comprises  an 
applicable  regime  of  disciplinary  `power'  and  `knowledge'.  Such  a  system  possesses  its 
own  logic,  effects,  internal  coherence,  and  external  communications  and  interactions. 
Titled  `Finishing  with  the  Idea  of  Third  World:  The  Concept  of  the  Political  Trajectory', 
Jean-Francois  Bayart  (1991)  emphasises  that  the  political  practices  of  development  must 
be  understood  as  a  moment  in  a  complex  and  very  long-term  story  through  which  each 
country  had  to  pass  to  produce  a  specific  mix  of  permissive  conditions.  The  variety  of 
cultural  characteristics  permits  the  formation  of  the  necessary  consensus  within  each  state 
apparatus,  which  in  turn  elaborates  the  development  strategies  to  be  adopted. 
Meanwhile,  development  discourse  is  "particularly  attuned  to  the  language  of 
development  itself,  pushing  towards  an  analysis  focused  on  the  texts  of  development 
without  abandoning  the  power-laden  local  and  international  context  out  of  which  they 
arise  and  to  which  they  speak"  (Crush  1995).  There  have  been  several  attempts  to  define 
and  categorise  development,  and  bring  order  to  a  heterogeneous  and  constantly 
multiplying  field  of  meaning  and  processing.  For  instance,  development  is  defined  in  its 
ideal  configuration  as  a  process  of  becoming,  and  a  potential  state  of  being:  "The 
achievement  of  a  state  of  development  would  enable  people  in  societies  to  make  their  own 
histories  and  geographies  under  conditions  of  their  own  choosing.  The  process  of 
development  is  the  means  by  which  such  conditions  of  human  existence  might  be 
achieved"  (Johnston  et  al.  1994:  128).  Development  is  thus  seen  as  a  product  of 
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conscious  non-exploitative  human  labour  operating  in  specific  sets  of  social,  material  and 
natural  crisis-free  conditions  and  as  a  liberating  process. 
Development  is  not  only  restricted  to  its  economic  dimensions  of  welfare  and 
growth,  but  extends  to  an  amalgam  of  modelled  processes  related  to  social  relations, 
existence  and  people's  creative  political  struggle  (Slater  1990).  Although  development 
can  be  explained  through  a  historical  and  geographical  process,  which  possesses  its  own 
variants  and  characteristics,  it  cannot  be  defined  in  universal  terms.  It  is  rather  "a 
contradictory,  often  perverse,  course  of  change"  (Johnston  et  al.  1994:  130).  It  has  also 
been  argued  that  development  is  currently  the  most  `elusive'  concept  which  ought  to  be 
banned  until  we  arrive  at  an  unequivocal  definition  (Sachs  1992:  4).  According  to  the 
standards  of  `ideal'  development,  it  can  be  argued  that  "no  society  in  history  has  ever 
achieved  a  state  of  development,  and  it  may  be  argued  that  no  society  has  ever  engaged  in 
a  process  of  development"  (Johnston  et  al.  1994:  128).  However,  while  there  are  several 
pieces  of  research  concerned  with  what  exactly  should  be  banished,  others  attempt  to 
model  `real  world'  processes  of  development  and  their  recurrent  internal  crises  and 
impasses  (Kay  1993;  Leys  1996).  Henceforth,  the  necessity  to  stabilise  the  concept  of 
development  and  bring  order  out  of  ambiguity  has  been  demanded  repeatedly. 
The  contemporary  discourse  of  development  is  global  in  its  reach,  encompassing 
apparatuses  and  bureaucracies  in  colonial,  post-colonial  and  independent  states.  This  is 
revealed  throughout  the  action-processes  and  the  specific  language  used  by  governments, 
multilateral  organisations,  Western  aid  agencies,  the  sprawling  global  network  of  NGOs,  - 
experts  and  private  consultants,  private  sector  organisations  and  the  plethora  of 
development  studies  programmes  worldwide.  Development  is  thus  "fundamentally  about 
mapping  and  making,  about  the  spatial  reach  of  power  and  the  control  and  management 
of  `other'  peoples,  territories,  environments,  and  places"  (Crush  1995).  Development  was 
principally  viewed  as  a  technical  problem,  until  the  1960s  and  1970s,  to  be  stimulated 
through  a  combination  of  knowledge,  skill  and  finance.  When  the  term  `development'  was 
first  empolyed  by  Keynes  in  the  1950s,  it  was  basically  applied  to  the  economies  of 
African  colonies  of  European  powers  in  the  run  up  to  decolonisation,  while  the  two  major 
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elements  in  US  thinking,  finance  and  trade,  were  seen  as  the  means  to  create  a  world 
economic  order  tailored  to  its  own  desires  through  loans,  credits  and  investments 
everywhere  (Kolko  1988).  Thus,  it  can  be  argued  that  `development  theory'  was 
originally  devoted  to  colonial,  and  then  ex-colonial,  states  to  accelerate  national  stability 
during  a  new  epoch  of  international  restructuring.  The  goal  of  development  was  economic 
growth,  the  agent  of  development  was  the  state  and  the  means  was  a  set  of 
macroeconomic  policy  instruments.  These  were  taken-for-granted  presuppositions  of 
development  theory  as  it  evolved  from  the  1950  onwards  (Leys  1996). 
Development  theory  was  also  devised  to  justify  the  means  by  which  national 
governments  could  manage  their  economies  so  as  to  maximise  growth  and  employment, 
as  was  crystallised  in  the  post-war  international  Bretton  Woods  agreement  in  1944,  and 
the  subsequent  establishment  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  the  World 
Bank  (Preston  1996:  157).  Development  agencies  used  development  theory  to  provide 
grounds  for  immediate  action  which  could  maximise  their  profits  within  a  new  process  of 
neo-colonisation.  In  contrast,  academic  theorists  sought  to  introduce  theory  which  could 
embrace  the  people  of  the  ex-colonies.  The  ahistorical  and  political  values  of  development 
theory  were  challenged  by  strong  criticism  from  the  `left'  in  the  1970s.  There  was  a 
struggle  between  those  who  tried  to  keep  it  within  its  original  parameters,  and  critics  who 
attempted  to  extend  the  debate  and  place  all  issues  back  into  the  framework  of  the 
historically  oriented  and  ethical  tradition  of  general  development  theory  as  formulated  by 
Hegel  and  Marx. 
The  political  arrangement  of  development,  articulated  in  the  Communist 
Manifesto,  proposed  to  replace  the  marketplace  and  the  processes  of  production  driven  by 
capitalistic  competition  with  a  governance  system  which  was  run  by  the  people.  Initially, 
Marx  (1957)  argued  that  in  order  to  break  the  power  of  capitalists  over  governance,  the 
forces  representing  labour  should  engage  in  `class  struggle'  so  as  to  take  control  of  the 
state.  Ultimately,  the  state,  too,  should  wither  away,  leaving  economic  activity  and 
governance  to  be  managed  by  local  communities.  Thus,  while  orthodox  Marxists  view  the 
process  of  development  in  `capitalist'  civil  society  as  an  unequal  terrain  of  oppression 
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structured  by  class  and  state  power,  classical  liberals  view  it  as  the  sphere  of  liberty  and 
autonomy  (Preston  1996).  In  practice,  wherever  there  were  Communist  or  socialist 
regimes  inspired  by  similar  ideas  of  class  struggle,  they  tended  to  reinforce  the  state,  and 
the  original  Marxist  idea  of  withering  away  was  forgotten. 
Development  is  also  depicted  differently  by  the  various  ideologies  in  contemporary 
economic  discourse.  Until  the  1980s,  the  World  Bank  used  to  describe  the  development 
problem  as  "essentially  a  question  of  the  quantity,  quality  and  proportion  of  resources  to 
be  devoted  to  development  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  economic  management  on  the  other" 
(Ikram  1980:  5).  It  was  believed  that  the  processes  of  production  and  distribution  had  to 
be  planned  to  ensure  efficient  production  and  continuing  growth,  and  for  some 
protagonists  of  economic  planning,  a  fair  distribution  of  the  benefits  of  growth.  In  reality, 
this  resulted  in  the  replacement  of  the  market  regulations  of  capitalist  production 
processes  with  centralised  planning  and  programming  by  the  state,  with  individual 
enterprises  driven  by  centrally-established  production  targets  rather  than  the  drive  of 
profitability  (Healey  1997).  Economic  activity  was  typically  seen  to  consist  of  a  number  of 
production  sectors,  usually  based  on  a  conventional  division  between  primary,  secondary 
and  tertiary,  or  service  industries.  Such  a  concentration  of  economic  and  political  power 
at  the  apex  of  a  national  system  not  only  encouraged  forms  of  governance  unresponsive 
to  people's  needs,  but  also  provided  many  opportunities  for  corrupt  practice  which, 
ultimately,  resulted  in  regressive  distributional  consequences  (Ward  1989).  It  diverted 
resources  away  from  the  poor,  acted  against  society's  wider  interest  and  undermined 
legitimacy  (Szeftel  1983).  Eventually,  uneven  development  intensified  and  extended  the 
existing  relation  of  exploitation,  dependency  and  stunted  life-chances  for  the  majority  of 
the  urban  poor. 
Now,  `free-market'  ideologues  view  development  as  a  process  of  sustainable 
economic  growth,  which  can  be  measured  by  the  gross  national  product  per  capita, 
resulting  in  the  most  efficient  and  socially  optimal  allocation  of  resources,  while 
government  interference  is  restrained.  David  Korten  (1995)  argues  that  this  ideology,  in 
its  various  guises,  "is  known  by  different  names-  neo-classical,  neo-liberal,  or  libertarian 
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economics;  market  capitalism,  or  market  liberalism".  The  term  `free-market'  can  indeed 
be  extended  to  embody  `economic  rationalism',  which  explains  the  situation  in  Australia 
and  New  Zealand,  and  also  what  Latin  American  scholars  call  `neo-liberalism'.  Generally 
speaking,  Korten  argues  that  in  most  countries,  including  the  United  States,  the  term  goes 
without  a  generally  recognised  name:  "Unnamed,  it  goes  undebated-  its  underlying 
assumptions  unexamined"  (Korten  1995:  72).  However,  the  neo-liberal  political 
movements  found  ground  in  the  new  economic  strategies,  focusing  on  the  supply  side  of 
the  economy  and  the  reduction  of  constraints  on  adaptation  and  innovation.  It  has  also 
resulted  in  the  concept  and  imposition  of  ERSAPs,  which  came  to  surface  after  the  failure 
of  the  liberal  approach  to  deal  with  the  diverse  forms  of  power  relations  which  link  state 
and  civil  society,  the  public  and  the  private  spheres.  The  pursuit  of  ERSAPs  in  many  DCs 
(1990-date)  introduced  several  measures  of  privatisation  and  financial  liberalisation, 
including  deregulation  of  prices,  wages,  customs,  tariffs  and  exchange  rates.  The 
programmes  focused  on  stabilisation  to  restore  macroeconomic  balance  and  reduce 
inflation,  structural  adjustment  to  stimulate  and  sustain  medium-term  and  long-term 
growth,  and  accelerated  implementation  of  current  social  policies  to  minimise  the  effect  of 
the  economic  reforms  on  the  poor  (Rondinelli  1993). 
Theoretically,  the  major  objective  of  the  neo-liberal  strategy,  including  ERSAPs, 
was  to  reduce  the  role  of  the  bureaucracy  and  politics  in  the  management  of  the  economy. 
It  also  aimed  to  `unfetter'  business  from  the  burdens  imposed  upon  it  by  a  regulatory 
environment  built  up  through  the  welfare  state  composed  of  wide  ranging  employment 
projects,  state  subsidised  housing,  free  education  and  health  system.  It  was  thought 
necessary  to  transform  the  style  of  governance  to  make  it  decentralised,  more  relevant  to 
the  dynamics  of  contemporary  economies  and  to  promote  an  entrepreneurial  rather  than  a 
regulatory  ethos  (Harvey  1989).  Decentralisation  within  the  state  was  thought  to  involve 
a  transfer  of  authority  to  perform  some  services  in  territorial  and  functional  terms.  While 
the  basis  of  territorial  transfers  was  the  desire  to  place  authority  at  a  lower  level  in  a 
territorial  hierarchy  and  thus  geographically  closer  to  service  providers  and  clients, 
functional  transfers  aimed  basically  to  delegate  authority  to  a  non-state  agency  that  is 
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functionally  more  specialised,  or  the  devolution  of  power  to  sub-national  units  of 
governments  (Turner  and  Hulme  1997:  152).  The  latter  would  include  local  governments, 
local  authorities,  district  councils,  provincial  governments  and  state  governments,  and  was 
seen  as  to  combine  the  promise  of  local  democracy  with  technical  efficiency. 
In  practice,  the  ERSAPs  that  DCs  have  pursued  have  not  proven  to  be  a  panacea 
for  making  state-sponsored  interventions  more  effective  in  promoting  development 
(Escobar  1995).  Under  the  banner  of  decentralisation,  national  governments  introduced 
policies  that  concentrated  power  and  decision-making  and  weakened  local  arenas  for 
political  debate.  Real  devolution  has  been  rare,  and  deconcentration  or  the  establishment 
of  mixed  authorities  have  been  the  favoured  modes  for  many  DCs'  leaders  (Turner  and 
Hulme  1997:  152).  Moreover,  the  neo-liberal  political  movement  resulted  in  the 
diminution  of  planning,  and  the  return  of  the  market  as  the  key  organising  principle  of 
economic  life  in  both  developed  and  DCs.  On  the  one  hand,  this  attempted  to  advance 
wealth  regeneration  and  the  spread  of  benefits,  while  on  the  other,  flexible  labour  markets 
created  an  insecure  working  class  unable  to  consume  the  set  of  neo-liberalist  measures 
imposed  in  DCs  (Friedman  and  Douglas  1998).  The  level  of  frustration  increased  in  many 
DCs,  specially  in  Africa,  as  service  delivery  became  static  or  declined:  "A  widespread 
realisation  has  taken  place  that  services  alone  do  not  produce  development"  (Curtis  1995: 
116).  The  complexity  of  these  political  and  economic  changes  caused  multiple  forms  of 
oppression  and  exploitation  (Hooper  1992;  Sandercock  1995);  worsening  social 
inequalities  resulted  in  civil  rights  movement  and  ongoing  struggles  based  on  ethnicity  and 
racism  (Leys  1996),  or  poverty  and  systematic  exclusions  of  class  and  gender  in  an 
international  development  context  (Friedmann  1992).  Moreover,  all  these  were  fused 
together  with  disastrous  spatial  results,  as  seen  in  environmental  pollution,  urban 
deterioration  and  the  periodic  collapse  of  markets. 
Development  theory  is  undoubtedly  faced  now  by  the  frequent  retreat  from 
politics  in  face  of  the  seeming  success  of  capital  which  subordinates  everything  to  the 
-.  ':  in 
arbitration  of  `global  market  forces'.  Based  on  his  work  in  Kenya  in  particular  and  in 
Africa  in  general,  Colin  Leys  (1996)  focuses  special  attention  on  the  actors  for  whom  the 
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goals  of  development  envisaged  by  various  theories  are  formulated.  He  systematically 
analyses  comparative  evidence  to  clarify  what  seems  to  be  at  stake-  namely  the  urgent 
need  to  revive  development  theory,  not  as  a  branch  of  policy-orientated  social  science 
within  the  parameters  of  an  unquestioned  capitalist  world  order,  but  as  a  field  of  critical 
enquiry  about  the  contemporary  dynamics  of  that  order  itself,  with  imperative  policy 
implications  for  the  survival  of  a  civilised  and  decent  life,  and  not  just  in  the  ex-colonial 
countries.  Leys  strongly  argues  that  any  equilibrium  model  is  just  a  model;  using  it  does 
not  commit  us  to  the  view  that  the  real  world  is  in  equilibrium,  nor  even  that  it  tends 
towards  equilibrium.  He  argues  that  the  present  `impasse  in  development  theory'  and  the 
unfolding  tragedy,  especially  in  Africa,  are  not  due  to  the  working  out  of  An  inexorable 
law  of  economics  but,  to  a  significant  extent,  to  politically  motivated  policy  decisions 
setting  capital  free  to  pursue  profit  wherever  it  wishes  and  on  whatever  terms  it  can 
impose,  rationalised  by  a  particular  brand  of  development  theory  (neo-liberalism)  which 
assigns  all  initiative  to  `the  market'.  The  situation  in  Central  America  is  not  much 
different.  Laura  Macdonald  (1997:  2)  agrees  that  the  impact  of  the  neo-liberal  adjustment 
programme  on  civil  society  is  disempowering  rather  than  empowering  and,  therefore,  any 
examination  of  the  potential  role  of  NGOs  in  civil  society  must  be  placed  in  a  specific 
historical  and  spatial  context.  Thus,  during  the  1990s  both  government  officials  and 
beneficiaries  in  DCs  have  become  subjects  for  the  compressed  application  of 
`development'  rather  than  initiators  experiencing,  contributing  and  responding  to  the 
exercise  of  that  development.  Escobar  (1995)  ascribes  such  a  capsized  situation  to  the 
outcome  of  a  development  apparatus  which  links  forms  of  knowledge  about  the  DCs  with 
the  deployment  of  forms  of  power  and  intervention,  resulting  in  a  specific  mapping  and 
production  of  DCs'  societies. 
However,  the  post-modern  epoch  of  development  discourse  acclaims  local 
communities'  experimental,  grounded,  contextual  and  intuitive  knowledges, 
notwithstanding  that  `the  public  interest'  and  `community'  are  likely  to  exclude  difference 
if  they  work  separately  (Sandercock  1998).  In  criticising  the  liberalism  ideology, 
proponents  of  post-modernism  attempt  to  find  a  new  social  ontology  which  views 
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development  through  the  attributes  of  a  person  as  a  coeval  with  the  society:  "Our 
constitutive  self-understandings  comprehend  a  wider  subject  than  the  individual  alone, 
whether  a  family  or  a  tribe  or  a  city  or  class  or  nation  or  people,  to  this  extent  they  define 
a  community  in  the  constitutive  sense"  (Sandel  1982:  173).  Thus  the  ideal  of  community 
arises  in  this  way  as  a  response  to  the  individualism  perceived  as  the  prevailing  theoretical 
position,  and  the  alienation  and  fragmentation,  class  or  gender,  perceived  as  the  prevailing 
condition  of  society  (Young  1990:  306).  Post-modernism  deconstructs  the  modernist 
reliance  on  state-directed  futures  and  its  top-down  processes,  and  concentrates  instead  on 
community-based  development,  from  the  ground  up,  geared  to  community  empowerment 
(Sandercock  1998).  It  acknowledges  that  there  are  multiple  publics  and  differences  and 
therefore  development  planning  requires  a  new  kind  of  multi-cultural  literacy  (Sennett 
1994;  Jacobs  1996).  The  post-modern  philosophical  movement  views  planning  for 
development  as  no  longer  exclusively  concerned  with  comprehensive,  integrated,  and  co- 
ordinated  action,  but  rather  more  negotiated,  political,  and  focused  planning  (Sandercock 
1998). 
On  the  other  hand,  Healey  (1997:  42)  argues  that  the  post-modern  challenges 
may,  in  fact,  sustain  the  tired  practices  of  the  old  modernity,  foster  scepticism,  individual 
efforts  and  isolated  autonomy  rather  than  fostering  the  public  realm  and  collaboration, 
which  are  needed  for  managing  our  relations  of  co-existence  in  shared  spaces.  According 
to  the  post-modern  essence,  individuals  might  adhere  to  one  of  the  following  scenarios: 
"One  response  is  to  turn  away,  to  an  interior  life,  or  to  enjoyment  of  what  we  can  while 
we  can.  Another  is  to  engage  in  a  perpetual  effort  of  resistance  and  deconstruction, 
individually  defending  ourselves  against  the  threat  of  `abstract  systems'  against  our  own 
`lifeworlds"'  (Healey  1997:  43).  However,  all  responses  seems  to  lead  to  hedonistic  or 
anarchistic  developmental  polities  rather  challenging  the  neo-liberal  political  project  and 
its  reassertion  of  a  narrow  utilitarianism  in  public  policy.  Therefore,  she  attempts  to  find 
alternative  routes  out  of  such  political  incapacity  and  argues  that  the  way  ahead  is  to  build 
up  institutional  preconditions  for  economic  growth,  including  market  `health  and  vitality', 
in  favour  of  planning  the  trajectory  of  the  future  collectively,  rather  than  being  perpetually 
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vulnerable  to  the  volatility  of  markets,  or  the  power  of  large-scale  capitalist  companies 
(Healey  1997:  9).  This  is,  in  essence,  the  foundations  of  the  `transformative  power'  praxis 
in  development  discourse,  which  is  discussed  in  the  following  Chapters. 
2.2-  Community  development-  paradigms  and  approaches: 
Community  development  is  very  much  linked  to  the  concept  of  self-help  in  that 
both  represent  issues  of  collaborative  action  for  internally  generated  improvement  and 
development  in  situ.  Community  development  is  defined  in  its  broad  consensus  as 
"organised  efforts  to  improve  the  conditions  of  community  life  and  the  capacity  for 
community  integration  and  self-direction"  (Dunham  1970).  It  is  thus  the  "long-standing 
tendency  of  membership  of  a  group  to  act  together  to  improve  the  lifestyle  of  the  group  as 
a  whole"  (FitzGerald  1980).  The  United  Nations  views  community  development  as  a  total 
approach  to  development  and  defines  it  as  "a  process  by  which  the  efforts  of  the  people 
themselves  are  united  with  those  of  governmental  authorities  to  improve  the  economic, 
social  and  cultural  conditions  of  communities,  to  integrate  these  communities  into  the  life 
of  a  Nation  and  to  enable  them  to  contribute  fully  to  national  progress"  (cited  in  Curtis 
1995:  117). 
The  debate  about  community  development  raised  fundamental  questions  about  the 
causes  of  poverty,  the  role  of  development  and  the  basis  of  democracy.  But,  instead  of 
seeing  this  as  an  important  international  debate,  these  issues  were  seen  as  challenging  the 
political  and  ideological  base  of  the  superpowers  and  of  local  governments.  It  became 
impossible  to  develop  economic  and  social  policies  related  to  development  without  these 
being  either  consigned  to  a  political  pole  or  adopted  by  one  of  them.  The  result  was  a 
capitalist-communist  conflict  which  pre-defined  the  wider  arena  and  translated  itself 
directly  into  a  series  of  dualities  on  the  ground.  These  might  be  state  and  community, 
oppressor  and  oppressed,  landed  and  homeless.  Each  sector  tended  to  create  its  own 
duality  and  that  led  to  social  justice  issues  in  such  spheres  as  ownership  of  land  (Abbott 
1996:  7).  Since  its  origin  in  the  eighteenth  century  in  the  UK  and  the  US,  the  discourse  of 
community  development  has  been  evolving,  cross-cutting  a  wide  range  of  disciplines,  and 
is  perhaps  the  most  controversial  concept  now.  Transforming  the  trajectory  from 
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`community  development'  to  `economic  development',  `involvement',  `empowerment', 
`management',  `mobilisation'  or  `participation',  the  associated  paradigms  reflect  how 
discourses  have  been  trying  to  place  community  development  into  an  undivided  context, 
and  to  conceptualise  urban  development  through  both  intrasocietal  and  intersocietal 
dynamics  of  production  and  exchanges. 
Most  of  the  early  interpretations  of  community  development  were  based  on  the 
primacy  of  economic  growth.  These  are  best  discussed  through  the  `paradigm-approach 
model  of  development',  which  "represents  a  tentative  description  of  what  the  system 
might  eventually  look  like  and  suggests  possible  relationships  between  variables" 
(Cotgrove  1967).  The  paradigm  approach  model  argues  that  community  development  was 
first  recognised  as  an  approach  which  operated  within  the  paradigm  of  modernisation 
theory,  whereas  empowerment  was  the  superseding  approach  which  operated  within  the 
paradigm  of  dependency  theory  (Figure  2.1). 
Figure  2.1:  The  paradigm  approach  model  of  development 
Paradigm: 
Original  linkage  superseded  by  New  linkage 
Modernisation 
theory 
Dependency 
theory 
Approach: 
Community 
development 
Source:  Abbott  (1996:  21). 
Empowerment 
The  modernisation  theory  used  western  society,  and  particularly  the  US,  as  a  role 
model  and  argued  that  all  societies  shift  from  the  traditional  and  primitive,  which  are 
apparently  synonymous  and  both  pejorative,  to  the  modern  through  a  series  of  clearly 
defined  stages  of  economic  growth.  This  is  not  a  new  concept.  In  the  nineteenth  century 
the  members  of  the  German  historical  school  of  economics  were  developing  economic 
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stages  in  Germany  and,  to  some  extent,  elsewhere  (Hoselitz  1960:  193).  What  was 
different  about  the  approach  after  the  Second  World  War  was  its  global  perspective  and 
the  way  in  which  it  divided  the  world  into  two  dominant  categories  of  developed  and 
underdeveloped.  The  malady  of  many  underdeveloped  economies  was  diagnosed  as  "a 
stable  equilibrium  of  per  capita  income  at,  or  close  to,  subsistence  requirements.  ... 
If 
economic  growth  is defined  as  rising  per  capita  income,  these  economies  are  not  growing. 
They  are  caught  in  a  low  level  equilibrium  trap"  (Nelson  1956  cited  in  Abbott  1996:  12). 
Saving  and  investment  were  thus  seen  as  the  key  to  achieving  meaningful  levels  of 
development. 
In  understanding  how  the  capitalist  countries  moved  from  low  to  high  levels  of 
economic  development,  it  was  argued  that  "the  opportunities  for  worthwhile  investment 
exist;  it  is  the  capital  which  is  lacking. 
...  what  is  needed  is  a  massive  investment  over  a 
short  period  to  raise  income  levels  above  the  containment  rate"  (Lewis  1954  cited  in 
Abbott  1996:  12).  Such  over-simplistic  manifestations  in  explaining  the  process  of 
transition  were  later  revised.  Rostow  (1956)  introduced  the  concept  of  `take-off  and  laid 
the  theoretical  foundations  of  modernisation  theory:  "The  process  of  economic  growth 
can  usually  be  regarded  as  centring  on  a  relatively  brief  time  interval  of  two  or  three 
decades  when  the  economy  and  the  society  of  which  it  is  a  part  transform  themselves  in 
such  ways  that  economic  growth  is,  subsequently,  more  or  less  automatic.  This  decisive 
transformation  is  here  called  the  take-off'.  Such  a  linear  conception  of  how 
underdeveloped  could  become  developed  was  further  expanded  into  a  general  model.  "It 
is  possible  to  identify  all  societies,  in  their  economic  dimensions,  as  lying  within  one  of 
five  categories:  the  traditional  society,  the  pre-conditions  for  take-off,  the  take-off,  the 
drive  to  maturity,  and  the  age  of  high  mass-consumption"  (Rostow  1960:  4). 
Talcott  Parsons  and  his  followers  in  the  US  also  developed  a  classification  of 
social  structures  which  distinguished  modern  industrialised  societies  from  traditional 
societies  (Parsons  et  al.  1961;  McLelland  1976:  16).  Parsons  saw  the  cultural  system  as 
fundamental  and  argued  that  there  were  changes,  in  what  he  defined  as  pattern  variables, 
which  were  required  for  development  to  occur.  These  pattern  variables  were  identified  as 
{ 
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affectivity,  diffuseness,  particularism  and  ascription  in  a  traditional  or  community-based 
society.  He  then  tried  to  show  how  they  shifted  over  time  in  the  creation  of  a  modern 
society  associated  with  affective  neutrality,  universalism  and  achievement  instead.  Thus, 
for  example,  there  have  to  be  changes  in  the  roles  and  relationships  between  people, 
reducing  the  traditional  context.  In  a  modern  western  society  people  take  on  specific 
roles,  such  as  their  jobs,  whereas  in  a  traditional  society  there  are  strong  emotional  and 
cultural  associations  linked  with  positions,  a  tribal  chief  for  instance.  So  in  a  western 
society  a  job  is  taken  out  of  the  emotional  and  cultural  environment  and  de-personalised. 
Hence,  Parsons  viewed  the  goals  of  development  as:  social,  described  as  the  integration  of 
society;  political,  summarised  as  the  need  for  the  society  to  work  for  the  attainment  of 
goals;  and  economic,  requiring  adaptation  to  the  new  requirement. 
In  reality,  all  of  these  are  based  on  the  role  model  of  a  typical  western  society. 
Their  primary  importance,  however,  was  to  emphasise  the  need  for  structural  change  in 
society  as  a  pre-condition  of  economic  take-off  as  perceived  by  Rostow.  Not  only  was 
this  important  in  the  anti-Communist  struggle,  deeply  engraved  in  the  Americans  psyche 
and  their  social  science,  but  it  also  provided  the  theoretical  justification  for  western 
governments  and  multilateral  agencies  to  interfere  with  the  social  and  cultural  society  of 
countries  in  the  name  of  economic  development  (Kolko  1988).  While  modernisation 
theory  was  subject  to  widespread  criticism,  it  was  the  basis  of  what  Latin  American 
scholars  called  `developmentalism',  which  used  to  measure  development  in  terms  of 
economic  growth  and  aimed  at  overcoming  `backwardness'.  Although  this  approach 
perceived  industrial  development  in  the  modern  sectors  of  the  economy  as  the  main  goal, 
this  type  of  growth  was  likely  to  be  dislocated  and  so  caused  social  conflicts. 
Developmentalism  reinforced  individualism  at  the  expense  of  the  clan  or  community  at 
large,  was  not  really  rooted  and  exaggerated  the  differences  between  rural  and  urban 
resulting  in  further  inequality. 
While  Marxist  development  theory  integrates  underdevelopment  into  its  own 
economic  model,  dependency  theory  treats  it  differently  as  representing  "a  limit-situation 
characteristic  of  societies  of  the  Third  World  which  cannot  be  understood  apart  from  the 
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relationship  with  dependency.  The  task  implied  by  this  limit  situation  is  to  overcome  the 
contradictory  relationship  between  these  `object'-societies  and  the  metropolitan  societies; 
this  task  constitutes  the  untested  feasibility  for  the  Third  World"  (Freire  1972).  Freire 
analysed  society  in  terms  of  a  dualistic  model  in  which  a  minority,  termed  oppressors, 
controlled  the  majority,  who  were  oppressed.  He  argued  that  the  oppressed,  having 
internalised  the  image  of  the  oppressor  and  adopted  his  guidelines,  are  fearful  of  freedom, 
which  would  usually  require  them  to  reject  this  image  and  replace  it  with  autonomy  and 
responsibility. 
This  led  to  a  new  approach,  conscientisacion,  which  became  a  form  of  community 
participation  to  be  seen  in  juxtaposition  to  community  development.  In  its  application, 
conscientisacion  was  strongly  influenced  by  a  specific  component  of  dependency  theory, 
derived  from  Freire's  concept  of  the  oppressor/oppressed  duality.  With  urbanisation  as 
the  focal  point  of  struggle  in  Latin  America  during  the  1970s,  this  was  applied  to  explain 
the  confrontation  between  the  state,  as  oppressor,  and  the  urban  disfranchised  poor,  as 
the  oppressed.  However,  the  linkage  between  conscientisacion  and  empowerment  is  more 
complex.  Empowerment  gained  its  conceptual  form  in  the  1970s,  driven  by  world  bodies 
such  as  the  ILO,  UNICEF,  NUCHS  and  UNRISD,  on  the  basis  that  such  action  would 
encourage  meaningful  change  in  society  and  enhance  the  satisfaction  of  basic  needs.  More 
specifically,  empowerment  is  defined  as  "the  organised  efforts  to  increase  control  over 
resources  and  relative  institutions  in  given  social  situations,  on  the  part  of  groups  and 
movements  hitherto  excluded  from  such  control"  (UNRISD  1979).  The  International 
Labour  Office  (ILO),  for  instance,  has  encouraged  the  use  of  this  term  to  allow  it  to 
confront  questions  of  power  both  ideologically  and  in  its  dealings  with  governments. 
Dependency  theory  explains  community  development  from  an  intersocietal  point 
-, 
of  view  in  the  context  of  urban  development.  The  basic  issue  is  how  patterns  of 
urbanisation  vary  according  to  the  socio-economic  and  political  relations  of  locales  to 
national  and  international  hierarchies  of  core/periphery  exploitation  (Smith  and  Tardanico 
1987).  Coming  after  the  failings  of  modernisation  theory,  dependency  theory  made  strong 
use  of  comparative  analysis.  It  did  not  seek  to  justify  revolutionary  action  in  terms  of  the 
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righting  of  past  wrongs,  but  used  instead  the  historical  development  of  society,  which 
views  the  world  dualistically  as  a  developed  centre  with  a  dependent  periphery,  as  the 
theoretical  basis  for  a  more  radical  transformation  of  society.  A  good  example  of  this  is 
Frank's  critique  of  modernisation  theory,  including  the  pattern  variables  which  Talcott 
Parsons  identified. 
Frank  (1980)  criticises  both  modernisation  theory  and  the  dualist  approach.  He 
argues  that  while  modernisation  theory  ignores  the  structure  of  communities,  the 
proposed  dualist  approach  does  not  fit  the  real  world.  It  neglects  the  real  linkages 
between  the  traditional  and  modern  sectors.  Frank  argues  that  the  control  of  power  by 
local  privileged  elites  created  increasing  economic  and  technological  dependence.  Thus, 
neither  changes  in  pattern  variables  nor  contact  with  the  west  has  led  to  development  in 
the  DCs.  However,  although  dependency  theory  did  not  ignore,  or  relegate  to  secondary 
importance,  the  dynamics  of  international  and  interregional  exploitation,  it  is  criticised  for 
inadequately  addressing  the  dynamics  of  international  capitalist  development,  class 
structure  and  its  consequences  for  both  the  political-economic  transformation  of  societies 
and  their  positions  in  the  global  capitalist  order  (Smith  and  Tardanico  1987). 
Although  community  development  discourse  has  evolved,  its  political  incapacity  to 
explain  the  full  implications  of  power  and  the  practical  relationship  between  government 
and  the  community  put  it  in  jeopardy.  It  provided  the  space  for  a  totally  different 
interpretation  which  exposed  communities  to  manipulation  by  government  and  opened  the 
way  for  widespread  criticism.  The  state  and  civil  societies  are  often  portrayed  as  passive  - 
instruments  or  direct  reflections  of  capitalist  interests  and  structures,  rather  than  as  an 
active,  partially  independent  force  (Smith  and  Feagin  1987).  Such  restriction  focuses 
exclusively  on  the  needs  of  communities  as  semi-independent  entities.  Thus,  they  are  often 
disempowered  or  disenfranchised,  or  alternatively  they  may  be  seen  as  embittered  or 
disillusioned  (Abbott  1996:  70).  Accordingly,  any  community  wanting  something  is 
usually  seen  by  politicians  as  a  "cluster  of  votes  that  can  be  recruited  in  exchange  for  a 
small  favour"  (Curtis  1995:  118).  This  leaves  community  leaders  often  confused  about 
how  to  respond  to  this  patronage  and  disempowered  to  act  on  their  own  behalf. 
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Therefore,  the  contemporary  discourse  of  community  development  has  expanded 
to  embody  issues  of  participation,  civil  society,  social  citizenship  and  sustainability.  The 
dimensions  of  time,  space,  marginalised  social-economic  groups,  and  dynamic  economies 
have  broadened  its  context,  whilst  the  ideas  of  new  knowledges  and  (re)framing  issues  are 
offered  as  a  means  to  create  new  options.  Sustainable  community  development  is 
perceived  as  citizens'  empowerment  and  participation  in  changing  perceptions  and  choices 
regarding  community  resources,  markets,  rules,  and  decision-making  capacity  (Hulme  and 
Edwards  1997;  Nelson  and  Wright  1995;  Healey  1997).  Civil  society,  community 
participation  and  institutionalised  collaborative  governance  are  still  trying  to  jointly  build 
on  these  changes,  taking  community  development  discourse  beyond  the  more  traditional 
static  definition,  and  placing  it  into  an  undivided  political  context  comprised  of  the  state, 
local  governments,  community  and  individuals,  which  are  discussed  in  the  following 
sections. 
2.3-  Civil  society: 
With  the  paradigm  shift  from  nation-state  to  the  city-state  (Friedman  and  Douglas 
1998),  and  the  perception  of  city  as  the  locus  of  new  forms  of  `insurgence'  citizenship 
(Holston  1995),  which  is  evident  in  the  new  social  movements'  struggles  on  behalf  of  the 
poor,  of  women  for  `rights  to  the  city'  and  of  the  marginalised  and  minorities  for  `rights 
to  difference',  civil  society  is  increasingly  seen  as  an  expression  of  all  citizens  asserting 
themselves.  The  role  of  civil  society  organisations  in  community  development  projects 
and  programmes  has  become  critical  in  two  ways.  First,  they  have  an  important  role  in 
planning  and  directly  implementing  projects,  which  address  the  basic  needs  of  low-income 
groups  they  represent.  Second,  they  can  help  to  improve  the  quality  of  governance  by 
placing  pressure  on  government  agencies  to  use  resources  more  effectively  to  reduce 
poverty.  Civil  society  has  been  increasingly  recognised,  specially  by  DAs,  as  being  critical 
to  successful  realisation  of  community  development.  In  part,  the  interest  reflects  a 
growing  awareness  of  the  importance  of  local  institutions  in  supporting  and  undertaking 
development. 
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It  is  widely  believed  that  civil  society  schemes  seem  to  offer  potential  models  for. 
mutual  and  sustainable  participatory  development  in  DCs,  while  state  efforts  are  often 
suffused  with  a  sense  of  bureaucratic  chaos  and  characterised  by  capital-intensive 
projects.  Local  NGOs  are  viewed  by  many  official  agencies  and  members  of  the  public  as 
more  efficient  and  cost-effective  service  providers  than  governments,  giving  better  `value- 
for-money',  especially  in  reaching  poor  people  (Meyer  1992;  Sollis  1992;  Vivian  1994). 
DAs  view  markets  and  private  sector  initiatives,  through  which  local  NGOs  and  GROs 
operate,  as  the  most  efficient  mechanisms  for  achieving  economic  growth,  producing 
goods,  and  providing  services,  even  if  they  do  this  imperfectly.  The  argument  of 
`imperfect  markets  are  better  than  imperfect  states'  (Colclough  and  Manor  1991:  7)  is 
exclusively  applied  to  the  entire  geography  of  the  imperfect  public  sector  bureaucracy  and 
performance  of  DCs.  A  scrutiny  of  NGOs'  performance  reveals  that  they  regularly  learn 
from  their  mistakes,  respond  to  the  demands  from  the  real  beneficiaries,  evaluate  their 
progress  seriously,  and  some  of  them  are  keen  on  integrating  their  counterparts  within  the 
process  of  planning  to  make  the  means  of  development  sustainable.  Nonetheless,  most 
NGOs  not  only  design  their  programmes  to  be  flexible,  but  they  are  also  aware  that  in  a 
post-modern  world,  complete  systems  which  claim  to  produce  comprehensive 
programmes  are  suspicious. 
Accordingly,  strengthening  civil  society  organisations  has  become  essential  for  all 
development  and  poverty  reduction  agencies,  national  or  international,  to  ensure  that 
government  policies  and  programmes  are  effective  and  reflective.  DAs  have  pursued  a 
`New  Policy  Agenda'  which  gives  renewed  prominence  to  the  roles  of  local  NGOs  and 
GROs  in  poverty  alleviation,  social  welfare,  and  the  development  of  civil  society 
(Robinson  1993).  Naturally,  the  details  of  this  policy  agenda  vary  from  one  donor  agency 
to  another  based  on  their  specific  economic  and/or  political  targets.  Politically,  local 
NGOs  and  GROs  are  awarded  a  key  role  in  the  democratisation  process  by  many  DAs. 
They  are  seen  as  an  integral  component  of  a  thriving  civil  society  and  an  essential 
counterweight  to  state  power,  opening-up  channels  of  communication  and  participation, 
providing  training  for  activists,  and  promoting  pluralism  (Robinson  1993).  Hence, 
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national  governments  tend  to  deal  carefully  with  many  local  NGOs,  knowing  that  while  , 
they  are  a  good  source  for  attracting  foreign  official  aid,  they  can  also  be  discarded  when 
necessary  (Smith  and  Lipsky  1993). 
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  many  questions  regarding  civil  society  performance, 
accountability,  and  its  ability  to  act  independently.  With  the  entitlement  of  civil  society 
organisations  to  play  a  supplementary  role  at  the  local  level  to  overcome  local  inertia, 
they  carried  out  large  numbers  of  development  `projects'  aiming  basically  to  support  self- 
reliance  and  to  integrate  marginal  populations  within  the  national  economy  (Macdonald 
1997:  10).  Large  numbers  of  `underdeveloped'  skills  and  the  mechanisms  of  the  `third 
system'  economy  were  thus  utilised  within  many  development  activities.  While 
community  participation  was  seen  as  a  cheaper  and  more  efficient  method  of  ensuring  a 
project  success  in  both  technical  and  economic  terms,  this  ideology  required  continuous 
mobilisation  and  encouragement  from  the  project  agency  and  better  management  of  civil 
society  organisations.  As  a  result,  many  have  become  dependent  upon  foreign  funding 
and/or  local  decision-making  processes.  Although  government  funding  of  local  NGOs  and 
GROs  enhanced  their  resources  and  scope,  they  failed  to  remain  autonomous  from  the 
state's  intervention.  The  acceptance  of  government  funding  repeatedly  placed  real 
constraints  upon  their  strategies.  Such  interference  could  be  blatant  or  subtle.  This  fact 
raised  important  questions  concerning  NGO-state  relations,  and  the  ability  of  NGOs  and 
bilateral  agencies  to  act  independently  in  pursuing  their  goals.  Edwards  and  Hulme  (1996) 
argue  that  although  official  funding  usually  tends  to  encourage  civil  society  organisations 
to  become  providers  of  social  and  economic  services  on  a  much  larger  scale  than  hitherto, 
even  though  their  long-term  comparative  advantage  is  doubtful,  this  weakens  their 
legitimacy  as  independent  actors  in  society,  diverts  their  accountability  away  from 
grassroots  constituencies,  and  over  emphasises  short-term,  quantitative  outputs.  It  is 
evident  that  increasing  numbers  of  local  NGOs  GROs  are  becoming  more  dependent  on 
official  aid,  while  there  is  a  discernible  flattening-out  of  voluntary  contributions  by  the 
public  in  many  Northern  countries. 
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Macdonald  (1997)  explores  the  issues  which  shape  and  restrict  NGO  roles  and 
actions  in  supporting  civil  society  and  the  delivery  of  development  assistance.  Using  a 
materialistic  and  historical  hermeneutic  model,  Macdonald  analyses  six  NGO  projects  in 
Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica  focusing  on  three  main  themes:  choice  of  development 
strategies;  forms  of  popular  participation;  and  the  role  played  by  international  agencies  in 
their  relationships  with  local  partners.  Macdonald  deconstructed  all  approaches  that 
romanticise  NGOs  and  exaggerate  their  ability  to  represent  the  disenfranchised  by  means 
of  enhancing  democratisation  in  a  `global  civil  society'.  In  a  similar  vein,  Escobar  (1995) 
discussed  a  series  of  crucial  cultural  questions  associated  with  the  practice  of  NGOs. 
First,  to  what  extent  can  the  position  of  NGOs  and  GROs  outside  of  the  organised  state- 
sphere  permit  a  role  on  ideological  grounds  rather  than  empirical  justification?  Second, 
what  is  the  impact  of  NGO/GRO  cultural  differences  on  mobilising  cultural  identity  as  a 
transformative  engagement  with  modernity?  Escobar  concluded  that  local  community 
organisations  and  `tradition'  are  neither  erased  nor  preserved  as  the  bases  for  `alternative' 
development,  but  are  refashioned  as  a  hybrid.  This  hybridity  entails  "a  cultural  (re)creation 
that  may  or  may  not  be  (re)inscribed  into  hegemonic  constellations".  Hence,  when 
communications  between  Northern  and  Southern  local,  communities  take  place  through 
official  aid  schemes,  this  becomes  the  core  discussion  of  the  new  geo-political  subjectivity 
which  imposes  a  `transcultural  status  in-between  world  reality'  (Escobar  1995).  Such 
important  issues  are  examined  in  more  detail  throughout  the  research  case  study  in 
Chapters  8  and  9. 
2.4-  Implementing  participation: 
A  transition  from  economic  development  programmes,  and  the  primacy  of 
economic  growth,  which  influenced  the  paradigm  approach  model  of  development,  to 
project-based  development  has  resulted  in  the  growth  of  `community  participation'  as  an 
alternative  approach.  The  move  towards  a  project-based  approach  has  also  opened  up  a 
wide  debate  on  the  objectives  of  community  participation,  including  levels  of 
participation,  types,  purposes  and  who  should  participate.  But  despite  the  extensive,  if  not 
overwhelming  literature  which  defines,  surveys  and  analyses  the  experience  of  community 
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participation,  most  publications  are  detailed  case  studies  which  document  aspects  of 
community  participation  in  the  implementation  of  specific  projects  (Moser  1989).  There  is 
a  small  number  of  workers  who  have  developed  conceptual  ideas  to  explain  community 
participation.  None  of  these  approaches  is  complete  in  itself,  because  they  are  not  situated 
in  the  wider  political,  economic,  ideological  and  social  environment,  which  leaves  us 
unable  to  deal  with  the  fundamental  gap  existing  between  theory  and  practice. 
Participation  is  a  very  broad  concept.  It  involves  shifts  in  power  within 
communities;  between  people,  policy-making  and  resources-holding  institutions;  and 
within  the  structure  of  those  organisations  (Nelson  and  Wright  1995).  Although  there 
have  been  many  attempts  to  create  an  abstract  order  of  participation,  people  have  always 
been  positioned  very  differently  in  relation  to  the  development  agency:  as  objects  of  a 
theoretical  process  of  economic  and  political  transformation  (World  Bank  1994),  as 
expected  beneficiaries  of  programmes  with  pre-set  parameters,  as  contributors  of  casual 
labour  to  help  a  project  to  achieve  its  ends  (Burgess  1982),  as  politically  co-opted 
legitimisers  of  a  policy,  or  as  citizens  trying  to  determine  their  own  choices  and  direction 
independent  of  the  state  (Curtis  1995).  One  of  the  early  attempts  to  create  an  abstract 
order  of  participation  was  Arnstein's  ladder  of  citizen  participation.  Arnstein  (1969) 
conceptualised  participation  as  a  power  game,  in  which  elites  retain  power  that  citizens 
struggle  to  gain  access  to.  There  are  four  levels  of  participation  in  Arnstein's  ladder:  it 
begins  with  non-participation,  which  is  equated  with  manipulation  and  exploitation; 
moving  up  we  find  tokenism,  which  is  equated  with  placation;  then  listening  and  sharing, 
which  is  equated  with  information  sharing  and  consultation;  and  at  the  top  of  the  ladder  is 
citizen  power,  which  is  equated  in  ascending  order  with  partnership,  delegated  power  and 
citizen  control.  But  in  real  field  settings,  the  continuum  repeatedly  collapses  in  on  itself 
because  participatory  approaches  are  always  attempted  in  communities  with  complex 
histories  and  social  dynamics,  which  make  them  very  difficult  to  foster  (Dichter  1995). 
There  will  be  times  in  any  participatory  project  when  the  process  is  top-down  and  led 
entirely  by  outsiders,  times  when  citizens  themselves  initiate  aspects  of  the  project  and 
even  manipulate  the  implementing  agency,  times  when  there  is  harmony  and  mutual 
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sharing,  and  times  when  such  harmony  breaks  down  and  powerful  people  on  both  sides 
may  obstruct  progress  or  manipulate  and  placate  the  people  (Figure  2.2). 
Figure  2.2:  Levels  of  citizen  participation 
Citizen  control 
Delegated  power 
Partnership 
Placation 
Consultation 
Information  sharing 
Therapy 
Manipulation 
Source:  Adapted  from  Arnstein  (1969:  216)  and  Dichter  (1995). 
Therefore,  when  the  term  is  used  in  the  context  of  development  the  first  question 
to  answer  is  exactly  what  type  of  participation  is  worth  consideration.  It  is  important  to 
make  a  distinction  between  voluntary  and  coercive  participation.  In  practice,  this  is  not 
easy,  particularly  when  extensive  material  incentives  are  employed  to  ensure  co-operation. 
Participation  in  the  construction  and  implementation  stages  of  a  project  is  now  very 
common  and  often  involves  the  beneficiaries  contributing  part  or  all  of  the  labour.  Here 
participation  is  a  practical  matter,  equated  with  co-operation  and  incorporation  into  pre- 
determined  activities  to  lower  costs.  This  is  only  one  stage  in  the  development  process, 
and  therefore,  participation  in  decision-making,  implementation,  maintenance,  in  benefits, 
and  in  evaluation  of  either  success  or  failure  must  also  be  considered.  The  other  type  of 
participation  is  what  Chambers  (1995)  calls  `participatory  appraisal'.  It  aims  at  starting 
projects  with  correct  information  based  on  the  notion  that  every  human  being  knows 
his/her  own  world  better  than  any  other.  But  this  only  appears  to  be  empowerment  if  a 
collective  view  is  taken  of  society  as  made  up  of  free-floating  actors,  each  with  different 
interests  which  they  pursue  by  negotiating  with  each  other  in  interactional  space. 
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However,  there  are  methods  of  gathering  information  in  a  participatory  manner  involving, 
citizen  representatives. 
Fostering  participation  is  more  difficult  when  decision-making  processes  are 
included  as  well.  Contradictions  arise  in  getting  people  to  `buy  in'  or  `own'  project 
decisions  (Dichter  1995);  power  involves  the  `outsider'  enabler  and  is  often  present  in 
multiple  and  heterogeneous  social  relations,  which  makes  the  process  of  negotiation  and 
working  collectively  more  difficult  but  not  impossible.  Shepherd  (1983)  argues  that 
"decision  making  processes  are  the  most  obvious  instance  of  exercise  of  power.  Therefore 
if  participation  in  decision  can  be  broadened  or  made  effectively  representative,  this  means 
that  power  is  being  shared  and  that  groups  formerly  excluded  from  the  exercise  of  power 
are  included".  The  last  type  of  participation  refers  to  `cognitive  participation'  or  `initiating 
action'  (Paul  1987).  This  is  the  highest  intensity  of  participation  according  to  which  those 
who  are  objects  of  policy  should  have  the  opportunity  to  participate  not  only  in  specific 
decisions  but  in  the  definitions  of  the  situation  on  which  these  decisions  are  based. 
Therefore  this  type  of  participation  is  the  most  complex  and  cannot  be  rushed.  Yet  again 
field  reality  may  witness  all  of  the  types  of  participation  discussed  above. 
The  second  dimension  of  participation  concerns  who  should  participate.  In  a  truly 
participatory  approach,  we  might  expect  all  those  affected  to  have  a  role  to  play  at  all 
stages  of  the  development  process.  This  highlights  the  fact  that  certain  groups,  e.  g.  the 
poorest  and  women,  have  been  bypassed  by  previous  development  and  should  now  be 
included,  or  even  `put  first'.  The  GTZ,  involved  in  this  study,  starts  participatory  -- 
development  processes  by  defining  the  stakeholders  who  either  affect  or  are  affected  by 
the  development  project's  actions  and  policies.  According  to  the  World  Bank  (1994),  the 
primary  stakeholders  are  the  target  citizens,  including  the  poor  and  the  marginalised  who 
lack  information  and  power  and  are  excluded  from  the  development  process;  secondary 
stakeholders  include  government  bodies,  NGOs,  businesses  and  professional  bodies  which 
have  technical  expertise  and  linkages  to  resources  and  primary  stakeholders.  A  GTZ 
project  incorporates  tiers  of  `ZOPP'  sessions,  German  acronym  for  `Objective  Oriented 
Project  Planning',  at  beneficiary  nation  level,  before  reaching  the  primary  stakeholders  at 
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the  site  of  the  project.  Thereafter,  the  primary  stakeholders  are  asked  at  numerous, 
informal  meetings  held  in  their  own  civil  society  organisations  to  identify  their 
neighbourhoods'  problems,  whilst  subsequent  -rounds  of  formal  discussions  through 
ZOPP  workshops  serve  to  define  the  cause  of  the  problems  and  to  explore  possible 
solutions  (GTZ  1987).  The  process  serves  to  identify  goals  and  to  forge  relationships 
within  the  community,  between  it  and  the  project  personnel  and  between  both  and  the 
city's  authorities.  Efforts  are  made  at  all  stages  to  cast  perceptions  into  realistic  and 
achievable  cause  and  effect  chains.  ZOPP  workshops  are  repeated  annually  with 
participants  to  reassess  achievements  and  failures,  and  to  prepare  and  update  the  project 
planning  matrix  (PPM),  which  outlines  the  project's  purpose,  objectives,  activities, 
stakeholders'  responsibilities  and  the  time  table  of  implementation. 
Once  the  scope  of  participation  and  the  participants  have  been  ascertained,  the 
focus  shifts  to  how  this  is  to  be  achieved  in  practice.  The  mix  of  how  and  what  in  a 
particular  situation  is  basically  determined  by  the  purpose  of  participation,  and  whether  it 
is  `participation  as  an  end'  or  `participation  as  a  means'  (Lane  1995:  183).  The  fact  that 
participation  has  a  variety  of  meanings  suggests  that  we  should  be  wary  of  approaches 
that  use  the  term  uncritically  or  view  it  as  unequivocally  good  (Figure  2.3).  Although 
participation  as  a  means  develops  a  commitment  to  the  project  and  local  self-reliance  to 
succeed  the  project,  it  involves  the  beneficiaries'  contributing  labour  and  other  resources. 
Participation  as  an  end  suggests  a  wider  scope  and  greater  intensity  than  where 
participation  is  viewed  as  a  predetermined  input.  The  community  or  group  sets  up  a 
process  to  control  its  own  development.  Although  most  DAs  define  participation  now  as 
"a  process  through  which  stakeholders  influence  and  share  control  over  development 
initiatives,  decisions  and  resources  which  affect  them"  (Nelson  and  Wright  1995),  the 
analysis  of  community  participation  should  be  able  to  place  the  process  within  a  wider 
context  in  a  coherent  and  logical  manner.  This  is  implicit  in  earlier  work,  but  has  rarely 
been  successful.  The  first  description  of  this  wider  contact  was  through  economic 
development,  outlined  by  the  paradigm  approach  model  of  development,  which  proved 
inadequate  and  was  overtaken  by  events:  The  second  was  the  `project  environment'. 
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Unfortunately,  those  who  controlled  the  international  funding  system  supported  this 
structure,  primary  because  it  could  be  linked  with  a  quantifiable  product,  e.  g.  a  water 
supply  or  health  clinic,  and  could  be  controlled  by  the  project  cycle.  But  it  did  not  offer 
any  guidance  in  how  to  evaluate  the  qualitative  outputs  or  to  uphold  sustainability;  it 
proved  even  less  satisfactory  and  opened  the  way  to  a  multiplicity  of  interpretations.  Thus 
community  participation  was  increasingly  seen  as  a  means  of  ensuring  a  satisfactory  end- 
product  (Abbott  1996:  7). 
Figure  2.3:  Purposes  of  participation 
Purposes  of  Participation 
-  To  satisfy  basic  human  needs 
through  some  on  going  processes. 
Source:  Adapted  from  Lane  (1995:  183). 
Participation  as  a  means 
(Inputs  into  development  projects) 
-  To  improve  project  effectiveness 
through  the  use  of  local 
information  to  specify  problems 
and  needs  correctly. 
-  To  improve  proposals  and  avoid 
misunderstandings,  enabling 
NGOs  to  reach  more  people. 
Building  on  both  the  `paradigm  approach  model'  and  the  `project-based  model' 
Abbott  (1996)  attempted  to  develop  a  practical  model  of  the  community  participation 
process,  including  its  relationship  with  the  wider  environment  in  a  structured  way.  The 
new  model  combines  both  an  appropriate  awareness  of  the  wider  environment,  along  with 
various  issues  required  for  detailed  implementation.  Abbott  criticises  the  paradigm 
approach  model  for  it  never  successfully  addressed  the  issue  of  detailed  implementation;  it 
focused  instead  on  the  relationship  between  the  approach  and  the  dominant  paradigm. 
The  project-based  model,  on  the  other  hand,  focused  almost  exclusively  on 
implementation,  without  giving  adequate  consideration  to  the  wider  surround.  While 
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Abbott  agrees  that  the  project-based  model  has  showed  reasonable  success  regarding  the 
use  of  community  management,  since  it  operated  almost  exclusively  within  the  arena  of 
inclusion  for  which  it  is  well  suited,  his  new  model  aims  basically  to  determine  the  type  of 
implementation  that  can  be  associated  with  the  other  arenas  of  consensus  and 
confrontation. 
In  order  to  incorporate  the  arena  of  consensus,  it  is  necessary  to  strike  a  balance 
between  idealism  and  pragmatism,  between  what  is  desired  and  what  is  practically 
achievable;  hence  there  is  a  goal  against  which  the  implementation  strategy  can  be 
measured.  This  is  defined  as  customising  the  conceptual  framework  and  comprises  a  two- 
stage  process.  The  first  is  to  identify  the  elements  which  encapsulate  the  key  issues  of 
participation  process-  namely  the  needs  of  community,  project,  state  and  other  actors. 
The  end  product  of  this  stage  is  a  working  model  that  represents  a  set  of  working 
principles  that  all  parties  agree  to  as  the  basis  for  the  project  (Figure  2.4). 
Figure  2.4:  Evolution  of  the  working  model  of  community  participation 
From  the  customised 
conceptual  framework 
Initial  working 
model 
....................................................  Modified  workinig 
model 
To  implementation 
Source:  Abbott  (1996:  141). 
Quantify  roles  and 
relationships 
Capacity  assessment 
Determination  of 
appropriate  intervention 
strategies 
Check  model 
feasibility 
The  second  stage  is  to  illustrate  the  much  wider  and  more  complex  relationship 
which  exists  between  the  two  constituent  parts  of  the  participation  process-  namely  the 
elements  and  the  structure  of  the  participation  process  itself.  The  end  product  of  this  stage 
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is  a  cycle  which  shows  how  to  monitor  and  evaluate  the  community  participation  process, 
and  makes  extensive  use  of  iterative  feedback  (Figure  2.5).  These  processes  are,  to  a  large 
extent,  similar  to  the  preparation  of  a  GTZ's  project  planning  matrix  (PPM),  constructed 
by  civil  society  representatives  in  partnership  with  the  project's  experts  and  secondary 
stakeholders  through  tiers  of  `ZOPP'  sessions. 
Figure  2.5:  Relationship  between  the  elements  and  the  structure  of  the  participation 
process 
The  crºneepttial  framewrºrk  comprising  the  community  parficipation  process 
Arena  of  -  Definition  of  the  arena  of  community  participation 
«ý  which  the  project  operates,  in  terms  of  consensus 
complexity  and  openness  of  government. 
-  Identification  of  actors. 
Customised  conceptual  -  Point  on  entry  of  the  community. 
framework  1  -  Differing  needs  of  the  community. 
I  -  Needs  of  other  actors. 
Customised  conceptual  -  Develop  the  hierarchy  of  objectives  for  the 
framework  2  combined  activity/community  participation 
process. 
-  Practical  implementation. 
model  -  Role  and  relationships  of  different  actors. 
-  Quantify  intervention  strategies. 
-  Intensity  of  community. 
Evaluation  of  the  community 
-  Involvement. 
participation  process 
-  Extent  of  consensus. 
Source:  Abbott  (1996:  142). 
The  arena  of  consensus  is  the  only  one  of  the  three  operating  arenas  sited  in  a 
complex  environment,  which  makes  it  the  most  likely  one  to  utilise  all  elements.  Therefore 
"having  carried  out  the  allocation  within  this  arena,  the  same  process  can  then  be  repeated 
for  the  arena  of  inclusion  and  confrontation"  (Abbott  1996:  132).  The  structure  of 
community  participation  within  the  arena  of  inclusion  is  broadly  similar  to  that  of 
consensus,  but  much  simpler,  both  in  respect  of  the  working  model  and  of  the  number  of 
active  elements.  The  activities  which  form  the  basis  for  community  participation  in  the 
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arena  of  inclusion  are  much  more  strongly  community-oriented  than  those  operating  in  the. 
arena  of  consensus;  external  actors  do  not  operate  independently,  but  rather  are  aligned 
either  to  the  government  or  the  community.  This  reduces  the  elements  which  are 
applicable  and  thereby  simplifies  the  structure.  The  essence  of  community  participation  in 
the  arena  of  inclusion  is  that  there  should  be  no  distinction  between  the  activity  and  the 
community  participation  process.  In  other  words,  the  activity  is  both  a  means  (providing 
an  output  in  the  form  of  a  product)  and  an  end  in  itself  (community  growth  and 
development).  According  to  Abbott's  model,  that  these  two  should  not  be  separable,  but 
rather  operate  in  a  symbiotic  relationship;  thereby  avoiding  the  weakness  associated  with 
Arnstein's  ladder  where  the  continuum  collapses  in  real  field  settings. 
The  basis  of  the  community  participation  process  in  the  last  arena,  confrontation, 
defines  the  nature  of  relationship  only  between  two  actors,  the  government  and  the 
community  organisation,  with  the  part  played  by  the  former  being  the  central  issue. 
Participation  in  this  arena  is  concerned  not  so  much  with  involvement  in  the  decision- 
making  process  as  with  confrontation  and  control  over  it.  If  the  needs  of  both  actors  differ 
significantly  and  the  government  refuses  to  acknowledge  the  needs  of  the  community, 
such  as  land  title  acquisition,  then  the  needs  of  the  community  stand  in  direct  opposition 
to  the  needs  of  the  government  and  the  project  becomes  the  focus  of  a  struggle  for 
power.  The  only  avenue  for  people  to  express  their  needs  in  this  situation  is  through 
confrontation  (Abbott  1996:  149).  This  confrontation  is  the  arena  in  which  successful 
empowerment  projects  operate,  but  the  political  nature  of  the  struggle,  means  that  the 
only  way  to  achieve  success  is  to  unite  large  numbers  of  people  which,  in  the  absence  of 
conscription,  means  a  focus  on  one  specific  activity.  Therefore,  the  elements  which  go  to 
make  up  the  components  of  the  conceptual  framework  and  the  working  model  do  not 
apply  in  this  arena. 
Thus,  the  significance  of  Abbott's  model  lies  in  its  ability  to  accommodate  large 
numbers  of  the  different  variants  of  the  participation  process.  Perhaps  the  most  complex, 
but  also  the  most  cohesive,  is  the  participation  process  in  the  arena  of  consensus.  With  a- 
changing  global  economy  and  an  increased  awareness  of  the  interaction  between 
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development  and  the  environment,  an  increased  number  of  community-based  activities  can 
operate  in  this  arena.  But,  unlike  the  two  other  operating  arenas,  there  is  no  experience  to 
date  of  the  problems  and  constraints  of  operating  in  this  environment  (Abbott  1996:  151). 
Meanwhile,  although  the  conceptual  framework  of  Abbott  provides  the  basis  for  choosing 
the  appropriate  arena,  it  does  not  detail  how  the  transition  to  an  effective  implementation 
strategy  will  happen.  Nor  does  it  describe  that  strategy,  which  will  be  different  for 
different  arenas.  However,  the  model  reduces  inter-related  conflicts  over  resources  and 
control,  enables  each  actor  to  develop  his/her  own  set  of  priorities,  and  emphasises  the 
fact  that  a  multi-level,  multi  objective  intervention  strategy  can  only  begin  with  the  core 
group  of  beneficiaries,  and  then  slowly  moves  out  to  encompass  sub-groups,  identifying 
and  enabling  access  to  services  for  each  sub-group  as  the  process  expands  outwards. 
Thus  it  can  be  concluded  that  what  various  concepts  and  approaches  associated 
with  community  participation  have  in  common  is  that  `gradual  empowerment'  is  the  only 
form  of  participatory  development  which  can  enable  people  to  make  their  own 
geographies  under  conditions  of  their  own  choosing  and  human  coexistence  (Johnston  et 
al.  1994),  and  to  do  so  without  threatening  the  regime  in  power  (Mayfield  1996),  or  being 
perpetually  vulnerable  to  the  volatility  of  markets  or  the  power  of  large-scale  capitalist 
companies  (Healey  1997).  However,  it  is  also  argued  that  although  this  form  of 
empowerment  is  transitional,  it  requires  a  process  of  concession  from  the  state  to  allow  a 
greater  role  of  civil  society  to  participate  in  the  urban  governance  processes,  enhance  its 
political  rights,  and  to  apply  democratic  forms  of  citizen  political  participation  in  the 
policy-making  process  progressively.  Meanwhile  local  government  needs  to  regain  its 
accountability  gradually.  These  are  the  focus  of  Chapter  3,  which  investigates  these 
challenges  in  the  context  of  collaborative  urban  governance. 
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As  early  discussions  revealed,  although  empowerment  and  participation  as  an  end 
are  commendable,  they  are  quite  complex  processes  which  require  strong,  open  and 
accountable  local  government  institutions  working  in  partnership  with  all  interested 
parties  to  produce  adequate  policies  and  programmes  for  the  development  of  human 
settlements.  While  the  challenges  facing  national  governments  to  strike  a  balance  between 
the  harsh  ERSAPs  and  their  attempts  to  enhance  decentralisation  and  establish 
autonomous  local  government  seem  overwhelming,  the  ability  of  local  governments  to 
improve  public  services  through  sustainable,  collaborative,  consensual  and  negotiated 
planning  approaches  becomes  even  more  problematic.  They  are  often  criticised  for  poor 
performance,  work  apathy,  institutional  confusion,  bureaucratic  disdain  for  the  public  and 
widespread  corruption,  all  of  which  constrain  the  freedom  of  urban  communities.  The 
establishment  of  good  governance  has  therefore  been  identified  as  an  overriding 
development  goal  and  has  become  widely  accepted  as  a  critical  element  in  securing  stable 
economic  development  and  an  empowered  civil  society. 
Good  governance  is  envisaged  by  the  World  Bank  (1995)  as  "the  practice  by 
political  leadership  of  accountability,  transparency,  openness,  predictability,  and  the  rule 
of  law- 
... 
[but  it]  has  been  shown  to  be  a  virtual  pre-requisite  of  the  enabling  environment 
for  market-led  economic  growth".  However,  the  broader  questions  concern  what  types  of 
economic  policies,  organisational  systems,  institutional  performance,  accountable  local 
government  and  citizen-state  relation  are  required,  in  real  terms,  to  apply  good  and 
institutionalised  governance  that  can  involve  citizen  collaboration.  Moreover,  it  is 
questionable  as  to  what  level  of  institutional  capacity-building  would  be  sustainable  if  the 
existing  patterns  of  public  sector  behaviour  are  still  tailored  to  maintain  the  status  quo 
rather  than  productivity,  let  alone  the  definition  of  sustainability.  In  order  to  answer  these 
questions  in  an  objective  manner,  the  discourses  of  governance  and  urban  governance, 
including  existing  forms  of  citizen  political  participation  in  the  policy-making  in  Des  and 
western  countries,  are  reviewed  below;  the  paradigm  shift  in  urban  planning  towards 
50 Chapter  3  Collaborative  Urban  Governance 
collaborative  models  of  urban  governance  is  discussed,  and  various  approaches  to 
measure  local  government  institutional  performance  following  this  paradigm  shift  are  also 
investigated.  Two  models  of  governance-  namely  `collaborative  planning'  and  `citizen 
governance'  are  commonly  used  to  explain  these  issues.  Although  neither  model  is 
specifically  designed  for  DCs,  they  both  recognise  participation  as  the  key  to  flourishing 
in  a  complex  and  ever-changing  world  system.  By  analysing  these  substantive  core 
contexts,  it  is  possible  to  conceptualise  a  pertinent  framework,  `accountable  bureaucratic 
capacity',  that  can  best  be  used  to  investigate  local  government  accountability,  citizen 
political  responsibilities,  and  the  level  of  consensus  capacity-building  needed. 
3.1-  Urban  governance: 
Urban  governance,  which  is  defined  as  "an  efficient  and  effective  response  to 
urban  problems  by  democratically  elected  and  accountable  local  governments  working  in 
partnership  with  civil  society"  (UNCHS  1999),  implies  political  power  being  decentralised 
with  respect  to  relations  both  between  the  state  and  civil  society  and  between  different 
levels  of  government.  It  is  greatly  improved  when  it  is  based  on  multi-stakeholder 
strategic  planning,  participatory  urban  management  and  the  promotion  of  civic  values, 
while  democratic  rules  protect  the  public  realm.  Local  authorities  have  a  key  role  to  play 
in  ensuring  that  these  processes  are  put  in  place.  The  benefits  of  urban  governance  can 
include  economic  efficiency,  increased  social  equity,  overall  sustainability  and  improved 
living  conditions.  However,  because  governance  and  urban  governance  are  inextricably 
linked,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  first  the  discourse  of  the  former.  Although  governance  - 
is  defined  abstractly  as  "the  control  of  an  activity  by  some  means  such  that  a  range  of 
defined  outcomes  is  attained"  (Hirst  and  Thompson  1996:  184),  some  scholars  argue  that 
good  and  workable  definitions  of  governance  have  been  difficult  to  find  (McCarney  1996; 
Turner  and  Hulme  1997).  Most  existing  usage  seems  to  fall  into  a  trap;  governance  is 
simply  equated  with  government,  focusing  on  the  state  side  of  the  picture,  which 
concentrates  on  accountability,  transparency  and  management  and  ignores  the  role  of 
groups  in  civil  society  in  the  governing  relation. 
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The  World  Bank,  for  instance,  identifies  four  institutional  and  organisational  key  , 
dimensions  to  governance:  public  sector  management,  accountability,  the  legal  framework 
for  development,  and  information  and  transparency  (World  Bank  1992)  (Box  3.1). 
Clearly  the  implementation  of  such  institutional  and  organisational  dimensions  usually 
requires  a  redesign  of  public  policy  and  social  provision;  this  is  rarely  done  given  the 
massive  transformations  in  the  global  marketplace  and  the  complexity  and  multiplicity  of 
levels  of  types  of  governance,  which  characterise  late  twentieth-century  capitalism  and  the 
new  political  world  (Osborne  and  Geabler  1993). 
Box  3.1:  The  World  Bank  Key  dimensions  to 
"  Public  sector  management:  Government  must  manage  its  financial  and  personnel 
resources  effectively  through  appropriate  budgeting,  accounting,  reporting  systems 
and  by  rooting  out  inefficiency,  particularly  in  the  parastatal  sector. 
"  Accountability:  Public  officials  must  be  held  responsible  for  their  actions.  This 
involves  effective  accounting  and  auditing,  decentralisation,  `micro-level 
accountability'  to  consumers  and  a  role  for  non-governmental  organisations. 
"  The  legal  framework  for  development:  A  set  of  rules  must  be  known  in  advance, 
and  be  enforced;  conflicts  must  be  resolved  by  independent  judicial  bodies  and 
rules'  amending  mechanisms  when  they  no  longer  serve  their  purpose. 
"  Information  and  transparency:  Information  must  be  available  on  economic 
efficiency,  as  a  means  of  preventing  corruption,  and  to  provide  a  basis  for  policy 
analysis  and  debate. 
Source:  Adapted  from  the  World  Bank  (1992). 
However,  in  the  context  of  social  change  and  the  fear  of  its  disintegration,  the 
dominant  challenge  is  not  only  to  reform  public  policy,  but  to  knit  together  the  myriad 
institutions  involved  in  the  governing  process  and  to  enhance  democratic  processes 
_ 
(Jewson  and  MacGregor  1997:  6).  Nonetheless,  a  distinctive  and  central  element  in 
modem  politics  remains  the  claim  of  the  state  to  exclusive  control  of  a  definite  territory. 
However,  transformations  in  international  economic  relationships  and  the  enhanced 
vigour  of  locally  based  social  movements  have,  to  some  degree,  challenged  this  claim  and 
developed  increasing  demands  for  change  in  governance  processes  and  the  public  sector 
performance  through  two  concepts-  `good  governance'  and  `new  public  management 
(NPM)'-,  both  aiming  at  setting  the  intellectual  agenda  for  reform  and  change. 
L 
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Although  there  are  a  variety  of  interpretations  of  the  exact  nature  of  good 
governance,.  a  common  core  of  ideas  and  a  new  orthodoxy  have  emerged  (Moore  1993). 
This  orthodoxy  is  promoted  by  focusing  intellectual  and  political  activity  on  the  issue  of 
good  governance  and,  less  subtly,  by  agencies  attaching  political  conditionalities  to  loans 
and  grants  (Robinson  1993).  The  promotion  of  good  governance  in  DCs  has  become  a 
prime  objective  for  many  international  DAs,  and  fundamental  changes  in  political  and 
administrative  structures  through  the  application  of  the  ERSAPs  have  become  a 
prerequisite  to  receiving  aid.  Despite  fundamentally  building  on  the  World  Bank's  key 
dimensions  of  institutionalised  governance,  the  British  DFID,  for  instance,  places  good 
governance  in  a  broader  participatory  socio-political  context  and  defines  it  through  four 
main  components:  legitimacy,  accountability,  competence  and  human  rights  (ODA  1993) 
(Box  3.2). 
tsox  i.  L:  ine  urim  cuw,  ipuiºcuw  ui  guuu  guvui  nanuu 
"  Legitimacy:  Government  must  consider  the  existence  of  participatory  processes 
and  the  consent  of  those  who  are  governed. 
"  Accountability:  The  political  and  official  elements  of  government  must  be 
accountable  for  their  actions,  this  requires  the  availability  of  information,  freedom 
of  the  media,  transparency  of  decision  making,  and  the  existence  of  mechanisms 
to  call  individuals  and  institutions  to  account. 
"  Competence:  Government  must  be  competent  to  formulate  appropriate  policies, 
make  timely  decisions,  implement  them  effectively  and  deliver  services. 
"  Human  rights:  Guaranteeing  individual  and  group  rights  and  security,  and 
respecting  the  rule  of  law  are  indispensable  measures  to  provide  a  framework  for 
economic  and  social  activity  and  to  allow  and  encourage  all  individuals  to 
participate. 
Source:  Adapted  from  ODA  (1993). 
The  new  public  management  concept  (NPM),  on  the  other  hand,  has  been 
specifically  tailored  by  DAs  for  DCs  as  a  measure  to  improve  their  public  sector 
performance.  It  aims  basically  to  sweep  away  the  traditional  public  administration 
paradigm  that  underpins  their  bureaucracies  and  apply  instead  new  reform  paradigms. 
Dunleavy  and  Hood  (1994)  identify  five  main  `shifts'  in  the  move  from  public 
administration  to  the  NPM.  These  are  a)  reworking  budgets  to  be  transparent  in 
accountancy  terms;  b)  viewing  organisations  as  a  chain  of  low-trust  principal-agent 
relationships  rather  than  fiduciary  or  trustee-beneficiary  ones;  c)  disaggregating  separable 
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functions  into  quasi-contractual  or  quasi-market  forms;  d)  opening  up  provider  roles  to 
competition  between  agencies  or  between  public  agencies,  firms  and  not-for-profit  bodies; 
and  e)  decentralising  provider  roles  to  the  minimum  feasible  sized  agency.  The  proponents 
of  the  NPM  often  identify  USA,  UK  and  New  Zealand  as  an  example  of  this  mode  of 
administrative  reform.  However,  the  NPM  has  been  criticised  for  its  inability  to  tackle  the 
fundamental  problems  underlying  public  sector  performance  in  DCs,  such  as  human  error, 
poorly  designed  programmes,  corruption  and  patronage.  This  critique  points  to  the  need 
to  question  whether  NPM  can  change  organisational  culture,  or  whether  the  approach  will 
be  absorbed  in  rhetoric  while  previous  practices  persist  (Turner  and  Hulme  1997). 
This  has  shifted  governance  discourse  to  a  new  radical  direction  for  change.  Hiny 
Schachter  (1997)  addresses  new  paradigms  of  reform  by  contrasting  two  models- 
`reinventing  government'  and  `active  citizenship'.  The  first  has  been  developed  by 
Osborne  and  Gaebler  (1993)  as  a  part  of  the  `march  of  history'  and  the  `global 
revolution'.  Reinventing  government  places  its  foundation  on  `entrepreneurial  revolution' 
as  a  way  of  creating  change  through  managerial  technique.  But  this  is  viewed  as  a  passive, 
mere  managerial  and  consumerist  model  that  limits  the  engagement  of  citizens  in  the 
decision  making  processes  (Schachter  1997).  In  contrast,  according  to  the  `active 
citizenship'  model,  people  are  engaged  in  deliberation  to  influence  public-sector  decision 
making,  animated,  at  least  in  part,  by  concern  for  the  public  interest,  a  concept  that  each 
individual  may  define  in  a  different  way.  "Active  citizens  shape  the  political  agenda,  they 
deliberate  on  the  ends  that  governments  should  pursue  as  well  as  evaluating  how  well 
particular  public-sector  programmes  work  now"  (Schachter  1997). 
Evidently,  there  are  a  lot  of  similarity  between  Schachter's  model  of  `active 
citizenship'  and  Abbott's  practical  model  of  community  participation  process,  discussed 
earlier.  In  fact,  it  can  be  argued  that  both  models  have  actually  based  their  essences  on  the 
new  paradigm  of  urban  planning,  according  to  which  urban  governance  is  practised  as  a 
communicative  participatory  activity  (Habermas  1987;  Innes  1995;  Forester  1989). 
However,  let  us  establish  first  what  are  the  existing  forms  of  citizen  political  participation 
in  the  policy-making  process  (referred  hereafter  as  forms  of  governance)  in  both  DCs  and 
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briefly  in  western  countries,  so  that  the  nature  of  the  paradigm  shift  required  in  urban  , 
planning,  and  the  new  forms  of  democratic  governance,  can  be  appriciated. 
3.2-  Present  forms  of  governance: 
Democratic  forms  of  governance  are  not  only  encouraged  in  western  countries, 
but  also  strongly  urged  upon  DCs  through  the  application  of  the  ERSAPs.  The  general 
perception  of  governance  forms  in  DCs  is  that  there  are  fewer  participants  in  the  process 
of  policy-making,  and  the  official  channels  for  political  participation  are  more  restricted, 
which  frequently  yield  non-democratic  forms  of  mobilising  power  including  violent 
challenges  to  the  government  (Turner  and  Hulme  1997:  70).  This  is  best  understood 
through  comparing  two  sets  of  policy  change  models,  society-centred  and  state-centred, 
constructed  by  Grindle  and  Thomas  (1991)  and  adapted  by  (Turner  and  Hulme  1997). 
While  society-centred  include  models  that  focus  on  social  class  analysis,  pluralism  and 
public  choice,  state-centred  include  models  the  envisage  rational  actors,  bureaucratic 
politics  and  state  interests  (Figure  3.1). 
In  society-centred  models  explanations  are  based  in  terms  of  the  power  relations 
between  social  groups  such  as  classes  and  interest  groups.  The  mechanisms  of  decision- 
making  take  a  minor  role.  In  contrast,  state-centred  analysis  focuses  on  decision-making 
within  the  organisational  context  of  the  state.  The  decision-maker  has  considerably  more 
capacity  for  choices,  while  societal  constraints  are  less  emphasised  as  investigators  of 
debate,  complex  actor  motivation  or  delve  into  organisational  politics  of  the  state. 
Therefore,  Nordlinger  (1987)  argues  that  taking  the  state  seriously  still  requires  bringing 
statist  and  societal  accounts  of  state  autonomy  together  in  mutually  illuminating  and 
analytically  integrated  ways.  Although  state-centred  models  provide  wider  chances  for 
enhanced  state-society  relations,  especially  within  the  state-interests  approach,  the 
majority  of  DCs  actually  apply  a  form  of  governance  which  often  combines  the  pluralism 
and  the  bureaucratic  politics  forms.  The  Head  of  state  often  acts  as  the  princely  arbiter  of 
disputes,  sometimes  overruling  the  cabinet,  while  appointed  or  elected  provincial  rulers 
frequently  influence  the  sovereignty  of  local  councils. 
55 
J Chapter  3  Collaborative  Urban  Governance 
Figure  3.1:  Forms  of  governance  in  developing  countries 
Social  class  analysis: 
Characteristic  of  Marxist  and  dependency  theory.  Policy  is  the  prerogative 
of  the  dominant  metropolitan  bourgeoisie.  May  incorporate  some 
concessions  to  the  subordinate  classes. 
Pluralism: 
Society-centred  Adapted  model  of  western  democracy.  Power  is  theoretically  distributed 
ºnodeis  among  active  societal  groups  and  civil  society,  while  the  state  acts  as  an 
arbiter  in  democratic  competition  responding  to  pressures  from  society. 
Public  choice: 
Similar  to  pluralism,  but  seems  irrational  because  organised  interest  groups 
or  individuals  obtain  preferment  from  the  state  and  facilitate  access  to  public 
Foods  and  regulations.  The  Door  lose  unless  they  articulate  their  interests. 
Rational  actors: 
Actors  (whether  persons,  governments  or  interest  groups)  behave  as  rational 
choosers  between  alternative  actions.  Involves  idealistic  sequence  of  goals, 
obiectives  and  priorities  which  are  difficult  to  achieve  in  the  real  world. 
1  Bureaucratic  politics:  State-centred  Decision-making  model  in  which  public  officials  engage  in  politics,  co-opt  or 
Models  compromise  to  secure  desired  policy  outcomes.  Constant  conflict  over  policy 
options  as  power  is  concentrated  and  subject  to  personal  idiosyncrasies. 
State  interests: 
Macro-political  neo-Marxist  model  in  which  the  state  acts  autonomously 
against  dominant  classes  in  defining  the  nature  of  public  problems  and 
developing  solutions.  Local  government-society  pursue  collective  interests. 
Source:  Author-  Adapted  from  Grindle  and  Thomas  (1991);  Turner  and  Hulme  (1997). 
Democratic  forms  of  governance  in  many  DCs,  such  as  parliaments  and 
congresses,  are  typically  closed  or  shorn  of  power,  regime  opponents  may  be  imprisoned, 
the  media  are  tightly  controlled  and  citizen  mobilisation  is  at  the  behest  of  the  state 
(Turner  and  Hulme  1997).  Of  course  this  is  inveterate;  imperious  public  servants,  army  - 
intervention  in  politics  or  prolonged  authoritarian  military  regimes  have  been  common 
forms  of  political  reign  in  a  great  many  DCs,  which  are  far  from  constituting  a 
homogenous  society.  The  implication  of  these  forms  of  governance  in  the  context  of 
urban  reproduction  is  that  while  a  large  number  of  under-qualified  decision-makers  are 
frequently  co-opted  by  the  state  through  a  systematic  organisation  of  patron-clientelism 
and  nepotism  in  exchange  for  their  faithfulness  (Lowder  1989;  Schenk  1989),  they  often 
appoint  inexperienced  practitioners  to  be  in  charge  of  urban  planning,  who  fail  to  promote 
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any  democratic  developmental  policies.  Thus,  elites  are  loath  to  thrust  authority  on  those 
below  them,  and  those  below  are  unaccustomed  to  accept  responsibility. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  basically  four  forms  of  western  governance,  which 
have  been  adopted  interchangeably  by  different  governments  at  different  phases  of  the 
modernisation  process.  These  are  representative  democracy,  pluralist  democracy, 
corporatism,  and  clientelism  (Figure  3.2).  While  most  state-centred  scholars  have  tended 
to  focus  on  national  institutions  (national  legislatures,  central  bureaucracies,  political 
party  systems-  embedded  in  representative  democracy  and  corporatism),  most  society- 
centred  models  have  focused  on  the  pluralistic  perspectives  (interest  groups  and  lobbyists) 
or  a  Marxist  perspective  (class-based  interests)  in  demonstrating  the  dominance  of  various 
societal/political  forces  in  the  governance  process  (Mayfield  1996:  17). 
Figure  3.2:  Forms  of  governance  in  western  countries 
Representative  democracy: 
Idealistic  model  of  a  democratic  state,  in  which  governments  are  created  on 
behalf  of,  and  at  the  service  of  citizens  as  electors.  Practitioners  report  to 
J 
politicians  who,  in  turn,  are  answerable  to  citizens  through  the  ballot  box. 
Existing  Pluralist  democracy: 
fo  rms  of  Mindful  of  diversified  interest  groups.  Although  politicians  are  also  elected 
through  the  ballot  box,  they  have  an  enhanced  role  to  act  as  arbiters  among  gor  ernance  .  gis  >  different  groups  rather  than  to  articulate  the  public  interest  (politics  of  voice  ). 
reflected  in 
regulation,  Corporatism: 
allocation  and  Neo-elite  realistic  version  of  representative  democracy  and  pluralism.  Based 
justiIcatitýtl  on  `shared  power',  specially  among  powerful  interest  groups,  e.  g.  trade 
...............  unions  and  major  businesses.  Intensifies  partnership  and  stable  consensus. 
Clientelism: 
_  Ever-present  form  of  governance.  Allocation  and  distribution  of  resources 
are  based  on  reciprocal  relations  of  obligation.  In  return  for  a  vote  and  other 
favours,  patrons  (politicians  and  practitioners)  direct  resources  to  clients. 
Source:  Author-  Adapted  from  Healey  (1997);  Mayfield  (1996)  and  Box  (1998). 
According  to  representative  democracy,  citizens  elect  their  representatives,  the 
politicians,  who  are  in  turn  responsible  for  articulating  the  `public  interest'  and  overseeing 
the  work  of  practitioners  and  public  administrators.  Governance  is  thus  focused  on  the 
institutions  of  formal  government,  and  carried  out  with  the  assistance  of  hierarchically- 
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structured  bureaucracies.  Municipal  officials  justify  their  actions  and  decisions  upwards  to 
their  superiors  and  the  politicians  to  whom  they  are  accountable,  rather  than  outwards  to 
citizens  (Healey  1997:  221).  This  model  is  hardly  applicable  in  the  real  world  because  it 
presumes  that  society  is  homogenous  and  all  citizens  are  politically  active,  while  in  reality 
politicians  do  not  aggregate  all  citizens'  interest  on  every  issue,  not  all  citizens  participate, 
and  officials  are  often  subject  to  all  kinds  of  influences  in  all  areas  of  governance. 
Conversely,  interest  diversity  is  recognised  in  the  model  of  pluralist  democracy,  which 
presupposes  a  society  is  composed  of  many  different  groups  and  interests,  which  compete 
to  define  the  government's  agenda  of  action.  As  within  DCs,  western  politicians  in 
pluralist  democracies  spend  less  effort  on  articulating  the  public  interest  than  on 
arbitrating  between  different  interest  groups.  Pluralist  democracy  produces  a  `politics  of 
voice'  in  which  competing  claims  and  groups  are  encouraged  to  articulate  their  concern  in 
adversarial  forms  as  fixed  interests  and  preferences  (Healey  1997:  223).  However,  the 
model  of  pluralist  democracy  has  been  criticised  for  its  assumption  that  all  groups  are 
relatively  equal  in  the  competitive  game;  in  reality,  this  model  has  resulted  in  creating 
political  lobbyists  and  social  discrepancy  in  which  preoccupied  citizens  say  `no'  to  any 
proposal  coming  from  the  government  or  any  other  group  (Forester  1989;  Mayfield 
1996).  In  cities,  the  role  of  planners  has  thus  transformed  from  experts  into  mediators 
between  competitors  and  arguing  for  particular  qualities  of  local  environments,  which 
raised  major  problems  of  ethics  and  legitimacy  (Healey  1997:  224). 
In  trying  to  excise  these  weaknesses  of  pluralist  democracy,  corporatism 
recognises  that  governments  are  far  from  being  an  egalitarian  `politics  of  voice',  but 
rather  the  creatures  of,  responder  to,  a  few  powerful  interests-  referred  to  as  a  neo-elite 
version  of  democracy  (Harding  1995).  At  all  levels  of  governance-  national,  regional  or 
local,  a  form  of  collaboration  between  government,  major  business  organisations  and  the 
trades  unions  is  routinely  practised  to  determine  and  prioritise  the  public  interest  in  a 
`shared  power'  process  (Mayfield  1996).  It  has  been  argued  that  the  corporatism  model 
has  many  advantages.  It  can  develop  and  deliver  a  stable  consensus,  co-ordinates  various 
dimensions  of  governance,  enables  long-term  horizons  to  override  the  ebb  and  flow  of 
58 Chapter  3  Collaborative  Urban  Governance 
political  majorities,  allows  `mutual  learning'  among  all  partners,  and  avoids  the  kind  of 
adversarial  competitive  politics  embedded  in  the  pluralist  approaches,  -  which  have 
developed  in  the  US,  the  UK  and  Australia  (Healey  1997:  225).  While  the  corporatism 
model  is  widely  practised  in  Europe,  apart  from  the  UK,  and  most  notably  in  Germany 
and  the  Netherlands,  representative  democracy  and  corporatism  are,  however,  "the 
models  most  associated  with  apparatus  of  the  modernist,  managerial  state  by  post-modern 
critiques"  (Healey  1997:  231). 
Although  the  last  western  form  of  governance,  clientelism,  involves  an  interactive 
relationship  between  politicians  and  government  officials,  the  processes  of  implementation 
are  highly  politicised;  it  does  so  in  particularistic  hidden  ways  based  on  personal  and 
social  networks  in  which  elected  politicians  and  officials  become  critical  gatekeepers  in 
managing,  allocating  and  distributing  resources  (Grindle  and  Thomas  1991:  66).  The 
model  of  clientelism  is  based  on  a  system  of  reciprocal  relations  of  obligation.  In  return 
for  a  vote  and  other  favours,  patrons  (politicians  and  elected  mayors)  dole  out  resources 
to  their  clients  (family  members  and  friends),  e.  g.  through  access  to  government  funds, 
land,  binding  regulations  or  tolerance  of  illegal  building  (Healey  1997:  229).  It  lacks  a 
developmental  agenda  and  is  thus  deeply  conservative.  The  patronage  structure  embedded 
in  clientelistic  governance  both  reflects  and  reinforces  the  existing  power  relations  of 
political  communities.  Although  this  type  of  governance  has  been  long  practised  in 
Southern  Italy,  it  is  also  widely  associated  with  relatively  weak  and/or  post-colonial 
governments  world-wide.  However,  it  has  been  argued  that  various  forms  of  governance, 
in  both  western  or  DCs,  still  lack  inclusionary  ways  of  collaboration,  consensus-building 
and  explicit  efforts  to  generate  and  maintain  the  structural  framing  of  our  contemporary 
societies,  given  the  diverse  interests  and  cultural  backbases  in  our  differentiated  societies 
(Walzer  1995;  McCarney  1996;  Healey  1997;  Friedman  and  Douglas  1998).  This  has 
focused  attention  in  search  for  new  models  of  collaborative  governance. 
3.3-  Collaborative  models  of  governance: 
The  evolving  forms  of  democratic  governance  are  based  on  the  paradigm  shift  in 
urban  planning  in  which  collaborative  urban  governance  is  seen  as  a  necessity  for  any 
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institutional  change  or  restructuring  of  society,  where  culture  and  identity  have  been 
reinterpreted  and  people  have  come  to  see  the  natural  environment  as  something  more 
than  a  resource  or  a  setting  for  human  action  (Forester  1996;  Sandercock  1998).  In  trying 
to  develop  the  `representative  democracy'  approach  of  governance  further,  collaborative 
models  of  urban  governance  invoke  the  argument  that  governance  is  not  just  the  province 
of  the  state,  but  rather  it  includes  a  wide  range  of  activities.  As  a  result  of  the  continuing 
urban  economic  crisis  and  the  binary  split  between  the  `localist'  and  `globalist' 
approaches,  urban  governance  has  now  moved  beyond  the  often  simplistic  suppositions  of 
the  1980s  (Graham  1995:  88).  Renewed  interest  in  theorising  the  continued  significance 
of  subnational  territories  within  a  seemingly  ever  more  closely  integrated  global  economy 
has  shifted  the  paradigm  from  reinvigorating  the  theory  of  agglomeration  (Scott  1986),  to 
tracing  the  `new  regionalism'  produced  from  re-scaling  of  political  process  (Keating 
1997),  and  the  autonomous  institutional  capacities  of  regions  to  organise  for  economic 
development  (Amin  and  Thrift  1995;  Korten  1996). 
In  view  of  the  latter,  the  proponents  of  the  institutionalised  performance  of  urban 
governance  are  now  concerned  about  how  to  give  various  stakeholders  a  voice  in 
planning  through  the  creation  of  new  constitutions  and  institutions  that  provide  citizens 
with  the  necessary  empowerment.  Associative  democracy  (Amin  and  Thrift  1995), 
interactive  governance  (Amin  and  Hausner  1997),  collaborative  planning  (Healey  1997), 
and  citizen  governance  (Box  1998)  have  each  found  favour  as  possible  formulations  of  a 
`third  way'  between  market-based  and  centrally-planned  forms  of  economic  and  political 
governance  (Giddens  1998).  The  two  models  of  `collaborative  planning'  and  `citizen 
governance',  in  particular,  agree  that  planning  is  a  policy-driven,  co-ordinative, 
knowledge-rich,  and  future-oriented  approach  to  urban  governance.  Although  both 
models  completely  reject  the  pluralist  and  clientelistic  forms  of  governance,  they 
acknowledge  the  existing  forms  of  `representative  democracy'  and  `corporatism',  in  that 
they  can  provide  a  stable  consensus  around  which  policy  programmes  can  develop,  as 
well  as  a  way  of  developing  a  `unitary'  conception  of  the  `public  interest'  with  which  to 
develop  policy  direction.  However,  `representative  democracy'  and  `corporatism'are  also 
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criticised  for  they  tend  to  operate  in  rigid  hierarchical  ways:  "They  encourage  a  separation 
of  policy  development  and  delivery  from  the  arenas  of  political  argumentation.  They 
involve  a  narrow  range  of  interests  in  the  processes  of  governance,  either  through  the 
representation  of  elected  politicians  or  a  partnership  with  business"  (Healey  1997:  231). 
In  search  for  an  alternative  form  of  urban  governance,  Healey  (1997)  proposes  a 
new  framework  for  `spatial  and  environmental  planning',  referred  to  as  the  transformative 
power  praxis  in  development,  which  is  rooted  in  institutional  realities  and  centres  on 
forging  new  discourses  between  different  groups,  agencies  and  individuals  in  fragmented 
societies  as  a  way  of  planning  and  making  sense  together  while  living  differently.  Drawing 
mainly  on  institutionalist  sociology,  regional  economics,  and  the  communicative  approach 
to  planning  theory,  Healey  aims  at  applying  a  new  understanding  to  contemporary 
participatory  planning  and  policy  making.  Focusing  on  the  writings  of  the  sociologist 
Anthony  Giddens  (1984;  1990)  and  the  philosopher  Jurgen  Habermas  (1987),  Healey 
develops  Giddens'  theory  of  structuration,  thereby  playing  a  major  role  in  the  developed 
institutionalist  approach,  as  it  expounds  the  argument  that  individuals  are  neither  fully 
autonomous  nor  automatons.  Structuring  forces  in  society  shape  our  actions  but  we  can 
also  shape  those  structuring  forces.  This  has  obvious  application  to  spatial  planning,  as 
Healey  points  out,  which  in  this  conception  becomes  an  effort  in  shaping  or  framing  the 
webs  of  relationships  through  which  people  give  value  and  take  actions  with  respect  to 
their  related  places  and  symbolic/institutionalised  organisation.  In  the  urban  upgrading 
context,  this  refers  to  the  processes  through  which  squatters  can  participate  in  a  collective 
_ 
dialogue  to  construct  their  imaginary  transformed  place  and  reconstruct/enhance  their 
own  sense  of  identity.  The  transformative  power  praxis  and  the  proposed  `collaborative 
planning'  framework  argue  that  urban  governance  has  traditionally  been  `trapped'  inside  a 
modernist  instrumental  rationalism  for  many  years  without  recognising  the  links  between 
the  ways  people  live  their  lives,  nor  did  it  recognise  the  operation  of  systems  of  local  and 
national  governance  and  the  planning  decisions  that  shape  our  built  environment.  This 
places  fundamental  principles  of  `good'  urban  upgrading  practice  and  promoting  active 
61 Chapter  3  Collaborative  Urban  Governance 
and  representative  citizen  participation  in  which  community  members  can  meaningfully 
influence  decisions  that  affect  their  lives. 
Box  (1998)  has  also  attempted  to  develop  a  `citizen  governance'  model  which 
serves  the  public  and,  in  its  ideal  form,  strengthens  the  professionalism  of  development 
practitioners  in  USA.  The  thrust  of  this  model  is  the  argument  that  the  way  to  find  the 
development  practices  best  suited  to  the  community  is  to  use  the  principles  of 
governance,  i.  e.  scale,  democracy,  accountability,  and  rationality,  as  a  primary  guide.  The 
three  basic  actors  in  citizen  governance  are  the  governing  bodies,  citizens,  and 
practitioners.  The  model  attempts  to  change  their  roles:  the  citizens  from  outsiders  to 
decision  makers,  the  governing  bodies  from  representative  of  elite  interests  to  legislators 
responsive  to  the  needs  of  the  whole  community,  while  practitioners  are  the  experts  (Box 
1998).  To  do  this,  a  Co-ordinating  Council,  a  Citizen's  Board  and  a  Helper  are  needed. 
The  function  of  the  Co-ordinating  Council  is  to  move  elected  governing  bodies  from  a 
`central  decision  making'  role  to  a  `citizen's  co-ordinating'  role,  delegating  power  to 
citizen  boards,  hearing  their  recommendations  and  affirming  or  modifying  their  work  to  fit 
overall  community  goals.  The  Citizen's  Board,  on  the  other  hand,  is  responsible  for 
creating  citizen  advisory  boards  to  assist  in  administering  major  local  government 
functions,  such  as  utilities,  public  works  and  social  services,  while  the  Helper  aims 
basically  to  change  the  role  of  public  service  practitioners  from  controlling  public 
bureaucracies  to  assisting  citizens  in  understanding  community  issues  and  services, 
helping  them  to  make  informed  decisions  about  public  programmes,  and  carrying  out  daily 
tasks  of  implementation  (Box  1998:  164). 
Although  there  are  important  differences  in  the  origin  and  emphasis  of  Healey's 
`collaborative  planning'  and  Box's  `citizen  governance'  models,  there  are  also  some 
important  similarities.  For  instance,  both  place  the  building  of  institutional  capacity  and 
the  inclusive  involvement  of  all  relevant  stakeholders  in  the  governance  processes, 
through  the  setting  up  of  new  systems  and  policy-making  procedures,  at  the  centre  of 
their  democratic  transformative  power  praxis.  In  doing  so,  both  models  try  to  avoid 
converting  societies  into  a  legal  morass  of  litigation  and  target,  instead,  gradual  and 
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systematic  institutional  change  through  creating  new  structures  that  can  consider  the  full 
range  of  stakeholders'  rights  and  duties,  build  links  which  can  foster  social  learning,  and 
encourage  practices  in  a  public  realm  of  multi-cultural  confrontations. 
Recent  debates  in  planning  theory,  that  emphasise  a  `dark  side  to  institutional 
interactions  and  social  actions',  have  nevertheless  criticised  both  the  `idealistic  visions'  of 
communicative  participatory  activity,  including  `optimistic'  normative  models,  such  as 
`collaborative  planning'  and  `citizen  governance',  as  well  as  some  of  the  key-dimensions 
of  urban  governance,  such  as  democratisation  and  participatory  urban  management 
(Flyvbjerg  1998;  Yitachel  1998).  Such  Theorists  draw  upon  a  tradition  which  dates  back 
to  Machiavelli  to  show  how  the  widespread  presence  of  `realpolitics'  and  Machiavellian 
behaviour  may  belie  or  distort  communicative  action.  With  their  emphasis  on  the  potential 
asymmetry  that  exists  between  power  and  rationality  in  the  real  world,  the  opponents  of 
collaborative  urban  governance  argue  that  the  distorting  effects  of  power  are  more 
pervasive  than  the  effects  of  rationality,  a  situation  which  is  more  likely  to  occur  in  the 
context  of  DCs  planning.  One  important  product  of  power,  as  it  is  exercised  by  individual 
stakeholders  and  apparent  in  the  structuring  of  social  action  with  collaborative 
governance,  is  the  presence  of  `strategic  direction'  as  an  `ideal'  and  benign  form  of 
direction.  Amin  and  Hausner  (1997:  17)  strongly  criticise  such  a  `strategic  guidance'  and 
depict  it  as  "a  mixture  of  highly  diffused  and  reflexive  governance  capability  resulting  in 
inter-institutional  overlap  and  contact  ...  and  forms  of  leadership  in  which  the  main  task  is 
not  to  dominate  but  to  guide,  arbitrate  and  facilitate".  However,  they  also  acknowledge 
two  less  benign  forms  of  direction-  namely  `hegemony'  (structural  dominance)  and 
`leadership'  (formally  constituted  hierarchical  power)-  which  may,  in  fact,  run  the  risk  of 
becoming  a  democracy  of,  and  for,  the  powerful  and  thus  promoting  associative  forms  of 
urban  governance  in  the  long-term  (Phelps  and  Tewdwr-Jones  1999). 
A  similar  critique  against  another  one  of  the  main  essences  of  urban  governance, 
sustainability,  is  raised  by  Marcuse  (1998),  who  argues  that  sustainability,  acting  as  a 
concept  and  a  slogan,  has  been  both  an  honourable  goal  for  carefully  defined  purposes 
and  a  camouflaged  trap  for  the  well-intentioned  unwary.  Marcuse  argues  that 
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sustainability  and  social  justice  do  not  necessarily  go  hand  in  hand  in  a  collaborative 
governance_  process  because  sustainability  encourages  several  forms  of  unjust  status  quo 
world-wide  resulting  in  many  bad  programmes  being  sustainable,  e.  g.  owned  and  operated 
public  housing  and/or  forcible  evictions  without  due  process  of  law.  Thus  sustainability 
should  not  be  considered  as  a  goal  for  a  housing  or  urban  programme,  but  as  a  constraint 
whose  presence  may  limit  the  usefulness  of  a  good  programme. 
While  sustainability  may  be  a  useful  formulation  of  goals  on  environmental  issues, 
it  is  a  treacherous  one  for  urban  governance  since  it  suggests  the  possibility  of  a  conflict- 
free  consensus  on  policies  whereas  vital  interests  do  conflict  in  the  real  world  (Marcuse 
1998;  Abbott  1996).  Indeed,  sustainability,  as  a  process  which  provides  services  that 
people  want  and  need  (Mayfield  1996:  232),  takes  more  than  simply  better  knowledge 
and  a  clearer  understanding  to  produce  change  (Marcuse  1998).  It  requires  inputs  and 
resources  that  are  available  over  an  extended  period  of  time,  and  is  based  on 
organisational/management  systems  which  are  compatible  and  relevant  to  the  political, 
economic,  social,  and  cultural  realties  in  which  they  function.  Finally, 
sustainability/institutionalisation  requires  an  awareness  of  how  capital  costs  to  provide 
new  services  might  be  obtained,  as  well  as  how  recurrent  costs  for  present  activities  will 
be  financed  in  the  future.  Only  then,  can  sustainability  imply  the  ability  not  only  to 
formulate  and  operate  a  desirable  urban  programme,  but  also  to  see  it  continue  without 
detracting  from  others  (Marcuse  1998);  thus  the  concept  may  usefully  emphasise  the 
importance  of  long-term  practicality  of  such  programmes. 
3.4-  The  local  government  context: 
In  a  global  context  of  profound  change,  many  countries  in  DCs  are  engaged  in 
processes  of  decentralisation  of  state  structures  and  functions,  and  trying  to  initiate 
critical  transitional  steps  to  democratisation  as  a  part  of  their  ERSAPs.  Yet,  issues  of 
community  participation  have  raised  a  large  number  of  questions  regarding  the  role  of 
local  government,  its  accountability  and  performance,  in  the  urban  governance  processes. 
These  concern  the  structure  best  suited  for  a  responsive  local  government,  the  services 
expected  from  it,  the  locus  of  greatest  power  and  control  in  communities,  the  roles  that 
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citizens,  elected  representatives  and  practitioners  can  play  to  increase  their  effective 
participation,  and  the  level  of  institutional  capacity-building  which  leads  to  greatest 
efficiency. 
While  outlining  the  challenges  that  confront  DCs  in  their  quest  for  economic 
reform  is  a  relatively  easy  task,  it  is  a  far  more  difficult  task  to  assess  the  capacity  of  their 
bureaucracies  to  meet  those  challenges  and  to  implement  the  institutional  and  structural 
adjustment  parts  of  reform  (McCarney  1996).  There  are  limitations  to  national 
government  and  civil  society  action,  limitations  of  competence  and  resources,  resulting 
from  the  increased  reluctance  of  the  public  to  allow  government  control  over  their  lives 
(Turner  and  Hulme  1997).  Along  with  the  inefficiencies  of  large-scale  social  welfare 
programmes  and  scepticism  about  government's  ability  to  administer  its  programmes 
competently,  the  shortage  of  resources,  especially  access  to  legal  land  and  basic 
infrastructure,  has  led  citizens  to  expect  less  from  their  national  governments  and  to  turn 
instead  toward  their  own  community  organisations  and/or  local  governance  entities  as  the 
focus  of  their  problem-solving  efforts.  This  has  placed  pressure  on  governments  to 
strengthen  the  capacities  and  performance  of  local  government,  and  to  reinforce  measures 
to  `eradicate'  corruption  and  ensure  greater  transparency,  efficiency,  accountability, 
responsiveness  and  community  participation  in  the  management  of  local  resources 
(UNCHS  1997). 
Some  research  has  argued  that  small  and  responsive  local  government  means 
government  shaped  in  response  to  citizen  desires  for  lean  and  effective  governments; 
government  that  is  less  intrusive  into  private  lives,  delivers  services  according  to  citizens' 
requirements  and  does  so  in  a  user-friendly  manner  rather  than  as  a  ponderous 
bureaucracy  (Grindle  and  Thomas  1991;  McCarney  1996;  Healey  1997;  Box  1998). 
Meanwhile,  as  a  result  of  the  economic  restructuring  of  local  economies  and  deep-seated 
changes  in  the  machinery  of  government  at  both  local  and  national  levels,  public-private 
partnership  is  now  widely  accepted  as  a  new  entrepreneurial  form  of  local  government 
that  entails  new  styles  of  management  and  accounting  for  public  finance  (Jewson  and 
MacGregor  1997).  This  new  public  sense,  along  with  the  application  of  ERSAPs,  yielded 
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many  other  measures,  i.  e.  privatisation  of  public  services,  entrepreneurialsm  in  public 
management,  total  quality  management  and  customer  service  orientation.  Although  all  of 
these  measures  share  the  same  values  of  partnership,  including  self-reliance,  individual 
liberty,  and  creating  responsive  local  government,  not  all  of  them  are  useful  in  all 
situations  (Box  1998).  Habitat's  agenda  for  capacity-building  and  institutional 
development,  for  instance,  encourages  local  governments  in  DCs  to  establish  a  specific 
kind  of  partnership,  `partnership  for  urban  innovation',  that  can  promote  policy  dialogue 
among  all  levels  of  government,  the  private  and  community  sectors,  and  other 
representatives  of  civil  society  (UNCHS  1997).  Theoretically,  Habitat  argues  that  this 
kind  of  partnership  can  analyse,  evaluate  and  disseminate  information. 
Partnership  and  good  performance  of  local  government  are,  indeed,  crucial  for  the 
prosperity  of  any  society.  But,  in  reality  some  local  governments  in  DCs  are  facing 
profound  challenges  not  only  as  a  result  of  the  shifting  global  context,  but  also  due  to  an 
internal  bureaucratic  culture  which  impedes  efficiency.  There  is  a  persistent  myth  or 
perhaps  naive  assumption  that  policies  made  by  DAs  or  politicians  are  implemented 
rationally  by  public  servants,  as  if  implementation  is  something  utterly  simple  and 
automatic  (Turner  and  Hulme  1997).  While  politicians  and  bureaucrats  are  active  in 
promulgating  this  myth  in  order  to  remain  in  control,  the  reality  is  somewhat  different 
and,  therefore,  the  end  product  is  often  undesirable.  Many  examples  stemming  from 
different  DCs'  cities  reveal  that  sporadic  joint-ventures  to  reform  local  governments  have 
failed  simply  because  the  reform  policies  did  not  consider  the  existing  performance  levels 
of  newly  empowered  local  governments,  enmeshed  in  a  post-colonial  bureaucratic  culture, 
which  set  the  real  norms  of  bureaucratic  performance  (Choguill  1987;  McCarney  1996; 
Mayfield  1996;  Opeskin  1996;  Randel  and  German  1997).  It  is  difficult  for  such  local 
governments,  established  along  traditional  lines  to  regulate,  administer  and  manage  the 
local  environment  and  the  delivery  of  services,  to  operate  within  a  non-traditional  city 
built  largely  outside  of  any  regulatory  framework  (McCarney  1996).  Local  government 
performance  and  accountability  are  more  than  just  a  technical  or  administrative  milieu, 
and  more  than  just  a  reformed  bureaucratic  structure  with  new  autonomous  powers  and 
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functions.  This  dictates  both  a  better  understanding  of  local  government  capacity, 
performance  and  a  reconsideration  of  its  accountability. 
3.5-  Accountable  bureaucratic  capacity: 
Performance  is  a  slippery  concept  (Jackson  1995).  How  do  we  know  improved 
performance  if  it  is  claimed,  and  what  are  the  critical  measures  of  success?  There  is  a 
broad  agreement  in  the  literature  that  it  is  multidimensional,  and  that  there  is  no  single 
ideal  indicator  (Carter  1991;  World  Bank  1992;  Jackson  1995).  While  some  disciplines 
may  only  point  in  one  direction,  political  judgement  frequently  trades  one  indictor  off 
against  other,  e.  g.  service  supply  economy  as  against  efficiency.  But  if  dimensions  of 
performance  cannot  be  measured,  there  is  nothing  to  trade  off  (Jackson  1995:  2). 
Therefore,  performance  measurement  still  stands  at  the  cross-roads  of  many  of  the  `big 
issues'.  It  is  not  a  simple  technocratic  exercise.  Any  serious  treatment  of  performance 
measurement  needs  to  get  beyond  discussion  of  the  adequacy  of  the  measures  themselves. 
It  should  confront  the  problems  of  what  local  government  should  be  doing;  whose  values 
are  to  count  in  a  value-for-money  audit;  how  conflicting  values  can  be  reconciled;  and 
establishing  the  critical  factors  for  success.  The  key  question  is:  how  accountable 
democratic  local  government  can  be  designed  to  ensure  that  appropriate  incentives  exist 
to  assure  high  performance.  Value-for-money  is,  in  fact,  more  than  just  ensuring  financial 
propriety  (Jackson  1995:  2).  It  brings  with  it  assurance  and  hence  confidence  in  the 
functioning  of  the  system  of  local  government,  a  trust  that  resources  are  being  allocated 
to  those  issues  that  the  majority  of  the  electorate  care  about-  even  to  those  areas  that  - 
represent  minority  interests. 
The  quest  for  improvement  in  public  sector  performance  has  been  a  long  one 
embracing  the  personnel,  the  organisation  and  methods  of  local  government  offices, 
focusing  on  what  government  can  properly  and  successfully  do,  and  how  it  can  do  it  with 
the  utmost  possible  efficiency  and  with  the  least  possible  money  or  energy  (Jackson 
1995).  Today  the  debate  continues;  what  activities  and  functions  should  be  done  by  local 
government  and  what  functions  are  better  done  by  civil  society  and  a  private  sector 
partnership.  The  fact  that  these  issues  remain  contentious  and  unresolved  does  not  reflect 
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the  lack  of  wit  on  the  part  of  public  policy  analysts.  Rather,  the  allocation  of  functions  to 
government  reflects  ideological  preferences.  Jackson  (1995)  argues  that  there  is  no  long- 
run  stability  in  the  dominant  ideological  view,  so  the  issue  is  continuously  debated. 
Moreover,  changes  in  technology  have  resulted  in  changes  in  the  comparative  advantages 
of  the  market  and  the  institution  of  government  in  delivering  services.  This  is  reflected  in 
the  new  wave  of  contracting  out  and  the  notion  of  government  as  an  `enabler'  rather  that 
absolute  `supplier'  (World  Bank  1992). 
No  longer  is it  necessary  for  local  government  to  produce  all  the  services  that  it 
provides.  Rather,  it  must  ensure  that  services  are  provided  to  a  predetermined 
specification  based  on  citizen's  need.  Whether  or  not  local  government  acts  as  an  enabler, 
it  is  also  charged  with  the  responsibility  of  assuring  that  its  budgets  give  value  for  money. 
The  phrase  `value  for  money'  is  imprecise  but  is  generally  thought  to  refer  to  the 
performance  of  public  sector  departments  and  agencies.  The  quest  for  `value  for  money' 
in  local  government  has  stimulated  the  spread  of  performance  measure  systems.  Such 
systems  contain  sets  of  performance  indicators  (PIs)  constructed  to  provide  information 
on  the  various  dimensions  of  performance,  commonly  referred  to  as  the  `Three  Es': 
Economy,  Efficiency  and  Effectiveness.  These  have  been  defined  by  Jackson  and  Palmer 
(1989)  and  adapted  by  Jackson  (1995)  (Box  3.3). 
Box  3.3:  Indicators  of  bureaucratic  performance  (the  `Three  Es'). 
Economy:  The  terms  and  conditions  under  which  an  organisation  acquires  human  and  material 
resources;  an  economical  organisation  acquires  these  resources  in  appropriate  quantity  and  quality 
and  at  least  cost.  It  is  concerned  with  minimising  the  cost  of  resources  acquired  or  used,  having 
regard  to  appropriate  quality;  thus  `spending  less'. 
Efficiency:  The  relationship  between  the  goods  and  services  produced  and  the  resources  used  to 
produce  them;  an  efficient  organisation  produces  the  maximum  output  for  any  given  set  of 
resource  inputs,  or  minimises  the  inputs  necessary  to  produce  a  given  quality  and  quantity  of 
outputs.  How  far  is  maximum  output  achieved  for  a  given  input,  or  minimum  input  used  for  a 
given  output;  `spending  well'. 
Effectiveness:  The  extent  to  which  the  defined  task  or  work  programme  has  been  accomplished  in 
relation  to  overall  aims.  It  is  concerned  with  the  relationship  between  the  intended  results  and  the 
actual  results  of  projects,  programmes,  or  other  activities.  How  successfully  do  outputs  of  goods, 
services  or  other  results  achieve  policy  objectives,  operational  goals  and  other  intended  effects; 
`spending  wisely'. 
Source:  Jackson  (1995). 
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Although  the  concepts  of  economy,  efficiency  and  effectiveness  are  often 
employed  by  local  governments  to  define  performance,  such  a  narrow  view  can  limit 
discussions  of  performance  largely  to  the  cost  of  providing  public  services.  Public  sector 
performance  means  different  things  to  different  groups.  It  reflects  the  variety  of  values 
placed  upon  the  activity  of  government.  Performance  measurement  cannot  and  should  not 
be  reduced  to  the  metric  of  the  cost  accountant.  No  one  would  dispute  that  whatever  it  is 
that  the  local  government  does,  it  should  do  so  at  least  cost  for  maximum  output  and 
quality.  That  is  axiomatic.  What  remains  an  issue  is  what  activities  government  should 
perform.  Discussions  of  performance  cannot  be  separated  from  those  involving  the  design 
of  democratic  institutions.  Such  institutions  need  to  resolve  the  conflicts  of  interests  and 
values  surrounding  public  services  (Jackson  1995).  Introduction  of  performance  measures 
and  indicators  can  quickly  result  in  a  reduction  in  commitment,  or  loss  of  a  sense  of 
vocation  and  morale.  The  notions  of  public  service  duty  have  tended  to  be  superseded  by 
the  charge  that  all  public  sector  bureaucracy  is  naturally  inefficient  and  must  be  tightly 
controlled.  Performance  measures  are  then  seen  as  an  instrument  of  control. 
In  a  similar  vein,  the  types  of  PIs  most  frequently  collected  by  institutions  relate  to 
costs,  volume  of  service,  utilisation  rates,  time  targets  and  productivity.  Such  indicators 
are  relatively  simple  to  quantify.  Indicators  of  quality  of  services,  customers'  satisfaction 
and  the  achievement  of  goals  appear  less  often,  if  at  all.  This  imbalance  is  frequently  noted 
in  the  literature  on  performance  measurement  (Pollitt  1986;  Jackson  1988;  and  Carter 
1991).  Authorities,  perhaps  not  surprisingly,  concentrate  on  measuring  what  is  easily 
measurable  and  this  often  results  in  a  bias  towards  measuring  performance  in  terms  of 
economy  and  efficiency,  rather  than  effectiveness  (Palmer  1995:  91).  It  is  therefore 
necessary  to  review  local  government  against  a  wider  spectrum  as  well.  This  leads  us  to 
the  second  dimension  of  the  institutionalisation  and  reform  processes-  namely  local 
government  accountability. 
The  concept  of  local  government'  accountability  is  frequently  used  in  the  literature 
by  governments,  DAs,  and  the  plethora  of  development  studies  programmes  world  wide, 
but  without  clear  explanation  of  what  precisely  is  meant.  One  view  is  that  it  refers  to  the 
69 Chapter  3  Collaborative  Urban  Governance 
public's  confidence  in  their  local  government  institution;  it  is  mindful  of  local  needs  and 
liable  for  the  money  it  collects  or  receives,  the  services  it  provides,  its  public  spending, 
and  for  the  consequences  of  its  actions  in  general  (Korten  1996).  Another  interpretation 
discusses  local  government  accountability  more  widely  to  include  its  structural  setting  up, 
bureaucratic  `Three  Es',  staffing  conditions  and  inter-organisational  co-operation,  not 
only  with  other  agencies  and  departments  of  government  but  also  the  private  and 
community  sectors  including  local  NGOs  and  civil  society  (Peltenburg  et  al.  1996; 
Jackson  1995;  Healey  1997;  Mayfield  1996). 
Based  on  the  above-mentioned  substantive  core  contexts,  it  is  possible  to 
conceptualise  an  explanatory  framework  in  order  to  examine  local  government 
accountability  and  the  level  of  institutional  capacity-building  needed  through  a  checklist  of 
analytical  variables.  The  proposed  framework,  accountable  bureaucratic  capacity,  argues 
that  local  government  performance  is,  in  fact,  a  function  of  four  key-dimensions: 
structural  and  organisational  variables  (decentralised  setting  up,  work  environment  and 
training  to  enable  municipal  officials  to  be  motivated  and  work  well);  behavioural 
variables  (worker  morale,  and  committed  individuals  who  are  self-motivated  and  creative 
or  ready  to  learn);  client-interaction  variables  (bureaucratic  respect  for  the  public  and  fair 
citizen  representation  within  popular  local  councils);  and  environment  variables- 
economic,  political  and  public-  (which  place  equal  and  shared  responsibility  not  only 
among  central  and  local  governments,  but  also  lay  stress  on  the  responsibility  of  the  public 
to  participate  in  the  political  life)  (Figure  3.3). 
Of  course  it  would  be  unrealistic  to  expect  it  to  be  easy  to  achieve  all  aspects  of 
this  `rational'  institutional  concept  in  DCs'  cities  late-capitalism.  This  is  not  to  support  the 
arguments  of  the  `dark  side',  discussed  earlier,  but  to  assume,  as  Healey  (1997)  argues, 
that  a  complex  and  interconnected  strategy-making  process  could  build  on  social  goals  by 
analytical  routines  based  on  empirical  inquiry,  observations  and  deductive  logic.  Thus, 
whilst  goals  express  the  most  desirable  ends  of  strategies,  analysis  works  out  the  most 
appropriate  means.  Nonetheless,  the  proposed  institutional  framework,  accountable 
bureaucratic  capacity,  stresses  equal  emphasis  on  the  necessity  of  analysing  the  hard 
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infrastructure  side  of  local  governance  (criteria-driven  policy  measures,  i.  e.  rights,  rules, 
resources  and  competence),  the  consensus-building  which  concentrates  on  both  the  soft 
infrastructure  (governance  style)  as  well  as  governance  efficiency,  and  the  participatory 
bases  which,  in  addition  to  both,  emphasises  the  style  of  reasoning  and  the  construction  of 
citizen's  rights  with  respect  to  process.  The  framework  examines  the  extent  to  which  the 
form  of  local  government  is  open  to  the  urban  governance  process,  permitting 
partnership,  and  encouraging  higher  levels  of  citizen  political  participation  throughout 
DCs. 
Figure  3.3:  Responsive  and  accountable  local  government  framework 
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Source:  Author-  Adapted  from  Palmer  et  al.  (1988),  Peltenburg  et  al.  (1996);  and  Mayfield  (1996). 
The  criteria-driven  measures  are  grounded  in  the  structural  organisational 
variables  of  the  `accountable  bureaucratic  capacity'  framework.  These  are  seen  as  the 
means  of  achieving  the  four  institutional  dimensions  to  good  governance  and  NPM- 
namely  legitimacy,  accountability,  competence  and  human  rights.  Theoretically  speaking, 
the  criteria-driven  approach  assumes  that  governments  have  the  legitimacy  to  make 
policies  in  which  a  set  of  regulatory  criteria  and  performance  targets  are  designed  to 
encourage  the  efficient  achievement  of  objectives  (Wolman  et  al.  1994).  This  approach 
has  developed  as  a  response  to  the  neo-liberal  ideology  and  the  limitation  of  market  and 
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social  behaviour  in  contemporary  urban  societies.  The  objective  has  been  to  devolve  as 
much  of  the  delivery  of  collective  activities,  "from  research  and  development  to  rubbish 
collection,  to  private  or  semi-private  agencies,  and  to  constrain  these  through  a  mixture  of 
regulatory  structures  and  financial  incentives"  (Healey  1997:  232).  However,  the  criteria- 
driven  approach  tends  to  construct  policies  based  on  the  monetary  values  of  the  `Three 
Es'  and  performance  indicators,  which  are  not  likely  to  be  shared  in  the  political 
communities  for  which  such  policies  are  designed.  Thus,  although  these  forms  of  hard 
infrastructure  and  formal  rules  are  necessary  to  (re)establish  effective  urban  governance 
institutions  in  DCs,  they  cannot  lead  per  se  to  an  accountable  bureaucratic  capacity;  they 
must  be  complemented  with  a  set  of  soft  infrastructure  and  consensus-building,  as  well  as 
considering  partnership  with  civil  society. 
The  consensus-building  embedded  in  the  accountable  bureaucratic  capacity 
framework  emphasises  that  reviewing  institutional  performance  and  accountability  in  a 
frequent  manner  is  crucial  to  restore  control  of  productive  assets  to  local  people  and 
communities  on  which  their  livelihoods  depend.  It  is  also  essential  before  endeavouring  to 
prepare  any  capacity-building  strategy  as  an  integral  part  of  strategic  development. 
Accountability  variables  go  beyond  a  single-focused  aspect  of  consensus  capacity- 
building,  e.  g.  training  or  equipment  supply,  to  ensure  that  local  government  institutions 
are  able  to  support  individuals  by  giving  them  responsibility,  freedom  to  act,  adequate 
respect,  pay,  and  work  conditions,  which  encourage  motivation  and  energy.  The 
objectives  of  such  multiple  consensus-building  are  the  promotion  of  national  human 
_ 
resource  development  policies  and  strategies  for  urban  management  and  development, 
which  can  ensure  that  local  government  service  gradually  becomes  a  profession  of 
respect.  Building  institutional  capacity  in  urban  governance  means  transforming,  creating 
and  mobilising  the  `institutional  capital'  of  a  place  in  the  collective  effort  of  shaping  the 
future  localities  (Peltenburg  et  al.  1996;  Healey  1997).  Thus  a  key  attribute  of  consensus- 
building  is  its  openness  to  employ  the  existing  webs  of  formal  and  informal  relations  (soft 
infrastructure),  including  stakeholders'  networks,  knowledge  resources,  trust,  norms  and 
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ways  of  thinking  and  acting,  which  are  embedded  in  urban  governance  structures  and 
stemmed  from  the  various  ideas  of  `social  capital'. 
Institutional  capacity  refers  to  the  ability  of  urban  governance  to  make  a  difference 
in  transforming  cities  through  ways  that  expand  stakeholder  involvement  and  shape  the 
driving  forces  affecting  life  chances,  economic  opportunities  and  environmental  qualities 
(Healey  1997).  Capacity-building  is  part  of  the  new  paradigm  in  planning,  it  aims  to 
enable  all  actors  involved  to  perform  effectively,  efficiently  and  sustainability,  both  in 
doing  their  own  job  and  in  working  in  collaboration  with  other  partners  (Wakely  1996). 
This  goes  beyond  just  the  formal  organisation  and  technical  skills  of  agencies  involved  in 
governance;  it  encompasses  also  the  more  intangible  `governance  cultures'  of  places,  the 
degree  of  interdependency  between  the  various  nodes  of  business  and  social  life,  and  the 
density  and  quality  of  the  relationships  between  these.  It  hence  embraces  all  the  issues  of 
empowerment,  enabling,  decentralisation,  partnership,  privatisation,  deregulation  and 
accountable  bureaucratic  capacity  (Figure  3.4). 
Figure  3.4:  Capacity-building  definition,  actions  and  targets  of  local  strategy 
Definition 
Encompasses  the 
country's  human, 
technological, 
organisational, 
institutional  and 
resource  capabilities. 
Local  capac  ty-building 
￿(  rategy  %r  effective 
development 
Actions  of  intervention 
Prime  Goal 
Accountable 
Bureaucratic  Capacity 
Effective  Structural 
organisation 
Evaluates  and  addresses 
the  crucial  questions 
related  to  policy  choices 
and  modes  of 
implementation  among 
development  options. 
Enhances  the 
performance  of  local 
governments. 
-  Articulation  of  needs. 
-  Supportive  institutional, 
legal,  human  and 
financial  framework. 
-  Generic  training  for 
men  and  women. 
-  Equipment  supply. 
-  Dissemination  of  useful 
experiences. 
Appropriate  Behavioural 
Culture 
Supportive  Environment 
(economic  and  political) 
Source:  Author-  Adapted  from  UNCHS  (1997);  Wakely  (1996)  and  Peltenburg  et  al.  (1996). 
The  cornerstone  of  the  UNCHS  "  (Habitat)  Capacity-Building  Strategy  is  the 
strengthening  of  national  and  local  institutions  for  human  resource  development, 
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facilitating  policy-development  dialogue,  dissemination  of  useful  practices,  societal 
awareness-building  and  civic  education  (UNCHS  1997).  Many  clients  can  benefit  from 
capacity-building  programmes,  e.  g.  communities,  civil  society  organisation,  private 
commercial  sector  and  central  government  entities.  However,  the  focus  here  is  on  local 
governments.  Municipal  capacity-building  refers  hereafter  to  a  process  that  involves  value 
added  instructions,  the  training  of  municipal  officials,  activities  with  multiplier  effects,  and 
networking  to  improve  urban  management  performance  through  the  accountable 
bureaucratic  capacity  framework.  This  could  be  supplied  by  DAs,  NGOs  or  the  national 
government.  Although  Figure  3.4  proposes  a  set  of  actions  for  local  capacity-building 
strategy,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  needs  for  capacity-building  are  always  changing;  there 
are  no  ready  solutions,  and  any  programme  must  be  appropriate  for  the  local  situation  and 
organisation. 
The  last  strand  of  the  proposed  framework,  participatory  bases,  suggests  that 
accountable  bureaucratic  capacity  should  warrant  a  type  of  inclusionary  discursive  local 
government  that  could  enhance  participatory  development  in  a  practical  way  through  a 
collaborative  form  of  governance,  in  which  citizens  are  in  the  driver's  seat.  Hence,  the 
environment  variables  embedded  in  the  proposed  framework,  economic,  political  and 
public,  place  equal  responsibility  on  central  and  local  governments  as  well  as  on  the  public 
to  participate  in  political  life  through  the  ballot  box  and  open  council  sessions.  As 
assumed  in  the  model  of  a  pluralist  democracy,  all  members  of  society  and  territorial 
political  communities  have  a  right  to  make  a  claim  for  attention.  Clearly,  such  claims  for 
attention  require  collaborative  action  by  civil  society  activists  and  community 
representatives  (public  environment),  while  the  local  government  has  to  be  willing  to 
listen.  However,  as  discussed  earlier,  there  will  be  times  in  any  participatory  approach  in 
reality  when  the  process  is  top-down  and  led  entirely  by  outsiders  resulting  in  possible 
resistance  and  protests,  and  times  when  citizens  themselves  initiate  aspects  of  the  project 
and  even  manipulate  the  implementing  agency. 
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3.6-  Theoretical  basis: 
Having  conceptualised  a  framework  that  can  be  used  for  examining  local 
government  accountability,  including  the  level  of  consensus  capacity-building  required,  a 
theoretical  base  is  still  needed  that  can  a)  link  it  with  society/individual  involvement  in  the 
urban  governance  process,  and  b)  predict  possible  conflictual  modes  of  participation 
associated  with  development  in  the  real  field.  Sharp  and  Bath  (1993:  213)  argue  that 
citizens'  political  participation  or  quiescence  are  still  not  well  articulated  in  the  urban 
governance  debate.  Little  attention  has  been  given  to  the  development  of  theory  that 
accounts  not  only  for  citizen  mobilisation  but  also  for  whether  it  is  manifested  in 
conflictual  or  collaborative  activity  with  governance:  "most  theories  point  to  what  it  is 
that  activates  citizens  rather  than  what  predicts  the  direction  (valence)  of  their  activation 
or  the  quality  and  effects  of  their  participation". 
Sharp  and  Bath  (1993)  have  developed  a  theory  that  highlights  the  importance  of 
the  community's  need  for  development  (jobs,  growth  and  prosperity)  and  the  individual's 
need  to  be  protected  from  the  negative  consequences  of  growth  or  development 
initiatives,  such  as  congestion  and  displacement.  Developmental  participation  theory 
recognises  the  potential  conflicts  between  one's  need  as  a  member  of  the  collectivity  and 
one's  individual  needs.  This  provides  bases  for  predicting  the  specific  form  that  citizen 
participation  in  economic  development  may  be  expected  to  take.  Developmental 
participation  theory  is  based  on  ideological  syllogism;  it  posits  that,  a)  if  political 
awareness  is  sufficiently  high,  and  b)  contingent  upon  the  mediating  effects  of  institutional 
arrangements  such  as  reformism,  governmental  fragmentation,  citizen  participation 
arrangements,  and  quasi-public  development  bodies,  c)  the  propensity  for  and  character  of 
citizen  participation  in  economic  development  is  a  function  of  community  and  individual 
needs  in  the  developmental  sphere  (Sharp  and  Bath  1993:  223).  The  theory  acknowledges 
that  when  a  community  is  economically  distressed,  everyone  has  a  strong  stake  in  making 
the  community  more  economically  competitive.  In  contrast,  when  the  community  is 
prosperous,  conflict  over  economic  development  is  likely  to  be  more  sustained; 
commitment  to  further  development  initiatives  is  more  limited  and  the  transformation  into 
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collaboration  is  more  -unlikely.  Hence,  need  might  be  understood  to  refer  to  the  stakes 
that  particular  types  of  citizens  have  in  a  government's  developmental  policy  initiatives. 
Peterson  (1981)  characterises  these  stakes  as  collective  in  nature  and  tied  to  the  economic 
competitiveness  of  the  city. 
The  four  mediating  institutional  arrangements  on  which  the  developmental 
participation  theory  builds  must  be  analysed  because  of  their  bearing  on  the  ability  to 
mobilise  citizens  around  developmental  issues.  They  mediate  the  effects  of  need  and 
awareness  on  political  mobilisation.  These  are  metropolitan  governmental  organisation, 
reformed  or  unreformed  institutions  of  local  government,  citizen  involvement  in  local 
governance,  and  public  authorities  and  similar  quasi-public  entities.  Theory  with  respect 
to  the  first  of  these  is,  in  fact,  an  application  of  microeconomic  theory  to  the  metropolitan 
realm.  The  essential  insights  of  the  theory  with  respect  to  political  participation  are 
preserved,  intact,  in  a  political  economy  theory  that  serves  as  a  challenge  to  metropolitan 
reform  traditions  (Sharp  and  Bath  1993:  219).  The  political  economist's  theory  predicts 
that  political  participation  is  greater  in  a  fragmented  metropolitan  area  than  in  a  more 
centralised  metropolitan  area  (Ostrom  1984).  Citizens  tend  to  find  the  larger  and  more 
hierarchical  organisations  of  a  unified  metropolitan  government  less  accessible  and  less 
understandable. 
Second,  theory  with  respect  to  the  impact  of  the  reform  institutions  on  political 
participation  is  largely  derived  from  interpretations  of  the  logical  implications  of  the 
reform  movement.  These  include  the  presumption  that  citizen  participation  will,  over  all,  -: 
be  lower  in  reformed  than  in  unreformed  settings,  because  the  depoliticisation  of  local 
affairs  through  non-partisanship  and  at-large  elections  short-circuits  the  avenues  for 
mobilisation  of  the  public  by  politicians,  and  because  the  reform  institutions  of  merit 
selection  and  professional  administration  delegitimise  citizen  involvement  in  the 
administrative  side  of  governance  (Welch  and  Bledsoe  1988).  Third,  theory  with  respect 
to  citizen  involvement  in  local  governance  argues  that  cities  have  introduced  a  variety  of 
organisational  arrangements  for  citizen  access  to  local  government  decision  making  in 
part  because  of  the  legacy  of  federally  mandated  citizen  participation  requirements  and  in 
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part  because  of  the  need  to  counterbalance  the  unresponsive  tendencies  of  reformism 
(Sharp  1990).  Such  arrangements  ranged  from  citizen  boards  to  broad-casting  of  city 
council  meetings  to  municipal  ombudsmen.  Increased  use  of  initiative  and  referenda  at  the 
sub-national  level  has  focused  attention  on  these  institutional  arrangements  of  direct 
democracy  (Caves  1992).  While  it  is  theoretically  argued  that  such  institutional 
arrangements  enhance  citizen  participation,  particularly  of  the  electoral  and  protest  type, 
empirical  research  suggests  that  development  policy  activity  of  local  government  is  only 
responsive  to  fiscal  stress  when  institutional  arrangements  for  citizen  access  to 
development  policy-making  are  more  elaborate  (Sharp  1990). 
The  last  mediating  institutional  arrangement,  public  authorities  and  similar  quasi- 
public  entities,  argues  that  the  potential  for  citizen  participation  in  economic  development 
planning  and  decision  making  can  be  inhibited  by  the  housing  of  development  activities  in 
quasi-public  entities  such  as  development  boards,  corporations  or  authorities.  Various 
analysis  have  documented  the  ways  in  which  such  quasi-public  entities  can  be  used  to 
insulate  development  activities  from  public  awareness  and  involvement  and  to  allow 
private  interests  to  function  virtually  as  a  shadow  government  (Stoker  1987;  Hula  1990). 
Developmental  participation  theory  is  perhaps  the  most  useful  synthetic  theory  for  the 
specific  targets  of  this  research.  It  is  not  only  designed  to  account  for  the  style  or  valence 
of  citizen  participation  but  also  for  political  activation  itself  as  well.  Moreover,  the  theory 
outlines  the  possible  reactions  of  local  government  towards  the  conflictual  modes  of 
participation,  such  as  protest  and  other  efforts  to  block  plans  or  projects.  It  stipulates  that 
in  economically  distressed  communities,  such  as  slum  and  squatter  settlements,  city 
leaders  faced  with  such  conflict  have  two  possibilities.  They  can  attempt  to  demobilise 
those  citizens  involved  in  the  conflict,  typically  through  the  use  of  non-responsiveness 
tactics  that  exhaust  the  challenging  group's  resources.  This  leads  to  alienation  or  exit  on 
the  part  of  those  defeated  and  demobilised.  Alternatively,  "city  officials  can  respond  in 
ways  designed  to  defuse  perceptions  of  highly  negative  individual  consequences  of 
development  initiatives,  either  by  negotiating  actual  changes  in  the  initiatives  or  through 
symbolic  manipulation  of  perceptions.  If  successful,  this  transformation  can  lead  to 
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collaboration  based  upon  a  congruence  of  individual  and  community  needs"  (Sharp  and 
Bath  1993:  223). 
Whether  the  form  of  governance  attempts  to  demobilise  conflictual  modes  of 
participation  associated  with  development  in  the  field,  transform  them  into  collaborative 
modes,  or  defuse  the  perceptions  of  highly  negative  individuals,  this  Chapter  revealed  that 
various  forms  of  governance,  in  both  western  and  DCs,  still  lack  inclusionary  ways  of 
collaboration,  though  at  different  scales.  They  also  lack  explicit  efforts  to  incorporate  and 
respect  the  diverse  interests  and  cultural  ideologies  in  our  differentiated  societies.  The 
voices,  experiences  and  political  activities  of  every  one  in  society  are  not  adequately 
represented  in  urban  political  analysis.  However,  understanding  different  forms  of  citizen 
political  participation  in  the  policy  making  process  in  both  western  and  DCs  helped  to 
appreciate  the  nature  of  the  paradigm  shift  in  urban  planning.  It  also  helped  to  identify  the 
fundamental  principles  of  `good'  urban  upgrading,  that  are  assumed  to  promote  active 
and  meaningful  citizen  participation.  But  all  these  kinds  of  commitments  require  a  belief 
that  `we',  all  individuals  including  city  leaders  and  municipal  officials,  have  made  the 
structural  forces,  which  direct  our  action,  and  thus  `we'  have  the  power  to  make  changes 
by  altering  the  rules,  the  flow  of  resources  and  the  way  we  think  about  things  (Giddens 
1984,1990).  Only  then  can  policy  reform  support  city  consensus-building  with  civil 
society  to  establish  priorities  for  social  development  and  urban  finance  strategies,  support 
the  development  of  evaluation  and  research  dissemination,  and  enable  legislation  required 
to  ensure  institutionalised  urban  governance  and  upgrading.  In  doing  that,  the  micro- 
practices  of  everyday  `life-world'  will  become  key  sites  for  the  mobilisation  of 
transformative  forces  through  a  long  process  of  `social  learning'  (Habermas  1987).  These 
processes  are  outlined  in  Chapter  4,  which  investigates  how  `we'  can  look  at  knowledge 
differently  (epistemological  approaches),  collect  data  (methodological  approaches), 
examine  the  interrelationships  between  a  wide  range  of  structural  forces  concerning  this 
research,  and  view  people  as  individuals  with  choices  and  personal  intentions  rather  than 
merely  as  objects  to  be  studied  and  observed. 
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"...  the  wonderful  thing  about  academic  work  today,  particularly  fields 
like  political  and  social  theory,  (is)  that  you  can  cross  over  disciplinary 
boundaries.  And  not  just  cross  boundaries,  but  do  work  that  is  genuinely 
post-disciplinary,  in  all  kinds  of  ways". 
(Mitchell  1996:  90). 
There  has  been  a  long  debate  in  the  discourse  of  human  geography  over  the 
merits  and  problems  of  doing  multi-disciplinary  research,  or  post-disciplinary  as  Mitchell 
1996)  calls  it,  utilising  different  research  methodologies,  and  choices  of  epistemological 
approach(es)  according  to  the  research  problem.  While  research  methodology  refers  here 
to  the  techniques  employed  in  the  analysis/interpretation  of  the  data  collected,  research 
epistemology  refers  to  the  way  in  which  `we'  look  at  knowledge,  and  what  it  is  possible 
to  know  within  any  given  field.  In  human  geography,  this  can  be  related  to  positivism, 
realism,  postmodernism,  post-structuralism  and  so  on.  Various  epistemological 
definitions  currently  used  in  the  discourse  of  human  geography  are  first  reviewed  briefly 
in  the  context  of  the  specific  aims  of  this  research,  before  justifying  the  choice  made. 
Then  the  selected  methodological  approach  is  discussed,  including  fieldwork  surveys  and 
the  problems  encountered. 
4.1-  Epistemological  approaches: 
It  is  important  for  the  specific  aims  of  this  research  to  identify  the  role  of 
development  in  what  Johnston  (1991)  calls  `the  nature  of  the  place'.  While  this  concept 
involves  a  resuscitation  of  traditional  `regional  geography',  it  is  a  unique  resuscitation 
suffused  by  the  more  recent  philosophical  concepts  of  `phenomenology'  and  `realism'. 
While  `post-modernism'  might  be  seen  in  contrast  with  these  concepts,  it  also  possesses  a 
number  of  bases  which  could  enhance  the  debate  in  this  research.  First,  phenomenology  is 
a  term  used  to  refer  to  philosophies  concerned  with  phenomena.  Different  interpretations  - 
of  the  meaning  of  the  word  phenomena  have  led  to  different  usage  of  the  term 
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phenomenology.  However,  phenomenology  sought  to  establish  how  the  mind  is  known 
through  an  examination  of  its  knowledge  and  behaviour.  This  is  particularly  important  for 
all  micro-level  studies  in  order  to  view  people  as  individuals  with  choices  and  personal 
intentions  rather  than  as  objects  to  be  studied  and  observed.  Modern  phenomenology, 
derived  largely  from  Husserl  (1977)  aims  to  reveal  phenomena  as  intuited  essences 
through  direct  awareness.  Phenomenological  statements  are  thus  non-empirical 
descriptions  of  phenomena.  More  important  is  `constitutive  phenomenology'  which  deals 
with  the  structures  of  social  meaning,  with  frames  of  reference  and  systems  of  typification 
which  constitute  the  `multiple  realities'  embedded  in  the  lifeworld  (Gregory  1978;  1996). 
Second,  realism  is  a  philosophy  which  holds  that  material  objects  exist 
independently  in  our  sense  experience  (Bhaskar  1978;  Sayer  1985).  It  is  concerned  with 
the  identification  of  causal  mechanisms  and  empirical  regulations,  and  is  opposed  to  both 
phenomenalism  and  idealism.  Phenomenalism  is  the  view  that  there  is  no  distinction 
between  essence  and  phenomenon,  and  therefore  we  can  only  record  what  is  directly 
experienced.  Instead,  realism  seeks  to  reveal  the  causal  mechanisms  through  which 
particular  events  are  situated  within  underlying  structures.  Within  `transcendental 
realism'  developed  by  Sayer  (1989),  this  is  achieved  through  the  process  of  abstraction. 
Realism  replaces  the  regularity  model  with  one  in  which  objects  and  social  relations  have 
causal  powers  which  may  or  may  not  produce  regularities.  In  fact,  proponents  of  realism 
claim  that  all  of  the  post-positivist  tendencies  in  human  geography  can  be  interpreted  as 
roads  towards  realism,  be  they  labelled  Marxist,  humanist  or  even  other  `mainstream' 
geographies  (Cloke  et  al..  1991:  135).  The  importance  of  realism  centres  on  its  referring 
not  only  to  a  philosophy  but  also  its  competence  in  describing  a  mode  of  representation 
(Bhaskar  1978;  Sayer  1985).  Transcendental  realism  sees  the  basic  objects  of  knowledge 
as  the  structures  and  mechanisms  that  generate  phenomena,  and  seeks  to  a)  identify  how 
something  happens  and  b)  establish  how  extensive  a  phenomenon  is  (Outhwaite  1987; 
Sayer  1989). 
Third,  despite  the  static  application  of  structuration  theory  (Giddens  1984,1990), 
it  seeks  to  transcend  hermeneutics,  functionalism  and  structuralism  through  the 
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integration  of  knowledge  of  human  agents  with  the  wider  social  structures  in  which  they 
are  embedded.  Hermeneutics  is  the  discipline  concerned  with  the  interpretation  of 
meanings.  Giddens  theory  of  structuration  emphasises  that  individuals  are  neither 
autonomous  nor  automatons.  Powerful  forces  are  all  around  us,  shaping  our  lives,  and 
presenting  both  opportunity  and  constraint.  But  structure  is  not  something  outside  us.  It 
is  not  an  `action  space'  within  which  we  operate,  as  rationalist  policy  analysts  tended  to 
imagine.  Individuals  are  not  mechanically  controlled  by  the  structural  or  administrative 
realities  of  a  given  social  situation.  We  live  in  multiple  relational  webs,  each  with  its  own 
cultures,  that  is,  modes  of  thought  and  systems  of  meaning  and  valuing  (Healey  1997: 
47).  Once  citizens  become  self-reflectively  aware  of  the  social  and  political  conditions  in 
which  they  function,  e.  g.  with  the  assistance  of  their  respective  civil  society 
organisations,  they  also  become  able,  consciously  and  sometimes  quite  freely,  to 
formulate  and  implement  specific  actions  structured  to  achieve  desirable  goals  (Bernstein 
1978).  Giddens  acknowledges  and  describes  this  process  in  voluntaristic  terms,  arguing 
that  human  beings  transform  nature  socially,  and  by  `humanising'  it,  they  transform 
themselves.  The  production  and  reproduction  of  society  thus  has  to  be  treated  as  a 
skilled,  interactive  and  discursive  effort  on  the  part  of  its  members,  not  as  merely  a 
mechanical  series  of  processes.  Conscious  reflexivity  on  `our'  assumptions  and  modes  of 
thinking,  on  our  cultural  referents,  thus  carries  the  potential  of  transformative  power, 
through  which  the  micro-practices  of  everyday  life  are  key-sites  for  the  mobilisation  of 
transformative  forces  (Sharp  and  Bath  1993;  Healey  1997). 
The  last  philosophical  epistemology  discussed  here,  post-modernism,  is  perhaps 
now  the  most  controversial  one,  and  especially  when  it  is  applied  to  the  DCs 
development  discourse.  Entrikin  (1991)  focuses  especially  on  the  identity  of  `place',  and 
consequently  the  conceptualisation  of  its  full  dimensionality.  He  implicitly  recognises  the 
very  different  standpoints  of  `empirical-analytic'  and  `historical  hermeneutic  science',  and 
concludes  that  `place'  is  best  viewed  and  explained  from  layers  located  between  objective 
and  subjective  realities.  This  conclusion  ties  up  with  the  essence  of  postmodernism  in  that 
human  activity  is  culturally  encompassed;  open  to  various  interpretations  according  to 
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different  perspectives,  and  therefore  can  best  be  analysed  through  understanding  the 
objective  regularities  as  well  as  the  subjective  explanations  of  these  regularities. 
Postmodernism  has  witnessed  rapid  developments  during  the  past  two  decades.  Starting 
from  a  new  discourse  in  `postmodern  style',  the  vehement  reaction  to  such  style  has 
become  the  paradigmatic  focal  point  in  the  debate  over  `postmodern  method'  and  the 
`postmodern  epoch'  in  general  (Dear  1986).  The  cultural  umbrella  of  postmodernism  has 
promoted  different  assessments  within  different  disciplines.  It  has  been  viewed  as  a  new 
aesthetics,  a  theory,  a  philosophy,  a  new  period  for  a  new  epistemology  (Lyotard  1986), 
a  `regime  of  signification'  (Lash  1990),  a  `structure  of  feeling'  (Williams  1977),  a 
dominant  element  in  the  cultural  logic  of  late  capitalism  (Jameson  1987),  or  merely  a 
`fragmented  consciousness'  (Harvey  1989).  Postmodernism  is  currently  "confronting  the 
terrain  of  the  humanities  and  social  sciences"  (Gregory  1996),  it  is  a  material 
phenomenon  of  globalising  and  universalising  imperatives  where  time  and  space  seem 
obsolete  and  paradoxically,  to  be  simultaneously  absolute  and  relative.  Postmodernism  is 
the  cultural  response  to  the  harsh  compression  of  time  and  space  and  the  shaping  of 
objectives,  images  and  ideas  by  the  global  marketplace  (Larson  1993).  It  is,  therefore, 
directly  relevant  to  the  local/global  approach  utilised  in  this  research. 
4.2-  Research  epistemology: 
This  research  adopts  a  post-disciplinary  approach  in  an  attempt  to  obliterate  all 
synthetic  confines  which  separate,  often  unrealistically,  social,  political  and  economic 
theories  from  urban  geographies  theories.  The  research  also  adopts  a  multi-epistemology  - 
approach.  It  is  thought  that  adoption  of  a  particular  epistemological  position  may 
condition  what  kind  of  knowledge  is  sought  and  what  emphasis  is  imposed  upon  the 
ways  in  which  that  knowledge  is  obtained.  The  separation  of  structures  and  causal 
relations,  which  Sayer  (1992)  calls  the  `expressive'  and  the  `objective'  respectively,  has 
serious  consequences  for  the  social  sciences  and  for  social  policy.  The  approach  adopted 
sustains  substantive  social  theories  that  are  capable  of  identifying  the  relations  between 
different  ontological  domains  and,  at  the  same  time,  recognising  their  integrity  as 
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differentiated  features  of  social  reality,  which  can  guide  the  vital  task  of 
conceptualisation.  therefore,  inevitable  because  of  the  specific  aims  of  this  research. 
Transcendental  realism  is  utilised  at  both  the  macro  and  the  micro  levels  to 
examine  and  explain  structures  of  central  government,  local  government  and  civil  society 
organisations,  including  their  respective  relationships  with  DAs.  There  are  various  actors 
represented,  which  sometimes  overlap  in  the  `real  world':  civil  society  with  civil  servants, 
administrators  with  politicians,  central  government  with  local  government  and  local 
NGOs  with  foreign  DAs  working  in  DCs.  Hence,  to  look  at  the  micro-processes,  which 
underlie  and  sometimes  oppose  the  macro  structures,  constitutive  phenomenology 
defines  the  reality  of  each  agent,  the  relations  between  individuals  and  organisations  and 
the  relations  between  the  free  agency  of  individuals  and  the  constraints  of  structures. 
There  are  various  levels  of  tensions  and  conjunctures  between  different  structures  or 
actors  addressed  throughout  this  research.  Sayer  (1985)  places  special  emphasis  on  the 
necessity  of  making  rational  abstractions  in  order  to  disentangle  such  conjunctures 
sufficiently,  so  that  it  is  possible  to  conduct  cohesive  research:  "In  real  life  we  live  in 
conjunctures  whose  boundaries  are  arbitrary;  they  haphazardly  cut  across  structures  and 
causal  relations,  and  unless  we  devote  considerable  energy  to  their  understanding,  we 
only  disentangle  such  conjunctures  sufficiently  for  us  to  cope  with  everyday  tasks.  As 
theorists,  however,  we  seek  to  understand  the  world  by  making  rational  abstractions 
which  isolate  unified  objects,  structures  or  groups,  and  we  try  to  conduct  concrete 
research  by  starting  from  such  abstraction"  (Sayer  1985).  Accordingly,  Chapter  5  will 
attempt  to  make  an  abstraction  and  an  unequivocal  disentanglement  of  the  different 
structures  and  actors  involved  in  this  study,  before  examining  the  `exercise'  and  'effect' 
of  causal  powers  of  each  of  them. 
The  agreement  of  this  research  with  postmodernism  and  humanism  lies  in  its 
rejection  of  univocal  explanation  and  its  celebration  of  difference.  Contrary  to  the 
argument  that  post-modern  debate  fosters  scepticism,  individual  efforts  and  isolated 
autonomy  rather  than  fostering  the  public  realm  and  collaboration  (Healey  1997),  it  is 
argued  here  that  all  human  activity  is  culturally  encompassed  according  to 
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postmodernism  and,  thus,  open  to  variable  interpretations  according  to  different 
perspectives  (Appendix  3-  CP,  12-08-99).  Post-modernism  advocates  community-based 
development,  from  the  ground  up,  geared  to  community  empowerment  (Sandercock 
1998:  30).  The  conceptual  model  utilised  throughout  this  research,  accountable 
bureaucratic  capacity,  assumes  that  people,  as  `actors',  are  always  situated  in  particular 
places  at  particular  periods,  with  the  context  of  their  actions  contributing  to  their  sense  of 
identity.  This  is  reflected  in  the  methodology  selected.  Quantitative  methods  are 
employed  to  assess  the  regularities,  while  qualitative  analysis  offers  the  explanations  of 
these  patterns  and  regularities,  and  establishes  the  nature  of  social  objects  and 
mechanisms  on  which  causal  relations  depend. 
The  research  emphasises  the  subjective  reality  of  individual  bureaucrats  in  which 
they,  as  individuals,  function  responsibly  and  autonomously  according  to  their  goals  and 
values.  It  assumes  that  social  institutions  are  the  constructions  of  human  agents  and 
therefore  the  same  human  beings  possess  the  power  to  change  those  institutions.  Any 
assessment  of  quality  is  thus  viewed  as  a  measure  of  relative  value,  but  based  on  an 
evaluation  of  the  general  characteristic  or  intrinsic  nature  of  what  we  are  assessing  (Dey 
1993:  10).  However,  it  is  helpful  to  distinguish  relations  of  different  types  before  making 
abstractions.  A  basic  distinction  is  made  first  between  `substantial'  relations  of 
connection  and  interaction  on  the  one  hand  and  `formal'  relations  of  similarity  or 
dissimilarity  on  the  other.  This  will  help  to  reveal  how  far  individuals  are  connected  to 
various  associated  `formal'  and  `informal'  agents,  and  whether  they  interact  directly,  bear 
a  purely  formal  relation,  or  lack  any  interaction,  as  objects  having  similar  characteristics. 
Another  distinction  is  made  between  `external  or  contingent'  relations  and 
`internal  or  necessary'  relations.  Objects  in  `external'  relations  can  exist  without 
interdependency  with  each  other  although  they  may  still  have  significant  interrelated 
effects,  e.  g.  local  NGO  and  DA.  By  contrast,  the  existence  of  one  object  necessarily 
presupposes  the  other  in  `internal'  relations  and  hence  change  in  one  part  is  dependent  on 
the  other.  Internal  relation  does  not  mean  tautology;  consequently  objects  can  be 
identified  separately,  e.  g.  landlord  and  tenant.  Accordingly,  the  structure  of  the  agents' 
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system  of  interest  is  discovered  by  asking  the  survey  population  simple  questions  about 
such  relations.  Sayer  (1992)  argues  that  while  these  questions  may  seem  simple  to  the 
point  of  banality,  the  answers  are  often  complex  and  many  errors  of  conceptualisation 
and  abstraction  stem  from  evasions  of  them.  Henceforth,  it  is  essential  first  to  clarify 
what  aspect  of  relations  we  are  considering,  which  may  seem  somewhat  descriptive, 
otherwise  any  attempt  to  distinguish  internal  from  external  relations,  or  necessary  from 
contingent  conditions,  will  result  in  confusion.  Finally,  it  is  equally  important  to 
emphasise  that  the  structure  of  the  argument  here  is  not  based  on  personal  disapproval; 
indeed,  the  explanation  of  mechanisms  and  social  phenomena  entails  that  we  evaluate 
them  critically.  Criticism  cannot  reasonably  be  limited  to  false  ideas,  abstracted  from  the 
practical  contexts  in  which  they  are  constitutive,  but  must  extend  to  critical  evaluation  of 
their  associated  practices  and  the  material  structures  which  they  produce  and  which  in 
turn  help  to  sustain  those  practices  (Sayer  1992:  40). 
4.3-  Research  methodology: 
Survey  methodological  problems  fall  into  three  broad  categories:  from  whom  to 
collect  the  information;  what  methods  to  use  for  collecting  it;  and  how  to  process, 
analyse  and  interpret  it  (Moser  and  Kalton  1989:  53).  The  divisive  gap  between 
qualitative  and  quantitative  methods  is  viewed  now  as  "a  form  of  intellectual  hardening 
that  closes  minds,  restricts  insight,  and  undermines  our  collective  understanding"  (Hodge 
1995:  426).  While  the  subjective/qualitative  deals  with  meanings  mediated  mainly 
through  language  and  action,  it  places  emphasis  on  the  process  through  which  the 
addressed  agents  operate  and  produce.  It  also  employs  verbal  descriptions  and 
explanation.  In  contrast,  the  objective/quantitative  deals  with  measurements  and  involves 
emphasis  on  structures.  It  is  applied  when  the  scale  of  situational  analysis  implies  a  high 
level  of  spatial  and  temporal  causes,  and  uses  statistical  analysis.  There  are  advantages  in 
combining  quantitative  and  qualitative  approaches  in  social  research,  as  a  polyvocal 
approach  can  avoid  privileging  a  particular  way  of  looking  at  the  social  world 
(McKendrick  1996). 
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A  multi-method  approach  is  considered  to  be  the  best-fitted  formula,  following 
from  the  above  and  the  nature  of  this  research.  The  objective/quantitative  refers  here  to  a 
society's  basic  `microstructures  level'  (Smith  and  Tardanico  1987:  87)  which  refers  to 
the  medium  of  the  everyday  activities  of  households.  Quantification  is  applied  at  the  level 
of  the  heads  of  households'  (HoHs)  life,  work,  family,  mobility  and  interrelationships 
with  the  upgrading  project  and  other  agents  involved.  It  uses  `structured'  forms  of  data 
collection  (Appendix  1).  It  aims  at  translating  knowledges  and  data  into  numeric  forms 
condensed  into  categories  and  generalisation.  These  objective  thoughts  are  allegedly  free 
from  the  subjective  influence  of  the  researcher's  personal  prejudice  or  bias.  Such 
methodological  techniques  can  deal  with  various  levels  of  analysis.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
approach  the  micro  level  in  a  subjective/qualitative  manner;  it  is  as  responsive  to 
quantitative  approaches  as  are  larger  scales  of  analysis. 
On  the  other  hand,  subjective/qualitative  techniques  are  applied  to  the  level  of 
institutional  phenomena,  and  include  `semi-structured'  forms  of  data  collection  to 
understand  local  government's  performance  and  policies  (Appendix  2),  as  well  as 
participation  observation.  Qualitative  techniques  are  also  applied  in  the  form  of  open- 
ended  interviews  with  selected  community  leaders,  senior  decision-makers  and 
bureaucrats,  elected  politicians,  local  urban  and  community  development  consultants,  and 
DAs'  short  and  long  term  consultants.  This  investigative  stage  aims  basically  to 
understand  the  rhetoric  and  practice  of  the  institutions  involved,  as  well  as  the  assessment 
of  private  sector  consultants  and  DAs'  experts  (Appendix  3).  Finally,  focus  meetings  with 
groups  living  in  the  case  study  areas  are  held  to  understand  the  squatter  settlers' 
explanations  for  the  complex  `real  world'  in  which  they  live  in,  and  to  try  to  say 
something  sensible  about  their  endurance  and  struggling  through  life's  difficulties.  Focus 
meetings  are  also  held  with  some  municipal  officials  and  academics. 
4.4-  Fieldwork  methodology: 
The  fieldwork  methodology  is  based  on  a  cross  between  Blumer's  conception  of 
`naturalistic  research'  (Blumer  1969)  and  a  `flexible  data  collection'  strategy.  Both  of 
these  emphasise  the  advantages  of  deciding  about  `what  data  to  collect  and  how'  over 
86 Chapter  4  Methodology 
the  course  of  the  research,  without  risking  the  objective  of  meeting  the  initial  aims  of 
research,  rather  than  following  a  pre-established  structure.  Thus  the  research  involves  the 
construction,  and  continual  reconstruction,  of  a  model  of  the  process  under  study.  While 
this  research  builds  on  Blumer's  principles,  it  disagrees  with  his  disparagement  of  the  use 
of  interviews  or  questionnaires  designed  to  document  types  of  attitude  or  personality,  and 
`flexibly-designed  interviews  and  questionnaires'  will  be  employed.  The  study  aims  to 
unearth  further  relations  among  the  phenomena  through  an  inductivist  approach. 
The  methodology  applies  a  `complementary  data  sources'  technique  to  both 
primary  and  secondary  data.  This  technique  aims  to  broaden  the  debate,  intensify  the 
analysis  and  minimise  possible  misinterpretations.  A  wide  range  of  secondary  data,  drawn 
from  official  sources,  the  media  and  cyber-data  sources  (the  internet),  are  utilised, 
including  bilateral  and  multilateral  agency  reports,  national  policies,  census  data,  laws  and 
regulations,  project  appraisals  and  evolution  reports,  maps,  video  films,  photos  and  aerial 
photos.  Primary  data  are  collected  in  two  fieldwork  phases,  involving  two  questionnaire 
surveys,  with  their  respective  pilot  projects,  site  visits  and  participant  observation.  The 
first  phase  of  fieldwork  explores  the  research  case  studies  and  identifies  the  real 
mechanisms  of  co-operation  between  state,  civil  society  and  DAs.  Chapter  5  presents  and 
discusses  the  issues  of  urban  governance,  NGOs/DAs/State  tensions,  and  the  power 
hierarchies  and  powerless  agents,  which  arise  in  Egypt.  Building  on  the  factual 
assessment  and  knowledge  gained  from  the  first  phase,  the  follow-up  fieldwork  concerns 
the  in-depth  scrutiny  of  NGO  programming  and  accountability,  local  government 
performance,  the  reality  of  civic-empowerment  and  community  participation,  the 
attainability  of  urban  upgrading  and  development  policies,  and  how  far  such  processes 
are,  or  can  be,  institutionalised  in  Egypt. 
The  first  phase  survey  aimed  to  investigate  the  reality  of  the  subject  and  thereby 
eliminate  misconceptions.  The  cities  of  Aswan,  Ismailia  and  Cairo  were  visited  during  the 
Summer  and  Autumn  of  1996  to  collect  secondary  data  for  Aswan's  project,  Ismailia's 
projects,  and  from  the  Information  Centre  of  the  Cabinet.  These  data  covered  the  housing 
and  NGO  policies  in  Egypt,  Nasriya's  and  Hai  El-Salam's  appraisal  reports,  project 
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evolution  reports,  maps  of  Aswan  and  Ismailia,  aerial  photos,  and  some  portentous 
reports  prepared  by  the  UNCHS,  the  USAID,  the  GTZ  and  Liverpool  University.  The 
survey  was  restricted  intentionally  to  factual  and  descriptive  assessments  of  the  nature  of 
relevant  phenomena  and  aimed  to  understand  how  far  the  three  agents,  i.  e.  community, 
local  government  and  DA,  were  working  collectively  in  both  case  studies.  This  approach 
provided  invaluable  information  about  the  case  studies,  answered  many  theoretical 
questions  and  gave  an  adequate  explanation  of  some  problematic  issues.  It  also 
developed  a  knowledge  of  each  area  on  which  the  second  phase  survey  was  based.  For 
instance,  the  initial  assessment  during  different  facets  of  the  Hai  El-Salam  project 
revealed  a  very  low  profile  of  community  participation  during  the  project.  Data  collected 
from  meetings  with  20  randomly-selected  HoHs  and  a  group  interview  (IGI1,17-10-96), 
contradicted  much  of  the  rhetoric  found  in  the  project's  documentation,  as  discussed  in 
Chapter  6.  Accordingly,  a  decision  was  made  to  discontinue  the  HoH  in-depth  systematic 
survey,  and  to  concentrate  instead  on  open-ended  interviews  with  community  leaders, 
senior  municipal  officials,  and  local  and  international  consultants  who  had  worked  for  the 
project  at  the  time,  in  search  of  explanations  as  to  why  community  participation  was  not 
formally  incorporated  within  the  project. 
The  second  phase/major  survey  took  place  in  the  same  cities  and  was  conducted 
during  January-July  and  September-December  in  1998.  The  fieldwork  was  programmed 
flexibly  so  that  it  could  shift  strategies  according  to  whatsoever  might  offer  further 
understanding.  After  absorbing  official  documents  and  media  sources  data,  various 
survey  techniques  were  employed,  including  participant  observation  and  interviewing 
individuals  from  different  sectors  of  interest  and  levels  of  power,  e.  g.  beneficiaries  from 
civil  society,  municipal  officials  from  local  government,  decision-makers  from  the  central 
government,  senior  leaders  and  members  from  NGOs,  and  project  advisors  and 
consultants  from  DAs  (Appendix  3).  Notes  were  also  taken  at  meetings  during  May, 
1996,  with  the  researcher's  supervisor  and  a  large  number  of  decision-makers, 
academics,  experts  and  consultants  working  in  Egypt  when  broader  contextual  issues 
were  raised.  Participant  observation  included  several  visits  to  community  centres  where 
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public  discussions  took  place  between  residents,  key-figures  and  leaders  in  both  areas. 
Meanwhile,  day  and  night  activities  were  noted  and  photographed.  This  helped  to 
understand  the  people  and  their  surrounding  environments,  appreciate  the  flow  of  their 
daily  life,  see  the  situations  that  arose  and  observe  the  problems  they  addressed  in  their 
conversations.  Participants  from  both  areas  were  acute  observers  and  expressed  their 
opinions  regarding  their  respective  projects  at  several  informal  meetings. 
The  two  broad  categories  of  population  associated  with  this  research  are  the 
`survey  population'  and  the  `target  population'.  The  term  `survey  population'  is  applied 
to  those  actually  interviewed  in  Aswan,  Ismailia  and  Cairo,  108  HoHs  in  Nasriya, 
representing  1.44%  of  the  total  households  in  the  area  (7500  units),  a  small  qualitative 
sample  of  20  HoHs  living  in  Hai  El-Salam  representing  only  0.2%  of  the  total  households 
in  the  area,  and  the  senior  municipal  officials  working  in  the  cities  of  Aswan  and  Ismailia. 
Although  this  population  covered  both  the  intended  beneficiaries  at  community  level  and 
local  government  level,  it  was  incomplete  without  other  enabling  actors-  namely  policy 
and  decision-makers  working  at  local  and  central  government  levels,  locally  elected 
politicians,  internal  and  external  consultants  or  experts  working  for  DAs,  and  members  of 
various  civil  society  organisations  working  in  both  areas.  The  `target  population' 
represented  the  population,  individuals  and  institutions,  for  which  results  were  required. 
The  target  population  of  this  research  includes  professionals  and  decision-makers 
working  for  national  governments  and  their  respective  counterparts  in  DAs,  Northern 
and  intermediary  NGOs. 
The  major  principle  underlying  sample  design  is  to  avoid  bias  in  the  selection 
procedure.  Bias  may  occur  if  sampling  is  carried  out  using  a  non-random  selection 
method,  a  sampling  frame  which  does  not  cover  the  population  adequately,  completely  or 
accurately,  or  if  some  sections  of  the  population  are  impossible  to  find  or  refuse  to  co- 
operate  (de  Vaus  1990).  The  aim  of  the  sample  was  to  be  representative  of  the  responses 
and  characteristics  of  the  survey  population,  so  selection  was  made  on  a  random  basis 
from  a  pre-stratified  spatial  grid;  a  grid  was  superimposed  on  the  map  of  Nasriya  and  the 
dwelling  at,  or  nearest  to,  the  intersection  of  the  grid  lines  was  selected.  The  size  of  each 
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cell  of  the  grid  was  established  at  about  80m  by  80m  which  resulted  in  108  households,  a 
number  suitable  for  tests  of  statistical  significance  and  feasible  given  the  resources 
available  to  the  researcher  (Figure  4.1).  This  stratification  also  granted  geographical  and 
group  representations,  as  housing  conditions  differed  and  ethnic  groups  were  clustered. 
The  response  rate  was  high  (3/108),  only  three  HoHs  refused  to  participate,  all  located  in 
Sector  8.  They  were  replaced  by  the  nearest  dwellings  to  the  intersection  of  the  grid  lines. 
A  similar  technique  was  applied  in  Hai  El-Salam  building  on  a  previous  sampling  grid 
(Davidson  and  Payne  1983),  but  the  response  rate  was  much  lower  than  that  of  Nasriya 
(6/20),  six  HoHs  refused  to  participate  in  different  geographical  locations  and  were  also 
replaced  by  the  nearest  dwellings  to  the  intersection  of  the  grid  lines.  The  decision  to 
conduct  the  household  survey  with  the  HoHs  was  made  on  the  basis  that  they  are  usually 
viewed  as  the  core  of  the  family  in  Egypt.  All  household  members  look  to  them  for 
guidance  and  support.  In  this  context,  the  HoH  is  generally  the  oldest  man;  other 
members  of  the  household  are  reluctant  to  voice  opinions  contrary  to  his  or  to  engage  in 
activities  concerning  the  household  without  his  permission.  Widows  receive  the  same 
respect  from  their  households,  but  only  10  HoH  fill  this  category.  However,  members  of 
the  household  were  often  present  during  the  interviews  and  contributed  to  the  answers, 
which  represented  a  family  consensus  about  the  project.  The  specific  voice  of  women 
was  incorporated  through  observing  some  meetings  of  the  Nasriya  Women's 
Development  Association  (WDA),  while  interviews  with  the  Project's  Consultant  for 
Gender  and  Development  (GAD)  revealed  the  project's  voice. 
In  addition,  key-figures  or  prominent  individuals,  who  had  been  associated  with 
either  project  for  long,  were  asked  to  nominate  some  knowledgeable  HoHs  or 
`community  leaders'  (Head  of  GROs)  who  had  witnessed  the  birth  of  both  projects  as 
additional  informants  for  focus  groups.  But  such  a  sample  was  most  unlikely  to  produce 
a  representative  sample  or  reliable  estimates  of  the  population.  Meanwhile,  the  survey 
tried  to  interview  most  of  the  senior  officials  and  policy-makers  who  were  at  the  top  of 
the  administrative  hierarchy  of  the  institutions  involved  in  this  study,  or  those  who  were 
thought  to  influence  the  development  processes. 
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Figure  4.1:  Nasriya  -  The  sampling  grid. 
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Interviewees  of  senior  officials  included  the  chief  planners  and  administrators  in 
charge  of  the  Nasriya  and  Hai  EI-Salam  projects,  all  previous  and  present  directors  of  the 
Aswan  Urban  Development  and  Land  Management  Unit  (UDLMU),  and  all  senior  urban 
planners  working  for  the  Ismailia  Urban  Planning  Office  (UPO).  At  the  NGO  level,  the 
interviews  included  the  Chair  of  the  Nasriya's  CDA,  several  members  of  its  Board,  and 
the  Head  of  the  largest  NGO  located  in  the  Ismailia  project  area,  the  Abna'a  El-Sharkiya 
community  centre.  At  the  DA  level,  informants  included  the  Chair  of  the  Habitat 
Programme  for  Sustainable  Development  in  Ismailia,  which  monitors  the  El-Salam 
project  now,  the  German  Advisor  of  the  GTZ  projects  in  Aswan,  in  addition  to  9  other 
international  consultants  working  at  present  for  various  DAs  in  Egypt. 
Finally,  the  survey  conducted  a  focus  meeting  with  4  Professors  working  at  the 
Faculty  of  Regional  and  Urban  Planning,  Cairo  University.  The  Thesis  Supervisor  was 
present  at  some  of  these  meetings.  It  is  generally  thought  that  `face  to  face'  interviews 
are  the  only  efficient  means  of  administering  questionnaires  in  Egypt;  they  permit 
clarification  of  any  misunderstandings  of  the  aims  of  the  survey,  maximise  the  response 
rate  and  reliability,  and  make  it  possible  to  obtain  the  interviewee's  first  reaction  and 
response  without  being  influenced  by  neighbours  or  peers.  This  was  particularly 
important  for  ascertaining  `knowledge'  as  against  `behaviour'.  Hence,  all  interviews  were 
administered  in  person;  HoHs  were  interviewed  by  means  of  structured  questionnaires, 
while  senior  municipal  officials'  questionnaires  were  semi-structured.  Open-ended 
interviews  were  also  held  with  policy-makers,  NGO  and  DA  members,  while  further 
discussion  continued  via  electronic  mail  to  update  the  researcher's  knowledge  and  to 
answer  questions  which  arose  while  the  research  was  progressing. 
4.5-  The  questionnaire  surveys: 
The  head  of  households  (HoHs)  interview  examined  the  interrelationships 
between  a  wide  range  of  variables  under  three  main  categories:  a)  possible  causal  factors, 
including  personal  data,  migration  and  mobility,  house  data  and  characteristics,  and 
articulations  of  land-supply;  b)  community  action,  including  relationships  with  the 
upgrading  project,  perception  of  participation  and  self-initiatives;  and  c)  sustainability,  as 
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expressed  in  membership  in  civil  society  organisations,  self-administration  and 
relationships  with  the  municipality  (Figure  4.2). 
Figure  4.2:  Construction  of  questionnaire-  head  of  household  survey 
Personal  data: 
Marital  status,  age,  education,  occupation,  income,  additional  financial 
sources,  and  family/extended  family  size  and  personal  data. 
Migration  and  mobility: 
Place  of  birth,  length  of  residence  in  birthplace,  migration  motives,  length 
of  residence  in  study  area,  why  it  was  chosen,  likelihood  of  further 
Passible 
migration,  why,  and  willingness  to  sell  the  house  if  offered  a  good  price. 
causal 
factors  House  characteristics: 
Ownership,  method  of  construction,  building  permission,  physical 
.....................  .  condition,  size,  connections  to  infrastructure,  cost  of  maintenance  and 
bills,  and  future  plans  for  extension  or  improvement. 
Land-supply  data: 
Initial  and  present  articulations  of  land  supply,  and  intention  of  legalising 
land  status  if  currently  illegal. 
Relationships  with  the  upgrading  project: 
Perception  of  problems  that  exist  in  the  area,  familiarity  with  the 
upgrading  project,  assessment  of  the  most  successful,  unimplemented  or 
inappropriate  activities  undertaken  by  the  project,  disagreements  between 
the  project  and  the  community,  and  assessment  of  specific  activities,  e.  g. 
Action  micro-credit  and  women's  activities. 
Participation  and  self-initiatives: 
Beneficiaries'  perception/evaluation  of  their  participation  during  the 
planning,  implementation  and  evaluation  phases,  the  forms  it  took  and 
subsequent  behaviour,  problem-solving  activities,  familiaritywith  other 
upgrading  projects  in  the  city,  and  comparison  of  successes. 
Self-administration: 
Membership  of  civil  society  organisations,  their  objectives  and  main 
achievements,  familiarity  and/or  membership  of  a  mother  association 
(CDA),  support  of  its  role,  participation  in  voluntary  work, 
acknowledgement  of  other  social  groups  in  the  area,  nature  of  conflicts 
SustainabiIttSr  within  the  area,  how  they  are  solved,  political  participation  (tested 
through  familiarity  with  representatives  and  voting  at  the  area,  popular 
local  council  and  parliament  levels). 
Relationships  with  the  municipality: 
Problem-solving  contact,  general  perception  of  the  attitude  of  the 
municipal  bureaucracy,  specific  problems  encountered  during  contact 
with  the  municipality. 
Source:  Author  (see  Appendix  I  for  the  questionnaire). 
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Second,  the  questions  addressed  to  the  senior  municipal  officials  examined  the 
nature  of  housing  and  upgrading  policies  in  Egypt  and  problems  in  application  of  public 
decision-making  process.  These  included  choice  of  sites  to  upgrade,  choice  of 
beneficiaries,  beneficiary  participation,  recuperation  of  investment,  legality  of  tenure  and 
role  in  the  land/housing  market,  institutional  performance,  time  dimension  and  monitoring 
of  performance  (Appendix  2).  Finally,  open-ended  interviews  with  decision-makers,  DA 
officials,  community  leaders,  and  members  of  local  NGOs  working  in  both  areas,  targeted 
three  major  issues.  The  first  concerned  `funding'  of  upgrading  and  capacity-building 
projects,  including  the  amount,  period,  alterations  and  freedom  of  choice  as  to  how  to 
spend  funds.  The  second  issue  concerned  the  interrelationships  between  civil  society/DA 
and  the  State.  Special  emphasis  was  placed  on  ascertaining  what  level  of  government, 
institution  or  counterparts  was  involved,  the  degree  of  partnership  and  at  what  stage  it 
took  place,  the  formal  compatibility  with  goals,  deadlines,  and  the  degree  of  autonomy 
over  decision-making.  Information  required  in  this  section  focused  on  the  criteria  of  area 
selection,  institution,  processes  and  people,  how  the  problem  was  conceptualised  by  the 
institution  initially  and  over  the  time  of  the  project  (Objective  Oriented  Project  Planning 
(ZOPP)  approach  for  instance),  and  finally  the  context  at  the  time,  the  site  and  the 
personnel. 
There  are  four  types  of  question  content-  namely  behaviour,  knowledge,  beliefs 
and  attitudes  (Dillman  1978).  The  primary  questions  of  the  main  survey  focused  on 
behaviour  and  knowledge,  ascertaining  what  people  do  in  a  certain  situation,  and  their 
associated  characteristics  (knowledge).  Questions  related  to  beliefs  and  attitudes  were 
more  complex  but  necessary  to  gauge  the  attributes  of  the  bureaucracy  and  how  far  its 
beliefs  enabled  it  to  play  a  dynamic  role  in  the  developmental  process.  They  were  also 
important  at  the  community  level  to  examine  how  far  the  beliefs  and  attitudes  of  the  poor 
enabled  them  to  make  an  assertive,  concerted  effort  to  improve  their  community,  and  if 
so,  how  far  they  have  been  successful  in  affecting  change.  This  was  necessary  to  test  the 
contention  that  many  poor  neighbourhoods  are  apathetic.  A  number  of  complementary 
methods  were  employed  to  address  different  facets  of  the  research  questions.  The 
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researcher  was  keen  to  approach  the  same  question  from  different  angles  to  the  same 
interviewee,  as  well  as  ascertaining  different  perspectives  by  asking  the  same  question  to 
respondents  at  different  levels  of  responsibility  and  power.  The  researcher  recorded  the 
answers  so  as  to  avoid  the  possible  embarrassment  of  illiterate  HoHs;  this  also  allowed 
municipal  officials  to  concentrate  on  the  question  content  and  to  offer  unhurried  answers. 
The  reliability  of  the  responses  was  ascertained  by  comparing  response  patterns 
among  similar  items  as  well  as  by  matching  response  patterns  with  some  `well- 
established'  characteristics  of  the  bureaucracy  (as  previously  assessed  in  the  literature 
and/or  observed  by  the  researcher  throughout  his  experience  as  a  practitioner  dealing 
with  both  actors,  squatters  and  bureaucrats).  The  community  beneficiaries/municipalities 
interrelationship  was  examined  by  comparing  response  patterns  to  similar  questions  asked 
to  both  HoHs  and  senior  municipal  officials.  This  tactic  helped  to  understand  the  actors' 
own  explanations  of  their  actions  and  perceptions  and  whether  there  were  contradictions 
in  their  responses.  If  a  contradiction  was  found,  such  that  they  could  not  both  be  correct, 
the  fact  that  what  was  said  was  mistaken  is  not  to  deny  that  it  was  said  and  perceived  to 
be  true;  and  therefore  explained  their  behaviour. 
The  analysis  of  the  data  proceeded  from  exploratory  through  to  explanatory 
approaches  by  means  of  description  to  either  univariate  or  bivariate  statistical  techniques. 
Inferential  statistics  were  used  only  for  the  HoHs  sample  survey  in  Nasriya.  The  nominal 
variables,  such  as  gender,  home  origin/ethnicity  or  location,  allowed  qualitative 
classification  of  individuals  into  categories.  The  ordinal  variables  included  socio- 
economic  status,  education,  age  group,  house  condition,  land  legal  status  and  household 
size  among  others.  Since  this  research  focuses  more  on  qualitative  measures  of  society, 
the  only  interval  variables  were  household  economy  and  investment  in  the  house. 
Because  the  people  of  Nasriya  come  from  different  home  origins,  reside  in  quite  diverse 
spatial  locations  and  at  different  standards  of  living,  most  of  tests  employed  non- 
parametric  distribution-free  methods  concerned  with  the  difference  between  independent 
samples  and  of  relationships  between  variables.  Cluster  analysis  was  also  used  to  classify 
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HoHs  according  to  their  assessment  of  their  level  of  participation  during  the  project's 
duration,  and  their  electoral  participation  and  familiarity  with  political  representatives. 
4.6-  Constraints  of  the  fieldwork: 
The  task  of  collecting  secondary  data  and  conducting  fieldwork  surveys  in  Third 
World  countries  is  by  no  means  easy.  The  issue  of  how  interviewees  respond  to  `us', 
researchers,  based  on  who  we  are  in  `their'  lives-  as  well  as  the  social  categories  to  which 
we  belong,  such  as  age,  gender,  class,  dialectic  group  or  race-  is  a  practical  concern  as 
well  as  an  epistemological  and  ethical  one.  Constraints  stemming  either  from  the  official 
administrative  level  (bureaucratic  culture  factors)  or  from  the  civil  citizens'  level  (cultural 
factors)  can  hinder  any  survey  and/or  mislead  the  researcher.  A  story  told  to  a  particular 
researcher  might  take  a  different  form  if  someone  else  was  the  listener  (Riessman  1993: 
11).  Hence,  the  desire  of  many  of  us  "to  treat  interview  data  as  more  or  less 
straightforward  `pictures'  of  an  external  reality  can  fail  to  understand  how  that  `reality'  is 
being  represented  in  words"  (Silverman  1997:  4). 
It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  what  is  available  in  many  governmental  institutions  in 
Egypt.  "Information  is  considered  to  be  a  precious  commodity-a  key  ingredient  of 
power-and  something  to  hoard,  not  to  disburse"  (Mayfield  1996:  138).  Admittedly,  the 
researcher  managed  to  access  data  in  many  institutions  only  because  he  was  known  by 
some  senior  staff  working  there  from  the  days  he  worked  for  the  UDLMU  and  the 
Nasriya  project  in  Aswan  (1989-1994);  this  helped  a  great  deal  to  extend  his 
`professional  connections'  to  various  institutions.  He  has  become  a  familiar  and  trusted 
figure  for  them.  Most  of  the  fieldwork  survey,  including  the  interviews,  could  not  have 
been  completed  successfully  without  `personal  relations'  with  senior  employees  working 
there. 
The  impact  of  bureaucratic  cultural  constraints  on  the  fieldwork  operation  was 
manifold.  Although  the  survey  aimed  to  interview  senior  officials  at  municipal  level,  it 
was  obvious  that  some  of  them  were  reluctant  or  unable  to  express  sincere  opinions 
regarding  their  subordinates,  superiors  or  the  administrative  system  in  general.  This 
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constraint  is  referred  to  general  anxiety:  "People  tend  to  give  complete  deference  and 
loyalty  to  their  superiors  and  expect  similar  behaviour  from  their  subordinates"  (Mayfield 
1996:  138).  In  such  a  climate  of  bureaucratic  consternation  and  submission  to  municipal 
directives,  it  was  always  necessary  to  obtain  permission  from  the  superiors  of  the 
intended  senior  municipal  officials  in  order  to  enable  them  to  express  their  opinions  freely 
and  to  avoid  any  misunderstandings  between  them  and  their  superiors.  On  the  other  hand, 
as  the  researcher  spent  ten  years  working  for  the  Aswan  project  and/or  observing  the 
development  that  has  taken  place  there,  two  major  factors  concerning  positionality  and 
possible  bias  had  to  be  considered.  Many  senior  officials  interviewed  in  Aswan  regarded 
the  researcher  as  a  colleague  who  by  no  means  knows  any  less  than  them.  Whenever  he 
questioned  any  critical  sensitive  area,  he  repeatedly  received  the  answer:  "Oh  come  on, 
you  know  the  answer  very  well,  do  you  not?  ".  The  researcher  had  to  explain  that  "it  is  a 
subjective  point  of  view,  and  I  want  to  know  your  own  opinion",  suggesting  that  what  is 
conceived  as  `self-evident'  might,  in  fact,  be  open  to  different  interpretations. 
Fortunately,  this  problem  did  not  exist  in  Ismailia,  but  another  one  arose.  Some  senior 
officials  could  not  devote  enough  time  for  the  interview  because  they  were  repeatedly 
interrupted  by  other  work,  visitors,  phone  calls,  or  documents  requested  urgently  by  their 
superiors-  thereupon  asking  the  researcher  to  terminate  the  meeting  and  come  again 
another  day,  even  though  an  appointment  had  been  made. 
Turning  to  the  beneficiaries  survey,  cultural  constraints  were,  in  fact,  more 
influential  and  could  have  misled  the  researcher  during  the  first  phase  survey.  Some  of 
the  householders  interviewed  in  Ismailia  frequently  gave  vague  answers  when  they  were 
asked  about  their  assessments  regarding  project  management,  municipal  performance,  or 
municipal  official's  attitude  in  general.  It  was  obvious  that  they  were  uneasy  about 
expressing  their  views  to  `strangers'.  It  is  also  worth  mentioning  that  strangers  are  not 
always  welcome  to  enter  houses  in  squatter  settlements  in  Egypt  and  to  question 
householders.  There  is  a  common  feeling  among  some  residents  of  being  either 
embarrassed,  because  of  the  poor  condition  of  their  houses,  or  suspicious  regarding  the 
real  purpose  of  the  interview.  This  is  even  more  intense  in  the  case  of  those  occupying 
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illegal  plots.  Despite  the  researcher's  explanation  that  the  purpose  was  purely  academic, 
some  still  believed  that  if  this  information  reached  to  the  municipality,  they  would  be  in 
trouble.  However,  the  fact  that  the  researcher  is  well  known  in  Nasriya  helped  a  lot  to 
remove  such  suspicions.  Nonetheless,  a  committed  sociologist  who  used  to  work  for  the 
project  volunteered  his  assistance,  which  helped  a  great  deal  due  to  his  popularity  in  the 
area.  Hence,  it  was  much  easier  to  arrange  meetings  with  HoHs  in  Aswan  than  in 
Ismailia.  Members  of  the  Nasriya's  CDA,  specially  the  members  of  the  Women's 
Committee,  were  also  a  great  help  in  arranging  meetings  and  introducing  the  researcher 
to  many  receptive  female  HoHs.  Absence  of  such  a  unified  CDA  in  Ismailia  forced  the 
researcher  to  introduce  himself  with  no  community  support. 
Many  randomly-selected  HoHs,  6/20  in  Ismailia,  refused  to  co-operate  during  the 
pilot  fieldwork,  which  jeopardised  the  survey  because  of  possible  bias  in  selection.  This 
problem  was  overcome  later  as  the  researcher  was  assisted  by  an  urban  planner  who  used 
to  work  for  the  Ismailia  project  and  knew  many  community  leaders  in  the  area. 
Meanwhile,  `personal  understanding'  of  fate  and  destiny  meant  that  several  interviewees 
in  Ismailia  and  Aswan  were  incapable  of  expressing  the  reasons  for  something  happening, 
e.  g.  a  certain  difficulty  they  faced  in  their  lifetime  or  their  planning  for  the  future.  Their 
answers  referred  to  the  `Will  of  God'  and  resoluteness  to  face  every  action  that  occurs. 
Hence,  it  was  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  Sayer's  argument  that  language  is  not  a  matter  of 
subjective  opinion;  concepts  are  constructed  in  terms  of  an  inter-subjective  language 
which  allows  us  to  communicate  intelligibly  and  interact  effectively  (Sayer  1992:  32). 
The  researcher  continuously  tried  to  understand  people's  own  `vocabularies  of  life'. 
There  is  undoubtedly  human  bias  from  the  researcher's  side.  The  Nasriya  project 
was  always  likely  to  be  over  emphasised.  The  researcher  was  not  only  born  in  Aswan  and 
knew  it  by  heart,  but  also  was  working  there  and  so  was  familiar  with  a  wide  range  of 
development  details.  This  could  have  made  him  subconsciously  reluctant  to  understand 
the  real  origins  of  the  situation  in  Ismailia's  case,  blind  to  other  interpretations  or  too 
willing  to  assumes  potential  similarities.  This  was  recognised  by  the  researcher;  it  is 
worth  stating  that  his  bias  is for  greater  citizen  empowerment  and  control  over  their  own 
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resources  in  all  poor  societies.  He  is  therefore  sensitive  to  all  forms  of  top-down, 
procedures,  whether  practised  by  community  civil  society  organisations,  local 
government,  central  government  or  external  donor  agency,  bilateral  or  multilateral. 
Criticism  of  case  study  institutions  discussed  throughout  this  research  to  illustrate 
examples  of  `unjust'  policy  or  `embroiled'  performance,  at  least  as  perceived  by  the 
survey  population  and  previous  writings  in  the  literature,  do  not  imply  attacks  on  these 
institutions,  but  rather  an  effort  to  explain  processes  that  arose  in  specific  circumstances. 
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POLITICS  AND  URBAN  GOVERNMENT  IN  EGYPT 
Egypt  is  presently  in  a  state  of  transition,  facing  manifold  challenges  and 
competing  urban,  political-cultural  and  socio-economic  forces,  which  will  not  easily  be 
resolved  by  the  national  government  per  se  but  rather  by  means  of  effective  local 
government  and  empowered  civil  society.  Because  Egypt  has  long  had  locally  defined 
provinces  and  districts  along  the  Nile  Valley  (Figure  5.1),  the  prime  purpose  of  central 
government  has  always  been  to  control  specific  agricultural  and  commercial  activities. 
Such  divisions  have  never  granted  local  autonomy  or  any  normative  commitment  to  a 
democratically  organised  system  of  local  structures  and  institutions.  Moreover,  the  local 
administration  system  is  defined  in  legal  and  organisational  terms  that  discourage  any 
form  of  democratic  openness  or  the  empowerment  of  civil  society  in  many  ways  (Mayfield 
1996).  Although  there  are  formal  democratic  institutions,  they  represent  the  interests  of 
patron-clientalism  rather  than  the  society  at  large,  and  discourage  criticism. 
At  present  social  pressures  are  demanding  greater  institutional  decentralisation  and 
the  creation  of  a  more  open  and  pro-active  society;  further  investigation  is  needed  into  the 
practice  of  international  donor  agencies  (DAs)  working  in  Egypt  and  the  means  by  which 
they  can  support  both  these  processes.  These  suggestions  correspond  to  Habitat's  Agenda 
for  `Capacity  Building  and  Institutional  Development'  (UNCHS  1997),  which  places 
special  emphases  on  decentralisation  and  on  improving  the  performance  of  local 
governments  in  DCs  and  countries  whose  economies  are  in  transition:  "Governments 
should  accord  a  high  priority  to  implementing  a  comprehensive  policy  for  capacity- 
building.  The  international  community  should  help  them  to  develop  their  capacity,  identify 
and  assess  their  institution-building  priorities  and  strengthen  their  management  capacity". 
This  capacity-building  strategy  is  assumed  to  act  as  an  integral  part  of  institutions'  urban 
development  strategy  and  their  investment  programmes  or  business  plans.  This  means  it 
will  be'  integrated  technically  and  in  terms  of  commitment  and  resource  allocation 
(Peltenburg  et  al  1996:  3).  Accordingly,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  the  fundamental 
bases  of  urban  governance  in  Egypt,  including  system  legacies,  legitimacy  and  stability.  It 
is  also  equally  important  to  review  local  government  structure,  its  staffing  conditions  and 
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inter-organisational  co-operation  not  only  with  other  institutions  but  also  with  the 
private  and  civil  society  sectors.  This  investigation  can  clarify  our  understanding  of  the 
processes  to  establish  a  more  open  and  -proactive  society,  and  an  autonomous  :  local 
government  that  could  allocate  resources  according  to  democratic  forms  of 
collaboration. 
This  Chapter  briefly  reviews  the  major  political  events  witnessed  in  the  last  five 
decades  since  the  1952  Revolution,  before  focusing  on  the  contemporary  challenges  that 
now  confront  Egypt  and  their  impact  in  shaping  urban  policies.  Subsequently,  the  reality 
of  foreign  aid  and  DAs  conflicting  aims  are  analysed.  Since  Egypt's  political  and 
administrative  systems  are  closely  inter-related,  a  brief  review  of  the  development  of  the 
country's  political  legacies  is  followed  by  a  review  of  the  administrative  systems.  The 
extent  to  which  contemporary  local  government  enhances  decentralisation  is  scrutinised 
with  particular  reference  to  the  ways  in  which  it  impacts  upon  participatory  initiatives. 
Finally,  the  constraints  facing  civil  society  and  the  opportunities  for  creating  more  open 
and  pro-active  society  are  discussed  in  detail.  This  examination  can  draw  conclusions  as 
to  what  form  of  urban  governance  is  present  in  Egypt. 
Figure  5.1:  Egypt  -  Major  cities. 
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5.1-  Urban  and  political  challenges: 
There  have  been  dramatic  changes  in  housing  programmes  and  urban  sector 
policies  in  Egypt  over  the  last  five  decades.  Egypt  has  experienced  a  major  transformation 
of  its  political  economy  during  this  period  that  has  impacted  not  only  on  daily  life  but  also 
on  the  international  situation  in  the  Middle  East.  The  years  from  1952  to  1999  were 
punctuated  by  one  massive  Revolution,  two  major  wars,  two  riots  and  recently  by 
fundamentalist  terrorism.  Each  one  of  these  events  reflects  the  socio-economic  and 
political  environment  at  its  time.  Urban  development  programmes  have  been  affected 
either  positively  or  negatively  by  these  events;  for  while  some  led  to  the  formation  of 
squatter  and  informal  settlements  in  Egypt,  others  stimulated  the  government  to  upgrade 
existing  settlements. 
The  1952  Revolution,  which  ended  centuries  of  colonisation,  swept  into  power  a 
small  group  of  military  officers.  Despite  their  negligible  experience  in  state  management 
and  development,  they  refused  to  leave  national  affairs  to  civilians  and  strove  to  transform 
the  polity  and  the  socio-economic  structure  rapidly  into  a  socialist  system  via  radical 
policies  of  land  reform  and  nationalisation.  Then  the  dramatic  defeat  in  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict  (1967-1973)  resulted  in  thousands  of  Egyptians  moving  from  their  lands  in  the 
Suez  Canal  zone  to  other  urban  centres  in  Lower  Egypt.  This  defeat  not  only  resulted  in 
an  acute  sense  of  inferiority  among  many  Egyptians  up  to  the  apparent  victory  in  the  1973 
war,  but  also  gave  rise  to  religious  movements  urging  spiritual  revitalisation.  In  1977, 
Egypt  was  again  shaken  to  its  very  core  by  urban  food  riots.  Several  hundred  thousands 
citizens  poured  into  the  streets  of  all  major  cities  in  an  effort  to  demote  President  Sadat 
when  his  government  tried  to  increase  the  prices  of  basic  subsidised  consumer  goods. 
After  the  military  had  restored  order,  the  message  was  very  clear  to  the  government- 
never  again  attempt  any  radical  cuts  in  the  social  `safety  net'. 
In  February  1986,  police  conscripts  and  squatter  dwellers  rioted  again  in  Cairo. 
This  riot  emphasised  two  particular  points  to  President  Mubarak's  government.  The  first 
was  that  tensions  over  economic  inequality  simmer  beneath  the  surface  and  that  if  the 
economy  continues  to  struggle,  break  out  again.  It  was  the  urban  poor  who  had  revolted, 
conscripted  by  the  police.  The  second  point  emphasised  that  the  next  time,  those  who 
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revolt  might  be  civilians  and  suppression  by  the  army  might  have  wider  consequences  for 
civil  unrest.  The  most  recent  event  concerns  the  rise  of  religious  fundamentalism.  Sadat's 
assassination  in  October  1981  prompted  a  massive  outpouring  of  contemplation, 
speculation  and  exaggeration  about  the  power  of  radical  religion  in  all  its  forms  in  Egypt 
(Eiweida  1997).  It  is  well  known  now  that  members  of  this  movement  come  from  poor 
neighbourhoods.  The  hardship  and  social  repression  have  led  to  alienation  and  resulted  in 
many  squatters  joining  the  fundamentalist  movement. 
In  economic  terms,  the  implementation  of  the  Economic  Reform  and  Structural 
Adjustment  Programme  (ERSAP)  (1990-date),  involved  measures  of  privatisation  and 
financial  liberalisation,  including  deregulation  of  prices,  wages,  customs,  tariffs  and 
exchange  rates;  all  have  had  a  major  effect  on  society.  The  programme  focused  on 
stabilisation  to  restore  macroeconomic  balance  and  reduce  inflation,  and  structural 
adjustment  to  stimulate  and  sustain  medium-term  and  long-term  growth.  The  International 
Development  Association  (IDA)  supported  Egypt  with  a  U$140  million  credit  for  the 
establishment  of  an  emergency  social  fund  to  accelerate  implementation  of  current  social 
policies  and  to  minimise  the  effect  of  the  economic  reforms  on  the  poor.  The  programme 
as  a  whole  was  also  supported  by  a  standby  arrangement  from  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF),  and  a  $300  million  World  Bank  ERSAP  loan  (World  Bank  1991:  129). 
Contemporary  leaders  in  Egypt  share  a  vision  of  a  dynamic  modem  economy,  one  based 
on  market  principles  and  integrating  Egypt  into  the  global  financial  and  trading 
community.  The  ERSAP  has  been  broadly  successful,  leading  to  a  reduction  in  the  fiscal 
deficit,  disciplined  monetary  growth,  financial  deregulation  and  deregulated  trade  and 
investment  policies.  Moreover,  because  Egypt  was  one  of  the  world's  most  heavily- 
indebted  countries,  U$43.7  billion  in  1989,  which  required  servicing  at  a  cost  equivalent 
of  22  per  cent  of  Egypt's  exports  of  goods  and  services,  the  Paris  Club  agreed  in  1991  to 
`debt  relief  covering  half  of  Egypt's  foreign  debt  (Licari  1997:  14).  In  1997,  the  World 
Bank  assessed  Egypt's  stabilisation  policies  as  highly  successful,  notwithstanding  criticism 
which  was  raised  about  the  slow  process  of  privatisation  and  the  low  profile  of  private 
investment  (World  Bank  1997:  1). 
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On  the  other  hand,  the  ERSAP  resulted  in  the  elimination  of  many  consumer 
subsidies  (Holt  and  Roe  1993),  privatisation  of  state-owned  industries  and  a  large 
reduction  in  public  spending  and  public  employment  (Sullivan  1990).  Poverty  and 
unemployment  are  thus  pressing  problems.  The  incidence  of  poverty  and  income 
inequality  increased  as  a  result,  and  is  now  evident  in  all  poverty  measures.  Based  on  the 
individual's  affordable  consumption  expenditure  in  Egypt,  it  is  estimated  that  near  half  of 
the  population  either  live  below  the  poverty  line  or  are  moderately  poor  (UNDP  1996). 
Among  the  poor,  7.4  per  cent  of  Egypt's  population,  about  4.4  million,  are  deemed  to  be 
ultra  poor,  living  below  the  food-based  poverty  line.  Many  of  these  live  in  rural  areas  but 
urban  poverty  is  also  sizeable.  The  poor  segment  of  urban  society,  who  live  on  less  than 
£E2  (£0.30)  daily  subsistence  per  person,  constitutes  58  per  cent  of  the  total  urban 
population.  The  headcount  index  at  the  basic-needs  urban  poverty  line  increased  from 
18.2  per  cent  in  1981/82,  to  20.3  per  cent  in  1990/91  and  to  22.5  per  cent  in  1995/96 
(Table  5.1).  The  high  prevalence  of  poverty  in  urban  areas  could  also  be  explained  by 
rural-urban  migration  and  the  lack  of  remunerative  employment  in  the  urban  sector. 
There  is  a  clear  geography  of  poverty  in  Egypt,  regions  and  Governorates  vary, 
not  only  in  wealth  and  natural  resources  endowment,  but  also  in  the  way  social  and  public 
services  are  distributed.  Lower  Egypt  is  relatively  better  off  than  Upper  Egypt,  with  only 
one-fifth  of  its  urban  population  poor  compared  to  one-third  in  Upper  Egypt,  though  the 
total  population  of  the  latter  is  lower  (UNDP  1996).  Rural  areas  of  Upper  Egypt  have  the 
highest  rate  of  poverty,  32%  of  the  poor  population  live  in  these  areas. 
Table  5.1:  Egypt-  Urban  poverty  measurements 
Geographic  location  Headcount  index  Poor  population  Relative  share 
(Million)  of  the  poor 
-  All  Urban  22.5  5.800  42.4% 
-  All  Rural  23.3  7.868  57.6% 
-  Urban  and  Frontier  16.0  2.086  15.2% 
Governorates 
-  Urban  Lower  Egypt  21.7  1.527  11.2% 
-  Urban  Upper  Egypt  35.0  2.276  16.7% 
Egypt 
. 
22.9  13.668  100% 
Source:  Adapted  from  UNDP  (1996:  27). 
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The  World  Bank  (1997)  estimates  that  despite  a  real  GDP  growth  of  between  4.4 
and  4.6  per  cent  between  mid-1996  and  mid-2005,  urban  unemployment  will  rise  from 
10.3  per  cent  to  17  per  cent  of  the  labour  force.  It  would  require  a  growth  rate  of  5.7  per 
cent  rising  gradually  to  7.5  per  cent  over  the  same  period  to  bring  unemployment  down  to 
6  per  cent.  This  is  misleading  because  many  of  those  nominally  in  employment  are  in 
reality  underemployed.  The  government  is  committed  to  finding  jobs  for  the  375,000  new 
entrants  to  the  labour  market  every  year,  in  addition  to  reducing  unemployment,  primarily 
through  accelerated  privatisation  and  support  to  competitive  markets.  Given  the 
difficulties  inherent  in  economic  transition,  the  government's  approach  tends  to  reduce 
absolute  liberal  pluralism  and  to  permit  various  forms  of  state  corporatism  instead.  This 
has  obvious  implications  for  the  forms  of  civil  participation  that  are  possible. 
Women's  status  has  been  affected.  Data  collected  by  the  1995  Egypt 
Demographic  and  Health  Survey  (EDHS  95)  suggest  that  Egyptian  women  have  limited 
control  over  important  aspects  of  their  lives  and  limited  autonomy  in  household  decision- 
making.  Despite  the  significant  narrowing  of  gender  differences  since  the  last  International 
Conference  on  Population  and  Development  (ICPD),  Cairo  1997,  women's  financial 
autonomy  is  still  limited  and  the  opportunities  open  to  them  are  still  less  than  those  open 
to  men.  Although  the  pressure  of  feminist  movements  in  Egypt  comes  from  major  cities, 
they  have  been  activists  and  established  large  numbers  of  small  development  projects  in 
urban  and  rural  Egypt  to  increase  social  awareness  and  dispel  Islamic  misconceptions 
about  population  policies.  They  have  also  established  family  planning  clinics,  employed 
physicians  and  nurses  to  provide  reproductive  health  care,  eradicate  illiteracy,  enhance 
women's  financial  independence,  and  combat  `traditional  practices  harmful  to  women  and 
children',  e.  g.  female  circumcision  and  child  labour  (Al-Abram  Weekly:  19  November 
1998).  Feminist  movements  face  many  obstacles  in  achieving  their  development  targets. 
Although  about  15%  of  the  total  15,000  registered  civil  society  organisations  working  in 
Egypt  are  devoted  exclusively  to  carrying  out  gender  related  projects,  NGO  activists 
complain  that  despite  the  ICPD,  NGOs  have  been  faced  with  major  challenges.  Policies 
have  been  broadened  to  integrate  women's  comprehensive  health  care  with  family 
planning  projects,  but  NGOs  did  not  have.  the  necessary  financial  or  human  resources  to 
meet  these  challenges.  Funds  have  always  been  a  major  obstacles,  and  the  new  policy 
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remains  ambiguous  to  many  (IM,  15-12-98).  Indeed  these  obstacles  preclude  the 
establishment  of  effective  and  independent  civil  society  and  are,  therefore,  discussed  in 
more  detail  in  Section  5.5. 
The  present  regime  is,  in  fact,  faced  by  several  quandaries.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
must  maintain  authoritarian  control  in  order  to  remain  in  power,  while  there  is  a  clear 
recognition  that  civil  society  and  new  social  forces  are  stimulating  pressures  for  greater 
pluralism  and  democratisation  on  the  other  (Mayfield  1996:  1).  The  state's  recognition 
that  modernisation  and  economic  development  require  a  greater  commitment  to 
secularism  and  modem  society,  is  countered  by  the  equally  persuasive  notion  that  some 
form  of  Islamic  government  may  be  needed  to  protect  Egypt's  traditional  values  as  it 
faces  the  challenge  of  modern  life,  as  is  evident  from  the  fundamentalist  religious 
movements  that  have  surfaced.  Although  they  are  still  generally  disorganised  in  many 
cities,  they  have  been  quite  powerful  in  rural  Upper  Egypt  as  a  response  to  the 
government's  urban  and  regional  biases  (Eiweida  1997).  This  has  left  the  government  in  a 
dilemma  between  maintaining  authoritarian  control  to  install  security,  or  embracing  civil 
society  organisations  as  a  means  of  enhancing  prosperity.  The  latter  embodies  a  risk  that 
some  extremist  organisations  might  masquerade  as  law  abiding  civil  society  interests. 
Egypt  is  thus  facing  a  series  of  urban  challenges  not  only  due  to  rapid  population 
growth  in  its  cities  and  their  geographical  constraints,  as  repeatedly  discussed  in  the 
literature,  but  also  because  of  internal  and  external  institutional  deficiencies.  According  to 
the  UN's  report,  `The  Sex  and  Age  Distribution  of  the  World  Populations'  (UN  1994: 
331),  it  is  expected  that,  based  on  a  medium  variant  projection,  the  population  in  Egypt 
will  reach  about  69  million  in  2000  and  117  million  by  2050,  more  than  double  the 
population  of  1986.  Presently,  more  than  half  of  the  population  is  rural  (57.6%),  but  the 
country  is  experiencing  rapid  urbanisation.  Although  the  urban  growth  rate  is  only  2.5% 
per  annum  (World  Bank  1997),  this  annual  increase  is  tremendous  in  the  Greater  Cairo 
Region  (GCR),  which  forms  the  biggest  metropolitan  area  anywhere  in  Africa  or  the 
Middle  East.  The  population  of  GCR,  10.6  million  in  1986,  was  estimated  to  reach  16.1 
million  by  2000  (UNCHS  1993:  98),  i.  e.  50  per  cent  of  the  total  Egyptian  urban 
population.  Nevertheless,  the  rate  of  growth  reaches  4%  per  annum  in  many  Egyptian 
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cities  specially  in  Upper  Egypt  where  the  levels  of  education  are  lower,  families  are  larger 
and  poverty  is  higher. 
Because  the  decision  of  transforming  a  village  to  a  city  depends  on  political  and 
administrative  regularities  in  Egypt  regardless  of  its  size  or  function  (PADCO  1982; 
Poppe  1991),  urban  growth  is  largely  uncontrolled  and  occupies  scarce  and  valuable 
agricultural  zones  which  are  rapidly  decreasing  in  the  Nile  Delta  and  Valley.  The  1979 
Housing  Plan  estimated  that  some  60,000  feddans  (25,210  ha.  )  of  agricultural  land  were 
being  lost  annually  due  to  urbanisation,  resulting  in  a  loss  of  20%  of  the  arable  land  by  the 
year  2000  (Abt  1982:  34).  The  1996  census  revealed  that  16  villages  have  become  cities, 
8  have  agglomerated  to  form  2  new  cities,  and  20  villages  have  jointed  8  existing  cities  in 
the  period  between  1960-1996  (CAPMAS  1996).  This  is  a  severe  problem  for  Egypt 
because  of  geographical  constraints.  The  inhabited  and  cultivated  area  of  the  country 
represents  only  5%  of  the  total  land  area  on  which  almost  99%  of  the  population  live, 
while  the  rest  is  a  vast  desert.  The  increasing  population  has  had  a  severe  impact  upon  the 
ratio  of  arable  land  per  person,  which  had  shrunk  from  0.2  hectare  in  1900  to  0.08  hectare 
in  1970  and  continues  to  shrink.  This  situation  raises  fears  that  the  limits  to  which 
increased  productivity  can  make  up  for  the  decrease  in  area  will  soon  be  reached. 
Housing  and  land  provision  for  low  income  groups  within  the  existing  city 
boundaries  have  almost  disappeared  with  the  application  of  the  ERSAP.  Instead,  the 
government  has  concentrated  its  efforts  on  spatial  decentralisation  away  from  the  River 
Valley  by  means  of  constructing  new  cities,  satellite  cities  and  mega  projects,  such  as  the 
Toshka  New  Valley,  South-west  Egypt,  and  the  El-Salaam  Canal  from  the  River  Nile  to 
Sinai.  These  new  communities  aim  basically  to  decongest  the  already  over-populated 
cities  and  enlarge  the  existing  inhabited  and  cultivated  area  from  5%  to  25%  by  2020  (Al- 
Ahram:  16  December  1998).  However,  this  is  a  centralised  practice  at  the  Cabinet  level 
which  does  not  follow  clear  guidelines  and  diverts  the  state's  scarce  resources  away  from 
the  poor.  The  urban  poor  will  eventually  be  forced  to  leave  their  settlements  and  re- 
accommodate  themselves  in  the  new  communities  (MH,  06-06-96).  Unsurprisingly,  the 
state  has  already  announced  its  plan  to  clear  81  slum  pockets  in  24  Governorates  (UNDP 
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1996:  54).  The  government  totally  ignored  the'  large  numbers  of  failed  slum  clearance 
experiences  replicated  in  DCs,  these  issues  are  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  10. 
Meanwhile,  the  government  has  started  to  sell  desert  land  to  large  real  estate 
associations,  in  line  with  the  privatisation  policy  and  building  up  partnerships  with  the 
private  sector.  The  tidal  wave  of  the  new  `paradise'  residential  communities  and  sea 
resorts  have  become  the  focus  of  these  Egyptian  associations'  interest.  Unsurprisingly, 
they  only  build  expensive  new  developments  equipped  with  fibre  optic  connections, 
swimming  pools  and  golf  courses  for  the  affluent  classes.  As  a  result,  some  individuals 
have  profited  greatly  from  such  construction  and  speculation  on  land  prices.  While  the 
main  concern  of  those  wishing  to  live  in  these  new  developments  is  whether  or  not  the 
promoters  have  already  embarked  on  the  construction  operations,  such  projects  have 
provoked  envy  and  fury  among  the  poor.  Furthermore,  urban  core  areas  have  lost  status, 
as  higher  income  groups  move  out  to  new  `middle  class'  areas,  leading  to  stagnation  and 
their  branding  as  `slums'.  In  many  areas,  e.  g.  the  old  quarter  in  central  Cairo,  the  result  is 
physical  and  social  deterioration,  to  the  extent  of  the  collapse  of  some  buildings. 
Alternatively,  they  may  be  redeveloped  in  a  piecemeal  manner,  as  developers  buy  up 
existing  buildings  to  construct  medium  or  high-rise  buildings  for  residential  or  commercial 
use,  evicting  or  paying  off  existing  tenants  in  the  process. 
The  absolute  increase  in  housing  in  urban  areas  is  one  of  the  most  pressing 
problems  in  Egypt.  The  government  took  responsibility  for  the  provision  of  low-income 
housing  from  the  early  1960s.  But,  given  the  pace  of  urban  population  growth,  it  became 
less  and  less  capable  of  satisfying  demand,  while  private  sector  initiatives  were  only 
concerned  with  profit-maximisation.  Although  the  1986  census  revealed  that  there  were 
1.8  million  vacant  housing  units  in  Egypt  and  523,000  in  Cairo  alone,  most  of  these  were 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  urban  poor.  They  were  constructed  by  the  private  sector  which 
always  demanded  large  down  payments  (key-money)  in  advance.  The  effects  of  this  are 
most  notable  in  GCR;  statistics  reveal  that  84%  of  new  housing  originated  from  a 
development  process  labelled  as  `informal  housing'  by  the  government  (Abt  1982).  While 
core  areas  deteriorate,  informal  housing  settlements  provide  essential  access  to 
employment  opportunities  and  housing  for-low-income  families.  However,  they  do  this  at 
108 r, 
Chapter  5  Politics  and  Urban  Government  in  Egypt 
a  cost.  Most  informal  settlements  sprout  at  the  city  periphery  and  consequently,  take 
place  on  agricultural  land.  They  are  thus  a  prime  contributor  to  the  loss  of  scarce 
agricultural  land  that  has  already  been  noted. 
Although  high  urban  population  increase  is  obviously  a  driving  factor  of  annual 
urban  growth,  it  is  also  a  consequence  of  uneven  development  which  appears  to  be  a 
symptom  of  urban  and  regional  bias  (Eiweida  1997);  rural  migrants  are  drawn  to  those 
urban  agglomerations  and  city  core  areas  where  the  concentration  of  industries  and  public 
and  private  services  are  most  likely  to  allow  their  integration  into  the  job  market. 
However,  statistics  suggest  that  natural  increase  is  now  a  bigger  contributor  than  in- 
migration  to  urban  growth  (CAPMAS  1996).  Moreover,  because  popular  and  economic 
housing  units  and/or  their  accessibility  to  the  poor  have  been  neglected  in  housing  policy, 
the  urban  poor  ignore,  in  their  turn,  the  housing  code  and  planning  or  zoning 
arrangements  (UNDP  1996:  54).  Similar  to  other  `self-built'  settlements  in  DCs,  post 
facto  planning  and  regularisation  are  expensive  because  squatters  choose  marginal  sites 
(Turner  1988),  thereby  provision  of  services  places  great  strains  on  the  scarce  resources 
of  Egypt's  central  government.  The  pace  of  informality  results  in  increasingly 
overcrowded  settlements  deprived  of  a  healthy  environment  and  basic  urban  services. 
These  `situations'  do  not  benefit  low-income  urban  groups.  Urban  problems  are 
compounded  by  two  fundamental  political  dilemmas,  each  with  its  own  set  of  conflicting 
options.  First  is  the  need  for  central  control  over  the  policy  implementation  processes 
related  to  national  development  and  the  competing  need  for  decentralisation  in  order  to 
stimulate  local  initiative,  responsibility,  and  creativity.  Although  the  deconcentration  of  - 
central-level  personnel  to  local  areas,  including  limited  delegation  of  central  prerogatives 
and  authorities,  took  place  during  the  past  two  decades,  complete  devolution  of 
legislative  authority  and  financial  autonomy  is  still  distant  from  Egypt's  local  government 
system  (Mayfield  1996).  The  Egyptian  Ministry  of  Fiscal  Planning  has  always  the  last 
word  as  to  how  resources  are  allocated  throughout  the  central  ministries  and  downwards 
to  the  Governorates  level.  Such  centralisation  of  allocative  and  political  power 
undermines  legitimacy  and  encourages  forms  of  governance  unresponsive  to  local 
people's  needs.  Second,  local  citizens  need  to  be  given  opportunities  for  meaningful 
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participation  to  become  willing  to  be  politically  active.  These  issues  are  discussed  in  more 
detail  in  Section  5.5. 
5.2-  Donor  agencies  and  power: 
External  development  assistance  has  constituted  the  major  input  to  urban  sector 
development  in  Egypt  over  the  last  three  decades.  Since  embarking  on  the  modernisation 
processes  after  the  1952  revolution,  diverse  models  of  economic  development,  national 
administration,  land  and  housing  management  have  been  proposed  and  sponsored  by 
multi-and-bilateral  donor  agencies  (DAs).  There  have  been  more  than  15  major  DAs 
contributing  some  U$2.3  billion  to  the  Egyptian  economy  every  year.  These,  in  order  of 
magnitude  include  the  USA,  the  African  Development  Bank,  Germany,  the  Islamic 
Development  Bank,  the  European  Investment  Bank,  France,  Japan,  Denmark  and  the  UK. 
Complementary  support  for  structural  reforms  has  been  funded  by  the  IMF,  the  World 
Bank  and  the  European  Union  (EU).  Individual  contributions  of  such  multi-and-bilateral 
donor  agencies  to  Egypt  have  been  presented  by  each  of  them  as  substantial  and  vital  to 
Egypt's  development  needs. 
Most  of  these  large  aid  flows  into  the  urban  sector  in  Egypt  have  failed  to  achieve 
the  intended  results  of  sustainable  development  for  the  poor  (Zetter  and  Hamza  1997). 
Based  on  data  collected  from  the  1970s  and  1980s,  Zetter  and  Hamza  (1997)  re-evaluated 
three  urban  upgrading  case  studies:  the  Helwan  Project,  Cairo  (USAID  funded),  the 
Garbage  Collectors  Settlement,  the  Zabaleen,  also  in  Cairo  (World  Bank,  Oxfam  and 
Ford  Foundation  funded),  and  the  Nasriya  Project,  Aswan  (GTZ  funded).  They  all 
targeted  issues  of  community  development  and  participation,  though  the  last  had  not  been 
completed  when  their  assessment  took  place.  Their  analysis  revealed  common  limitations 
in  project  formulation,  i.  e.  the  ambiguous  political  rationale  for  participation,  the  desire 
for  short-term  project  visibility,  and  the  poor  conceptualisation  of  models  of  participation 
and  institution  building.  The  above  study  argued  that  the  failure  of  the  pragmatic 
managerialist  approach  adopted  in  Egypt,  and  the  resulting  conflicts  in  programme  design 
and  delivery,  can  only  be  understood  using  a  macro-micro  methodology,  linking  macro 
level  political  economy  perspectives  with  micro  level  project-based  analysis.  While 
acknowledging  many  forms  of  institutionäl  deficiencies  at  the  macro  level  of  Egypt's 
110 
i 'i Chapter  5  Politics  and  Urban  Govemment  in  Egypt 
bureaucracy,  the  study  was  critical  of  the  DAs'  performance  as  well,  arguing  that  funds 
were  inappropriately  allocated  because  of  reluctance  on  the  part  of  donors  to  implement 
development  projects  unless  these  satisfied  their  set  of  criteria.  For  instance,  the  emphasis 
on  high  visibility  and  consumption  rather  than  production  outputs  meant  that  housing  was 
addressed  through  a  pragmatic  managerialist  approach  which  associated  participation  with 
administrative  factors,  such  as  the  use  of  centralised  bureaucratic  organisations.  This 
approach  can  only  provide  second  level  solutions  which  do  not  address  the  conceptual, 
cultural  and  institutional  complexities  underlying  the  intervention  processes.  Rather,  the 
instrumental  requirements  of  the  donors  will  serve  the  internal  political  and  bureaucratic 
interests'  resistance  to  structural  change  in  urban  policy  and  strategy  (Zetter  and  Hamza 
1997:  164). 
Several  proposals  made  by  international  DAs  are,  indeed,  based  on  occidental 
criteria  with  little  concern  for  the  characteristics  of  a  given  place  and  its  specific  structures 
and  values.  The  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP  1993),  for  instance, 
recommends  two  steps  by  which  national  governments  can  avoid  possible  clashes  between 
citizens  and  their  `inflexible'  government  systems.  The  first  is  to  start  a  rapid  democratic 
transition,  along  with  a  strengthening  of  civil  society  institutions.  Secondly,  they  should 
decentralise,  granting  more  authority  to  local  governments,  and  give  much  greater 
freedom  and  scope  for  action  to  local  NGOs  and  GROs.  The  execution  of  such  specific 
proposals,  though  necessary  in  the  long  term,  may  be  unrealistic  and  even  dangerous  in 
the  short.  They  are  characterised  by  totality,  universality  and  indifference  to  divergent 
cultural  and  ruling  mechanisms  in  DCs.  Rapid  transition  in  any  authoritarian  regime  can 
only  cause  its  sudden  weakening,  which  would  probably  spark  off  wide-spread  anti- 
government  demonstrations  and  civil  disturbance,  and  consequently  a  sudden  economic 
slump,  which  might  fuel  further  intense  political  conflict  (Linz  1978;  Baloyra  1987).  Such 
outcomes  are  likely  to  paralyse  and  eventually  cause  the  collapse  of  the  regime,  leaving 
the  country  in  a  potential  state  of  chaos  and  anarchy,  which  surely  does  not  promote 
peace,  development  or  positive  civil  participation.  Democratic  transition  within  the 
existing  regime  in  Egypt  is  a  quite  problematic  and  involved  process.  Mayfield  (1996: 
329)  argues  that  increasing  pluralism  and  the  process  of  democratisation  would  better 
begin  at  the  local  people's  council  level.  Transition  can  best  be  conceptualised  as  a 
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process  of  concession  from  above  by  which  greater  civil  and  political  rights  are  gradually 
extended,  but  at  a  rate  of  change  that  is  not  too  threatening  to  the  regime  in  power. 
While  it  is  justified  for  donor  countries  to  benefit  from  any  aid  they  offer,  surely  it 
is  even  more  so  for  the  recipient;  Egypt,  too,  should  have  gained  from  aid  to  solve  its 
urban  problems.  The  romantic  view  of  the  co-operative  role  of  external  development 
assistance  to  alleviate  poverty  and  sustain  development  in  Egypt  has  become  to  a  large 
extent  redundant.  International  development  agencies  have  always  constructed  an  image 
of  Egypt  as  a  place  with  a  vast  population  packed  within  a  limited  agricultural  area  and 
increasing  in  size  at  a  rate  that  outpaces  its  ability  to  feed  itself.  Clearly  this  image  is 
useful  to  the  state  in  maintaining  the  status  quo.  It  diverts  attention  from  services  and 
housing  supply  and  establishing  collaborative  forms  of  governance  based  on  public  trust. 
It  has  also  shifted  the  country's  resources  gradually  from  staple  foods  production  to  more 
expensive  items  of  imported  consumables  (Mitchell  1995).  Teclmo-culturally,  the  motive 
behind  the  focus  on  such  deceptive  imaginative  geographies  has  always  been  a  discursive 
regime  of  power-knowledge  created  to  promote  a  justification  for  the  need  for  external 
technical  and  administrative  know-how  `intelligence'  to  solve  these  problems  (Said  1995; 
Gregory  1995:  456). 
Building  on  the  geo-political  stand-point,  Mitchell  continues  his  criticism  of  the 
policies  of  DAs  working  in  Egypt  and  takes  the  practices  of  USAID  and  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  (IIvIF)  as  examples,  since  they  constitute  the  largest  multi-and-bilateral 
DAs  contributing  to  the  Egyptian  economy  every  year.  He  argues  that  from  the  late 
1980s,  as  USAID  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IlVIF)  imposed  policies  that 
removed  price  subsidies,  increased  unemployment,  and  brought  economic  recession,  the 
degree  of  inequality  almost  certainly  increased  (Mitchell  1995:  133).  The  United  States 
always  repeats  that  Egypt  has  received  an  excess  of  U$24  billion  over  the  last  20  years, 
but  in  fact,  it  has  imported  commodities  and  machinery  worth  U$48  billion  from  the  US, 
and  the  bulk  of  US  grants  and  loans  has  been  spent  on  American  experts  (Palmer  et  al. 
1988).  American  experts  supervising  the  building  of  a  water  station  in  Bani  Sweif 
Governorate,  for  instance,  received  more  than  U$100  million  in  salaries,  benefits,  vehicles 
and  feasibility  studies  over  a  period  of  ten  years  (Mayfield  1996).  Donor  governments 
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often  gain  many  times  more  than  they  spend  on  assistance  programmes,  which  offer  them 
more  investments  abroad,  prevents  economic  crises  in  their  countries  and  create  job 
opportunities.  A  USAID  report,  for  instance,  documents  some  of  the  direct  economic 
benefits  of  US  assistance  to  American  companies  and  institutions  in  1993-1994:  "Close  to 
80  percent  of  USAID's  contracts  and  grants  flow  back  to  American  firms.  Shipping 
contracts,  technical  expertise,  supplies,  and  agricultural  products  have  meant  American 
jobs  and  economic  benefits  in  our  own  back  yard.  US  assistance  programs  have  also 
helped  open  some  of  the  most  dynamic  markets  for  US  exports  abroad"  (USAID  1999). 
While  the  report  stresses  that  US  aid  effectively  helps  US  diplomacy  and  makes 
the  world  more  receptive  and  respectful  towards  the  United  States,  its  citizens  and  its 
interests,  the  undisclosed  aim  is  to  continue  expanding  US  markets  beyond  its  borders. 
American  exports  to  developing  countries  rise  by  12%  every  year,  while  the  annual 
increase  in  American  exports  to  industrial  nations  is  less  than  6%.  Despite  the  fact  that 
Egypt  might  not  be  gaining  real  development  from  using  the  US  aid,  there  is  a  continuous 
threat  to  terminate  this  assistance  if  Egypt  does  not  follow  US  goals  and  interests.  The 
last  US  threat  to  terminate  aid  to  Egypt  was  in  1998  when  some  U$50  million  of  Egypt's 
annual  share  of  US  aid  was  cut.  Stressing  the  success  of  the  economic  reform  programme 
in  Egypt  in  marginalising  the  importance  of  US  economic  assistance,  the  Egyptian 
Minister  of  Economy  declared  that  a  reduction  or  termination  in  US  assistance  is  not 
expected  to  cause  any  adverse  repercussions  for  the  Egyptian  economy:  "The  U$2.1 
billion  that  Egypt  receives  from  the  US  is  a  mere  two  per  cent  of  Egypt's  U$75  billion 
Gross  National  Product  (GNP).  US  aid  was  about  10  per  cent  of  GNP  at  the  outset  of  the 
programme  in  1991  but  now  the  economy  can  deal  with  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  US 
to  cut  aid  without  incurring  heavy  losses"  (Al-Ahram  Weekly:  19  February  1998).  Thus 
Egypt  is  mulling  over  ideas  to  be  offered  to  the  US  on  reducing  economic  aid,  but  with 
particular  emphasis  on  supporting  the  country's  economic  reform  drive,  i.  e.  `Trade  not 
Aid'. 
These  are  the  contemporary  global  mechanisms  resulting  from  the  ERSAP,  which 
leave  little  choice  to  the  Egyptian  government  other  than  to  accept  instructions  from 
above.  Bilateral  agencies  pour  into  Egypt-  where  each  one  sets  its  own  agenda  to  fulfil 
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specific  demands.  They  often  introduce  new  policies  and  systems  to  approach  the 
problems,  with  varied  results.  Within  such  a  climate,  any  attempt  to  institutionalise  the 
process  of  urban  development  in  Egypt  must  consider  the  broader  mechanisms  of  foreign 
aid  involved,  local  government  and  its  current  administrative  reform  and  accountability 
rebuilding,  and  civic-empowerment  processes  and  their  associated  constraints.  The 
prospects  for  a  `rapid  democratic  transition'  to  contemporary  Egypt  require  an 
examination  of  multiple-variant  factors  at  the  local  internal  level,  which  is  the  focus  of  the 
following  sections. 
5.3-  Egypt's  political  context: 
The  effect  of  Egypt's  political,  legislative  and  administrative  systems  on  local 
government  are  inter-related  in  a  way  that  makes  it  difficult  to  consider  one  without  the 
other.  According  to  the  1971  Constitution,  Egypt  is  an  autonomous  republic  in  which  the 
People's  Assembly  has  legislative  power.  The  Assembly  has  a  total  of  454  seats,  of  which 
10  are  usually  filled  by  presidential  decree.  The  last  election  was  in  1995  when  more  than 
1,000  candidates  from  13  political  parties  and  over  2,500  candidates  without  declared 
party  affiliation  contested  444  seats.  The  President's  party,  the  National  Democratic  Party 
(NDP)  won  with  an  overwhelming  majority.  Egypt's  political  and  legislative  system  is  in 
many  ways  hierarchical  (Figure  5.2).  The  President  is  nominated  by  two-thirds  of  the 
elected  People's  Assembly  and  has  broad  constitutional  powers.  He  appoints  vice 
presidents,  prime  ministers,  and  the  Council  of  Ministers-  the  cabinet  or  `government'. 
Presidential  appointees  include  senior  civil  servants,  heads  of  autonomous  agencies, 
governors,  judges  and  public  sector  senior  managers.  A  large  presidential  bureaucracy,  - 
managed  by  a  ministerial  level  appointee,  is  a  personal  instrument  of  control  over  the 
wider  bureaucracy.  The  Prime  Minister  wields  a  lot  of  powers  as  well.  He  commands  the 
large  state  bureaucracy  through  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  can  personally  intervene  at 
any  level  to  achieve  his  objectives  if  the  chain  of  command  proves  sluggish.  Since  the 
levers  of  macro-economic  policy-  banks,  the  budget,  and  the  large  public  sector-  are 
under  government  control,  broad  responsibility  for  running  the  economy  is  within  the 
Prime  Minister's  domain. 
114 Cha  tp  er  5  Politics  and  Urban  Government  in  Eft 
Figure  5.2:  Egypt-  Administrative  and  legislative  functional  structure 
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Similar  to  the  Council  of  Ministers,  which  operates  at  the  central  level,  there  is  a, 
Governors'  Council  which  is  also  led  by  the  Prime  Minister  and  is  responsible  for 
reviewing  matters  relating  to  the  local  government  system  and  proposing  changes  in 
procedures  and  legislation.  All  governors  in  Egypt  are  appointed  by  the  centre  as 
generalist  representatives  of  the  president  and,  in  a  similar  way  to  the  French  prefectoral 
system,  are  assumed  to  represent  the  same  national  interests  as  central  government. 
However,  they  have  substantial  authority  and  power  to  issue  a  wide  range  of  decrees, 
which  is  positive  for  decentralisation.  The  mayors  come  next  in  the  power  hierarchy;  they 
function  as  `council-managers'  because  they  are  not  elected  but  appointed  by  the  Prime 
Minister. 
The  history  of  centralisation  and  the  current  concentration  of  decision-making 
power  at  the  centre  cannot  be  ignored  when  considering  strategies  for  the  development  of 
participatory  structures  and  systems.  Central  ministries  are  usually  defined  by  functional 
specialisation  and  operate  through  formalised  programme  implementation;  they  are 
seldom  capable  of  shifting  priorities  or  adapting  national  policies  to  local  needs. 
Moreover,  since  the  1952  revolution,  the  National  Democratic  Party  is  firmly  established 
in  power  and  dominates  the  political  process  at  all  levels.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
participatory  processes,  this  has  advantages  and  disadvantages.  While  the  main  advantage 
is  that  of  continuity,  there  are  two  obvious  disadvantages  in  a  situation  in  which  political 
change  is  unlikely.  The  first  is  the  lack  of  incentives  for  improved  performance  among 
politicians  and  senior  officials.  The  second  is  the  danger  of  political  apathy.  Fergany 
(1995)  reports  the  results  of  an  opinion  poll  carried  out  in  Cairo,  which  revealed  that  over 
half  the  1500  people  interviewed  had  no  opinion  on  whether  a  specific  party  represented 
them,  while  over  a  quarter  considered  that  none  of  the  present  parties  represented  them. 
Of  course  such  a  low  profile  of  citizen  political  participation  jeopardises  the  establishment 
of  a  meaningful  model  of  citizen  governance.  The  forces  that  shape  and  direct  citizens 
political  participation  will  be  addressed. 
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5.4-  Local  government  system: 
Local  government  has  limited  power  in  Egypt.  Administrative  systems  were  very 
centralised  from  1923  up  to  the  1952  revolution,  although  the  Constitution  and  associated 
laws  were  frequently  amended.  The  first  constitution  of  1923  provided  a  framework  for 
local  administration,  dividing  Egypt  into  provinces,  districts,  and  villages.  The  14 
provinces  were  each  headed  by  a  high-level  central  government  official  who  reported  to 
the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  they.  were  further  subdivided  into  96  districts,  each  headed  by 
a  police  officer,  and  some  4000  villages,  each  headed  by  a  village  chief.  It  has  been 
suggested  that  the  Egyptian  bureaucracy  during  this  time  was  ill-equipped  to  stimulate 
and  develop  the  country's  economy  and  that  its  main  tasks  were  to  maintain  order  and 
collect  revenue  (Bianchi  1989).  The  leaders  of  the  1952  revolution  continued  the  tradition 
of  centralising  power,  giving  almost  total  responsibility  for  the  planning  and 
implementation  of  their  ambitious  economic  and  social  development  programmes  to 
central  government  bureaucrats. 
A  new  constitution,  introduced  by  referendum  in  1956,  was  vague  about  the  role 
of  local  government,  stating  only  that  "The  Egyptian  republic  shall  be  divided  into 
administrative  units,  and  all  or  some  of  them  may  enjoy  a  corporate  status".  A  total  of  25 
Governorates  were  created  in  1960  under  law  124  which  delegated  all  functions  which 
were  predominantly  local  to  local  authorities.  These  were  further  divided  into  smaller 
units  as  will  be  explained  later.  During  the  1960s  local  administrative  units  fell  under 
unitary  authorities,  including  elected,  selected  and  ex-officio  members.  All  elected 
members  had  to  be  elected  under  the  Arab  Socialist  Union  (the  official  party)  system.  The  - 
last  Constitution  of  1971,  including  its  amendments  in  1980,  also  said  little  about  the  local 
government  system.  In  1975,  a  dual  system  of  a  non-elected  Executive  Council  and  a 
partly  elected  popular  council  was  introduced  at  each  administrative  level  to  enhance 
citizens'  representation.  In  1979,  the  Local  Administration  Law  43  was  amended  to 
strengthen  the  authority  of  governors  by  reducing  the  administrative  and  budgetary 
controls  of  the  central  government  over  the  Governorates.  Local  government  was  given 
wider  powers  to  sell  land  and  raise  local  taxes,  which  reduced  their  demands  on  the 
central  treasury.  Although  these  amendments  were  fully  utilised  by  some  Governors,  who 
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issued  local  decrees  to  enhance  decentralisation  and  reform,  many  others  did  not. 
However,  it  has  been  argued  that  these  amendments  were  not  enough,  and  the  local 
government  structures  and  administrative  hierarchy  are  still  in  many  ways  submissive  to 
the  centre  (Palmer  et  al.  1988;  Mayfield  1996). 
Egypt  is  currently  divided  into  26  Governorates  of  which  four  (Cairo,  Alexandria, 
Port  Said  and  Suez)  are  predominantly  urban.  Other  Governorates  are  subdivided  into 
districts,.  cities  and  villages  in  descending  order.  Cities  and  each  of  the  four  predominantly 
urban  Governorates  are  divided  into  quarters  (Figure  5.3).  These  quarters  correspond 
roughly  to  the  village  level  found  in  more  rural  governments.  The  Governorates  and  their 
offices  at  the  district  and  local  levels,  which  are  the  main  vehicle.  for  the  provision  of 
municipal  services,  are  linked  with  central  government  in  two  important  ways.  First,  the 
governors  are  appointed  rather  than  elected  and  second,  there  is  no  separate  cadre  of 
local  government  officers  employed  directly  by  the  Governorate  administration.  Rather, 
representatives  of  central  ministries,  line-ministries,  are  placed  at  the  various  levels  within 
the  Governorate  structures. 
Figure  5.3:  Egypt-  Local  government  hierarchy 
Governorate 
District  A  District  BII  District  C  District  D  I-  --  -º 
City  1II  City  21_1  Village  1 
Quarter  X 
Source:  Author 
Quarter  YI  Quarter  ZI_...., 
Village  2.  º 
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5.4.1-  The  operating  context: 
The.  operating  context  of  Egypt's  administrative  and  legislative  structures  is  to  a 
large  extent  complicated.  While  the  President,  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  cabinet  operate 
at  the  central  level  and  head  the  administrative  hierarchy,  the  People's  Assembly  operates 
as  a  counterweight  at  the  central  level  and  heads  the  legislative  system.  This  is  replicated 
throughout  Governorates  at  the  local  government  level.  While  governors  and  mayors 
head  the  administrative  system  and  the  Executive  Councils  at  their  respective  levels, 
elected  Popular  Local  Councils  represent  the  legislative  power.  In  effect,  the  Executive 
Council  is  the  administrative  branch  of  government  while  the  local  council  embodies  the 
democratic  and  local  regulatory  aspects  of  the  system.  Although  the  local  administrative 
and  legislative  system  work  interdependently,  it  is  easier  to  consider  them  separately  first, 
in  order  to  examine  the  chances  open  for  shifting  the  balance  from  centralised,  expert- 
based  systems  to  decentralised,  citizen-centred  systems. 
The  administrative  context: 
At  each  level  of  the  local  administrative  system,  there  is  an  Executive  Council 
chaired  by  a  chief  executive  (Governor  at  the  Governorate  level  and  Mayor  at  the  city  or 
village  level),  and  the  members  are  the  representatives  of  line  ministries  that  have 
functions  and  responsibilities  at  each  level.  While  the  structure  of  functions  performed  at 
the  village  Executive  Council  level  seems  simple,  it  expands  at  the  city  and  district  levels 
to  include  more  offices  and  there  is  also  a  shift  of  functions  out  of  the  headquarters  into 
the  service  department  area,  e.  g.  supply,  youth  and  sports.  The  District  Executive  Council 
operates  also  as  the  Executive  Council  of  the  city  in  which  the  district  seat  is  located.  The 
structure  of  the  Executive  Council  becomes  even  more  involved  at  the  Governorate  level 
as  there  is  an  even  greater  proportion  of  functions  in  the  service  department  area.  A 
simplified  representation  of  the  Governorate  Executive  Council  shows  it  to  be  made  up  of 
eight  divisions  (Figure  5.4). 
Other  types  of  office  operating  within  the  Governorates,  which  are  not 
accountable  to  the  local  administration  because  they  are  established  at  the  Governorate 
level  and  represented  at  the  Governorate  Executive  Council  level,  are  the  field  offices  of 
various  central  agencies,  such  as  the  Central  Agency  for  Population,  Mobilisation  and 
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Statistics,  the  Central  Agency  for  Organisation  and  Management,  the  National  Authority 
for  Roads  and  Bridges,  the  National  Authority  for  Telecommunication.  Governors  are 
authorised  to  establish  what  are  called  Governor's  Affairs  Offices.  These  include,  in 
Aswan  Governorate  for  instance,  the  Production  and  Economic  Affairs  Office,  Urban 
Development  and  Land  Management  Unit,  Complaints  and  Citizen's  Services,  and  Legal 
Affairs  among  others.  Heads  of  these  offices  are  also  represented  in  the  Governorate 
Executive  Council  (Figure  5.4). 
Figure  5.4:.  Egypt-  Governorate  Executive  Council  structure 
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Source:  Author 
The  structure  of  Executive  Councils  is  criticised  for  it  contains  a  dualism  that 
becomes  more  pronounced  as  one  moves  up  the  levels  of  the  system.  The  split  is  between 
offices  that  are  fully  under  the  management  control  of  the  unit  chief  (Mayor)  and  those 
that  are  administratively  under  his  control  but  technically  under  the  control  of  a  central 
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ministry.  The  dualism  is  typically  expressed  as  a  difference  between  headquarters 
departments  and  service  departments.  The  basic  structural  features  of  the  Executive 
Council  system  are  not  easily  made  out  from  the  welter  of  office  designations  and 
organisation  charts,  but  there  are  significant  differences  between  sectors.  Agriculture, 
education,  health,  and  even  social  affairs,  for  instance,  seem  to  be  highly  centralised  and 
hardly  responsive  to  local  councils  at  any  level.  To  a  large  extent,  they  have  their  own 
local  administrative  geography  based  on  the  locations  of  co-operatives,  schools,  health 
units  and  so  on. 
The  structural  feature  which  governs  the  performance  of  service  sectors,  e.  g. 
water,  sewerage,  roads,  etc.,  is  the  dualism  of  the  directorates'  structure  and  the 
headquarters'  structure.  At  the  district,  city  and  village  levels,  technical  functions  are 
managed  by  the  engineering  affairs  departments,  which  are  part  of  the  local  unit 
headquarters.  Thus  the  environmental  impact  of  any  service  sector  project  should  be  co- 
ordinated  with  these  departments.  At  the  Governorate  level,  service  directorates  receive 
substantial  procedural  and  technical  directions  from  their  parent  ministries.  Their  budget 
allocations  for  capital,  operation  and  maintenance,  and  salaries  are  listed  individually  and 
separately  from  the  headquarters  capital.  They  also  have  their  own  contracting  and 
procurement  departments.  All  these  give  relative  autonomy  for  service  directorates, 
notwithstanding  they  ought  to  co-ordinate  through  the  regular  Executive  Council 
meetings.  However,  policy  implementation  at  the  Governorate  and  district  centre  levels 
falls  into  almost  watertight  compartments  with  co-ordination  arranged  centrally  or 
through  the  interplay  of  the  Governorate  Executive  Council  (Mayfield  1996).  Certainly,  it 
seems  that  officials  at  the  municipal  level  look  to  their  own  central  ministries  for  guidance 
on  `technical'  matters. 
The  legislative  context: 
The  legislative  structure-  namely  the  Popular  Local  Councils  (PLCs),  works  in 
parallel  with  the  executive  administration  but  its  members  and  heads  are  all  elected.  Each 
PLC  comprises  10  directly  elected  representatives  from  each  district,  who  in  turn  elect  a 
Head.  Elected  PLCs  have  acquired  the  power,  at  least  theoretically,  to  approve  or  - 
disapprove  the  local  budget.  Authority  on  matters  relating  to  budgets  and  the 
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implementation  of  policy  is  delegated  to  the  Executive  Councils,  while  PLCs  are 
instruments  of  ratification  and  public  participation,  with  general  review  and  consultative 
responsibilities.  According  to  Article  12  of  the  Local  Administrative  Law  (43/1979)  and 
its  subsequent  amendments,,  thirteen  specific  tasks  are  assigned  to  the  PLCs  (Box  5.1). 
Box  5.1:  Egypt-  The  main  responsibilities  of  the  Popular  Local  Councils. 
"  Determining  the  projects  to  be  included  in  social  and  economic  development  plans. 
"  Proposing  the  annual  budget  of  the  Governorate,  following  up  its  execution  and 
approving  the  proposal  of  the  final  statement  account.  This  refers  to  the  Governorate 
level  and  is  the  same  at  more  local  levels. 
"  Preparing  a  plan  for  local  people's  participation  which  identifies  possibilities  for 
supporting  local  projects.  Although  the  exact  degree  of  participation  envisaged  is  not 
clear,  the  focus  is  likely  to  be  on  financial  participation. 
"  Approval  of  general  projects  relating  to  housing,  construction  and  utilities  and  urban 
planning. 
Source:  Adapted  from  Local  Administration  Law  43  (1979). 
Subsequent  amendments  to  the  law  have  had  some  significance  for  municipal 
systems.  Law  59,  passed  in  1981,  introduced  some  minor  amendments  to  Law  43, 
increasing  the  responsibilities  of  local  councils  in  some  areas  and  giving  them  some  added 
authority  to  raise  local  revenues.  However,  Law  145,  passed  in  1988  increased  central 
control  over  some  fiscal  matters,  including  the  disbursement  procedures  for  the  various 
Special  Account  Funds.  However,  the  potentially  most  interesting  clause  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  development  of  local  participatory  procedures  is  Article  133  which 
explicitly  states  that  the  popular  council  has  the  right  to  seek  resolution  from  the  Ministry 
of  Local  Administration  or  the  Prime  Minister  if  it  disagrees  with  the  Governorate  budget  = 
as  presented  to  it.  Mayfield  (1996)  notes  the  possibility  that  this  may  be  a  `sleeper'  clause 
with  important  implications  for  strengthening  popular  councils  in  the  long  run. 
By  the  mid-1990s,  deconcentration  and  local  delegation  started  to  become  more 
of  a  reality.  The  Council  of  Governors  tries,  at  least  theoretically,  to  let  special  local 
conditions  formulate  local  policies  and  plan  in  a  bottom-up  manner.  The  Local 
Administration  Law  43  (1979)  was  amended  in  1996  to  give  more  equitable 
representation  of  people  within  the  popular  local  councils.  The  government's  election 
`list'  system  was  deemed  unconstitutional  and  was  replaced  with  a  `direct'  election 
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system.  Moreover,  the  total  number  of  representatives  at  all  levels  of  local  popular  council 
was  increased.  In  the  case  of  Governorates,  the  total  number  of  representatives  from  each 
district  has  also  increased  from  six  to  ten  members.  Table  5.2  gives  details  of  the 
hierarchy  of  popular  councils  and  their  composition. 
Table  5.2:  Egypt-  Local  popular  councils  hierarchy  and  composition 
Level  Total  number  of  representatives 
Governorates  10  representatives  from  each  district.  This  number  increases  to  14  in  the 
Governorates  of  Canal  Zone,  Matrooh,  New  Valley,  North  and  South 
Sinai  and  the  Red  Sea.  (Article  10). 
Districts  10  representatives  from  each  local  unit  in  the  district  except  for  the  capital 
city  (represented  by  12  members)  and  cities  with  more  than  one  quarter 
(represented  by  14  members).  (Article  39). 
Cities  14  representatives  from  each  quarter.  If  the  city  consists  of  only  one 
quarter,  the  total  number  of  representatives  becomes  24.  (Article  47). 
Quarters  12  representatives  from  each  administrative  section.  If  the  quarter  consists 
of  only  one  administrative  section,  the  total  number  of  representatives 
becomes  18.  (Article  59). 
Villages  A  total  number  of  24  if  the  local  unit  consists  of  only  one  village,  and  2 
representatives  from  the  mother  village  and  1  representative  from  each 
helmet  village  if  the  local  unit  comprises  more  than  one  village  up  to  a 
maximum  number  of  24.  (Article  66). 
Source:  Author-  Adapted  from  the  Local  Administration  Law  43  (1979)  and  its  amendments  in  1996. 
Strongly  supported  by  the  Prime  Minister  through  the  Governors'  Council, 
Governors  are  encouraged  to  enhance  co-ordination  among  all  government  bodies 
working  in  their  Governorates  and  they  enjoy  more  authority  over  their  local  revenues. 
Moreover,  they  are  authorised  to  transfer  heads  of  districts  and  cities  within  the  premises 
of  the  Governorates  and  to  appoint  new  heads  to  quarter  and  village  local  units  in  order 
to  improve  the  performance  of  municipalities.  Such  practices  used  to  be  very  centralised 
until  1997.  However,  it  seems  that  the  PLCs'  power  is  more  theoretical  than  real  at 
present.  While  the  functions  of  PLCs  cover  nearly  the  entire  scope  of  local  administration, 
their  specific  role,  as  set  out  in  the  local  administration  law,  is  best  described  as  advisory. 
Heads  of  PLCs,  at  Governorate  level,  are  no  longer  represented  in  the  Governors' 
Council,  at  national  level,  and  thus  are  excluded  from  discussions  of  action  options  or 
making  changes  based  on  observed  performance. 
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The  fieldwork  survey  revealed  that  PLCs  have  virtually  no  budgets  or  staff  under 
their  direct  control,  hence  have  little  access  to  information.  Public  policy  decisions  are 
made  based  on  the  preference  of  elite  practitioners  or  deliberation  limited  to  some  elected 
representatives.  They  are  granted  a  small  area  of  responsibilities  in  public  policy  and  given 
very  little  real  authority.  The  PLCs  can  suggest  plans,  projects,  studies,  and  procedures. 
They  can  also  ratify  plans  and  budgets,  notwithstanding  it  is  not  clear  whether  they  have 
the  right  to  contest  them  according  to  the  law.  Although  their  authority  includes  the  right 
to  challenge  decisions  of  the  Chief  of  the  Executive  Council  and  to  question  an  official's 
capacity  for  command,  this  right  often  remain  intact,  depending  on  the  clout  and  influence 
of  the  Governors  and  key  individuals  within  each  Governorate.  The  reality  of  the 
democratic  relationships  between  the  legislative  and  administrative  systems  at  the  local 
level,  including  such  personal  and  contextual  factors,  are  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  10. 
5.4.2-  Municipal  functions: 
Local  government  units  are  responsible  for  establishing  and  managing  a  range  of 
public  utilities  within  their  respective  administrative  areas  (district,  city  and  village),  and 
within  the  limits  established  by  the  Government's  general  policies  and  plans.  Each  takes 
charge  of  all  the  tasks  performed  by  the  ministries  pursuant  to  the  applicable  laws  and 
regulations,  with  the  exception  of  national  utilities  of  a  special  nature,  such  as  motor 
ways,  airports,  dams  and  embankments.  Law  43  (1979)  specifies  the  utilities  to  be 
established  and  managed  at  the  Governorate  level  and  those  to  be  entrusted  to  more  local 
units  of  government.  Articles  5  to  27  of  the  executive  regulation  of  Law  43  (1979) 
determine  twenty  three  areas  of  services  to  be  planned  and  established  by  the  local 
government  units  in  co-ordination  with  the  Governorates.  These  include  educational 
facilities,  health  care,  housing,  urbanisation  and  local  infrastructure  utilities,  social  affairs, 
food  supply,  agricultural  affairs,  land  reclamation,  irrigation,  cultural  development,  youth 
and  sports,  transportation,  economic  and  rural  development,  vocational  small-scale 
industries  and  security.  While  some  responsibilities  are  delegated  to  all  levels  of  the 
system  down  to  the  village  unit,  most  are  delegated  to  the  district  level. 
For  all  Egyptian  cities,  Engineering  Departments  within  municipalities  comprise  - 
five  main  sub-sections  (Box  5.2).  Housing  and  physical  infrastructure  are  the 
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responsibility  of  departments  reporting  to  the  Ministry  of  Housing  and  Utilities.  In  the 
case  of  water  and  sewerage  utilities,  other  than  in  Greater  Cairo,  the  Ministry  works 
through  the  National  Organisation  for  Potable  Water  and  Sanitary  Drainage  (NOPWSD). 
In  Cairo,  city-level  municipal  companies  take  responsibility  for  water  supply  and  drainage. 
These  no  longer  report  to  the  Ministry  which  does  not  have  direct  responsibility  for  them. 
Box  5.2:  Egypt-  The  main  sub-sections  of  municipal  Engineering  Departments 
"  Land  Properties  (el-Amlak):  Land  sale  and  management. 
"  Organisation  and  licences  (el-Tanzeem):  Building  control,  alignment  and  the 
inspection  of  all  buildings  under  construction. 
"  Projects  section  (el  Mashroa'at):  Construction  management  of  government  buildings 
that  do  not  fall  under  a  specialist  `general'  organisation  such  as  the  General 
Organisation  of  Educational  Facilities. 
"  Environmental  Section  (el-Bee'aa):  Solid  waste  management. 
"  Utilities  (EI  Marafek):  Design  and  supervision  of  all  infrastructure  and  utilities'  work. 
Source:  Fieldwork  survey. 
Although  the  Engineering  Departments  of  village  units  have  a  special  subsection 
for  public  participation  projects,  responsible  for  reviewing  all  proposals  for  projects 
partially  or  totally  funded  by  local  community  leaders  and  groups  who  have  raised  their 
own  resources  outside  the  formal  government  budget  process,  the  law  does  not  clarify  the 
extent  to  which  this  mechanism  is  actually  used,  while  nothing  is  mentioned  about  cities. 
Municipal  officials  interviewed  in  Ismailia  and  Aswan  did  not  appear  to  recognise  it  in  the 
form  described  here  (OA,  26-11-1998;  MA,  01-04-98).  Even  if  it  is  used,  it  is  likely  that 
participation  is  by  Popular  and  Executive  Council  members  rather  than  the  community  in 
general.  Nevertheless,  it  provides  a  possible  institutional  mechanism  for  supporting 
participatory  initiatives. 
Urban  planning  ordinances  in  Egypt  are  `unrealistic',  considering  the  existing 
capabilities  of  local  governments  and  their  performance.  The  overall  urban  planning 
strategies  are  defined  at  the  centre  by  the  Ministry  of  Housing  and  Utilities  through  its 
General  Organisation  for  Physical  Planning  (GOPP).  The  GOPP  is  not  represented  in 
every  Governorate.  Instead,  there  are  nine  regional  planning  offices  covering  the  Greater 
Cairo  Region,  Alexandria,  Matrooh,  Delta,  Suez  Canal,  North  Upper  Egypt,  Assuit,  the 
Red  Sea,  and  South  Upper  Egypt.  Meanwhile,  the  legal  framework  of  urban  planning  law 
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in  Egypt  gives  scope  for  municipalities  themselves  to  prepare  and  adjust  the  technical 
planning  process  at  local  level.  Urban  Planning  Law  3  (1982)  makes  local  government 
units,  or  municipalities,  responsible  for  urban  planning  and  local  development  schemes  for 
existing  cities.  This  responsibility  is  theoretically  applied  at  three  main  planning  stages:  the 
Structure  Plan,  General  or  Master  Planning  and  Detailed  Planning.  The  last  includes 
specific  initiatives  such  as  land  subdivision  schemes  and  urban  upgrading  schemes. 
Theoretically,  all  urban  planning  processes  should  be  done  in  co-ordination  with 
the  local  political  decision-makers  and  require  the  final  approval  of  the  General 
Organisation  for  Physical  Planning  (GOPP)  in  Cairo  (SS,  30-05-96).  Public  participation 
sessions  for  specific  local  discussions  and  public  hearings  are  a  requirement.  Throughout 
the  process,  planning  decisions  should  be  discussed  with  all  political  and  administrative 
bodies  in  order  to  achieve  a  common  understanding  of  the  problems  identified,  the 
strategies  proposed  and  the  actions  required.  In  reality,  municipalities  cannot  fulfil  all 
these  tasks  efficiently;  there  is  a  shortage  of  qualified  staff,  and  problems  of  co-ordination 
and  information  exchange  between  organisations.  Another  factor  is  the  lack  of  a  planning 
`culture'  within  local  government.  These  variables  of  `accountable  bureaucratic  capacity' 
will  be  taken  into  account  when  considering  options  for  improved  approaches  to  urban 
planning  involving  greater  levels  of  citizen  participation  in  Chapter  10. 
5.4.3-  Municipal  finances: 
Government  finances  are  highly  centralised  in  Egypt;  over  96%  of  total 
government  revenue  is  collected  centrally  (Mayfield  1996).  An  analysis  of  Governorate 
budgets  for  the  years  1986/87  showed  that  central  transfers  accounted  for  an  average  of 
73.4%  of  total  expenditure,  although  the  percentage  is  rather  less  for  urban  Governorates. 
Much  of  this  funding  was  provided  through  `sectoral'  allocations  to  the  Governorates 
made  through  the  various  central  ministries  located  in  Cairo.  At  first  sight,  these  figures 
confirm  that  the  Egyptian  fiscal  system  is  highly  centralised.  However,  there  is  potential 
for  local  resource  mobilisation.  The  direct  sources  of  revenue  for  local  administrative 
units  include  taxes,  fees  and  charges  (licenses).  Direct  sources  of  revenue  in  urban  areas 
include  property  taxes  on  buildings  (based  on  the  assessed  rental  value  of  the  buildings), 
taxes  on  places  of  entertainment,  utility  tariffs  and  receipts  from  public  markets. 
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Article  51  of  the  amended  Law  on  Local  Administration  provides  city  councils 
with  access  to  eleven  itemised  sources  of  revenue  in  the  form  of  taxes,  fees,  licenses, 
service  tari  ffs  and  other  charges.  Taxes  imposed  on  buildings  located  within  the  city's 
administrative  boundary  are  perhaps  the  most  important  of  these.  Seventy-five  percent  of 
the  revenue  collected  from  agricultural  and  property  taxes  can  be  retained  at  the  city  level 
with  the  remainder  being  forwarded  to  the  Governorate.  Article  54  of  the  Law  on  Local 
Administration  states  that  each  PLC  at  the  Governorate,  district,  city  and  village  levels 
should  establish  a  Local  Services  and  Development  Fund  (LSDF).  These  funds  have  the 
long-term  objective  of  stimulating  greater  local  resource  mobilisation  and  developing 
greater  local  autonomy  in  respect  of  finances  and  programme  implementation.  Until  the 
1970s,  the  funds  were  mainly  used  for  welfare  type  activities,  including  food  subsidies  for 
the  poor. 
In  the  1980s,  some  local  councils  began  to  use  LSDFs  to  finance  projects  aimed  at 
generating  income  to  supplement  revenues  from  central  government  budget  resources. 
Today,  the  LSDFs  represent  the  largest  and  most  discretionary  of  the  revenues  being 
collected  by  local  units.  There  is  some  tension  between  the  desire  of  the  Centre  to  control 
and  audit  the  use  of  locally  generated  funds  and  the  drive  for  greater  local  autonomy. 
While  Mayfield  (1996)  argued  that  it  is  generally  recognised  that  LSDFs  provide  a  flexible 
source  of  funding  which  has,  in  most  cases,  been  allocated  for  worthwhile  projects  and 
services,  he  reported  that  the  Central  Agency  for  Auditing  has  reported  misuse  of  funds  in 
some  instances  and  has  suggested  that  some  form  of  greater  control  needs  to  be 
established.  Box  5.3  lists  the  sources  of  finance  for  the  LSDF  at  the  Governorate  level. 
Box  5.3:  Egypt-  Sources  of  finance  for  the  Local  Services  and  Development  Fund 
(LU)  )  at  the  Governorate  level. 
"  Fees  imposed  by  Popular  Local  Council  specifically  for  the  fund,  these  are  collected  at 
the  Governorate  level  with  a  portion  being  distributed  to  lower  level  units. 
"  Profits  from  income  generating  projects  financed  by  the  fund. 
"  Income  from  donations,  grants  and  legacies  to  the  fund  which  the  Governorate's 
Popular  Local  Council  approves  for  allocation  to  the  fund. 
"  Half  of  any  increase  in  the  Governorate's  revenue  over  the  amount  estimated  in  the 
budget,  with  the  remainder  going  to  the  public  treasury. 
Source:  Author-  Adapted  from  the  Local  Administration  Law  43  (1979). 
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The  Local  Administration  Law  emphasises  that  the  fund  is  to  be  used  in 
accordance  with  the  decision  of  the  PLCs  for  a  range  of  purposes  including  the  financing 
of  projects  which  are  established  by  local  efforts  and  participation.  This  appears  to  offer  a 
mechanism  for  financing  community  initiated  schemes  and  corresponds  to  Egypt's  recent 
emphasis  on  the  need  to  encourage  local  entrepreneurship.  In  Ismailia  Governorate,  for 
instance,  sources  of  finance  for  the  LSDF  at  the  Governorate  level  have  been  extended  to 
include  money  generated  from  land  sales.  The  revenues  are  now  used  to  finance  part  of 
new  infrastructure  networks,  the  construction  of  a  wholesale  market  with  the  intention  of 
supporting  local  small-scale  entrepreneurs,  confronting  the  problem  of  solid-waste 
disposal,  constructing  low  cost  housing  units,  and  implementing  several  upgrading 
projects  throughout  the  Governorate,  explained  Ms  Habiba  Eid,  Director  of  the  UNDP- 
funded  Sustainable  Ismailia  Project  (HE,  17-12-98). 
Two  other  positive  initiatives  by  municipal  officials  to  generate  funds  for  LSDFs 
through,  for  instance,  soliciting  of  extra  payments  for  the  issuing  of  certain  certificates 
have  been  noted  (Mayfield  1996).  This  practice  appears  to  be  a  variant  on  `rent  seeking' 
behaviour  with  the  important  difference  that  a  receipt  is  provided  for  the  extra  payment 
which  is  deposited  in  the  LSDF  rather  than  the  official's  pocket.  It  would  seem  probable 
that  this  mechanism  works  best  at  the  village  level  where  social  pressure  may  help  to 
prevent  true  rent-seeking  behaviour  and  there  may  be  a  shared  interest  in  collecting  funds 
for  specific  local  purposes.  Another  common  practice  is  to  solicit  donations  for  a  given 
project  from  a  prominent  family  and  to  use  its  commitment  to  leverage  funds  out  of  other 
such  families.  This  practice  suggests  that  small  rural  municipalities  tend  to  be  more 
financially  self-sufficient  than  urban  units.  However,  according  to  the  amendments  of  the 
Law  43-1979,  local  governments  are  encouraged  to  enter  into  joint  ventures  with  private 
investors;  in  effect  developing  a  partnership  between  government  officials  and  the  local 
rich  that  parallels  the  open-market  alliance  at  the  national  level  encouraged  by  current 
government  policy.  While  there  is  clearly  considerable  scope  for  local  resource 
mobilisation,  there  is  a  danger  that  such  a  mechanism  could  be  used  to  suit  the  needs  of 
the  elite  rather  than  the  community  as  a  whole.  This  issue  is  important  and  hence,  will  be 
further  investigated  in  Chapter  10. 
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5.5-  Civil  society  participation: 
In  the  light  of  the  ERSAP  and  the  state's  shift  from  producing  to  planning  and 
monitoring  production  and  distribution,  it  has  been  expected  that  civil  society's  role  will 
increase.  In  reality,  the  state  jurisdictions  have  been  working  against  establishing  that 
particular  type  of  civil  society  concerned  with  maintaining  democracy  and  ensuring  that 
the  government  is  accountable  and  effective.  The  government  has  reduced  the  realm  of 
politics  to  distribution.  At  the  citizens'  level,  the  government  constantly  strives  to  limit 
and  control  mass  political  participation,  while  maintaining  its  legitimacy  by  providing 
goods  and  services  to  the  population  (Singerman  1997:  245).  Thus  the  state  sustains  its 
power  through  monitoring  production  and  distribution,  whilst  citizens  participate  by 
consuming.  "To  be  political,  and  remain  out  of  danger,  is  to  consume.  To  be  political,  and 
be  in  danger,  is  to  participate  seriously  in  formal  politics"  (Singerman  1997:  245).  The 
government's  policies  of  political  exclusion  have  thus  gone  hand  in  hand  with  their  public 
commitment  to  provide  the  basic  needs  for  the  masses  in  return  for  their  political 
acquiescence. 
Even  those  politically  active  citizens  who  venture  to  participate,  are  discouraged 
in  many  ways.  Issuing  vote  cards,  for  instance,  is  only  possible  during  two  weeks  in 
December  and  citizens  are  required  to  submit  several  documents.  They  also  have  to 
tolerate  embroiled  red  tape  bureaucracy  before  they  get  the  card.  In  this  context,  any  form 
of  pluralist  activation  at  groups'  level  is  also  restrained.  The  state  controls  and  regulates 
every  common  mechanism  that  people  use  to  enhance  their  collective  interests,  e.  g. 
unions,  meetings  of  any  kind,  political  parties,  newspapers,  voluntary  associations,  interest 
- 
groups,  demonstrations,  books,  radio,  and  television.  Those  who  consciously  resist  the 
state,  or  who  engage  in  strategies  that  conflict  with  statist  objectives,  are  rarely  free  of 
fear  and  retribution.  Although  theoretically  speaking  the  stronger  civil  society  is,  the  more 
a  state  can  act  indirectly  to  fulfil  its  commitment  (Walzer  1995:  3),  it  seems  that  the 
government  in  Egypt  has  never  empowered  civil  society  to  act  entirely  according  to  its 
own  agenda,  or  to  address  the  needs  of  its  fellow  citizens. 
A  draft  law  articulated  in  1997  to  amend  the  regulations  which  govern  the 
activities  of  some  15,000  NGOs  working  in  Egypt,  Law  32  of  1964,  has  opened 
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widespread  controversies,  especially  among  human  rights  activists.  The  government  has 
tried  to  over-contain  civil  society  within  the  framework  of  the  state  through  the 
amendment  of  its  domineering  jurisdictions.  "The  law  is  not  prohibitive  and  the  row  is 
about  procedures. 
If  NGOs  were  left  alone  they  would  not  be  able  to  function,  or  at  least  they  would 
not  function  as  effectively  as  when  they  are  backed  by  the  government",  said  the  Minister 
of  Social  Affairs  (Al-Ahram  Weekly:  4  June  1998).  Such  patronage  not  only  over- 
regulates  the  activities  of  NGOs  but  also  stifles  all  forms  of  civil  society.  Although  active 
civil  society  organisations  in  Egypt  have  been  trying  to  urge  the  government  to  facilitate 
the  procedures  of  registration  and  restrict  the  authority  of  administrative  bodies,  the  draft 
law  introduces  the  new  proviso  that  all  NGOs  must  be  approved  and  registered  with  the 
Ministry  of  Social  Affairs.  It  also  gives  the  government  the  right  to  appoint  its  own 
officials  to  NGO  boards  which  will  definitely  weaken  the  authority  of  members  of  these 
boards  in  favour  of  the  Ministry  of  Social  Affairs.  While  the  draft  law  has  dropped  the 
government's  right  to  dissolve  an  NGO  and  suggests  instead  that  disputes  be  taken  to 
court,  the  power  is  still  tilted  in  the  state's  favour  because  the  judiciary  will  rule  according 
to  the  NGO  law,  not  according  to  the  far  less  restrictive  civil  law.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that 
the  draft  has  been  open  for  discussion  with  advocacy  organisations  and  leaders  of  human 
rights,  the  latter  view  the  by-law  as  repressive  and  consider  that  it  only  "fosters  the  state's 
control  and  limits  civil  society  independence";  according  to  Abu  Zahra,  Professor  of 
Behavioural  Science,  Alexandria  University,  and  Head  of  `Friends  of  the  Environment', 
an  active  NGO  in  Egypt  (AI-Ahram  Weekly:  11  June  1998).  Moreover,  the  draft  law  uses 
many  vague  terms  which  can  easily  be  manipulated  by  the  government  in  order  to  impose 
further  restrictions.  As  yet,  the  draft  by-law  has  neither  been  approved  by  the  public  nor 
officially  endorsed. 
Undoubtedly,  as  power  is  concentrated,  the  machinations  of  the  elite  who  run  the 
ERSAP  guide  state  objectives,  whilst  the  power  of  the  popular  sector  in  low-income 
areas,  the  subject  of  this  study,  is  assumed  by  the  state  to  be  `neutralised'.  Thus  the  urban 
poor  and  popular  classes  "have  either  been  brutally  repressed,  co-opted,  or  have  grown 
apathetic  and  acquiescent,  socialised  into.  accepting  elite  domination"  (Singerman  1997: 
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3).  The  political  participation  of  ordinary  men  and  women  is  circumscribed  as  repression 
and  fear  work  to  intimidate  their  voices  and  their  leaders.  But  this  negative  scenario  does 
not  seem  to  be  all-encompassing  in  Egyptian  cities.  A  study  carried  out  about  family, 
politics,  and  networks  in  poor  urban  quarters  of  Cairo  proved  that,  far  from  being 
politically  apathetic,  or  acquiescent,  the  urban  poor  engage  in  a  range  of  activities  that 
have  political  import  and  aggregate  power  for  collective  benefit  (Singerman  1997).  The 
following  Chapters  will  also  examine  the  potential  dynamics  which  exist  in  another  two 
cities,  Ismailia  and  Aswan. 
The  performance  of  civil  society  organisations  themselves  and  the  extent  to  which 
they  are  accountable  for  the  services  they  provide  and/or  the  foreign  aid  they  receive  are 
also  questionable.  Some  research,  presented  during  a  conference  on  the  `Role  of  Non- 
governmental  Organisations  in  Egypt's  National  Development  Strategy'  (Cairo  1993), 
agreed  that  an  overwhelming  majority  of  active  NGOs  working  in  the  area  of  community 
development  still  lack  managerial  capabilities  and  planning  skills,  such  as  community 
needs  assessment,  project  planning,  implementation  and  appraisal  (UNICEF  1994).  They 
also  face  many  other  problems  and  constraints  which  hinder  their  action  and  reduce  their 
effectiveness.  They  are  unable  to  raise  sufficient  financial  resources  and  thus  their 
independence  and  freedom  of  action  is  questionable  (Al-Sawaf  1995:  6). 
A  detailed  study  of  the  constraints  facing  Egyptian  private  voluntary  organisations 
and  the  role  of  management  training  was  carried  out  by  a  UNICEF  survey  in  1993  in  the 
Governorates  of  Cairo,  Alexandria  and  Assuit.  Many  active  NGO  leaders  and  members 
were  interviewed;  in  addition,  three  participant-observation  workshops,  each  attended  by 
between  23  to  28  members  representing  civil  society  organisations  and  municipal  officials, 
were  held  (Al-Sawaf  1995:  7).  Interviewees  were  requested  to  identify  the  main  problems 
and  constraints  faced  by  civil  society  organisations  in  their  respective  Governorates.  The 
results  showed  a  relatively  high  degree  of  consistency  and  concurrence  among  the 
answers,  while  most  of  the  problem  areas  were  mentioned  in  all  three  Governorates.  A 
long  list  of  the  problems  found  has  been  clustered  into  four  categories,  financial, 
managerial,  institutional  and  cultural  (Box  5.4). 
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Box:  5.4:  Egypt-  Obstacles  facing  the  effective  operation  of  civil  society  organisations 
"  Financial  obstacles:  insufficient  financial  resources  to  carry  out  independent 
development  project;  and  lack  of  financial  and  moral  incentives  for  NGO  staff  and 
volunteers. 
"  Managerial  obstacles:  lack  of  adequate  knowledge  of  the  regulating  articles; 
inadequate  skills  in  assessing  needs,  project  planning  and  management  skills,  including 
lack  of  innovative  project  ideas;  problems  in  communication  and  management  among 
NGO  board  of  directors,  NGO  full-time  staff  and  social  affairs  directors;  inadequate 
technical  and  administrative  capacities  of  NGO  staff  and  shortage  of  technical  and 
managerial  skills;  and  shortage  of  NGO  trained  leaders  and  volunteers. 
"  Institutional  obstacles:  inadequacies  in  the  laws  and  regulations  governing  civil 
society;  non-availability  of  information  on  community  needs;  the  frequent  changes  in 
government  and  donor  policies;  and  lack  of  co-ordination  among  NGOs  themselves. 
"  Cultural  obstacles:  inadequate  public  relations  on  the  part  of  NGOs  and  the  lack  of 
attention  given  to  them  in  the  mass  media;  men  often  dominate  gender  projects;  and 
women's  perspectives  are  often  ignored  in  such  projects. 
Source:  Adapted  from  UNICEF  (1994). 
Although  assessing  an  NGO's  development  performance  is  a  complicated  task, 
since  it  involves  achievement  on  at  least  three  levels:  operational  activities,  strategic 
choices,  and  organisational  standing  in  society  (Fowler  1997:  163),  the  UNICEF  study 
has  focused  attention  on  the  urgent  need  for  training  programmes,  technical  assistance, 
on-the-job  advice,  monitoring,  advocacy,  dialogue  and  selective  financial  and  material 
assistance  (UNICEF  1994).  However,  there  is  always  a  fair  degree  of  scepticism  about 
the  impact  of  training  programmes  in  Egypt.  "Most  training  programmes  in  Egypt  tend  to 
be  theoretical  because  practitioners  often  lack  sound  professional  and  practical 
grounding",  ascertained  Professor  Salah  Arrafa  of  the  American  University  in  Cairo  and  a='. 
GTZ  Community  Development  Consultant  (SA,  04-06-98).  Many  training  programmes 
are  too  generic,  'off-the-shelf  and  not  tailor-made  to  fit  the  specific  needs  of  participants. 
The  same  materials  are  repeatedly  used  by  the  trainers  and  some  exercises  designed  in  the 
West  are  used  without  any  adaptation,  especially  in  the  area  of  gender  sensitisation  (SA, 
04-06-98). 
Training  programmes  are  also  conducted  as  `one-shot'  interventions  with  little 
follow-up,  and  are  often  aimed  at  developing  individuals'  skills  rather  than  improving  the 
performance  of  organisations,  including  counter-part  bodies  of  local  government. 
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Interpretations  of  civil  society  performance  and  its  needs  are,  in  fact,  multilevel  because 
the  various  actors  involved  provide  different  inputs  and  hold  different  perspectives. 
Therefore,  participatory  techniques  and  multiple-stakeholder  survey  methods  are  sought 
to  better  highlight  the  real  needs  and  interests  that  civil  society  organisations  have  without 
gathering  distorted  or  biased  information  (Fowler  1997:  170).  This  is  particularly  evident 
in  the  case  of  Egypt,  where  the  state  fulfils  a  patronage  function,  and  civil  society 
organisation  is  often  ruled  by  the  elite,  or  has  replaced  some  government  services  which 
have  withered  away.  These  issues  are  addressed  in  more  detail  throughout  Chapters  8  and 
9  in  order  to  test  the  performance  and  accountability  of  civil  society  organisations 
considered  in  this  research. 
5.6-  Conclusions: 
The  above  examination  of  urban  politics  in  Egypt  reveals  that  Egypt  presently 
applies  state-centred  forms  of  governance,  bureaucratic  and  corporatist  politics,  more 
than  a  society-centred  pluralism  model.  The  local  administration  system  of  urban 
management  is  defined  in  legal  and  organisational  terms  that  disempower  local 
governments  from  acting  autonomously  or  independently.  Urban  decision-making 
processes  are  more  defined  as  based  on  some  type  of  functional  representation  within  the 
organisational  context  of  the  state,  e.  g.  the  GOPP  and  Ministries  of  Finance  and  Planning, 
rather  than  a  `pluralist  democracy',  based  on  a  multi-party  governing  system  and 
empowered  civil  society.  Thus  central  ministries  are  defined  by  functional  specialisation 
and  operate  through  formalised  and  centralised  programme  implementation.  Such 
administrative  elites  often  develop  urban  policy  preferences  which  are  quite  divergent 
from  societal  interests. 
Although  the  government  has  taken  some  measures  to  reduce  centralisation,  form 
partnerships  with  various  organisations  representing  key  sectors  in  the  society,  and 
mediate  among  competing  interest  groups,  most  of  these  measures  conspired  to  over- 
regulate  the  activities  of  different  interest  groups  and  stifle  all  forms  of  civil  society. 
Participation  in  the  administration  of  local-planning  authorities  is  still  characterised  more 
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by  a  corporatist  state-centred  approach  than  by  pluralist  forms  of  interest  mediation. 
Moreover,  most  amendments  made  under  the  local  administration  system  of  urban 
management  have  increased  the  possibilities  for  relatively  unchallenged  corporatist 
interest  inter-mediation.  Thus,  it  is  difficult  for  civil  society  organisations  and  pluralist 
groups  outside  the  single-party  organisation  to  negotiate  or  participate  effectively  in  the 
urban  governance  process. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  process  of  urban  development  and  urbanisation  in  Egypt  is 
currently  facing  several  challenges.  Although  rapid  population  growth  and  geographical 
constraints  are  seemingly  the  most  pressing  problems,  there  are  also  institutional 
deficiencies  at  both  internal  and  external  levels.  Power  is  concentrated  in  the  hands  of 
those  who  run  the  ERSAP,  supported  by  occidental  measures  of  reform  imposed  by 
international  DAs  and  characterised  by  totality  and  indifference  to  different  cultural  and 
ruling  mechanisms.  Despite  its  seeming  success  in  macro  economic  terms,  the  ERSAP  has 
resulted  in  increased  rates  of  unemployment,  urban  poverty  and  informal  squatting.  Many 
scholars  have  demonstrated  how  large  aid  flows  into  the  urban  sector  in  Egypt  have  failed 
to  achieve  the  intended  results  of  sustainable  development  for  the  poor  due  to  external 
institutional  deficiencies.  Where  aid  agreements  require  that  most  of  the  financial  aid 
received  by  Egypt  be  spent  in  the  donor  country,  use  its  shipping  and  employ  its  firms,  the 
real  benefits  that  Egypt  gained  from  aid  are  still  questionable.  This  is  examined  in  more 
detail  throughout  the  research  case  studies  in  the  following  Chapters. 
State  jurisdictions  foster  control  and  work  against  establishing  an  independent  civil  - 
society  concerned  with  maintaining  democracy  and  ensuring  that  the  government  is 
accountable  and  effective  at  the  internal  level  within  Egyptian  cities.  Accordingly,  activists 
and  the  popular  sector  in  low-income  areas  are  induced,  in  many  ways,  to  become,  or 
remain,  politically  inactive.  Such  a  political  climate  has  given  rise  to  several  competing 
social  movements  that  reflect  the  influence  of  different  interest  groups,  such  as  Islamists, 
secularists,  feminists  or  human  rights  activists.  These  movements  have  been  triggered  by 
many  traumatic  or  energising  events  over  the  last  five  decades,  including  riots  and 
terrorism,  which  have,  in  turn,  increased  the  potential  political  unrest  that  exist  in  urban 
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poor  areas  and  among  suppressed  civil  society  organisations.  Clearly,  these  forms  of 
governance  and  urban  political  events  have  influenced  the  development  agenda  of  the 
joint-venture  projects  in  Ismailia  and  Aswan,  the  level  of  citizens'  trust,  participation  in 
upgrading  projects  and  political  activation  in  formal  institutions,  and  local  goverment 
performance  and  accountability,  which  are  the  focus  of  the  following  Chapters. 
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Ismailia  is  a  medium-sized  city  in  the  north-east  of  Egypt  at  the  centre  of  the  Suez 
Canal  zone.  Ismailia's  growth  after  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  of  1967-1973  exceeded  the 
capacity  of  the  government  to  cope  with  housing  demands.  Rapid  resettlement  and 
urbanisation  raised  the  population  to  175,000  in  1975,  preventing  the  government  from 
supplying  sufficient  formal  housing,  while  the  incomers  spilled  over  onto  the  city's 
peripheries  where  services  were  non-existent  and  difficult  to  supply.  These  `informal' 
housing  areas,  mostly  on  government-owned  land,  formed  about  50%  of  the  total  housing 
stock  of  the  city  (Davidson  1984:  125).  Clearly  the  most  urgent  priority  was  to  tackle  the 
growing  housing  problem,  which  made  the  Egyptian  government  resolved  to  try  new 
approaches  to  urban  planning  and  management. 
The  Ministry  of  Housing  and  Reconstruction,  in  conjunction  with  the  United 
Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP),  entrusted  the  first  physical  Master  Plan 
(1975-2000)  to  a  British  consultancy  firm,  Clifford  Culpin  and  Partners.  Assisted  by  other 
local  and  international  firms  and  specialists,  the  consultants  defined  the  overall  goal  of  the 
plan  as  to  make  Ismailia  city,  in  particular,  and  the  Canal  Zone,  in  general,  play  a  positive 
and  increasing  role  in  the  development  of  the  Egyptian  economy.  Some  of  the  pressure  on 
the  already  congested  cities  of  Cairo,  Alexandria  and  other  large  cities  in  the  Nile  valley 
and  delta  would  be  relieved  by  means  of  a  rehabilitation  programme  for  the  city  (ARE 
1976).  Following  the  completion  of  the  Master  Plan,  the  British  Ministry  of  Overseas 
Development  (now  DFID)  funded  the  preparation  of  `Demonstration  Projects',  while  the 
American  USAID  financed  the  execution  of  large  parts  of  the  infrastructure  networks. 
The  Master  Plan  recommended  the  launch  of  two  pilot  schemes  combining  urban 
upgrading  and  sites-and-services  in  two  areas.  The  one  in  the  north  of  the  city,  called  El- 
Hekr,  was  at  the  time  the  largest  `informal'  low-income  area  in  Ismailia.  It  has  since  been. 
re-named  Hai  El-Salam  or  `District  of  Peace'  in  the  aftermath  of  President  Sadat's  peace 
initiative,  and  it  is  on  this  that  the  research  focuses.  The  other,  to  the  south,  Abu  Atwa, 
concerned  rural  development  (Figure  6.1). 
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Figure  6.1:  Ismailia-  Location  of  Hai  EI-Salam  and  Abu  Atwa  project  areas 
Existing  and  extension  housing  areas 
Sources:  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt  (ARE  1975) 
Besides  the  technical  issues  of  housing  supply,  e.  g.  upgrading  and  sites-and- 
services,  the  project  targeted  the  issues  of  `resourcefulness'  and  sustainability  by  means  of 
cross-subsidy,  community  involvement  and  participation,  and  the  creation  of  a  project 
implementation  agency  as  a  nucleus  for  an  integrated  urban  development  apparatus 
(UNCHS  1996:  4).  The  Master  Plan  listed  the  project  objectives,  which  aimed  to  be 
`realistic',  relevant  to  low-income  groups,  quickly  implementable,  replicable,  flexible,  and 
based  on  the  best  possible  understanding  of  the  existing  `situations'  (Box  6.1).  These 
objectives  were  backed  up  by  the  political  will  to  implement  them  as  well  as  the 
administrative  will  to  instigate  changes  in  the  institutional  framework.  The 
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implementation  started  at  once  and  the  major  activities  were  completed  15  years  ago, 
although  the  land  sale  programme  and  maintenance  activities  are  still  on-going  processes. 
Box  6.1:  Ismailia-  Hai  EI-Salam  project  objectives 
"  "Be  relevant  to  low-income  groups,  which  form  the  majority  of  the  population;  be 
capable  of  implementation  with  minimum  subsidy; 
"  be  based  on  the  best  possible  understanding  of  the  existing  situation  in  its  social, 
cultural,  economic  and  physical  aspects; 
"  be  able  to  be  administered  without  the  need  for  a  high  level  of  sophistication  and 
continued  support  from  outside  expertise; 
"  be  realistic,  e.  g.  should  be  implementable  within  the  existing  administrative  and 
executive  structures  and  not  require  fundamental  legal  or  organisational  reform; 
"  be  capable  of  implementation  as  soon  as  possible; 
"  be  capable  of  modification  from  experience  and  with  changing  external  factors;  and 
"  be  replicable,  in  form  and  content,  at  other  sites  in  the  future.  " 
Source:  ARE  (1976). 
Despite  some  deficiencies  in  terms  of  community  participation  and  land 
management  policies,  the  project  is  of  particular  interest  since  many  of  the  concepts 
accepted  as  everyday  givens  were  first  developed  and  given  form  in  Hai  El-Salam.  It  has 
been  argued  that  several  upgrading  projects  throughout  DCs  have  adopted  many  of  the 
principles  first  tried  in  Ismailia  (UNCHS  1996).  This  is  illustrated  in  the  foreword  of  Dr 
Wally  N'Dow,  Assistant-Secretary-General  of  United  Nations  Centre  for  Human 
Settlements  (UNCHS-  Habitat),  to  the  Ismailia  Project's  Report  submitted  to  `The  City 
Summit',  Istanbul-1996,  as  an  example  of  best  practice  (Box  6.2). 
Box  6.2:  Hai  El-Salam-  The  UNCHS's  assessment 
The  Hai  El-Salam  project,  Ismailia,  has  become  a  classic  example  of  solid  professional 
work  applying  innovative  concepts  in  the  field  of  upgrading,  community  improvement 
and  the  provision  of  land  for  lower  income  groups.  The  project  itself  and  its 
implementation  provide  a  variety  of  lessons  to  be  learned  ranging  from  the 
methodological  approach  to  the  problem,  the  inception  of  the  physical  planning  concept, 
to  its  implementation  and  occupation.  For  these  reasons,  the  Hai  El-Salam  project 
represents  an  example  of  successful  management  of  the  human  settlements  development 
process  and,  as  such,  has  been  selected  for  inclusion  in  the  catalogue  of  best  projects  for 
the  1996  United  Nations  Conference  on  Human  Settlements,  Habitat  II. 
Source:  UNCHS  (1996:  ii). 
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Indeed,  the  Hai  El-Salam  project  was  considered  to  be  at  the  forefront  of  urban 
development  practice  in  the  1980s.  In  the  Egyptian  context,  it  broke  new  ground  in  its 
attempts  to  bring  informal  sector  housing  practice  into  an  official  project.  The 
examination  of  Ismailia's  experience  illustrates  the  extent  to  which  the  project  objectives 
were  met.  This  Chapter  examines  the  various  facets  of  the  project,  starting  from  the  pre- 
project  situation  to  what  actually  happened  20  years  after  its  launching.  The  study  does 
not  focus  on  the  supply  issues  of  technical  infrastructure  since  supply  followed 
conventional  provision  methods  rather  than  community  participatory  initiatives.  Instead, 
special  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  land  and  community  management  issues,  and  how  far 
the  process  of  sustainability  has  flourished  both  in  terms  of  collaborative  participation  for 
community  development  and  of  decentralisation  of  local  government.  Each  of  these 
aspects  is  discussed  in  terms  of  an  analysis  of  the  existing  situation,  proposals  and 
implementation.  Data  collected  from  the  fieldwork  surveys  in  1996  and  1998  are  utilised 
to  evaluate  and  highlight  the  lessons  learnt  throughout  the  process. 
6.1-  Area  background  and  characteristics: 
The  Hai  EI-Salam  area  is  about  1.5  km  from  the  centre  of  Ismailia  city.  The  area 
abutted  built-up  areas  of  the  city  to  the  east  and  south,  agricultural  land  to  the  west  and 
desert  land  to  the  north  (Figure  6.2).  The  area  ranged  from  densely  developed  housing  in 
the  south  to  a  sparsely  populated  desert  fringe  in  the  north.  The  project  covered  an  area 
of  approximately  226  hectares,  of  which  132  hectares  were  already  `informally' 
developed  with  a  population  of  some  37,000  in  1977  (ARE  1978:  4).  The  area  had  no 
physical  constraints  to  urban  expansion  or  to  the  development  of  effective  links  of  internal 
and  external  road  patterns.  The  general  lie  of  the  land  was  conducive  to  the  eventual 
installation  of  main  services  such  as  gravity  sewerage  systems.  Hai  El-Salam  lacked 
physical  infrastructure  including  running  water  and  sewage  networks.  It  was  also  very 
deficient  in  the  provision  of  community  facilities.  There  was  only  one  primary  school,  a 
church  and  some  small  mosques.  Other  schools,  a  neighbourhood  centre  and  a  hospital 
existed  a  nearby  area,  and  were  used  by  the  residents  of  Hai  El-Salam.  According  to  the 
land  use  map  of  1977,  the  western  quarter  of  the  study  area  was  agricultural,  being 
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essentially  low  lying  ground,  irrigated  from  the  adjacent  sweet  water  Canal.  This  area 
was  not  suitable  for  urban  development.  Equally,  the  south-west  corner  of  the  area  was 
occupied  by  the  Suez  Canal  Authority's  plant  nursery  and  an  agricultural  college,  in  a 
addition  to  housing.  These  sections  had  been  later  excluded  from  the  project  area 
boundary  for  technical  and  administrative  reasons. 
Figure  6.2:.  Hai  El-Salam  -  area  boundaries  and  land  use  in  1978. 
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An  estimated  56  per  cent  of  the  built-up  area  in  1977  was  devoted  to  residential 
use,  containing  within  it  shops  and  workshops.  These  activities  were  concentrated  along 
the  principal  streets  and  in  particular  the  two  widest  ones.  Most  workshops  were  small- 
scale  and  concerned  carpentry,  blacksmithing  and  vehicle  and  bicycle  repair,  and  were 
located  on  the  ground  floor  of  the  owner's  dwelling.  Larger  industrial  or  commercial  uses 
were  few,  the  only  significant  premises  being  a  bakery,  a  timber  yard  and  a  grain  store  in 
the  commercial  area  concentrated  along  one  of  the  main  streets.  Although  the  first 
settlement  took  place  in  1937,  and  the  major  acceleration  occurred  after  the  conflict  of 
1973,  the  reconstruction  of  Ismailia  attracted  many  labourers,  especially  from  Upper 
Egypt  and  the  Delta,  intending  to  settle  in  the  area.  Statistics  in  1977  reveal  that  half  of 
the  population  had  lived  in  the  area  for  about  ten  years  prior  to  the  project.  One  fifth  had 
lived  there  for  less  than  two  years,  having  moved  to  Hai  El-Salam  primarily  so  as  to  own 
a  house  of  their  own,  or  to  save  so  as  to  be  able  to  achieve  home  ownership  eventually 
(ARE  1978). 
The  housing  typology  in  1977  ranged  from  rural  or  modified  traditional  forms  to 
those  with  a  concrete  skeleton.  Traditional  rural  houses  consisted  of  one  floor  built  of 
stone  or  mud  bricks,  while  wood  beams  or  metal  pipes  were  used  to  carry  roofs  made  of 
mud,  palm  leaves  or  corrugated  metal  sheets.  Such  poor-quality  buildings  tended  to 
predominate  along  the  western  fringe  of  the  project  area,  and  probably  represented 
agricultural  settlements  of  greater  age,  which  were  then  engulfed  by  urban  settlement. 
Modified  traditional  houses  consisted  of  stone  walls  using  cement  mortar,  with  concrete 
ceilings,  and  were  built  so  that  a  second  floor  could  be  added.  The  area  also  contained 
some  public  housing,  the  majority  of  which  had  a  concrete  skeleton  and  belonged  to 
`middle  income'  families  who,  because  of  their  employment  with  the  government, 
Governorate,  or  other  public  agency,  had  privileged  access  to  such  subsidised  housing 
(ARE  1978).  Hai  El-Salam  provided  the  main  supply  of  low-cost  land  for  owner-builder 
construction  and  a  large  proportion  of  new  low  and  moderate-cost  rental  accommodation 
prior  to  the  project.  Most  households  lived  in  individual  houses  but  one  fifth  occupied 
shared  dwellings  in  1977.  Approximately  one  quarter  of  households  rented 
141 Chapter  6  Successes  and  Failures  of  Ismailia 
accommodation,  including  15%  renting  individual  houses.  The  low-cost  rental 
accommodation  was  scarce,  of  poor  quality  and  remotely  located.  The  moderate  cost 
units  were  scarce  too,  and  their  services  were  deficient  although  rents  were  increasing 
rapidly  (ARE  1978).  The  land  tenure  was  mainly  quasi-formal  (Hekr)  by  which  the 
government  owned  the  land  but  the  settlers  held  a  lease  and  paid  nominal  fees  annually  to 
the  municipalities  in  order  to  get  temporary  rights  to  stay  on  the  land  (Eiweida  1997: 
113).  Most  of  the  land  was  unserviced,  while  the  sale  of  it  to  the  original  settlers  and  to 
newcomers  in  the  extension  area  was  a  major  source  of  funds  for  the  project. 
6.2-  Project  conception: 
The  first  socio-economic  and  needs-assessment  survey  of  the  existing  population 
and  the  target  group  took  place  in  1977.  The  survey  was  carried  out  by  a  team  of 
teachers  from  the  area  under  the  guidance  of  the  project's  consultants  and  sociologists 
during  the  summer  school  vacation.  Covering  the  whole  of  Hai  El-Salam,  this  was  the 
only  means  to  "ensure  easy  accessibility  and  acceptability  by  the  residents  in  addition  to  a 
high  degree  of  reliability  in  the  results  of  the  survey"  (UNCHS  1996:  9).  Indeed,  teachers 
not  only  constituted  an  active  section  of  the  beneficiaries,  but  also  "were  more  likely  to  be 
trusted  by  the  community,  had  instant  access  to  the  families  of  pupils  they  taught,  as  well 
as  good  capability  to  collect  accurate  data,  and  served  as  good  communicators  whereby 
they  informed  the  residents  about  the  project",  argued  Ms  Habiba  Eid,  a  former  Director 
of  the  Hai  El-Salam  Project  (HE,  17-12-98).  The  1977  needs-assessment  survey  showed 
a  clear  consensus  of  the  residents  on  the  priorities  for  improvement. 
While  the  condition  of  the  housing  in  the  area  was  generally  not  felt  to  be  a 
problem,  though  they  aimed  to  make  improvements  when  they  could  afford  them,  the 
provision  of  water,  surfaced  roads  and  sewerage  were  felt  to  be  the  priorities  for 
government-aided  improvement.  The  survey  also  revealed  the  economic  status  of  the 
population  prior  to  the  project.  Households  of  Hai  El-Salam  consisted  of  on  average  5.6 
persons.  The  population  was  mostly  within  the  bottom  30  percentile  income  bracket  of 
the  Egyptian  population  with  a  mean  household  income  of  £E25/month  (U$35.7  in  1977) 
equal  to  a  half  month's  salary  for  a  junior  government  employee  in  the  1970s.  The 
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project's  estimations  revealed  that  while  57.3%  of  the  households  had  very  low  incomes 
which  fell  below  this  and  no  expectation  of  any  improvement  in  their  status,  28.5%  of  the 
population  were  experiencing  or  expecting  an  improvement  in  their  status,  even  though 
they  had  low  incomes.  The  rest  of  population  had  either  low  to  moderate  incomes  (12%), 
or  moderate  incomes  (1,6%)  with  the  latter  earning  some  £E70  a  month  (L.  J$100). 
The  land  tenure  of  nearly  all  households  was  provisional  (Hekr),  but  despite  this  a 
land  market  existed.  Security  of  land  tenure  was  an  underlying  concern  for  people 
throughout  the  area.  Taking  into  account  the  high  proportion  of  unskilled  labourers 
(51%)  and  the  proportions  of  clerical  workers  (20%)  and  craftsmen  (17%)  who  tended  to 
have  higher  incomes,  the  project  recognised  that  providing  sufficient  public  housing  for 
all  would  be  beyond  the  resources  of  the  government.  It  therefore  proposed  to  utilise  the 
capacity  of  the  people  to  organise  the  building  of  their  own  houses  by  providing  the 
existing  occupiers  with  a  legal  land-title  and  the  new  comers  with  basically  serviced  plots 
on  which  to  build.  The  project  acknowledged  the  advantages  of  progressive  incremental 
construction  of  housing  by  small  contractors  and  the  owners  themselves. 
It  was  appreciated  that  upgrading  usually  entails  the  removal  of  some  dwelling 
units  to  allow  street  alignment  or  the  provision.  of  services  or  utilities.  Hence,  the 
development  of  the  area's  unbuilt  fringe  was  necessary  to  relocate  the  affected 
inhabitants.  The  new  development  also  aimed  at  accommodating  services  requiring  large 
sites,  such  as  schools,  a  hospital  and  green  areas,  as  well  as  providing  legal  housing 
opportunities  that  would  prevent  further  squatting  (Figure  6.3).  Mr  David  Sims,  one  of  -- 
the  founders  of  the  project  and  now  a  partner  in  Clifford  Culpin  and  Partners,  explained 
that  the  project  proposals  were  to  strengthen  and  improve  the  role  of  Hai  El-Salam  in 
Ismailia's  housing  market  by  providing  surveyed  and  serviced  plots,  improving  levels  of 
services  in  the  existing  squatter  area,  and,  more  importantly,  by  facilitating  and 
supporting  construction,  improvement  and  expansion  of  houses  in  the  existing  and  new 
areas  for  owner-occupiers  and  for  rental  of  a  housing  unit,  shop  or  a  workshop. 
Supportive  policies  included  land  tenure  regularisation  and  simplification,  the  supply  of 
plans  and  permit  requirements,  improvement  of  the  supply  system  of  state-subsidised 
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materials,  provision  of  credit  for  low-income  owner-builders,  and  the  provision  of  services 
on  terms  affordable  by  the  population. 
Figure  6.3:  Hai  El-Salam  -  The  new  development  and  land  rationalisation  plan. 
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Source:  Based  on  Arab  Republic  of  Egypt  (ARE  1978,  volumel). 
No  direct  construction  by  the  Project  Agency  was  proposed,  except  in  the  case  of 
resettlement  housing  (DS,  18-12-98).  Improvement  proposals  for  the 
rationalisation/regularisation  of  the  layout  of  streets  and  for  the  creation  of  plot  clusters 
around  the  communal  spaces  in  the  existing  area,  were  meant  to  cope  with  changes  of  the 
boundaries  of  some  plots  by  provision  of  new  in-fill  plots  in  the  sporadically  developed 
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areas.  The  sale  of  land  to  settlers,  in  return  for  legal  tenure  and  improvement,  granted, 
land  security  to  the  residents  and  bolstered  the  self-financing  concept  of  the  project.  The 
sale  of  land  to  the  existing  residents  was  preferred  by  the  community  to  hekr  or  the 
collection  of  fees;  low  income  groups  are  willing  to  pay  for  legal  ownership  of  land, 
particularly  if  it  is  serviced  (HE,  17-12-98).  The  other  reason  why  legal  ownership  of  land 
was  more  preferred  by  the  community  was  probably  ideological;  "private  individual 
ownership  of  land  is  part  of  sharia  law"  according  to  Islam  (Rakodi  1997:  374).  Land  is 
more  easily  financed  by  lending  institutions  than  utility  fees,  and  fees  are  often  difficult  to 
collect  from  low-income  groups,  particularly  if  all  the  upgrading  occurs  simultaneously. 
Thus  revenues  from  land  sales  underwrote  the  capital  costs  of  infrastructure  installation 
as  has  occurred  in  many  other  upgrading  projects  in  developing  countries. 
The  subdivision  plan  for  the  new  development  area  resulted  in  about  half  the  plots 
having  medium  dimensions  of  about  108m2  (6m  x  12m  or  9m  x  12m),  with  a  third  smaller 
(6m  x  12m  or  6m  x  15m)  and  a  fifth  larger  (9m  x  18m)  (ARE  1978).  Some  68  per  cent  of 
the  plots  were  planned  with  6m  frontages,  28  per  cent  with  9m  frontages,  and  less  than  5 
per  cent  were  planned  with  frontages  of  12m  or  more  (12m  x  12m).  In  total  3,527  low- 
cost  plots  were  planned  in  five  neighbourhoods.  Plot  pricing  was  determined  on 
`technical'  grounds  in  relation  to  affordability.  The  idea  of  offering  concession  plots  was 
first  developed  by  the  project  in  the  1970s.  Besides  the  low-cost  plots,  the  new 
subdivision  offered  a  number  of  plots,  169  plots  in  the  first  phase,  ranging  between  360m2 
and  576m2  in  concession  areas  at  commercial  prices.  These  plots  were  sold  fully  serviced 
at  market  prices  to  fulfil  the  idea  of  internal  project  cross-subsidy.  Furthermore,  some 
plots  were  earmarked  and  sold  later  by  auction  to  generate  further  revenues  for  the 
project.  The  intention  was  that  the  project  agency  would  be  financially  sustainable,  with 
money  from  land  sales  being  used  to  finance  the  acquisition  of  more  land  and  the 
provision  of  basic  services  for  the  urban  poor.  However,  this  intention  was  undermined  in 
the  1990s  by  local  government  rules  which  did  not  allow  the  same  agency  to  retain 
incoming  moneys.  Generated  money  was  diverted  from  participatory  programmes  that 
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could  benefit  the  urban  poor;  these  issues  are  the  focus  of  the  following  section  and 
Chapter  10. 
Inhabitants  were  able  to  generate  income  from  housing  by  allowing  mixed  land 
uses  within  the  community;  housing  was  thus  a  contributor  to  household  income  rather 
than  merely  a  commodity.  Shops  and  workshops  on  the  ground  floor,  as  well  as  flats 
above,  could  be  rented  out.  Revenues  could  be  used  to  finance  further  building  and  cover 
the  payment  of  the  cost  of  the  land  and  infrastructure  maintenance.  More  importantly, 
"innovation  was  also  evident  in  the  form  of  the  administration  proposed  for  the  project, 
which  was  directly  linked  to  local  government  in  order  to  bypass  the  bureaucracy  of 
central  government"  (Khoury  1996:  198).  The  technical  aid-assistance  to  Ismailia 
Governorate  helped  to  establish  both  a  Project  Agency  for  Hai  El-Salam  for  the  execution 
of  the  project,  as  well  as  an  Urban  Planning  Office  (UPO)  for  the  Governorate.  The 
Governor  took  advantage  of  the  Local  Administration  Law,  which  empowered 
Governors  to  create  semi-autonomous  agencies  to  plan  and  manage  the  development  of 
urban  projects  within  Governorates,  to  establish  a  new  organisation  in  the  form  of  a 
Project  Agency  Board  in  1978.  The  Project  Agency  Board  included  senior 
representatives  of  the  Governorate,  the  City  Council  and  its  concerned  departments,  the 
Housing  Directorate,  the  local  office  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  Project  Manager; 
it  was  directly  answerable  to  the  Governor  (Figure  6.4). 
The  Project  Agency  was  freed  from  the  restrictions  of  the  local  bureaucracy.  This 
mandated  autonomy  was  not  only  from  the  departments  responsible  within  the  central  and 
local  government  for  the  decision-making  process,  but  also  granted  financial 
independence.  The  Project  Agency  acquired  the  power  to  buy  and  sell  land,  enter  into 
contracts  and  manage  its  own  budget  (ARE  1980:  5),  but  it  could  not  act  in  total 
isolation.  It  was  suggested  that  the  Agency  should  be  governed  by  a  board  of  directors, 
who  could  also  act  as  the  governing  board  for  similar  projects.  Furthermore,  the  same 
mechanism  was  used  in  1981  by  the  Governor  to  establish  an  Urban  Planning  Office 
(UPO)  at  the  level  of  the  Governorate.  Such  actions  are  significant  in  the  context  of 
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urban  governance  decentralisation  and  municipal  capacity-building,  and  they  will  be 
discussed  in  greater  detail  in  Chapter  10. 
Source:  Adapted  from  ARE  (1978:  volume  1) 
6.3-  Participatory  initiatives: 
Assessment  of  the  reality  of  community  participation  in  the  different  facets  of  the 
Hai  El-Salam  project  is  not  easy.  There  is  considerable  doubt  about  the  achievement  of 
two  of  the  project's  main  objectives-  namely  to  `be  relevant  to  low-income  groups'  and 
to  `be  based  on  the  best  possible  understanding  of  the  existing  situation  in  its  social, 
cultural,  economic  and  physical  aspects'.  Data  collected  from  meetings  with  randomly- 
selected  HoHs  in  Hai  El-Salam,  community  leaders,  as  well  as  housing  and  development 
consultants  working  in  Egypt,  were  found  to  contradict  much  of  the  rhetoric  repeated  in 
the  project's  documents  and  reports.  First,  participation  in  the  project  conception  process 
does  not  seem  to  have  been  all-encompassing.  Almost  half  of  the  HoH  respondents 
interviewed  in  Hai  EI-Salam  denied  that  any  needs-assessment  survey  took  place,  though 
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they  claimed  that  they  experienced  and  remember  the  initiation  of  the  project  very  well., 
The  project's  documents  argue  that  community  participation  in  the  decision-making 
process  throughout  the  project's  duration  was  maintained  through  `natural  mediators' 
from  the  area.  Representatives  were  selected  from  the  area  residents  to  co-ordinate  with 
the  Project  Agency.  These  representatives  were  `natural'  social  leaders  within  the 
community  identified  during  the  survey.  The  community  representatives  were  supposed 
to  act  as  a  liaison  between  the  residents  and  the  project,  to  define  problems  with  their 
fellow  citizens,  resolve  obstacles,  and  form  a  people's  committee  "which  was 
instrumental  in  identifying  the  realistic  ability  of  the  residents  to  pay  for  upgrading  costs" 
(UNCHS  1996:  17).  In  reality,  all  HoHs  interviewed  and  a  community  leader  in  the  area 
(YS,  27-10-96)  had  no  knowledge  of  such  a  committee  and  could  not  remember  that  they 
had  ever  been  invited  or  consulted.  In  addition,  despite  the  theoretical  importance  of  such 
a  committee,  it  was  not  formally  incorporated  within  the  Project  Agency  Board  structure 
shown  in  Figure  6.4. 
Second,  there  was  no  formal  participation  in  the  implementation  of  infrastructure 
options,  and  low  initial  levels  of  service  were  chosen  on  the  basis  of  financial  criteria 
developed  by  project  staff  using  data  on  costs  and  incomes.  Although  the  residents 
showed  a  lot  of  willingness  to  participate,  the  project's  consultants  preferred  to  `supply' 
the  area  with  infrastructure  and  services  through  contractors,  rather  than  `enabling'  the 
residents  and  allowing  `mutual  learning'  among  all  partners.  A  group  of  HoHs 
interviewed  during  the  fieldwork  survey  (IGII,  17-10-96)  remembered  the  readiness  they 
showed  to  participate  when  the  first  surveying  was  initiated:  "We  welcomed  the 
surveyors  to  our  houses,  carried  the  surveying  instruments  and  held  the  measuring  stick 
even  in  wet  streets  or  over  ruins.  We  were  ready  to  cut  trenches,  but  we  were  not  asked". 
Indeed,  coming  back  `home',  after  many  years  of  evacuation,  had  made  the  residents 
eager  to  participate  in  improving  their  spatial  environment  and  reconstructing  their 
houses,  but  this  willingness  was  not  utilised  by  the  project. 
One  of  the  first  planning  Consultants  in  the  project  argued  that  participation  was 
much  more  possible  on  an  arbitrary  basis:  "Although  people  were  not  invited  for  meetings 
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on  a  regular  base,  it  was  like  an  open  door,  if  anybody  from  the  area  wanted  to  come  and 
talk,  he/she  would  find  someone  to  listen  to.  Participation  was  based  on  self-initiative 
rather  than  imposed  from  the  top.  Meanwhile,  the  location  of  the  Project  Agency's  office 
within  the  settlement  was  a  vital  aspect  to  ensure  continued  communication  with  the 
community"  (FD,  17-1-98).  In  fact,  this  liberal  philosophy  seemed  to  embody  some 
negative  features  raised  by  the  Marxist  interpretations  of  self-help,  which  view  it  as 
exploiting  squatters  twice  over,  both  by  the  problem  and  its  `solution'  (Burgess  1982), 
rather  than  vesting  in  citizens  a  higher  degree  of  power  and  involving  the  community  in 
the  decision-making  process  through  an  institutionalised  framework.  Thus,  it  is  argued 
that  the  term  `community  participation'  was  used  in  the  documentation  of  the  Hai  AI- 
Salam  project  as  a  `cosmetic  label',  as  Chambers  calls  it  (1995:  30),  to  make  whatever 
was  proposed  in  the  1970s  appear  `politically  correct'  in  the  1990s,  while,  in  fact,  the 
rhetoric  could  not  be  substantiated  in  the  field,  most  probably  because  of  different 
conceptualisations  of  `participation'  and  `empowerment'  at  that  time. 
The  residents  tended  to  settle  in  socially-related  groups  in  Hai  El-Salam.  This 
gave  rise  to  sections  that  were  still  predominantly  occupied  by  groups  of  families  with 
common  origins.  Each  community  segregated  itself  from  the  others,  but  was  keen  to 
construct  a  focal  neighbourhood  centre  (GRO)  for  its  members.  It  was  noted  during  the 
research's  fieldwork  survey  in  1998  that  most  of  the  GROs  in  the  area  were  not  very 
active  in  terms  of  carrying  out  development-related  activities.  Members  of  GROs  used 
their  buildings  only  for  social  events,  such  as  weddings  and  condolences  on  deaths.  The 
two  most  active  civil  society  organisations  were  the  Abna'a  El-Sharkiya  and  the  El-Khair 
Wal-Baraka.  While  the  first  was  a  GRO  established  by  people  coming  from  Sharkiya,  the 
latter  was  a  large  NGO  established  by  a  group  of  well-off  religious  people  to  assist  the 
poor  and  disadvantaged.  The  services  offered  by  these  were  to  a  large  extent  similar,  but 
were  carried  out  at  a  larger  scale  by  the  El-Khair  Wal-Baraka.  A  Board  Member  of  the 
Abna'a  El-Sharkiya  GRO  explained  that  the  organisation  offers  medical  care  services, 
first  aid,  literacy  programmes  and  social  assistance  to  the  poor,  such  as  loans  and  charity 
grants  (YS,  27-10-96).  In  addition  to  such  services,  the  El-Khair  Wal-Baraka  also  dealt 
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with  the  distribution  of  money  collected  from  the  Zakat  (Muslim  annual  donations  to  the 
poor).  Both  associations  were  open  to  any  resident  and  the  services  available  were  not 
exclusive  to  their  members.  However,  such  groups  in  Hai  El-Salam  had  never  tried  to 
come  together  and  establish  any  sort  of  unified  NGO  at  settlement  level.  It  could  seem 
that  the  disparities  in  origins,  period  of  residence  and  standard  of  living  were  too  great  to 
generate  a  common  identity  with  the  area. 
6.4-  Land  management  crisis: 
At  present,  urban  land  management  in  Ismailia  is  faced  by  enormous  technical  and 
administrative  problems  (Khoury  1996).  Hai  El-Salam  is  currently  facing  a  series  of 
socio-economic  repercussions  structured  by  class  and  state  power  due  to  underestimation 
of  population  mobility,  and  mismanagement  of  land  policy  and  regulations.  A  survey 
carried  out  in  1985  indicated  that  although  the  number  of  inhabitants  (70,000)  had  greatly 
exceeded  projections  for  that  year  (60,000),  the  area  included  a  great  variety  of 
`unexpected'  social  groups  (GOHBR  1985).  The  study  also  noted  an  increase  of 
commercial  activities  in  the  area.  The  most  drastic  changes  had  occurred  in  the  new  sites- 
and-services  area,  where  housing  standards  had  improved,  indicating  that  the  purchasing 
power  of  new  residents  was  much  greater  than  of  households  resident  before  the 
upgrading  process.  The  HoHs  interviewed  and  those  participants  in  the  group  interview 
in  1996  (IGI1,17-10-96)  explained  that  the  poor  were  continuously  replaced  by  middle 
and  higher  income  groups;  when  the  original  beneficiaries  sold  their  plots,  attracted  by 
some  cash  in  a  climate  of  increased  land  prices  owing  to  the  upgrading,  their  tenants  were  -- 
forced  to  leave  because  of  rapid  rent  increases.  Official  statistics  confirmed  that:  "Some 
75  per  cent  of  the  land  sold  [to  beneficiaries]  was  purchased  by  second  buyers  in  an 
informal  manner"  (Metwalley  1993). 
This  process  meant  that  the  owners  benefited  at  the  expense  of  the  poorer  groups, 
while  the  government  has  lost  because  the  specific  target  groups,  in  whom  DAs  and  the 
government  had  invested  a  massive  capital  injection,  have  re-entered  the  informal  market 
by  squatting  elsewhere  on  other  government-owned  land.  "Although  several  incentives 
were  offered  to  the  low-income  groups  of  Hai  El-Salam  to  stimulate  housing 
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improvement,  such  as  subsidised  construction  materials,  cheap  architectural  design 
models  and  access  to  credit  facilities,  many  settlers  made  substantial  profits  merely  from 
holding  and  transferring  land  without  investing  in  its  improvement  or  paying  taxes  on  its 
increasing  market  value",  said  an  Urban  Planner  in  the  Ismailia's  UPO,  who  had  worked 
for  several  years  for  the  Hai  El-Salam  project  before  he  became  a  Director  of  El-Safa 
Upgrading  Project-  a  project  which  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  Hai  El-Salam  (GG,  26- 
11-98).  Increasing  pressure  on  serviced  urban  land  in  Ismailia  stimulated  the  market,  but 
efficient  formal  markets  require  a  more  rapid  and  transparent  mechanism  of  title 
provision.  Otherwise,  like  in  Hai  El-Salam,  land  tenure  becomes  obscured  by 
undocumented  informal  transactions. 
The  extent  to  which  the  project  succeeded  in  serving  its  intended  target,  low- 
income  groups,  as  stressed  in  the  project's  initial  objectives,  is  questionable.  First  of  all, 
despite  the  target  population  being  defined  as  the  existing  population  of  Hai  El-Salam, 
composed  predominantly  of  low  income  groups,  surprisingly,  "the  project  was  not 
designed  exclusively  for  this  income  group,  as  families  with  higher  income  levels  in 
Ismailia  also  required  plots  for  housing.  This  was  seen  as  a  good  opportunity  to 
undertake  cross-subsidy  of  the  plots  for  lower  income  groups"  (UNCHS  1996:  10). 
Consequently,  a  certain  proportion  of  plots  were  sold  by  auction  with  few  restrictions  at  a 
higher  price,  and  the  profits  allowed  lower  prices  to  be  charged  for  plots  for  the  lower 
income  groups.  An  income  `ceiling'  was  proposed  for  the  subsidised  plots.  Prices  varied 
according  to  location  and  standard  of  services.  Besides  the  benefits  of  cross-subsidy,  the 
idea  of  allowing  access  to  higher  income  groups  was  also  thought  to  help  "to  remove  the 
pressure  which  they  would  otherwise  bring  to  bear  to  replace  or  buy  out  the  low  income 
groups.  ... 
Yet  another  advantage  is  that  instead  of  developing  a  large  single  income- 
group  ghetto,  a  reasonably  balanced  section  of  the  city  can  develop"  (UNCHS  1996:  10). 
In  reality,  some  higher  income  groups  were  not  content  with  their  share.  Supported  by 
land  speculators,  they  started  to  expand  into  the  areas  of  lower  income  groups,  buying  up 
plots  one  by  one.  It  was  evident  during  the  fieldwork  area  reconnaissance  that  large  parts 
had  improved  substantially  and  are  clearly  not  a  low-income  housing  area,  being 
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comprised  of  high  quality  buildings,  almost  all  multi-storey  and  made  of  modern  materials 
using  more  complex  structural  systems  (Plate  6.1). 
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The  quality  of  most  buildings,  including  structures  made  from  traditional  materials 
and  with  traditional  techniques,  was  generally  good.  Either  the  residents  have  suddenly 
become  rich  and  reconstructed  their  houses,  or  they  have  been  replaced  by  higher  income 
groups.  The  latter  is  more  probable,  given  that  social  surveys  of  the  newly  formed 
squatter  settlements  around  Ismailia  city,  Abu  Halous  and  El-Kilo  Etnain,  reveal  that  by 
1998  many  of  their  residents  were  Hai  El-Salam  beneficiaries  (OA,  26-11-98).  This 
suggests  that  families  who  managed  to  invest  in  construction  were  able  to  stay,  while 
those  who  moved  out  were  tempted  to  sell  their  land,  and  so  possibly  fund  future 
construction  elsewhere.  The  only  locations  in  which  this  process  did  not  seem  to  have 
occurred  were  the  narrow  streets  and  alleys  in  which  the  Urban  Planning  Law  enforced 
height  restriction-  the  height  could  not  exceed  one  and  half  times  the  width  of  the  street. 
The  field  reconnaissance  revealed  that  modified  traditional  houses  survived  in  the  old 
sections  of  the  area,  especially  where  the  narrow  streets  kept  the  land  value  low  (Plates 
6.2  and  6.3). 
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Plate  6.1:  Hai  E1-Salam-  Large  parts  of  the  area  have  improved  substantially  and  do 
not  resemble  a  low-income  housing  area. n 
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Plate  6.2:  Hai  El-Salam-  Example  of  the  traditional  houses  which  characterised  the  area 
prior  to  the  upgrading  project  and  the  invasion  of  speculators  in  the  1980s. 
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Plate  6.3:  Hai  El-Salam-  Example  of  the  modified  traditional  houses  that  still  exist  in  the 
old  section  of  the  area,  especially  in  narrow  streets.  Height  restriction 
protected  the  inner  areas  from  the  greed  of  urban  speculators  and  the 
replacement  of  the  urban  poor  residents  by  higher  income  strata. 
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A  parallel  process  was  evident  in  the  sites-and-services  area  in  which  it  was 
originally  planned  to  allot  the  plots  of  land  overlooking  the  main  streets  to  middle  income 
groups  at  market  prices,  while  plots  along  the  narrower,  subsidiary  streets  were  allotted 
to  the  urban  poor.  The  design  included  a  number  of  spaces  for  common  use.  However, 
some  private  interest  groups  pressured  project  officials  in  the  1980s  to  convert  the 
narrow  streets  and  common  urban  spaces  into  wide  streets  instead.  Dr  Manal  El-Batran, 
an  Urban  Development  Advisor  to  the  Egyptian  Minister  of  Housing  (1997-  date), 
condemned  this  action  as  wider  streets  permitted  higher  building  which,  indirectly,  led  to 
an  increase  in  land  prices  beyond  the  financial  reach  of  low  income  families  (ME,  19-12- 
98).  Thus  the  price  of  a  square  metre,  which  was  sold  by  the  project  at  £E2.5-10  (£0.60  - 
2.5)  in  1985,  had  risen  to  £E1800  (£310)  in  1998,  far  beyond  the  inflation  rates  during 
the  same  period.  Moreover,  while  the  concept  of  concession  plots  was  very  necessary  for 
the  self-subsidy  philosophy  of  the  project,  "price  speculation  in  areas  located  near  to  the 
sites-and-services  area,  such  as  the  Sheikh  Zaied  area,  was  not  predicted.  It  is  very  likely 
that  people  now  still  practice  the  same  idea  of  the  project  10  years  ago  and  always  try  to 
freeze  [earmark]  their  valuable  plots  until  their  prices  increase  significantly"  (FD,  17-1- 
98).  Indeed  owners  did  earmark  their  plots  so  as  to  capitalise  on  their  increased  value 
when  the  neighbourhood  consolidated.  This  situation  has  also  encouraged  an  increased 
number  of  middle-income  settlers,  who  live  in  what  was  the  sites-and-services  area,  to 
realise  the  enhanced  value  of  their  property  and  sell  out  to  higher  income  groups,  thereby 
reducing  the  social  mix  and  making  it  even  more  difficult  for  other  low  income  groups  to 
gain  access  to  Hai  El-Salam. 
Although  it  was  recognised  from  the  beginning  of  the  project  that  there  would  be 
pressure  on  allocatees  to  re-sell  their  plots  illegally,  no  regulations  were  enforced;  "it  is 
difficult  to  argue  against  the  right  of  allocatees  to  re-sell  if  they  genuinely  cannot  afford  to 
build,  but  excessive  pressure  in  this  direction  can  be  reduced  by  providing  alternative 
possibilities  for  middle-and  upper-income  groups"  (Davidson  1984:  145).  Of  course  this 
policy  was  unrealistic  and  made  a  fatal  assumption  that  the  local  government  would 
continue  to  reproduce  efficient  urban  plans  even  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  foreign  aid- 
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assistance.  This  assumption  collapsed  because  of  institutional  problems  which  hindered 
the  sustainability  of  the  UPO's  performance,  as  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  10.  In  the 
1990s,  with  the  rapid  increase  in  the  land  prices,  specific  local  regulations  to  control  land 
resale  were  devised.  In  order  to  register  the  resale  of  an  urban  plot,  the  owner  is  required 
to  pay  an  amount  equal  to  the  initial  land  cost  to  the  UPO,  if  the  buyer  is  from  Ismailia,  or 
one  and  half  times  the  amount  if  he/she  is  not.  Only  half  the  amount  is  required  if  the 
buyer  is  from  the  same  nuclear  family  (OA,  26-11-98).  Such  regulations  are  ineffective  in 
the  face  of  increasing  land  prices  in  the  informal  market.  The  amount  paid  to  the  UPO  in 
any  case  is  much  less  than  the  price  received  by  the  sellers.  Besides,  outsider  buyers 
always  circumvent  the  regulations  by  `proving'  that  they  are  local  Ismailians  so  that  they 
pay  less.  It  can  thus  be  argued  that,  whilst  the  society  has  changed  and  land  has  become 
increasingly  market  driven,  local  regulations  to  control  land  resale  have  neither  adapted 
nor  been  enforced  for  a  long  time. 
Provision  of  full  land  titles  has  undoubtedly  transformed  public  perceptions  of 
previously  `informal'  settlements  into  attractive  neighbourhoods.  The  prevailing  concept 
of  the  politicians,  consultants  and  policy  makers  in  the  1970s  was  that  the  Hai  El-Salam 
area  should  not  look  like  just  another  informal  area  after  the  project's  completion, 
explained  a  large  number  of  consultants  and  senior  municipal  officials  (DS,  18-12-98; 
FM1,26-11-98).  Inhabitants  were  directed  and  assisted,  through  subsidised  construction 
materials,  to  build  to  higher  construction  specifications  than  their  traditional  methods; 
using  skeleton  structures  and  reinforced  concrete  (OA,  26-11-98).  These  high  building 
standards  resulted  in  high  property  values.  Whilst  the  granting  of  full  land  titles  has  been 
of  considerable  benefit  to  local  owners  and  investors,  it  has  also  led  to  dramatic  increases 
in  rent  levels  which  have  forced  existing  tenants  out  of  the  area  (HE,  17-12-98).  It  was 
observed  during  the  fieldwork  survey  that  the  average  rent  for  three-room  units  has 
increased  from  £E10/month  (£5)  in  the  late  1970s  to  £E300  (£50)  in  1999.  In  addition, 
key-money  of  £E15,000  (£2580)  is  also  required  if  the  tenant  wants  to  acquire  a  long- 
term  contract.  This  amount  is  equal  to  about  50  months'  wage  of  a  senior  government 
employee  with  ten  years  experience.  A  key  planner  working  for  both  the  Ismailia's  UPO 
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and  the  Sustainable  Ismailia  Programme  (SIP)  noted  that  the  application  of  the  recently 
amended  Landlord-Tenant  Law  in  1996,  which  allowed  landlords  to  negotiate  the 
duration  and  rate  of  any  new  rent  contract,  resulted  in  many  people  now  buying  a  new 
flat  rather  than  renting  one.  This,  in  effect,  stimulated  further  demand  for  large  serviced 
plots  in  distinct  locations.  The  UPO  has  become  unable  to  keep  pace  with  the  investors' 
escalating  demand.  This  further  inflated  the  land  prices  not  only  in  the  informal  market, 
but  also  in  the  formal  one  (OA,  26-11-98).  The  fieldwork  survey  revealed  that  the 
average  size  of  the  plots  sold  by  auction  in  1998  was  1000m2  at  a  price  of  £E3000 
(£517)  per  square  metre.  Unsurprisingly,  given  the  evidence  of  such  capital  availability, 
investors  targeted  high  standard  housing  units  and  pressured  the  planning  apparatus  to 
permit  the  construction  of  multi-storey  apartment  blocks  (Plate  6.4). 
Plate  6.4:  Hai  El-Salam-  The  average  size  of  plots  sold  by  auction  in  1998  was  1000m2 
which  cost  £E3000  per  square  metre,  obviously  out  of  reach  of  middle 
income  groups,  let  alone  the  poor. 
Despite  these  fundamental  problems,  a  Project  Management  Unit  (PMU)  is  still 
operating  in  Hai  El-Salam  almost  20  years  after  the  start  of  the  original  demonstration 
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projects.  The  PMU  Director,  stated  that  they  will  keep  working  until  the  last  plot  is  sold, 
to  its  beneficiary,  and  the  entire  area  is  adequately  serviced  (SK,  26-11-98).  The  PMU  is, 
in  fact,  a  similar  organisation  to  the  initial  Project  Agency  but  smaller  in  scale,  since  many 
activities  have  already  been  completed  and  the  DA  had  completed  its  mission.  More 
interestingly  in  terms  of  sustainability,  the  Sustainable  Cities  Programme,  launched  by 
UNCHS  (Habitat),  negotiated  with  Ismailia  Governorate  in  the  early  1990s  so  as  to 
develop  the  Hai  El-Salam  experience  into  a  more  general  Sustainable  Ismailia  Programme 
(SIP). 
The  SIP  recognised  a  gap  between  the  contents  of  the  Master  Plan  and  the  city's 
realities:  "The  rapid  urbanisation  of  the  city,  the  heavy  demands  of  its  inhabitants  for 
services  and  the  weakness  of  the  institutional  framework  to  manage  the  city  through  the 
Master  Plan  approach,  have  aggravated  urban  problems  during  the  last  few  years.  This 
has  given  rise  to  the  need  for  a  new  approach  in  overcoming  the  city's  problems" 
(Khoury  1996:  200).  The  SIP  project  aims  to  support  environmentally  sustainable 
development  and  growth  by  strengthening  local  capacity  to  plan,  co-ordinate  and  manage 
environment-development  interactions  in  a  framework  of  broad-based  participatory 
systems,  operationalised  through  working  groups  constituted  by  stakeholders  (Together 
Foundation  and  UNCHS  1998).  The  SIP  also  aims  to  promote  integrated  and  dynamically 
updated  development  plans  and  sector  investment  strategies.  The  working  groups  and  the 
Environmental  Planning  and  Management  (EPM)  process  initiated  through  it,  have  been 
successfully  carried  out,  as  demonstrated  by  the  increased  level  of  popular  participation, 
the  environmental  strategies  and  bankable  projects  generated  through  the  working 
groups,  and  the  concrete  steps  being  taken  to  institutionalise  the  EPM  process  within  the 
Governorate's  structure. 
The  SIP  Director,  Ms  Habiba  Eid,  who  is  also  a  Local  Popular  Council  Member, 
explains  that  the  SIP's  aim  is  to  move  on  from  the  early  position  of  the  Hai  El-Salam 
project  and  to  prepare  an  environmental  planning  and  management  strategy  for  Ismailia 
based  on  a  more  appropriate  participatory  planning  approach  (BE,  17-12-98).  The 
programme  is  intended  to  address  both  the  city's  development  sectors  and  human/natural 
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resources  as  well  as  replicating  the  experience  of  urban  upgrading.  The  new  approach 
seeks  to  overcome  the  weaknesses  inherent  in  the  Master  Plan  approach  (Halla  1994).  It 
recognises  that  since  every  actor  should  participate  in  the  action  of  planning  and  its 
implementation,  the  lack  of  relevance  and  lack  of  implementation  that  so  often 
characterised  the  Master  Plan  approach  should  be  avoided.  The  extent  to  which  the  SIP 
has  succeeded  in  achieving  its  objectives,  without  contradicting  the  initial  municipal 
capacity-building  strategies  established  during  the  Hai  El-Salam  project,  is  examined  in 
Chapter  10. 
6.5-  Conclusions: 
The  evidence  suggests  that  while  the  Hai  El-Salam  project  succeeded  in  physical 
terms,  achieved  many  of  its  objectives  and,  indeed,  was  pioneer  in  inserting  informal 
sector  housing  practice  into  an  official  project  in  the  1970s,  there  is  considerable  doubt 
about  the  achievement  of  its  first  two  objectives:  to  `be  relevant  to  low-income  groups' 
and  to  `be  based  on  the  best  possible  understanding  of  the  existing  situation  in  its  social, 
cultural,  economic  and  physical  aspects'.  The  Hai  El-Salam  project  failed  to  provide 
sustainable  living  spaces  for  the  target  urban  population  not  due  to  financial  constraints 
but  because  of  serious  land  management  problems  and  ineffective  legislation.  The  case 
study  revealed  that  while  the  project's  initial  objectives  aimed  to  favour  the  urban  poor 
and  be  relevant  to  low-income  groups,  the  project's  philosophy,  which  was  prepared  by  a 
western  consultant  firm,  was  very  much  market-driven,  while  local  government  was 
insufficiently  aware  of  the  dynamism  of  land  markets  in  upgraded  areas,  which  subverted 
the  original  plans  and  objectives.  Little  consideration  was  given  to  the  social,  cultural  and 
economic  consequences,  and  inadequate  legislation  hampered  the  goal  of  legalising  land 
tenure  for  the  poor. 
There  are  various  side  effects  of  the  granting  of  tenure  which  were  not  foreseen 
by  the  project.  The  invasion  of  legalised  areas  by  higher  income  groups  and  land 
speculators,  resulting  in  urban  gentrification  and  the  displacement  of  poorer  people, 
especially  tenants,  and  further  illegal  land  occupation,  were  a  result  of  blanket  promises  of 
secure  tenure.  Payne  (1997:  46)  argues  that  tenure  policies  which  give  preference  to 
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freehold  tenure  or  long  leases  at  the  expenses  of  other  options,  such  as  rental  tenure, 
whilst  offering  many  long-term  advantages,  may  have  adverse  short-  and  medium-term 
impacts  on  the  efficiency  and  equity  of  urban  land  markets.  In  this  sense,  free,  or 
unconstrained,  urban  land  markets  may  serve  to  inhibit,  as  well  as  facilitate,  national 
economic  development.  Yet,  the  Global  Strategy  for  Shelter  to  the  Year  2000  is  sceptical 
about  `informal'  processes:  "There  is  however,  considerable  doubt  that  the  established 
informal  supply  process  can  continue  to  meet  needs  (even  if  it  were  desirable  to  look  on 
informal  supply  as  the  permanent  de  facto  policy  of  the  government).  Therefore,  some 
form  of  intervention  by  government  may  be  necessary"  (UNCHS  1990).  Indeed,  the 
experience  of  Hai  El-Salam  showed  clearly  that  soon  after  the  upgrading  project,  demand 
for  land  in  the  area  rose,  speculators  got  involved,  and  land-sale  transactions  to  higher 
income  groups,  many  of  whom  were  tenants  from  inner  city  crowded  and  rented  houses 
in  Ismailia,  grew  rapidly.  They  paid  off  lower-income  owners  in  Hai  El-Salam,  who  in 
turn  moved  away  and  squatted  elsewhere.  Once  the  new  `informal'  settlements  were 
established,  government  land  protection  laws  became  virtually  impossible  to  enforce. 
The  Ismailia  experience  shows  that  much  of  the  population  involved  has  been 
unable  to  participate  in  the  capitalistic  land  and  property  markets.  Given  the  difficulties  of 
predicting  the  outcome  of  land  tenure  policies,  it  is  essential  to  involve  the  community  in 
collaborative  decision-making  processes  and  to  build  up  an  effective  institutional 
framework  within  which  people  operate.  At  the  community  level,  the  upgrading  project 
did  not  enhance  the  `awareness'  of  beneficiaries,  raise  their  socio-economic  status  and 
intensify  community  self-reliance  by  means  of  effective  participation,  empowerment, 
promoting  pluralism  and  job  creation.  The  project's  approach  did  not  go  beyond 
consultation,  in  terms  of  community  participation,  which  surely  did  not  help  sustainability 
of  community  development  by  the  residents  themselves.  Support  for  this  argument  stems 
from  their  low  response  rate  during  the  survey.  The  land  legislation  processes  ignored 
people's  participation  in  collaborative  policy  making,  and  the  result  was  the  adoption  of 
land  tenure  policies  which  have  reinforced  land  value  inflation  and  absorbed  funds  which 
could  be  put  to  more  productive  economic  use.  Once  many  residents  of  Hai  El-Salam 
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were  offered  cash,  they  sold  their  plots  and  left  the  area.  Building  social  infrastructure  is 
not  less  important  than  simple  infrastructure  improvement.  Physical  infrastructure 
provision  per  se  can  lead  to  false  expectations  of  tenure  security  (Payne  1997).  Ismailia's 
experience  shows  that  people  may  be  replaced  by  higher  income  groups  after 
improvements  in  infrastructure  have  taken  place. 
Meanwhile,  it  can  also  be  argued  that  the  absence  of  a  unified  civil  society 
organisation  and  any  clear  economic  development  agenda  in  the  Hai  El-Salam  area  have 
left  its  economically  insecure  residents  prey  to  either  pressure  to  sell  their  plots,  or  to  pay 
increased  rents.  The  project  did  not  encourage  the  residents  of  Hai  El-Salam  to  create  a 
civil  society  organisation,  which  could  have  crystallised  their  common  interests,  and 
consequently,  the  capitalistic  market  and  state  powers  have  been  all-encompassing  in 
shaping  the  area.  In  the  context  of  the  discourses  of  the  1990s,  citizens  and  their  values 
are  both  the  means,  ends  and  judges  of  development  and  markets  should  be  in  the  service 
of  them  (Fowler  1997).  The  importance  of  the  Hai  El-Salam  experience  was  that  it 
demonstrates  some  of  the  issues  that  future  projects  needed  to  address.  Let  us  now 
discuss  Aswan's  experience  and  compare  its  approach  to  that  of  Ismailia. 
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Like  many  other  areas  in  Egypt,  Nasriya  was  named  after  the  former  Egyptian 
President  Nasser  in  the  1960s,  when  rural-urban  migration  became  a  major  phenomenon 
sweeping  hundreds  of  thousands  into  the  big  cities  unexpectedly;  the  population  of  Aswan 
almost  doubled.  Similar  to  Ismailia,  albeit  a  decade  before,  spontaneous  land  occupation 
in  Nasriya,  as  one  of  the  thirteen  other  peripheral  areas  in  Aswan,  was  the  only  option  for 
many  induced  rural  migrants  (Figure  7.1).  Although  Nasriya  suffered  from  the  lack  of  any 
technical  infrastructure,  adequate  community  facilities  and  social  support  programmes 
before  the  1970s,  the  inhabitants  themselves  had  made  several  attempts  to  improve  the 
infrastructure  by  themselves.  By  the  1980s,  services  were  still  by  no  means  adequate; 
conflicts  over  resources,  such  as  access  to  clean  water  and  streets,  increased  and  many 
quarrels  among  the  residents  arose,  although  they  were  all  solved  internally  without 
intervention  of  the  police  or  any  other  formal  institution  (NGI1,07-04-98).  This  situation 
roused  the  Egyptian  government  to  reconsider  its  urban  development  policies,  which 
encouraged  the  German  co-operation  (GTZ)  to  propose  and  initiate  a  pilot  urban 
development  and  land  management  scheme  in  Aswan  in  1987,  which  included  an  urban 
upgrading  project  for  its  largest  quarter-  the  Nasriya  area. 
The  Nasriya  project  shared  similar  initial  objectives  to  the  Hai  El-Salam  project 
aiming  to  demonstrate  the  feasibility  of  maintaining  an  existing  residential  area  whilst 
providing  it  with  appropriate  infrastructure  at  a  minimum  cost  through  the  participation  of 
its  inhabitants  (GTZ  1992).  But,  in  addition  to  the  technical  supply  of  physical 
infrastructure,  one  of  the  main  goals  of  the  project  was  to  strengthen  the  self-confidence 
of  the  community  and  to  enhance  the  traditional  ties.  Throughout  the  processes  of  buiding 
the  infrastructure  supply,  the  inhabitants  were  placed  in  the  position  of  being  able  to 
participate  in  the  future  planning  of  the  programme  and  community  organisation,  GTZ 
German  Project  Adviser  (1988-1998)  (OA,  21-03-98).  The  project  was  designed  in  a 
flexible  way  and  its  objectives  were  refined  at  the  end  of  each  implementation  phase.  The 
project  started  in  1987  by  assisting  the  community  to  establish  a  GRO,  the  Nasriya 
Community  Council  (NCC),  not  only  to  carry  out  and  follow  up  the  project  activities,  but 
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also  to  provide  an  organisational  counter-weight  framework  to  the  local  government.  This 
model  was  transcended  in  1992  by  a  more  institutionalised  Community  Development 
Association  (CDA),  which  could  represent  all  the  residents  of  the  area  through  an  elected 
assembly,  articles  of  association  and  executive  committees  responsible  for  various 
community  activities.  In  a  similar  vein,  following  in  the  footsteps  of  Ismailia,  GTZ  offered 
technical  assistance  to  Aswan  Governorate  to  establish  an  Urban  Development  and  Land 
Management  Unit  (UDLMU),  so  that  the  sustainability  of  urban  development  would  be 
secured  and  the  replicability  of  urban  upgrading  within  other  squatter  settlements  would 
be  possible.  There  are  several  questions  regarding  the  `real'  capacity  of  the  beneficiaries  to 
maintain  the  material  advances  obtained  at  the  community  level,  as  well  as  their 
sustainability  and/or  replicability  at  the  institutional  level.  A  critical  scrutiny  of  the 
advantages  and  weaknesses  of  such  a  project,  including  the  roles  of  `self-help'  in  physical 
and  community  initiatives,  provides  useful  insights  into  the  variety  of  problems  associated 
with  the  concept  of  participation  when  it  comes  to  implementation.  The  study  also 
pinpoints  the  sort  of  constraints  confronting  community  development  and  municipal 
capacity-building  programmes. 
7.1-  Area  background  and  project  initiatives: 
Set  apart  from  the  urban  core,  Nasriya  is  situated  on  the  slopes  of  mountains,  2  km 
to  the  North  East  of  the  centre  of  Aswan  City.  Nasriya  stretches  along  a  stony 
mountainside,  which  rises  at  first  gently  then  more  steeply  reaching  a  height  of  60m 
differentiation  within  the  area.  The  first  settlement  was  that  of  Nubians  in  1933-34 
displaced  by  the  second  elevation  of  the  Aswan  Old  Dam.  By  1955  other  peoples 
migrated  to  Aswan  from  villages  in  Upper  Egypt  seeking  job  opportunities  in  the  new 
industries.  The  rate  of  immigration  reached  its  peak  in  1960-1967  due  to  the  inflow  of 
workers  during  the  construction  of  the  High  Dam,  specially  from  villages  belonging 
administratively  to  the  Districts  of  Ques  and  Luxor,  Quna  Governorate.  The  communities 
were  named  after  the  migrants'  home  origin.  Nasriya  was  the  most  populous  urban  area  in 
Aswan,  with  a  population  of  45,000  in  1987.  Despite  its  large  area,  about  100  hectares 
(250  acres),  Nasriya  was  not  the  most  densely  populated  area  because  95%  of  its 
residential  plots  consisted  only  of  one  floor  (Plate  7.1). 
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Figure  7.1:  Aswan  -  Informal  areas  and  directions  of  urban  growth. 
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Plate  7.1:  Nasriya-  General  view  showing  the  steepy  topographic  features  of  the  area  and 
urban  morphology. 
The  land-use  map  revealed  that  the  built-up  area  comprised  about  80%  of  the  total 
area,  and  consisted  of  houses,  mosques,  community  centres,  three  schools  and 
unregulated  commercial  facilities,  while  there  were  no  green  areas  (Figure  7.2).  The  social 
distribution  map  revealed  that  each  community  constituted  a  spatial  neighbourhood, 
usually  surrounding  a  community  centre  constructed  by  themselves  (Figure  7.3).  Nasriya 
had  suffered  for  more  than  25  years  from  the  lack  of  any  proper  community  facilities, 
paved  access,  sanitation  and  water  supply.  The  municipality  installed  ten  public  taps  in  the 
1970s  along  the  open  Kima  Canal,  a  fetid  open  sewer  at  the  bottom  of  the  slope  running 
along  the  western  boundary  of  the  area.  Most  of  the  residents,  especially  women  and 
children,  had  to  carry  water  containers  on  their  shoulders  for  long  distances  over  high 
ground  and  often  uphill  to  their  houses.  Better-off  families  used  donkeys  to  transfer  these 
containers  or  hired  daily  carriers.  The  hardship  was  worst  for  the  people  living  far  from 
these  taps,  especially  those  at  the  eastern  fringe  at  the  upper  elevated  areas  of  Nasriya, 
according  to  a  group  of  HoHs  living  there  (NGI1,07-04-98). 
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Figure  7.2:  Nasriya  -  Land  use  map  in  1987. 
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Figure  7.3:  Nasriya  -  social  distribution  map. 
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Although  some  households  had  pit  latrines,  waste  water  was  often  reused  in 
construction  and  shallow  ditches  channelled  the  excess  to  the  Kima  Canal,  which  was  also 
the  receptacle  of  solid  waste  as  well.  Aswan  was  proposed  as  a  case  study  for  elaborating 
Physical  Structural  and  General  Plans,  during  the  Egyptian/German  co-operation  to 
improve  the  performance  of  the  General  Organisation  of  Physical  Planning  in  Egypt 
GOPP  (1982-1988).  A  joint  mission  comprising  some  German  experts  and  senior  planners 
from  the  GOPP  went  to  Aswan  to  evaluate  the  potential  for  such  a  scheme.  After  several 
meetings  with  the  Governor  of  Aswan,  Mr  Kadry  Osman  (1984-1991),  it  was  decided  that 
the  Regional  Planning  Apparatus  of  Aswan  (RPA)  would  host  the  scheme  and  provide  a 
wide  range  of  local  specialists  in  various  disciplines.  Because  the  RPA  used  to  work  with 
many  multilateral  organisations  prior  to  the  construction  of  the  High  Dam,  its  technical 
members  were  the  only  professionals  in  Aswan  with  experience  at  that  time.  The  outcome 
was  several  complementary  studies,  besides  the  Aswan  General  Plan  (1986-  2010). 
Although  this  was  not  the  first  attempt  to  elaborate  such  a  comprehensive  study,  it  was 
definitely  the  first  to  yield  a  `realistic'  and  highly  professional  plan  (Figure  7.4).  The  co- 
operative  effort  also  trained  many  local  staff  who  later  became  responsible  for  the  Nasriya 
upgrading  project,  and  for  running  the  first  Physical  Planning  Office  (1988-  1992),  which 
expanded  afterwards  to  function  as  the  Urban  Development  and  Land  Management  Unit 
UDLMU  of  Aswan  Governorate  (1992-  date). 
Nasriya  was  proposed  as  an  `Action  Area'  for  upgrading  according  to  the 
recommendations  of  the  Aswan  General  Plan.  It  was  also  identified  as  an  area  for  vertical 
densification  after  upgrading.  Nasriya  was  expected  to  "offer  potential  for  reasonable 
improvement  and  thus  absorption  capacities  for  future  population  increase"  (GOPP;  GTZ 
1986:  24).  However,  the  residents  of  Nasriya  argue  that  "the  selection  of  the  area  was 
also  made  because  of  the  willingness  and  enthusiasm  of  its  inhabitants  to  embark  on  a  self- 
help  project,  while  their  enthusiasm  and  determination  moved  the  process  of  the  project's 
selection  and  identification  in  a  bottom-up  direction.  The  residents  made  several  attempts 
to  improve  their  living  environmental  conditions  even  prior  to  GTZ's  involvement", 
explained  Mr  Mahmoud  Sabri,  Chair  of  the  Nasriya  CDA  (MS,  28-05-98). 
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Figure  7.4:  Aswan  General  Plan  (1986  -  2021). 
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The  residents  organised  themselves  through  a  hierarchy  of  extended  families 
developed  into  quarters,  forming  a  community  for  each  social  group  based  upon  their 
village  of  origin.  They  then  established  neighbourhood  community  centres  (GROs)  in 
which  meetings  on  important  occasions  and  traditional  festivities  were  held.  The 
community  leaders  organised  the  construction  and  maintenance  of  the  community  centres, 
mosques  and  associated  guest  houses,  and  thus  laid  the  foundation  for  social  and 
educational  programmes.  In  addition,  the  elected  representatives  of  the  community 
centres,  some  of  whom  were  government  employees,  maintained  contact  with  the  local 
authorities  in  order  to  propose  measures  for  physical  improvement  within  their  areas  of 
competence. 
7.2-  Project  design  and  management: 
The  first  `Socio-Economic  and  Environmental  Assessment  Survey'  was  carried  out 
in  December  1986,  as  part  of  the  General  Plan  studies.  The  survey,  as  in  Ismailia,  was 
carried  out  by  a  local  team  under  the  guidance  of  the  project  leaders.  Besides  scrutinising 
the  economic  standards  and  social  status  of  the  community,  the  survey  aimed  at 
identifying  the  community's  demands,  and  their  expectations  from  the  project. 
Infrastructure  supply,  was  at  the  top  of  the  residents'  priorities,  with  90%  of  those 
interviewed  citing  sanitation  as  their  first  priority,  compared  to  only  4.7%  who  cited  water 
as  a  first  requirement.  Unsurprisingly,  this  small  proportion  represented  residents  of  the 
remote  and  elevated  fringe  of  Nasriya  (Figure  7.5). 
Figure  7.5:  Nasriya-  Urgent  necessities  of  the  residents  (1986) 
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Source:  Author-  Adapted  from  Levin  (1987). 
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Conversely,  as  a  second  priority,  water  was  ranked  first,  scoring  38%  while  only 
2%  of  those  asked  cited  sanitation  as  second  priority.  The  remaining  10%  of  first  priorities 
included  roads,  community  facilities  (with  particular  emphasis  on  health  and  education), 
solid-waste  disposal,  the  clean-up  of  the  Kima  Canal,  electricity,  house  improvement,  and 
other  specific  services  in  descending  order.  It  is  evident  that  the  respondents  in  this  survey 
demanded  the  most  essential  needs.  Job  creation,  for  instance,  did  not  emerge  as  a 
priority.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  interviewees  were  HoHs,  most  of  whom 
were  male;  almost  one  third  were  labourers,  with  others  holding  a  wide  variety  of  self- 
employed  positions,  while  only  6%  were  civil  servants  in  1987  (Lewin  1987). 
After  this  survey  was  analysed  and  the  priorities  were  established,  the  project 
started  the  process  of  planning  and  discussion  with  the  people.  More  than  one  hundred 
meetings  took  place  in  the  community  centres  during  the  planning  phase.  These  included 
the  municipal  officials  concerned,  and  were  organised  by  the  respective  community  leaders 
(Heads  of  GROs),  who  also  worked  as  key-figures  for  approaching  the  residents  and 
introducing  the  project's  staff.  "In-depth  discussions  between  the  project's  consultants, 
municipal  officials  and  the  community  leaders  highlighted  the  potential  level  of  community 
participation  in  each  component  and  therefore,  the  concept  of  `self-help'  shaped  the  main 
framework  of  the  project",  asserted  the  Project's  Egyptian  Director  (1991-1998)  (AH, 
06-09-98).  The  focus  of  the  Nasriya  project  was  on  environmental  health  conditions  at  the 
roots,  at  community  level;  it  also  targeted  issues  of  community  participation,  governance 
and  the  consolidation  of  civil  society.  While  making  citizens  responsible  for  critical 
decisions  about  complex  issues  was  at  the  top  of  the  community  development  agenda, 
infrastructure  supply  was  at  the  top  of  the  environmental  agenda.  Thus,  the  project's 
planning  was  designed  to  achieve  four  main  objectives  in  the  first  phase  (Box  7.1). 
Box  7.1:  Aswan-  Nasriya  project  objectives 
"  To  improve  the  living  conditions  in  the  area; 
"  To  supply  the  area  with  the  required  social  and  physical  infrastructure; 
"  To  enhance  the  participatory  potentials  of  the  inhabitants;  and 
"  To  establish  the  importance  of  community  participation  and  empowerment. 
Source:  Fieldwork  survey. 
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Accordingly,  the  engagement  of  community  members  in  the  diagnosis  of  problems 
was  a  deliberate  policy  of  the  project.  "It  is  a  standard  procedure  for  GTZ  projects  to 
incorporate  a  participatory  dimension  in  their  project  planning  and  design",  according  to 
the  Project  Adviser  (OA,  21-03-98).  Community  participation  within  the  processes  of 
planning  and  decision-making  in  Nasriya  was  maintained  through  applying  tiers  of  ZOPP 
workshops.  The  early  ZOPP  sessions  in  Nasriya  produced  a  project  planning  matrix 
(PPM),  constructed  by  local  representatives  in  partnership  with  the  project's  experts  and 
the  municipal  officials.  The  first  PPM  encouraged  brainstorming,  strategising,  information 
gathering  and  consensus  building  among  stakeholders  (JK,  08-02-98).  The  involvement  of 
municipal  officials  helped  to  ensure  that  they  were  fully  involved  in  the  project  process, 
this  is  crucial  in  the  context  of  municipal  capacity  building  (Peltenburg  et  al.  1996),  as  will 
be  dicussed  in  Chapter  10. 
Subsequent  ZOPP  workshops  were  held  regularly  over  the  period  of  the  Nasriya 
project.  In  the  course  of  these  workshops,  consecutive  planning  matrixes  were  produced 
to  match  community  demands,  covering  a  large  number  of  activities  to  be  implemented, 
e.  g.  establishing  improved  water  supply,  sewerage  and  solid  waste  management  facilities, 
as  already  suggested  by  surveys  and  the  actions  of  the  community.  Other  priorities  that 
emerged  from  these  workshops  related  to  improvements  to  existing  schools,  construction 
of  a  community  Service  Centre,  improvement  of  the  roads  and  lanes  inside  the  area, 
execution  of  a  social  programme  with  special  emphasis  on  women's  development,  the 
provision  of  loans  for  house  improvement  and  income  generation,  the  opportunity  of  land 
ownership  linked  to  a  remodelling  plan,  establishing  an  Urban  Development  and  Land 
Management  Unit  (UDLMU)  at  the  Governorate  level,  offering  on  job  training  for  the 
municipal  officials  concerned,  and  the  elaboration  of  a  plan  for  a  new  extension  in  East 
Nasriya  to  make  new  plots  available  for  the  inhabitants  of  Nasriya  so  as  to  avoid  any 
further  informal  growth  and  overcrowding  (GTZ  1991,1992,1994).  While  many  of  these 
activities  were  implemented  successfully,  the  only  failure  was  the  solid  waste  disposal 
system,  the  cause  of  which  will  be  examined  later. 
The  setting  up  of  a  Project  Management  Unit  (PMU)  in  1987  was  not  easy.  The 
project  recognised  the  initial  difficulty  -of  working  through  the  existing  municipal 
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structures  and  took  a  conscious  decision  to  by-pass  those  structures  (OA,  21-03-98).  The 
Nasriya  PMU  comprised  an  Egyptian  Project  Director  and  a  number  of  specialists 
supplied  from  various  government  departments  based  on  the  specific  experience  and 
qualifications  that  were  required  at  the  time.  The  structural  organisation  of  the  PMU 
consisted  of  four  main  departments  during  the  first  two  phases  of  the  project  (1987- 
1994):  infrastructure,  community  facilities,  social  development  and  administration  and 
finance.  The  GTZ  supplied  this  team  with  a  full-time  German  Project  Adviser  to  play  a  co- 
ordinating  role  between  the  project  and  other  local  and  national  bodies  and  to  help  in 
building  municipal  capacity  in  respect  to  participatory  urban  upgrading  policies  and 
maintenance  measures.  Furthermore,  GTZ  paid  for  some  local  full-time  employees,  e.  g. 
the  heads  of  community  facilities  and  social  development  departments,  secretaries  and 
translators,  in  addition  to  a  large  number  of  local  and  expatriate  short-term  consultants  to 
help  in  planning  and  monitoring  the  project's  activities  and  to  promote  urban  upgrading 
and  community  participation.  To  some  extent,  this  structure  meant  that  impacts  on 
municipal  capacity  have  been  limited  but  this  was  inevitable  given  the  starting  situation,  as 
will  be  dicussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  10.  The  local  civic  representatives  and  organisations 
were  responsible  for  mobilising  the  inhabitants,  reflecting  their  demands  and  supporting 
the  project's  team  in  their  work,  which  are  discussed  in  the  following  sections. 
7.3-  Roles  of  self-help  in  development  initiatives: 
There  is  a  common  agreement  in  the  literature  that  the  term  `self-help'  concerns 
not  only  the  construction  processes  but  also  self-planning,  (re)development,  the 
management  of  resources,  self-contracting  of  skilled  labour,  and  self-provision  of  utilities 
(Turner  1976;  Ward  1982;  Choguill  1987;  Moser  1989).  In  Nasriya,  the  variety  of  ways  in 
which  families  have  built  their  own  houses  and/or  attempted  to  improve  their 
environment,  with  or  without  the  technical  aid  assistance  and  the  government  supports, 
have  expanded  the  `roles'  of  self-help  beyond  the  `Marxist  viewpoints',  leaning  instead 
toward  the  contrasting  `Liberal  approach'  (Figure  7.6).  Proponents  of  the  Marxist 
approach  criticise  self-help  housing  recommendations  and  the  arguments  upon  which  they 
are  based.  Burgess  (1982),  for  instance,  argues  that  the  proposal  of  self-help  often  boils 
down  to  "the  economic  and  ideological  means  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  the  status 
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quo  and  the  general  conditions  for  capitalist  development".  Self-help  is  thus  doomed  to 
failure  because  self-help  housing  cannot  be  accommodated  as  a  commodity  in  a  system  in 
which  the  capitalist  mode  of  production  is  dominant. 
Figure  7.6:  Nasriya-  Self-help  processes  during  the  formation  and  upgrading  of  the  area 
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[Marxists  critique] 
'-Housing  improvement  often  does  not 
have  a  high  priority  among  squatters, 
or  even  the  homeless  pavement  dwellers. 
-  Distinction  between  social  appearance 
and  social  reality. 
-  Appearance  is  deceptive  and  a  true 
scientific  approach  should  try  to 
penetrate  the  world  of  phenomenal 
form  to  a  deeper  underlying  reality.  J 
Atrocious  housing 
-  Physically  precarious. 
-  Brittle  and  friable  social  relations. 
-  Social  pathologies. 
-  High  rate  of  unemployment. 
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Conversely,  the  Liberal  approach  stands  strongly  against  centrally  designed 
economic  development  strategies  which  frequently  displace  people,  either  forcibly  or  by 
choice,  who  cannot  be  absorbed  by  the  settlements  concerned.  It  suggests  that  instead  of 
threatening  the  existing  efforts  of  squatters,  governments  should  respect  and  support 
them.  Turner  coined  the  term  `viable  housing'  for  policies  that  rely  on  the  self-help 
approaches,  not  only  during  the  formation  processes  of  squatter  settlements,  but  also 
during  the  urban  upgrading  processes,  and  within  sites-and-services  projects.  Self-help  is 
thus  the  approach  whereby  the  user  is  an  active  and  effective  part  of  the  whole,  or  part,  of 
the  housing  process  (Turner  1976:  140).  It  usually  involves  an  incursion  into  functions 
that  would  normally  be  the  responsibility  of  the  public  or  private  sectors  but  which  they 
are  either  unable  or  unwilling  to  provide. 
It  has  been  argued  that  self-help  went  beyond  the  mere  physical  upgrading  of 
Nasriya  (GTZ  1992).  Although  the  initial  objective  of  the  project  was  to  improve  the 
infrastructure  in  a  sustainable  way  at  minimum  cost  through  the  empowerment  and  the 
participation  of  the  inhabitants,  the  project  involved  employment,  welfare,  regeneration, 
training,  social  development  and  community  facilities,  as  argued  the  GTZ  Project  Adviser 
(OA,  21-03-98).  Cost  recovery  was  based  on  mechanisms  of  cost  sharing  in  the  form  of 
labour  provided  by  the  residents.  The  form  of  participation  was  decided  in  collaboration 
with  residents  after  they  had  refused  any  form  of  direct  cost  recovery,  regardless  of  how 
low  the  instalments  or  the  interest  rates  were  to  be.  More  importantly,  GTZ  principles  of 
self-help  also  targeted  the  involvement  of  municipal  officials  concerned  in  a  process  of 
`learning  by  doing'  throughout  participation  in  planning  and  implementation  of  all 
activities  (JK,  08-02-98).  Self-help  performed  various  roles  throughout  the  project's 
duration  in  the  field.  It  involved  individual  as  well  as  group  inputs,  and  corresponded  to  a 
system  of  production,  financing,  and  maintenance  in  which  a  significant  part  was 
organised  and  carried  out  by  that  person  or  group.  Citizen  participation  took  various 
forms  according  to  their  abilities  and  the  technical  parameters  of  the  task  (GTZ  1992). 
Therefore,  it  is  worthwhile  to  review  the  experience  of  self-help  within  each  of  the 
project's  components,  the  extent  to  which  it  has  been  socially  and  economically  useful, 
and  examine  the  various  roles  performed  by  the  community  or  the  municipality.  The 
discussion  will  also  explore  the  causes  of  the  areas  of  success  and  failure.  Emphases  are 
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particularly  placed  upon  the  lessons  that  have  been  learnt  in  the  context  of  policies  of 
participatory  upgrading. 
7.3.1-  Physical  infrastructure: 
First  of  all,  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  84%  of  HoHs  interviewed  (108  cases) 
perceived  the  infrastructure  initiatives  as  the  best  service  achieved.  The  execution  of  the 
on-site  sewage  and  water  networks,  house  connections  and  community  facilities 
improvement  was  targeted  for  self-implementation  under  technical  supervision  and  with 
the  devices.  supplied  by  the  project.  Community  leaders  decided  during  the  early  ZOPP 
sessions  that  sophisticated  activities  which  required  special  technical  expertise  should  be 
tendered.  Local  contractors  in  the  area  were  always  encouraged  to  tender  for  operations 
within  their  sphere  of  competence.  All  supervisors  and  technical  labourers  were  selected 
from  the  residents  themselves  and  received  the  required  training.  The  idea  behind  this 
strategy  was  to  enable  active  members  of  the  community  with  new  skills  that  could  aid 
them  in  the  long-run  to  improve  their  income,  a  principle  which  was  also  expanded  to 
include  local  capacity-building  initiatives  at  community  level. 
To  implement  the  physical  infrastructure  scheme,  a  working  team  was  established 
consisting  of  a  specialised  site  engineer  (head  of  the  team),  engineer-assistant  and  eight 
supervisors  and  technicians.  While  the  site  engineer  was  seconded  from  the  Housing 
Directorate,  his  assistant  and  all  the  supervisors  were  residents  from  Nasriya,  with  no  or 
little  previous  experience  and  were  paid  by  the  project.  Specialist  masons  and  skilled 
labourers  for  cutting  the  rocky  soil  were  also  hired  from  the  area  whenever  required,  and 
were  usually  paid  on  a  daily  basis  at  the  local  rate  (£E6-8/day,  about  £1.50).  This  team 
formed  the  nucleus  of  the  Infrastructure  Department  within  the  project.  They  were 
supplied  with  an  on-site  office,  storage  space,  surveying  equipment,  compressors  and  a 
renewable  stock  of  manual  excavation  tools.  The  project  offered  technical  assistance  to 
the  Youth  Directorate  in  Aswan  to  complete  the  construction  of  the  Nasriya  Youth 
Centre  and  used  it  as  the  PMU  (it  was  later  refurbished  by  the  project  and  is  used  now  for 
youth's  and  women's  activities). 
A  materials  depot  and  work  area  for  the  machinery  was  established  in  a  part  of  the 
.  'a 
centre's  courtyard.  The  tools  and  facilities  were  also  located  there  to  ensure  control  over 
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the  equipment  and  its  maintenance.  A  local  contractor  was  responsible  for  supplying 
gravel  and  sand  for  the  pipe  beds.  The  supply  of  PVC  pipes  was  delivered  regularly  by  a 
reputable  factory  in  Cairo.  Due  to  the  limited  storage  space,  they  were  reordered 
whenever  the  stock  fell  to  30%  in  the  course  of  the  pipe-laying.  However,  a  special  store 
was  constructed  in  1990  for  the  infrastructure  equipment  and  pipes  with  a  view  to 
subsequent  use  by  the  solid-waste  disposal  programme.  The  chief  of  the  Infrastructure 
Department  was  given  responsibility  for  the  co-ordination  of  the  work  at  three  different 
levels:  with  the  institutions  concerned  at  both  the  local  and  national  levels;  the  project 
experts,  consultants  and  contractors;  and  with  the  community  representatives.  The 
infrastructure  team  was  also  responsible  for  introducing  the  scheme  to  the  people  in  co- 
operation  with  the  project's  sociologists  and  the  community  representatives.  Public 
meetings  took  place  within  each  community  centre.  This  step  was  essential  for  mobilising 
the  residents  and  organising  the  work  on  the  one  hand,  and  for  demonstrating  the  work 
mechanisms  to  the  government  officials  on  the  other. 
The  overall  responsibility  for  all  the  infrastructure  activities  was  transferred  to  the 
Utilities  Department  at  the  Aswan  City  Council  (ACC)  by  a  decree  from  the  Governor  in 
1990,  but  the  PMU  did  not  completely  phase  out  from  this  component  until  1994.  This 
overlapping  period  aimed  at  increasing  the  involvement  of  the  municipal  officials  in  the 
final  stage  of  implementation  so  that  they  could  operate  and  maintain  the  networks  easily 
after  the  project's  team's  withdrawal.  It  also  tried  to  rebuild  the  mistrust  deeply  rooted 
between  the  residents  and  their  respective  local  government.  An  inter-sectional  committee 
was  established,  in  which  all  the  organisations  concerned  were  represented,  to  test  and 
commission  all  the  sewage  and  water  elements  completed.  Likewise,  a  similar  committee 
was  constituted  for  the  permanent  control  of  on-going  construction  work  and  for 
invoicing  the  contractors.  While  work  carried  out  by  contract  was  supervised  by  the 
Housing  Directorate,  the  `self-help'  work  was  supervised  by  the  project'  team  in  co- 
operation  with  the  Infrastructure  Committee  of  the  NCC.  Co-ordination  between  and 
within  these  committees  was  very  positive  and  efficient,  judging  by  interviews  with  the 
Mayor  of  Aswan,  project  administrators  and  many  community  leaders  (MA,  01-04-98; 
MF,  05-11-98;  TA,  16-06-98;  MS,  28-05-98;  AA,  05-11-98;  and  AW,  20-05-98). 
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Only  4%  of  the  Nasriya  houses  had  been  provisionally  connected  to  an  old  waste- 
water  line  running  parallel  to  the  Kima  Canal  prior  to  the  project;  the  line  was  to  connect 
the  pumping  station  with  the  main  city  treatment  plant  (south  of  the  area).  The 
inhabitants  used  to  dig  shallow  pits  at  the  roadside  following  the  natural  slope  which 
would  finally  channel  the  waste-water  into  the  canal.  A  few  other  conduits  in  the  western 
area  also  directed  sewerage  into  it.  After  exchanging  proposals  between  the  PMU  and 
the  residents  as  to  how  to  implement  the  network,  the  willingness  of  the  residents  to 
implement  it  themselves  encouraged  the  project  to  commence  the  design  of  the 
programme  as  soon  as  possible.  A  consultant  firm  from  Cairo  was  contracted  and  started 
the  first  survey  in  mid-1987.  The  system  was  designed  considering  that  the  of  site  main 
collector  would  be  constructed  by  a  contractor  since  it  required  sophisticated  techniques, 
while  the  on-site  collection  system  would  be  constructed  by  the  `self-help'  of  the 
residents.  Before  starting  any  excavation  work,  people  were  usually  invited  to  one  of  the 
community  centres  located  within  the  targeted  section;  here  the  Project's  Engineer  would 
explain  the  process  of  implementation,  and  how  manual  equipment  would  be  distributed. 
Excavation  levels  were  given  to  each  householder  subsequently,  and  machinery  was 
supplied  for  rocky  areas. 
Many  participants  interviewed  explained  that  before  beginning  the  excavation  in  a 
new  street,  the  residents  involved  would  meet  those  who  had  already  dug  their  trench  to 
discuss  the  difficulties  faced  and  how  they  managed  to  solve  them  (NGI1,07-04-98; 
NGI2,05-12-98).  Occasionally,  some  residents  objected  to  excavating  themselves  and 
preferred  to  hire  labour,  but  soon  recognised  that  this  was  not  a  wise  decision  because  it 
proved  to  be  costly  and  slow,  CDA  Board  member  and  Head  of  the  Infrastructure 
Committee  (MA,  21-10-96).  "Social  cohesion  networks  served  to  deepen  the  role  of 
participation  by  means  of  co-operation  and  solidarity",  he  added.  With  no  prompting 
from  the  project,  young  men  and  neighbours  volunteered  to  do  the  work  of  widows  and 
elderly  residents,  said  a  Nubian  widow  who  is  also  very  popular  in  her  area  (UmS,  18-09- 
98).  This  was  even  more  important  in  the  narrow  alleys  where  the  excavations  blocked 
house  entrances  and  hindered  walking  (Plate  7.2).  Again,  residents  showed  considerable 
care  and  concern  for  their  neighbours  delivering  water  and  goods  and  helping  the  elderly 
to  walk  through,  confirmed  the  Chair  of  the  CDA  (MS,  28-05-98).  Although  the  work 
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used  to  take  place  in  the  evenings  until  late  at  night,  the  residents  were  always  active  and 
enthusiastic.  Food  and  drink  were  unceasingly  offered  and  lights  were  generously 
installed,  as  agreed  all  the  HoHs  interviewed.  Undoubtedly,  once  the  residents  believed  in 
the  project,  they  recognised  that  it  was  in  their  best  interest  to  finish  the  work  as  quickly 
as  possible. 
Plate  7.2:  Nasriya-  The  challenge  of  cutting  trenches  in  the  rocky  soil.  Excavations  in  the 
narrow  alleys  blocked  house  entrances  and  hindered  walking,  but  social 
cohesion  networks  served  to  deepen  the  role  of  participation  by  means  of  co- 
operation  and  solidarity. 
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The  administration  of  the  domestic  sewage  connections  was  given  to  the 
Engineering  Department  at  the  ACC.  The  applications  from  house-holders  were  received 
by  the  Infrastructure  Department  of  the  project  and  listed  in  files  including  the-name  of 
the  applicant,  serial  number  of  the  manhole  to  which  the  connection  was  proposed  and  its 
location.  These  lists  were  handed-over  to  the  Sewage  Department  along  with  a  sectional 
sewage  map  (1/1000)  indicating  the  houses'  locations  and  the  proposed  manholes.  A 
copy  of  such  a  document  was  always  kept  for  the  project's  records  and  was  passed  on 
later  to  the  CDA.  The  system  was  designed  with  relatively  short  distance  between  the 
manholes  because  of  the  labyrinthine  topography  of  the  area,  which  resulted  in  the  short 
lengths  of  the  streets.  The  construction  of  additional  manholes  proved  to  be  necessary. 
Because  the  average  distance  between  the  manholes  was  approximately  15m  (max.  25m), 
it  was  decided  that  the  domestic  connection  pipes  should  be  conducted  directly  into 
them.  Although  this  meant  the  trenches  for  such  pipes  would  be  longer,  the  required 
depth  was  only  1.  Om  (Plate  7.2).  This  made  excavation  feasible  and  it  was  completed 
willingly  by  the  residents  themselves.  Self-help  resulted  in  a  reduction  in  the  total  cost 
and  later  enabled  the  residents  to  clean  and  maintain  the  network  easily  by  themselves. 
The  total  length  of  the  sewage  network  was  about  32km.  The  residents  dug  about 
42.000m3  of  trenches,  which  saved  about  30%  of  the  total  cost  if  the  work  had  been 
implemented  by  a  contractor  (GTZ  1992).  Loans  were  made  available  for  house 
improvements  including  infrastructure  connections.  By  1998,  around  6000  houses  were 
already  connected  to  the  network,  representing  some  80%  of  the  total  number  of  plots. 
As  for  the  water  network,  the  whole  of  Nasriya  had  been  serviced  by  an  8  inch 
line  running  along  the  west  side  of  the  Kima  Canal  in  1987.  The  line  was  3500m  long  but 
there  were  no  data  about  plot  connections,  most  of  which  were  illegal.  Some  15 
communal  water  taps  existed  in  Nasriya,  but  10  of  them  were  along  the  Canal.  The 
pressure  of  the  existing  line  was  insufficient  for  a  constant  supply  even  to  some  of  the 
lower  parts  of  the  area.  The  project's  aim  was  that  a  completely  new  water  network 
would  supply  the  entire  area  of  the  Nasriya  and  its  urban  extensions  constantly  and 
efficiently.  The  average  water  consumption  was  expected  to  rise  from  10  litres/person  to 
50  litres/person  by  the  end  of  the  first  phase,  and  up  to  100  litres/person  at  the  final 
stage.  Only  about  30%  of  the  expected  water  supply  network  would  rely  on  the  existing 
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line  along  the  canal.  The  water  supply  system  was  designed  by  an  Egyptian  consultant 
firm  based  in  Cairo  in  1987,  but  was  later  modified  by  the  project's  local  experts  and 
municipal  officials. 
It  was  evident  that  the  consultant  firm  had  not  considered  the  local  conditions  and 
the  envisioned  self-help  component.  The  location  of  the  pumping  station,  the  main 
pressure  line  and  the  proposed  location  of  the  water  tank  had  to  be  changed.  This 
resulted  in  a  substantial  reduction  in  the  overall  length  of  pipelines,  offered  easier  access 
for  traffic  and  did  not  necessitate  any  house  demolition.  The  number  of  vertical  pumps 
was  also  reduced  and  an  underground  tank  and  supplemental  pump  were  built  instead  to 
compensate  for  any  sudden  fluctuation  in  water  pressure  in  the  municipal  system,  as 
explained  the  Project  Director,  emphasising  the  necessity  of  consulting  local  experts  and 
community  representatives  during  the  design  process  (AH,  06-09-98).  Construction 
started  in  1988  with  a  connection  of  the  supply-line  from  the  city  network  to  the  booster- 
pumping  station.  It  was  done  by  the  ACC  (water  supply  off-site).  Meanwhile,  bids  were 
invited  for  the  pumping  main  up  to  the  water  tank,  through  announcements  in  two 
national  newspapers;  a  local  contractor  from  Aswan  won  the  contract.  The  work  started 
in  May  1989  and  was  completed  and  tested  in  December  1989.  By  September  1990,  the 
ACC  took  over  the  water  supply  component.  As  it  was  planned  for  the  construction  of 
the  water  distribution  system  to  be  done  by  self-help,  a  similar  organisational  structure  to 
the  sewage  system  was  established.  However,  it  was  not  possible  to  embark  on  the  water 
programme  before  finishing  all  planned  sewage  work.  Unsurprisingly,  it  was  found  that 
the  inhabitants  in  the  upper  elevated  area  were  more  willing  to  dig  trenches  because 
water  was  badly  needed,  than  in  areas  with  a  more  or  less  sufficient  supply  (NGI2,05- 
12-98;  AH,  06-09-98).  The  intensity  of  physical  need  for  services  was  a  factor  in 
determining  the  level  of  participation,  which  is  examined  in  more  detail  in  the  following 
Chapter. 
The  road  network  component  was  not  perceived  as  successful  by  25%  of  the 
HoHs  interviewed.  It  had  been  considered  of  minor  importance  during  the  first  two  phases 
of  the  project,  in  view  of  the  restraints  caused  by  the  sewage  and  water  components,  the 
Project  Administrator  (TA,  16-06-98).  The  construction  of  the  east  bank  road  was 
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dependant  on  the  completion  of  the  main  sewage  collector  and  a  retaining  wall  for  the 
Kima  Canal.  Likewise,  the  implementation  of  the  internal  road  system  was  largely 
dependent  on  the  progress  on  the  main  sewage  and  water  lines.  However,  the  project 
failed  to  implement  all  these  plans  in  time.  They  were  only  completed  in  1994,  when 
substantial  financial  support  was  given  to  the  Governorate  by  the  `National  Programme 
for  Urban  Upgrading',  which  aimed  to  improve  33  squatter  pockets  within  Aswan 
Governorate.  This  support  came  from  the  central  government  and  constituted  the 
Egyptian  share  of  the  project  regarding  this  component  (the  extent  to  which  it  replicated 
the  participatory  experience  of  Nasriya  is  discussed  in  Chapter  10). 
The  main  failure  was  the  solid  waste  collection  and  disposal  system,  according  to 
40%  of  the  HoHs  interviewed.  Nasriya  lacked  any  municipal  waste-disposal  system  before 
the  project.  Refuse  with  potential  for  recycling  was  usually  stored  on  house  roofs. 
Domestic  refuse  used  to  be  dumped  either  in  the  nearest  vacant  area,  where  goats  would 
eat  the  organic  materials  including  paper,  or  in  the  flood  water  of  the  Kima  Canal,  which 
was  already  polluted  by  the  effluent  of  the  Kima  fertiliser  factory,  the  discharge  of 
Aswan's  sewage  treatment  station  and  the  municipal  hospital,  let  alone  the  illegal 
discharges  of  houses  alongside  the  canal  (Plate  7.3).  The  main  difficulty  in  establishing  an 
effective  system  was  the  physical  features  of  Nasriya-  steep  topography,  high  density  of 
the  built-up  area  and  narrow  alleys  and  paths.  Almost  80  per  cent  of  roads  were  less  than 
4m  wide  and  the  numerous  intersections  made  vehicles'  manoeuvring  difficult. 
Local  government,  Nasriya's  community  leaders  and  GTZ  experts  were  supposed 
to  learn  how  to  work  together  through  the  project.  But  while  the  former  were  constrained 
by  wider  city  demands,  tight  budgets,  audits  by  outside  authorities  and  enmeshed  in 
procedure,  which  made  project  officials  impatient,  the  NCC  and  the  CDA,  although 
answerable  to  a  much  narrower  constituency,  also  had  to  subsume  ethnic  communities. 
These  difficulties  were  instrumental  in  the  failure  of  the  solid  waste  system,  for  neither  the 
GTZ  consultant  nor  the  community  consulted  the  ACC  during  its  design.  The  initial  waste 
collection  system  was  designed  by  a  GTZ  German  expert  based  on  a  survey  to  estimate 
the  daily  volume  and  nature  of  the  waste.  This  revealed  that  about  10  tons  per  day  were 
generated,  of  which  80%  was  found  to  be  sand,  ashes,  dust  and  stones  owing  to  the 
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continuous  building  process  (GTZ  1992).  It  was  only  realised  later  that  this  survey  was 
biased,  as  residents  seized  the  opportunity  to  off-load  an  accumulation  of  rubble  and 
plastic. 
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Plate  7.3:  Nasriya-  Domestic  refuse  used  to  be  dumped  in  the  flood  water  of  the  Kima 
Canal,  which  was  already  polluted  by  the  effluent  of  the  Kima  fertiliser  factory 
and  several  `illegal'  discharges. 
Moreover,  the  GTZ  expert  proposed  to  use  five  small  `imported'  diesel  tractors 
that  could  go  through  certain  routes  on  a  regular  basis  and  stop  at  ordained  collection 
points  where  people  could  expel  their  solid  wastes  themselves  directly  into  the  tractors' 
hoppers.  The  idea  of  arranging  a  local  collection  system  using  non-mechanical  means  was 
discouraged  by  the  GTZ's  expert  due  to  the  topography  of  the  area  and  his  perception  of 
`modernisation',  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  municipality  itself  was  using  donkey-carts 
even  within  the  `formal'  quarters  (AA,  05-11-98).  Consequently,  the  chosen  type  of 
vehicles  proved  inadequate,  given  the  demanding  terrain  and  climate  in  Aswan.  This 
failure  was  also  attributed  to  the  mismanagement  of  the  system  by  the  CDA,  according  to 
another  German  adviser  of  a  subsequent  joint-venture  programme  operating  at  the  city 
level  (RS,  03-03-98).  He  claimed  that  vehicles  were  abused  by  local  drivers;  regular 
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routes  were  not  respected  and  breakdowns  were  frequent,  necessitating  costly  repairs. 
Moreover,  some  drivers  ignored  the  ordained  collection  points,  favoured  relatives  and 
accepted  bribes,  complained  24%  of  HoHs  interviewed. 
Conceptually  speaking,  the  system  was  planned  on  a  cost  recovery  basis  in  which 
the  operational  and  maintenance  responsibility  was  given  to  civil  society  organisations. 
Taking  into  account  the  limited  capability  for  municipal  waste  collection  at  the  beginning 
of  the  project,  it  was  planned  to  set  up  the  system  as  an  integral  part  of  the  self- 
administration  programme.  The  responsibility  was  given  first  to  some  GROs,  the  Biadia 
and  then  the  Shaghab  community  centres,  but  neither  of  them  had  the  legal  authority  to 
collect  the  fees  and  were  consequently  overburdened  (AA,  05-11-98;  AW,  20-05-98).  The 
task  was  then  given  to  the  Youth  Club,  as  it  was  the  only  `formal'  institution  in  Nasriya 
with  the  legal  status  and  willingness  to  run  the  system  at  the  time.  But  soon  after,  the 
municipal  administration  objected  and  claimed  that  the  system  should  be  entirely  organised 
and  run  by  the  ACC-  East  Quarter  (the  quarter  to  which  Nasriya  administratively  belongs, 
being  the  rightful  entity  according  to  the  Local  Administration  Law). 
Belatedly,  the  ACC  was  approached,  but  its  offer  of  management  and  maintenance 
was  on  condition  it  housed  the  vehicles,  said  the  Mayor  of  Aswan  (MA,  01-04-98).  As  the 
CDA  could  not  accept  such  a  loss  of  face,  the  vehicles  were  run  into  the  ground  and  the 
service  collapsed.  Undoubtedly  arrogance  and  rigidity  on  all  sides  contributed  to  this 
costly  failure,  which  left  the  CDA's  Board  feeling  frustrated  and  badly  advised,  as  the 
Chair  of  the  CDA  expressed  bitterly  (MS,  28-05-98).  This  experience  made  the  need  for 
early  collaboration  and  the  integration  of  Nasriya's  operations  abundantly  clear.  The 
lessons  were  learnt  and  regular  joint  meetings  were  thereafter  instituted  between  officials 
and  the  CDA  Board  to  discuss  the  operation  of  the  whole  range  of  projects  and  services. 
In  many  cases  these  discussions  are  attended  by  the  Mayor  or  even  by  the  Governor  of 
Aswan  (MA,  01-04-98;  SM,  02-04-98).  The  main  problem  facing  the  system  now  centres 
on  the  limited  capabilities  of  the  local  government  and  the  CDA  to  deal  with  fluctuations 
in  revenue.  However,  the  GTZ  now  runs  another  solid-waste  disposal  programme  at  the 
city  level  where  a  better  system  of  fees  collection  is  sought. 
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7.3.2-  Sale  of  land: 
As  an  overwhelming  proportion  of  the  Nasriya's  houses  were  constructed  on 
state-owned  land,  residents  used  to  be  under  constant  threat  of  being  evicted  at  any  time. 
This  was  a  major  deterrent  to  investment  in  house  improvement.  Streets'  regularisation  to 
permit  better  access  for  traffic  and  emergency  services  was  achieved  through  a 
remodelling  plan  (Plate  7.4).  It  was  elaborated  jointly  by  the  ACC  and  the  PMU  and  was 
completed  at  the  beginning  of  the  project,  so  that  any  householder  wanting  to  buy  his/her 
plot  would  know  exactly  the  distance  that  the  house  had  to  set  back.  Of  course  some  main 
roads  were  designated  for  future  widening  so  as  to  improve  the  access  in  the  area, 
especially  for  ambulances  and  the  fire  brigade.  This  activity  is  still  on-going.  The  land 
price  has  been  set  at  a  concession  rate  so  as  to  acknowledge  the  efforts  of  inhabitants.  The 
first  price  was  set  at  £E5-10  which  was  about  one-third  of  the  market  price.  The  current 
price  ranges  from  £E7-15,  depending  on  the  plot's  location.  Before  the  applicant  pays  the 
purchase  price,  the  plot  is  surveyed  and  compared  with  the  leased  surface  area  entered  in 
the  ACC  land  register. 
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Plate  7.4:  Nasriya:  Land  regularisation  plan.  Once  a  householder  wants  to  re-build  the 
house,  he/she  has  to  set  the  main  facade  back  up  to  1.5m  (e.  g.  horizontal  and 
vertical  middle  streets  in  the  photo).  This  simple  model  was  presented  in  public 
meetings  as  well  as  for  disseminating  the  experience  elsewhere. Chapter  7  The  Reality  of  the  Aswan  Programme 
Two  types  of  payment  are  made  available-  cash  down  which  gives  a  bonus  of  a 
10%  reduction,  or  a  minimum  down-payment  of  25%  followed  by  monthly  instalments 
over  a  maximum  period  of  three  years  at  a  3%  interest  rate.  In  attempting  to  reduce  land 
speculation,  purchase  is  only  permitted  to  the  registered  leaseholders,  or  their  descendants 
who  regularly  pay  lease  (hekr)  to  the  state.  Once  a  land-title  is  offered,  the  land-owner  is 
not  allowed  to  resell  the  plot  within  a  period  of  ten  years  from  the  date  of  signing  the 
contract.  A  revolving  fund  for  house  improvement  was  established  to  encourage  residents 
to  reconstruct.  Once  a  householder  wants  to  re-build  the  house,  he/she  has  to  set  the  main 
facade  back  up  to  a  maximum  distance  of  1.5m.  It  is  not  obligatory  to  reconstruct 
immediately,  rather  it  is  a  long-term  plan.  As  most  of  roads  are  planned  to  be  only  some 
6m  wide,  people  encourage  and  help  each  other  to  set  their  main  facades  back  or 
reconstruct. 
However,  it  was  observed  throughout  the  fieldwork's  duration  (1996-1998)  that 
illegal  land  occupation  in  the  eastern  fringe  of  the  area  is  still  on  going.  While  existing 
settlers  supply  their  extended  family  members  or  social  groups  with  a  plot  based  on  a  non- 
commercialised  customary  basis,  local  land  developers  and  speculators  subdivide 
surrounding  government-owned  land  illegally,  and  supply  new  comers  with  plots  on 
commercial  bases,  charging  the  same  land  prices  of  the  Nasriya  project.  Meantime, 
although  tenants  can  also  buy  the  lots  where  they  live  in  Nasriya,  they  are  required  to 
present  a  declaration  of  consent  from  the  leaseholder  in  which  he/she  should  clearly  state 
the  acceptance  of  transfer  of  the  property  (focus  meeting  with  senior  municipal  officials 
FM2,26-11-98).  This  is  scrutinised  in  more  detail  in  the  following  Chapter. 
7.3.3-  Urban  extension: 
The  main  aim  of  East  Nasriya  was  to  reduce  the  size  of  squatter  growth  in 
Nasriya.  The  new  extension  was  designated  as  a  low  income  residential  zone  in  the 
physical  structure  plan  of  Aswan  (1986-2017),  the  layout  being  fine  tuned  by  the 
UDLMU.  The  CDA  defined  the  target  beneficiaries  as  three  groups  of  people:  residents 
living  in  over-crowded  multi-family  houses  who  want  to  live  independently,  newly- 
married  couples,  and  families  living  in  substandard  housing  conditions  which  could  not  be 
improved  in  situ-  giving  priority  to  tenants  who  failed  to  get  a  letter  of  consent  from  their 
185 Chapter  7  The  Reality  of  the  Aswan  Programme 
landlords  or  leaseholders.  A  pilot  area  was  selected  for  the  first  land  subdivision 
(superimposed  on  the  area  on  which  the  fast  `informal'  growth  was  taking  place);  the 
priorities  for  land  distribution  were  announced  and  only  Nasriya  people  could  apply.  As 
the  total  number  of  applications  submitted  to  the  ACC  rose  to  approximately  900,  an  ad 
hoc  committee  was  established  to  visit  each  eligible  case  and  select  only  those  with  real 
needs. 
In  order  to  avoid  favouritism  or  corruption  during  the  selection  process,  three 
organisations  had  to  be  represented  on  the  committee-  the  ACC,  the  PMU  and  the  CDA. 
The  committee  revealed  that  some  238  plots  were  urgently  required  for  the  pilot  phase 
and  that  plot  sizes  should  range  from  90m2  up  to  200m2.  Lot  allocation  related  size  to 
need  and  was  made  by  public  lottery,  the  idea  being  to  match  appropriate  size  of  plots 
with  each  target  family's  dimensions  and  ability  to  pay.  Table  7.1  reveals  the  plot  size 
requirements  and  classification,  the  system  of  proposed  area  per  family  size  and  the  total 
number  of  earmarked  plots  targeting  cross-subsidy.  As  each  plot  had  a  different  view, 
orientation  and  location,  a  public  lottery  was  arranged  to  avoid  any  injustice  in  the 
distribution  process  and  was  attended  by  the  Governor  of  Aswan,  the  Mayor  and  all 
selected  beneficiaries  (Plate  7.5).  The  names  of  beneficiaries  eligible  for  the  same  group  of 
size-ranged  plots  were  put  together  in  one  pot,  the  plot  number  was  stated  clearly  and 
then  a  name  was  randomly  picked  up  by  a  child  and  announced  at  once. 
Table  7.1:  Nasriva-  East  Nasriva_  first  phase  plot  classification  and  data 
Size  of 
household 
Eligibility  Plot  size  required  (m) 
(persons)  Over- 
crowded 
(No.  ) 
New 
couples 
(No.  ) 
Sub- 
standard 
(No.  ) 
90:  110  110:  130  130:  170  170:  190  >190 
2-4  35  55  13  103 
5-6  35  -  20  55 
7-9  59  -  19  69 
10-11  06  -  04  10 
more  -  -  01  1 
Total  126  55  57  103  55  69  10  1 
Required 
Plots  (No.  )  238  238 
Earmarked 
plots  (No.  )  115 
Source:  UDLMU  1996 
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Plate  7.5:  East  Nasriya-  New  plots  were  distributed  by  public  lottery  to  avoid  any  injustice 
in  the  distribution  process.  From  the  left,  the  German  Project  Adviser,  the 
Governor,  the  researcher,  the  Chairs  of  the  CDA  and  the  WDA. 
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Plate  7.6:  East  Nasriya-  The  model  house 
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Although  this  was  a  new  approach  and  applied  for  the  first  time  in  Egypt,  it  turned 
out  to  work  very  effectively  and  no  complaints  were  received  from  the  people.  The  land 
use  plan  of  the  pilot  area  also  included  a  school,  sports  field,  recreation  and  green  areas, 
and  a  Women's  Centre.  A  model  house  was  also  constructed  by  the  project  (Plate  7.6),  an 
in  situ  blocks  production  unit  was  operated  by  the  CDA,  and  a  theatre  play  was 
performed  by  the  CDA  to  demonstrate  a  variety  of  potential  designs  and  the  use  of  local 
construction  materials,  said  the  GTZ  Consultant  for  East  Nasriya  Development  (HM,  20- 
01-98  ).  The  conception  of  East  Nasriya  was  to  enable  families  to  invest  directly  in  their 
own  housing,  rather  than  pay  for  something  decided  and  provided  by  someone  else.  Self- 
help,  the  direct  investment  by  families,  took  the  form  of  family  members'  and  friends' 
labour,  purchased  materials  and  hired  labour,  or  a  combination  of  both  similar  to  the  way 
they  had  constructed  their  houses  in  Nasriya.  The  PMU  offered  a  group  of  skilled 
labourers  from  the  area,  who  had  been  trained  through  constructing  previous  community 
facilities  in  Nasriya  and  would,  therefore,  charge  less  than  the  average  market  price 
because  of  being  local. 
Theoretically  speaking,  this  variety  in  the  forms  of  self-help  distinguished  sites- 
and-services  not  only  from  conventional  construction,  but  also  from  what  we  might  call 
`conventional  self-help',  in  which  family  or  project  labour  mainly  replaces  real  market  paid 
labour  in  an  otherwise  conventional  construction  process.  Self-help  in  East  Nasriya  came 
closer  to  its  most  common  form,  as  seen  in  the  complete  planning  and  organisation  of 
housing  production  by  families  in  Nasriya,  where  the  functions  of  planning  and  financing 
were  as  important  as  family  labour.  As  for  the  perception  of  the  local  government  policy- 
makers,  the  gradual  construction  and  reliance  on  self-help  reduced  housing  costs,  and 
therefore  was  more  favourable  to  them  than  state  housing.  "Considering  the  limited 
finance  supplied  by  GTZ,  East  Nasriya  settled  more  families  than  in  many  other 
conventional  housing  estates  throughout  Aswan  Governorate,  while  houses  were  more 
suitable  for  the  residents'  daily  needs  than  conventional  flats",  as  explained  the  Governor 
of  Aswan  (SM,  02-04-98).  Gradually  as  the  project  was  phasing  out  in  1998,  civil  society 
organisations  in  Nasriya  took  complete  responsibility  for  co-ordination  with  local 
government. 
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However,  the  fieldwork  revealed  that  settlement  in  East  Nasriya  was  very  slow. 
Despite  published  prices,  beneficiaries  complained  about  the  expense  of  the  land  (£E15- 
25/m2);  that  hurdle  was  lowered  by  agreement  between  the  GTZ  and  the  CDA-  that  part 
of  the  house  improvement/construction  loan  could  be  used  for  land  purchase.  Nobody 
could  solve  the  problem  of  access  through  Nasriya  to  expedite  the  transfer  of  recycled 
building  materials;  barring  large  scale  destruction,  the  access  road  being  necessarily 
circuitous.  The  complaint  that  lack  of  water  made  construction  almost  impossible  was 
solved  by  the  provision  of  a  public  tap  following  the  instructions  the  Governor  and  the 
Mayor  after  a  joint  workshop.  Thus  the  CDA  and  local  government  have  become 
accustomed  to  consulting  one  another. 
7.3.4-  Community  facilities: 
The  idea  of  constructing  a  Service  Centre  resulted  from  the  many  facilities  that  the 
area  lacked.  The  selected  site  was  the  only  vacant  plot  in  the  central  area  of  Nasriya  and 
was  used  as  an  informal  garbage  dump.  The  inhabitants  cleared  the  site  with  the  assistance 
of  the  Municipality  and  persuaded  the  leaseholder  to  donate  it  to  the  project.  The  service 
centre  was  built  by  a  local  contractor  and  managed  and  supervised  by  a  `construction  unit' 
consisting  of  the  project  team,  to  supply  materials  and  local  workers,  and  an  engineer 
from  the  Housing  Directorate  to  supervise  and  prepare  the  invoices.  This  reduced  the  total 
cost  by  as  much  as  30  per  cent  (GTZ  1992).  Using  Nubian  sandstone,  the  building  is 
constructed  in  the  traditional  style  with  vaults  and  domes  for  the  roof.  It  has  introduced  a 
distinguished  architectural  model  that  guided  the  local  authorities  in  their  design  for  many 
other  public  buildings  in  Aswan  (Plate  7.7).  The  Service  Centre  consists  of  two  floors  and 
is  run  now  by  the  CDA.  The  ground  floor  houses  a  training  centre,  a  land  sale  office  that 
is  run  by  the  ACC,  a  bakery,  a  post  office,  an  office  for  the  loan  programme,  a  branch  of 
the  Social  Affairs  Department,  a  pharmacy  and  a  shop.  The  upper  floor  contains  an  office 
for  the  CDA  board,  a  multi-function  room  (a  library,  a  children's  club  or  a  meeting  room), 
a  basic  clinical  and  first  aid  unit  and  a  laboratory. 
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Plate  7.7:  Nasriya-  The  Service  Centre  supplied  the  area  with  many  facilities  that  it  lacked 
before,  and  introduced  a  distinct  architectural  model  that  guided  the  local 
authorities  in  their  design  of  many  other  public  buildings  in  Aswan. 
Plate  7.8:  Nasriya-  The  new  school  extension  in  the  largest  school's  yard.  The  new 
building  offered  another  example  of  vernacular  architecture. Chapter  7  The  Reality  of  the  Aswan  Programme 
The  project  also  introduced  various  programmes  to  improve  educational  provision, 
in  Nasriya.  The  students  and  teachers  were  involved  in  environmental  campaigns, 
educational  trips,  the  basic  cleaning  and  painting  of  classrooms  and  blackboards  and  the 
landscaping  of  open  areas.  Meanwhile,  the  project  improved  the  three  schools  that  existed 
in  Nasriya  with  the  participation  of  the  students  and  a  local  contractor  for  concrete  work. 
Mindful  of  the  absence  of  any  vacant  land  in  Nasriya,  the  project  also  constructed  a  new 
extension  in  the  yard  of  the  largest  school.  The  new  building  comprised  13  classrooms,  a 
library  and  vocational  training  rooms.  The  new  extension  was  also  an  example  of 
vernacular  architecture  that  involved  the  potential  users  in  the  processes  of  design,  used 
local  materials  in  construction,  considered  the  hot  climate  of  Aswan  and  fulfilled  the 
demands  for  sound  educational  facilities  considering  the  limited  financial  resources  (Plate 
7.8). 
Improvement  of  neighbourhood  community  centres  was  also  one  of  the  most 
praised  components  by  the  residents;  43%  of  HoHs  rated  it  as  the  second  best  service 
outcome  of  the  project.  Although  rural-urban  migration  was  the  major  generator  of  ethnic 
clustering  in  Nasriya  and  Hai  El-Salam,  grouping  living  in  close  proximity,  co-operation 
and  interaction  between  sub-communities  in  the  former  seemed  more  evident;  they  had  the 
same  target  of  improving  their  living  environment  and  each  ethnic  group  constructed  a 
community  centre,  named  after  the  village  of  origin,  which  functioned  as  a  focal  institution 
for  enhancing  their  social  consolidation,  as  argued  the  Project  Co-ordinator  (MF,  05-11- 
98).  It  was  necessary  for  the  project  to  capitalise  on  these  existing  organisations  and 
activate  their  role  in  carrying  out  and  supplying  social  programmes  at  the  decentralised 
level.  These  issues  are  examined  in  detail  in  the  next  Chapter. 
There  were  39  such  community  centres  and  most  of  them  were  neither  in  good 
physical  condition  nor  registered  with  the  Social  Affairs  Directorate,  which  prevented 
receiving  any  outside  assistance  legally.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  upgrading  of  these 
centres  was  not  included  in  the  first  project  document,  increasing  demands  from  the 
inhabitants  to  improve  those  centres  with  `self-help'  motivated  the  project  to  modify  its 
initial  position.  A  pilot  phase  programme  was  initiated  to  make  use  of  the  enthusiasm  and 
organisational  capabilities  of  the  most  active  centres,  offering  them  the  materials  and 
191 Chapter  7  The  Reality  of  the  Aswan  Programme 
technical  assistance.  The  selected  community  centres  had  to  make  rooms  for  the  following 
functions  as  a  minimum:  A  main  room  for  general  meetings;  an  examination  room  for 
regular  doctor's  visits;  a  separate  room  for  women's  activities,  such  as  sewing  and 
knitting;  a  multi-functional  room  which  could  be  used  as  a  nursery,  or  for  literacy 
programmes  or  various  awareness  activities;  in  addition  to  a  kitchen  and  toilets.  A 
kindergarten  was  also  incorporated  in  the  design  if  the  space  allowed  (Plate  7.9). 
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The  last  component,  gender  and  development  (GAD),  received  special  attention 
from  the  project,  though  it  was  a  complex  issue  considering  the  conservative  Muslim 
identity  of  most  residents  in  Nasriya.  There  was  an  absence  of  gender  awareness  at  all 
levels  of  the  project  structure  in  the  early  phase.  While  its  integration  at  a  later  phase  is  to 
be  commended,  the  way  it  was  integrated  was  problematic.  There  was  the  issue  of  how  to 
define  gender-relevant  project  intervention  in  the  local  context.  Unfortunately,  much  of 
the  gender  training  done  in  Egypt  uses  tools  and  concepts  developed  in  the  `North', 
asserted  the  GTZ  Consultant  for  Gender  and  Development  (KM,  05-08-99).  While  gender 
sensitisation  is  essential  in  any  context,  including  the  Egyptian,  it  is  an  issue  of  how  the 
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Plate  7.9:  Nasriya-  Physical  improvement  and  extension  of  neighbourhood  community 
centres.  A  kindergarten  was  incorporated  in  the  design. Chapter  7  The  Reality  of  the  Aswan  Programme 
concept  is  developed  and  integrated,  a  Women  Information  and  Communication  Office 
(WICO)  was  first  established,  but  was  soon  substituted  by  the  Women  Committee, 
operating  within  the  CDA's  structure. 
Following  the  targets  of  the  Nasriya  project  to  improve  the  socio-economic  status 
of  all  residents,  including  women  and  the  disadvantaged,  the  project  held  several  meetings 
with  the  members  of  the  CDA  and  the  Women  Committee  in  1992.  The  collective  group 
agreed  upon  the  necessity  of  strengthening  the  capabilities  and  awareness  of  women  in 
society  by  two  means.  The  first  was  to  improve  the  performance  of  the  existing 
community  centres,  as  they  form  a  preliminary  base  for  assembling  the  residents  and  could 
supply  better  women's  development  activities  at  a  decentralised  level.  But  due  to  the 
limited  area  available  at  each  centre,  the  size  of  rooms  dedicated  for  women's  activities 
was  often  insufficient.  The  second  arose  during  an  evaluation  visit  from  the  German 
Ministry  of  International  Co-operation  and  Development  in  1993.  The  women's  team 
proposed  to  build  an  independent  Women's  Centre  in  the  Upper-Middle  part  of  Nasriya; 
to  be  incorporated  within  the  planning  of  the  East-Nasriya  new  extension. 
By  1995,  and  despite  the  fact  that  the  women's  team  had  been  active  for  more 
than  five  years,  a  clear  plan  for  women's  development,  especially  for  those  who  were 
responsible  for  the  mobilisation  of  the  women's  community  of  Nasriya,  was  still  lacking. 
The  discussion  between  the  project  staff  and  the  women's  team  took  a  top-down 
direction,  and  clearly  stated  that  only  when  the  team  was  adequately  qualified  and 
supported  by  the  project,  or  from  other  outside  or  inside  sources,  would  they  be  able  to 
answer  the  needs  expressed  by  women  in  the  community.  The  project  thought  that  to 
make  the  process  of  women's  empowerment  successful,  it  was  necessary  for  the  women 
themselves  to  identify  their  particular  strategic  gender  needs  in  co-operation,  and  with  the 
supportive  assistance  of  the  CDA,  explained  the  Project  Co-ordinator  (MF,  05-11-98). 
Fortunately,  this  policy  seemed  to  work.  A  core  of  female  members  of  the  CDA, 
dissatisfied  with  their  low  representation  on  the  Board,  pressed  for  and  succeeded  in 
establishing  an  independent  Women's  Development  Association  (WDA)  in  1996.  They 
immediately  set  the  targets  of  the  proposed  Women's  Centre  as  basically  to  serve  active 
women  in  Nasriya  and  to  encourage  sceptical  and  less-active  ones  to  join  in  their  various 
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activities  (focus  meeting  with  the  WDA  Board  FM4,04-04-98).  After  several  meetings, 
between  the  project's  architect  and  the  WDA  members  had  taken  place,  it  was  agreed  that 
the  design  should  incorporate  five  main  components  (Box  7.2). 
Box  7.2:  Nasriya-  The  Women's  Centre  components 
"  Educational  Unit:  designed  to  offer  a)  programmes  to  improve  the  quality  of  life  of 
Nasriya  women  by  increasing  their  knowledge  in  specific  areas,  e.  g.  reproductive  health 
and  legal  rights  relevant  to  their  daily  lines,  b)  training  courses  taught  by  professionals 
at  a  minimum  fee  to  support  East  Nasriya  preparatory  and  secondary  school  students  in 
their  academic  studies,  and  c)  a  children's  club  to  provide  local  children  with  an 
opportunity  to  play  in  a  safe  and  fun  environment  and  to  benefit  from  a  pre-school 
educational  programme; 
"  Cultural  Unit:  designed  to  develop  the  social/cultural  awareness  of  Nasriya  girls  and 
women  by  means  of  a  wide  range  of  activities,  e.  g.  seminars,  audio-visual  facilities, 
theatre  plays  and  cultural  trips; 
"  Health  Unit:  to  provide  affordable  basic  medical  services  to  East  Nasriya  inhabitants, 
including  general  examinations,  vaccinations,  immunisations  and  injections, 
reproductive  health  and  first  aid,  (the  Unit  reports  to  the  Directorate  of  Health  in 
Aswan); 
"  Income-generating  Unit:  which  aims  basically  to  produce  reasonable  priced  ready-to- 
wear  clothes  and  bed-linen,  while  creating  job  opportunities  for  women  from  the  area; 
and 
"  Loans  Unit:  seeks  to  help  women,  specially  single  women  and  the  poorest,  to  improve 
their  economic  situation  via  micro-credit  and  income  generating  projects. 
Source:  Key  Informants  (FM4,04-04-98). 
A  joint  supervision  team  was  established  between  the  project's  construction 
consultant  and  the  WDA,  the  implementation  process  started  immediately,  and  local 
contractors  and  skilled  labourers  in  the  area  were  encouraged  to  tender  for  operations, 
added  the  Head  of  the  WDA  (ZA,  05-04-98).  The  Women's  Centre  was  the  last  input  of 
the  GTZ  in  Nasriya,  and  the  building  was  officially  inaugurated  in  December  1998.  The 
sustainability  of  the  WDA-supplied  activities  is  examined  in  the  follow-up  Chapters. 
7.4-  Conclusions: 
The  Nasriya  project  demonstrated  the  possibility  of  improving  an  existing  squatter 
settlement  through  providing  its  residents  with  the  required  infrastructure  and  community 
development  at  a  low  cost  by  means  of  applying  sound  community  participation.  In 
particular,  the  project  has  proved  that  participatory  approaches  can  be  welcomed  by  civil 
194 Chapter  7  The  Reality  of  the  Aswan  Programme 
society  organisations,  as  well  as  local  government  entities,  while  their  performance  is 
improving  over  time.  The  processes  of  self-help  went  through  different  phases  during  the 
implementation  of  various  components,  thereby  building  capacity  of  `learning  by  doing'. 
The  Nasriya  project  faced  difficulty  in  the  beginning  to  promote  participatory 
development  and  to  bring  about  radical  changes  in  systems  and  administrative  structures 
in  Aswan,  but  has  undoubtedly  laid  the  foundation  for  further  development  and  gradually 
involved  the  local  government  in  a  new  participatory  approach  in  Aswan.  Its  experience 
illustrates  the  desirability  of  at  least  being  aware  that  all  projects  should  have  long-term 
community  and  municipal  capacity-building  goals. 
While  the  role  of  self-help  in  implementing  many  physical  activities  was  palpable, 
building  self-confidence  for  the  residents  by  means  of  community  empowerment,  self- 
administration,  gender  and  development,  and  land  security,  is  a  distinctive  example  of  a 
sort  of  self-help  achievement  that  cannot  be  quantified.  Some  roles  of  self-help  had  to  be 
changed,  partly  because  policies  had  changed  in  response  to  community  demands  or 
unsuccessful  components,  which  necessitated  the  application  of  different  purposes  of  self- 
help  in  different  contexts.  It  is  commonly  assumed  that  the  best  form  of  participation  will 
always  be  the  most  complete  form  of  participation.  The  theoretical  assumption  is  that 
community  control  is  better  than  delegated  power  or  partnership,  which  are,  in  turn, 
assumed  to  be  better  than  consulting,  informing,  or  the  `cheap  labour'  types  of 
participation  (Arnstein  1969). 
The  experience  of  Nasriya  challenged  this  ladder.  The  early  participation  of 
community  members  in  the  project  amounted  to  little  more  than  the  provision  of  cheap 
labour.  It  shaped  an  essential  entity  in  the  development  of  effective  empowered 
community  organisations.  The  important  point  is  that  this  limited  form  of  participation 
was  appropriate  for  the  time,  given  the  previous  lack  of  government  involvement  in  the 
Nasriya  area  and  the  consequent  limited  trust  between  community  members  and 
government  officials.  This  conclusion  ties  in  with  that  of  Smith  (1998)  who  argues  that 
`weak'  forms  of  participation-  including  the  provision  of  labour  material  and  cash,  the 
enlistment  of  community  members  as  workers  of  various  kinds  and  community 
consultation  on  plans  prepared  by  others-*  can  lead  to  benefits  and  perhaps  increase  the 
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possibility  that  `stronger'  forms  of  participation  can  be  introduced  later.  An  important 
point  in  Nasriya  was  that  initiatives  such  as  the  sewerage  and  water-supply  improvement 
programmes  were  very  much  in  line  with  people's  initial  priorities.  This  suggests  that  the 
project  intended  to  achieve  objectives  that  the  people  viewed  as  important. 
Whilst  the  governments  of  Egypt  and  Germany  shared  the  costs  of  the  upgrading 
project,  the  co-operation  of  the  inhabitants  contributed  to  a  substantial  reduction  in  these 
costs.  Initial  calculations  show  that  some  30%  of  the  construction  and  development  costs 
have  been  saved  due  to  the  efforts  of  the  inhabitants  (GTZ  1992).  "This  is  an  indication 
that  the  project's  goals  have  been  achieved.  It  is  not  only  a  question  of  an  infrastructure 
network  being  laid  out  and  connected  to  every  house,  but  of  showing  how  the  project 
components,  can  be  articulated  and  implemented,  overcoming  many  technical  or 
organisational  difficulties,  with  effective  community  self-administration",  as  asserted  H.  E. 
Salah  Mosbah,  the  Governor  of  Aswan  (SM,  02-04-98).  It  is  the  latter  aspect  which  has 
led  the  Egyptian/German  co-operation  project  of  Aswan  to  act  as  an  orientation  point  for 
future  urban  development  planning  and  improvement  programmes  in  Egypt.  "The  Nasriya 
project  has  shifted  low-income  housing  policies  in  a  different  direction  by  calling  attention 
to  the  potentials  that  exist  for  cost-saving,  infrastructure  construction  and  strengthening  of 
community  solidarity  through  the  participation  of  the  population  and  their  self-efforts" 
(SM,  02-04-98).  This  is  significant  in  that  empowerment  created  by  the  collective  action 
and  enhanced  community  spirit  was  not  perceived  as  a  threat  to  the  local  government  in 
Aswan. 
On  the  contrary,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  project  has  clearly  influenced  the 
attitudes  of  the  government  officials  at  all  levels  from  the  Governor  down,  particularly 
those  who  have  been  directly  involved  with  it.  The  establishment  of  the  UDLMU  at  the 
Aswan  Governorate  level  is  a  great  success  on  its  own.  Although  it  still  needs  many 
administrative  and  financial  reforms,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  10,  it  continues  to  function 
and  is  fulfilling,  to  a  degree,  a  major  task  in  implementing  the  Aswan  Physical  Master 
Plan,  small-scale  urban  plans,  urban  upgrading  and  daily  communication  with  other  local 
and  national  institutions,  besides  offering  consultation  to  the  Governor  of  Aswan  and  all 
municipalities  in  Aswan.  It  is  also  true  that  the  Unit  has  been  doing  a  major  role  in 
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enhancing  the  planning  awareness  of  many  government  officials  since  its  establishment. 
The  Unit's  staff  attend  meetings  at  top  local  levels  and  are  consulted  in  almost  every 
major  development  project,  either  financed  locally  or  by  the  central  government. 
The  fundamental  question  about  the  Nasriya  and  Hai  El-Salam  projects,  which 
received  substantial  external  support  and  were  limited  in  scale  when  compared  with  the 
overall  scale  of  squatter  settlements  in  Egypt,  is  the  extent  to  which  they  can  be  replicated 
within  mainstream  government  structures.  Indeed,  initiatives  such  as  Nasriya  should 
ideally  be  seen  as  the  first  step  in  a  medium  to  long-term  process  aimed  at 
institutionalising  participatory  approaches.  But  replicability  only  operates  within 
institutionalised  processes,  and  both  require  more  than  just  demonstration  projects.  They 
require  the  micro  and  macro-level  initiatives  to  be  seen  as  an  integrated  entity  with  the 
need  to  influence  the  macro  situation  being  taken  into  account  in  the  design  of  local 
initiatives.  They  require  `accountable  bureaucratic  capacity',  including  its  four  key- 
variables:  structural  and  organisational,  behavioural,  client-interaction  and  environment 
variables.  They  require  active  participation  from  civil  society  as  well  as  citizens. 
Therefore,  it  is  probably  premature  to  predict  the  long-term  institutionalisation  of 
participatory  processes  before  first  examining  citizens'  collaborative  action  and  political 
participation. 
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The  discourses  and  procedures  of  participation  in  practice  stretches  from  people 
at  local  societal  level,  through  in-country  governmental  and  non-governmental 
organisations  to  international  donor  agencies  (DAs).  In  order  to  reduce  the 
disempowering  repercussions  of  the  ERSAP  on  the  DC's  poor,  the  World  Bank  has 
introduced  the  idea  of  `stakeholders'  as  parties  who  either  affect  or  are  affected  by  the 
Bank's  actions  and  policies.  Defining  the  Bank's  overriding  objectives  as  poverty 
reduction,  the  primary  stakeholders  were  unequivocally  stated  to  be  the  poor  and 
marginalised:  those  who  lack  information  and  power  and  are  excluded  from  the 
development  process  (World  Bank  1994:  2).  Participation  was  thus  defined  as  "a  process 
through  which  stakeholders  influence  and  share  control  over  development  initiatives, 
decisions  and  resources  which  affect  them"  (World  Bank  1994:  6). 
According  to  the  World  Bank  proposals,  the  goal  of  participation  is  to  reach  and 
engage  primary  stakeholders  in  ways  that  are  transformational  (getting  communities  to 
decide  on  their  own  priorities),  not  instrumental  (getting  people  to  buy  into  a  donor's 
project).  In  reality,  instrumental  participation  has  repeatedly  been  the  inadvertent 
outcome  of  many  urban  development  projects  carried  out  by  the  World  Bank  and  many 
other  bilateral  donor  agencies  (Nelson  and  Wright  1995:  5).  Participation  has  positioned 
people  very  differently  in  relation  to  the  development  apparatus-  as  objects  of  a 
theoretical  process  of  economic  and  political  transformation;  as  expected  `beneficiaries' 
of  programmes  with  pre-set  parameters;  or  as  contributors  of  casual  labour  to  help  a 
project  achieve  its  ends  (Nelson  and  Wright  1995:  6).  Although  instrumental 
participation  projects  might  achieve  their  `physical'  aims  more  efficiently,  effectively, 
quickly  or  cheaply,  primary  stakeholders  would  always  remain  passive  recipients, 
informants,  labourers  in  a  development  effort,  unable  to  set  up  the  collaborative  process, 
or  to  control  their  own  development.  In  contrast,  participation  as  an  end  fosters 
sustainability  by  means  of  self-administration  and  considering  the  power  relationships 
between  members  of  a  community  as  well  as  between  them,  the  state  and  agency 
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institutions.  Participation  as  an  end  can  thus  be  employed  to  "describe  an  empowering 
process  which  enables  local  people  to  do  their  own  analysis,  to  take  command,  to  gain  in 
confidence,  and  to  make  their  own  decisions.  In  theory,  this  means  that  `we'  participate 
in  `their'  project,  not  `they'  in  `ours"'  (Chambers  1995:  30). 
The  Hai  El-Salam  project  did  not  go  beyond  consultation  in  terms  of  community 
participation,  whilst  the  approach  that  the  Nasriya  project  adopted  `seemed'  to  advocate 
participation  as  an  end  and  worked  across  organisational  boundaries.  This  paradigm  shift 
from  `things'  top-down  to  `people'  bottom-up,  as  Chambers  calls  it  (1995),  reflected  a 
ten-year  gap  between  project  initiation.  On  that  account,  this  chapter  focuses  on  the 
experience  of  Nasriya.  It  aims  to  examine  the  extent  to  which  the  goals  of  participation 
have  `really'  evolved  as  an  end,  and  to  understand  and  explain  the  key  issues  required  for 
successful  collaboration  at  local  society  level.  In  practice,  collaboration  is  difficult  owing 
to  the  diversity  of  mind-sets;  cultural  and  social  groups  frequently  have  different  aims, 
practices,  expectations,  and  power  resources  (Huxham  1996).  Accordingly,  the 
processes  of  people's  participation  during  the  project's  planning,  implementation  and 
evaluation  are  analysed.  The  discussion  explores  first  the  extent  to  which  the  population 
of  Nasriya  has  been  empowered  and  involved,  and  examines  the  means  and  features  of 
creating  and  sustaining  value  for  the  participants  in  such  a  context.  The  various  options 
which  have  been  made  available  to  the  Nasriya  community  to  work  toward  sustainable 
community  economic  development  are  scrutinised.  Particular  emphases  are  placed  on 
beneficiaries  perceptions  of  their  participation,  the  causal  factors  and  mind-sets  that  may 
enhance/suppress  the  forms  and  degrees  of  their  participation,  and  actions  taken  by  the 
institutional  triangle  of  state,  community  and  DA  to  sustain  participation  at  community 
level  after  the  project's  withdrawal. 
8.1-  Participatory  initiatives  (1985-1995): 
The  transformation  of  citizens  into  collaborators  is  more  likely,  as  is  their 
commitment  to  further  development  initiatives,  when  the  community  is  economically 
distressed  (Sharp  and  Bath  1993).  Conflict  over  economic  development  is  less  probable 
when  everyone  has  a  strong  stake  in  making  the  community  more  affluent.  Such 
199 
-J Chapter  8  Collective  Action  and  Communi  Participation 
transformative  processes  had  been  experienced  in  the  Nasriya  community  before  the 
upgrading  project  started;  several  open  interviews  with  Nasriya's  community  leaders 
revealed  that  the  community  initiatives  to  get  government  support  for  action  to  improve 
sewerage  and  water  supply  facilities  were  significant  in  triggering  the  project's 
identification  and  planning. 
The  first  serious  attempt  had  been  made  in  early  1985,  when  the  population  of 
Nasriya  took  a  unified  stand  and  assertively  presented  its  position  to  the  municipal 
administration,  demanding  infrastructure  improvements.  The  second  attempt  took  place 
in  1986  and  was  perhaps  more  significant.  After  no  action  was  taken  by  the  municipality, 
some  £E4000  (equal  to  sixty-months'  salary  for  a  junior  government  employee  in  1986) 
had  been  collected  by  community  associations  from  the  Nasriya  residents  for  the 
construction  of  a  limited  sewer  and  water  supply  network,  as  explained  the  Head  of  the 
Shaghab  Community  Centre  (AW,  20-05-98).  Soon  after  the  local  sewage  network  was 
implemented,  the  Ministry  of  Irrigation  made  an  official  objection  at  the  local  police 
station  on  account  of  the  fact  that  the  sewage  network  was  constructed  illegally  and  the 
sewerage  was  being  discharged  directly  into  the  Kima  Canal  without  treatment.  In 
response,  the  police  arrested  the  leaders  who  had  collected  the  money  and  organised  the 
construction  work.  "All  relatives,  neighbours  and  friends  of  the  arrested  people  rushed  in 
groups  to  the  local  police  station  and  demonstrated  there  for  three  days.  We  were  about 
300  people  defending  the  accused  ones  and  praising  their  moral  character"  (AW,  20-05- 
98).  Of  course  such  popular  political  activity  did  not  emerge  suddenly  at  the  peak 
moment  of  the  demonstration,  but  was  only  the  end  result  of  a  political  process 
mobilising  potential  collective  forces. 
Thus  it  is  argued  that  this  `police'  action  could  have  conceivably  been  a  potential 
stimulus  for  a  series  of  protests  by  the  entire  community  of  Nasriya.  To  break  the 
deadlock,  a  request  was  then  made  by  the  people  to  meet  with  the  Governor.  "I  went 
there  with  three  other  community  leaders,  and  we  put  all  our  problems  and  complaints 
straight  on  the  table.  The  Governor  listened  carefully  but  we  were  all  surprised  to  see 
him  again  on  the  following  day  at  1.00am,  visiting  Nasriya  for  the  first  time,  along  with 
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the  Mayor  of  Aswan.  He  stopped  first  at  the  Nasriya  Bridge  [crossing  the  Kima  Canal] 
to  see  the  situation  himself,  and  once  the  people  realised  that  the  Governor  was  truly  in 
the  area,  they  invited  him  one  by  one  to  visit  their  houses  and  showed  him  the  terrible 
conditions  they  had  been  living  in",  Head  of  the  Shaghab  Community  Centre  (AW,  20- 
05-98). 
These  active  complaints  and  organised  protests  of  the  community  encouraged 
policy-makers  to  position  the  project  in  partnership  and  to  give  their  demands  prime 
consideration.  The  residents'  action  exemplified  Blumer's  definition  of  social  movement 
as  "collective  enterprises  to  establish  a  new  order  of  life"  (Blumer  1969).  "Two  days 
after  the  Governor's  visit  to  Nasriya,  he  asked  for  a  public  meeting  with  the  people  of 
Nasriya  to  be  organised,  and  some  500  people  were  gathered  in  the  Biadia  Community 
Centre  to  express  their  problems  themselves.  ... 
The  selection  of  our  community  centre 
was  not  because  Mr  Abdel-Rahman  Sayed  Omar  was  from  Biadia  [the  first  Director  of 
the  Physical  Planning  Office,  Aswan  Governorate,  (1987-1988),  who  also  became  later 
the  first  Director  of  the  Nasriya  Project  (1988-1989)],  but  because  we  were  the  most 
active  community  centre  in  the  area,  the  most  suitable  in  physical  condition,  central  in 
location  and  one  of  the  largest  in  size",  Head  of  the  Biadia  Community  Centre  (AA,  05- 
11-98).  Two  or  three  months  later,  the  Governor  came  again  to  the  Biadia  Centre  and 
introduced  the  German  Consultants  to  the  community  for  the  first  time.  They  soon 
started  the  dialogue  with  the  community's  and  the  NCC's  leaders. 
"When  the  Germans  met  us  first,  they  proposed  to  repeat  the  same  idea  we 
implemented  before  and  collect  £E250  from  each  house  in  Nasriya  so  that  they  could 
construct  a  greater  sewage  network.  Of  course  we  refused  because  we  knew  that  nobody 
would  be  willing  to  pay.  We  then  proposed  instead  to  dig  the  trenches  ourselves  and  the 
idea  was  later  accepted  by  the  GTZ",  (AW,  20-05-98).  So,  it  can  be  argued  that  the 
project  was  driven  by  community  demand  in  a  very  real  sense.  Decision-making 
processes  are  the  most  obvious  instance  of  exercise  of  power  (Shepherd  1983),  and 
because  participation  had  been  broadened  by  effective  representation  in  Nasriya,  power 
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was  shared,  and  excluded  groups  had  become  included,  these  issues  are  the  focus  here 
and  Chapter  9. 
The  order  in  which  facilities  were  provided  was  very  much  based  on  community 
priorities  when  the  project  started  in  1987.  These  had  been  established  in  a  formal  way 
through  social  surveys,  public  hearings  and  ZOPP  meetings  (Objectives-Oriented  Project 
Planning,  in  German).  However,  despite  the  project's  attempts  to  incorporate  all  citizens 
in  the  planning  process,  the  people's  own  assessment  of  the  degree  of  their  active 
participation  varied.  While  less  than  half  of  the  respondents  believed  that  their 
participation  during  the  planning  phase  had  been  effective,  the  same  number  perceived  it 
as  none  at  all  (46%),  and  the  rest  (8%)  described  it  as  limited  (Table  8.1).  And  yet, 
participation  during  the  implementation  of  the  project  seemed  overwhelming,  with  87% 
describing  their  participation  as  effective.  The  first  requirement  in  implementation  was  to 
discuss  with  residents  the  technical  details  of  the  work  to  be  carried  out  and  the  approach 
to  be  adopted.  Subsequently,  the  challenge  of  `self-help'  had  to  be  conceptualised  by  the 
project  and  supported  by  the  local  government,  which  was  not  used  to  administering 
such  a  collaborative  approach.  Once  the  basic  concept  of  participation  within  the 
construction  phase  had  been  established,  community  leaders  started  to  organise  the 
people  into  groups  for  implementation.  This  was  achieved  by  some  150  meetings  that 
took  place  before  and  during  the  project's  implementation.  The  main  concern  of  the  early 
meetings  was  to  enable  community  leaders  to  introduce  the  project's  staff,  allow  them  to 
explain  the  technicalities  of  the  work  and  answer  questions. 
Although  an  overwhelming  proportion  of  the  residents  trusted  the  project,  and 
were  enthusiastic  to  carry  out  the  scheme,  there  was  some  powerful  opposition  at  first. 
"Some  individuals  in  the  Aswan  Local  Popular  Council  tried  to  convince  people  that  the 
project's  staff  wanted  residents  to  participate  in  the  work  so  that  they  could  pocket  the 
money  set  aside  for  the  hire  of  contractors.  We  [Nasriya  community  leaders]  were  sure 
that  they  wanted  to  redirect  the  foreign  aid  project  into  their  own  areas  instead. 
Unfortunately,  they  succeeded  in  creating  a  strong  lobby  against  the  development  project 
amongst  some  of  the  residents  themselves"  (AW,  20-05-98).  This  was  resisted  by  the 
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first  Nasriya  Community  Council  (NCC,  1986-1992).  "The  NCC  brought  together, 
residents  from  different  sections  and  social  groups  and  played  an  essential  role  in 
overcoming  this  conflict.  The  first  Head,  Sheikh  Ahmed  Younes,  was  a  charismatic 
leader,  enjoying  a  lot  of  support  from  the  residents  due  to  his  assertiveness  and 
enthusiasm,  and  thus  was  able  to  defuse  the  negative  criticisms  through  open  and  honest 
dialogue",  said  the  German  Project  Advisor  (OA,  04-02-98).  Sheikh  Ahmed  Younes 
explained  the  reality  of  the  project's  philosophy  to  the  people  on  several  occasions,  and 
succeeded  in  transforming  the  perceptions  of  sceptical  individuals  into  collaboration 
based  upon  a  congruence  of  individual  and  community  needs.  He  also  assisted  the 
inhabitants  to  organise  their  efforts  and  exchange  experiences  between  groups. 
The  process  of  construction  brought  people  closer  together  through  cutting 
trenches,  sharing  food  and  drink,  providing  lights  to  facilitate  work  at  night,  and  helping 
neighbours  to  pass  the  temporary  barriers  created  by  the  excavated  material.  A  feature  of 
the  work  was  the  way  in  which  young  men  and  neighbours  offered  to  do  the  work  of 
widows  and  elderly  residents  who  could  not  do  it  themselves.  People  were  also  brought 
together  in  improving  their  community  centres,  and  in  the  construction  of  the  sportsfield 
in  East  Nasriya,  the  Service  Centre  and  the  Women's  Centre.  Thus  enthusiasm  and  active 
support  had  been  sustained  over  eight  years.  By  1995,  the  basic  infrastructure  network 
had  been  laid  out  and  connected  to  some  80%  of  the  area's  houses,  almost  half  of 
households  had  taken  the  initiative  to  legalise  their  plots  and  were  offered  land  titles,  and 
community  facilities  and  services  had  been  established  and  were  fully  run  by  the 
community  organisations.  The  chair  of  the  Nasriya  CDA  pointed  out  that  because  the 
sewerage  and  water  supply  networks  have  been  taken  over  by  the  Aswan  City  Council 
(ACC)  following  their  completion  in  1995,  all  major  physical  maintenance  problems  are 
directly  addressed  to  and  discussed  with  the  Head  of  the  East  Quarter.  If  problems  are 
found  to  require  a  higher  authority,  a  meeting  with  the  Mayor  will  immediately  be 
requested,  take  place  and  problems  are  usually  resolved  at  this  level  of  administration. 
Apart  from  the  Service  Centre  and  the  Women  Centre,  Nasriya's  civil  society 
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organisations  are  now  completely  responsible  for  running  and  maintaining  the  services  in 
Nasriya  in  collaboration  with  other  government  bodies. 
"Similar  to  any  other  quarter  in  Aswan,  Nasriya  is  included  in  the  city's  annual 
fiscal  plan  for  infrastructure  and  services  renewal  and/or  replacement.  Moreover,  Nasriya 
has  been  enrolled  in  the  National  Programme  for  Urban  Upgrading  and  the  National 
Programme  for  Maternity  and  Childhood,  where  increasing  volumes  of  investment  have 
been  assigned  for  further  development",  said  the  Mayor  of  Aswan  (MA,  01-04-98).  Such 
`formal'  arrangements  seem  conventional  by  virtue  of  not  involving  direct  community 
participation.  The  difference  from  conventional  practice  lies  in  the  presence  of  strong 
community  organisations,  particularly  the  CDA,  which  have  the  power  to  fully  capitalise 
on  their  external  communications  and  place  pressure  on  the  local  government  if  it  fails  to 
maintain  facilities  adequately.  However,  there  is  evidence  that  the  residents  deal  with 
minor  problems  themselves  in  an  `informal'  manner.  The  HoHs  survey  revealed  an 
awesome  willingness  among  the  residents  (68%)  to  deal  with  minor  blockages  in  the 
infrastructure  networks  themselves.  "Small  amounts  of  £E2  [£0.30]  are  usually  collected 
from  each  house  in  the  affected  street,  and  a  local  labourer  is  hired  to  deal  with  the 
problem",  was  the  explanation  repeated  by  many  HoHs  during  the  survey  in  the  tradition 
of  self-help  still  there.  It  seemed  that  the  strong  networks  existing  within  the  community 
engendered  co-operation  and  solidarity,  providing  a  firm  underpinning  for  the 
participatory  process. 
8.2-  Participants'  perceptions  (1987-1995): 
The  challenge  of  urban  upgrading  and  community  development  is  not  to  achieve 
efficiency  per  se  but  to  realise  a  community  vision  chosen  and  enacted  by  its  residents. 
Conceptually,  what  so  called  `living  democracy'  (Lappe  and  Du  Bois  1994)  means  is  a 
redefinition  of  the  role  of  the  citizen  from  passive  consumer  of  government  services  to  an 
active  participant  in  the  development  of  his/her  area  (Box  1998).  This  redefinition 
requires  that  citizens  take  a  greater  responsibility  for  determining  the  future  of  their 
community.  The  reality  of  popular  participation  during  the  planning,  implementation  and 
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evaluation  of  the  Nasriya  project  as  expressed  by  the  people  themselves  varied  widely. 
Despite  the  fact  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  survey  population  devalued  their 
participation  in  the  planning  (45%)  and  the  evaluation  (65%)  phases,  many  of  them 
attributed  this  to  either  their  inactive  attitude,  or  to  the  project,  including  the  previous 
NCC,  not  inviting  them  to  participate  (Table  8.1). 
Table  8.1:  Nasriya-  Peo  le's  own  assessmen  t  of  their  participation  uring  the  project 
Degree  of  Participation  in  Participation  in  Participation  in 
participation  planning  implementation  evaluation 
Effective  47  87  25 
Limited  08  05  10 
None  45  08  65 
Total  %  100  100  100 
The  HoHs  interviewed  interpreted  `effective  participation'  in  planning  or 
evaluation  in  terms  of  attendance  at  almost  all  meetings,  public  hearings  or  workshops 
that  took  place  in  their  area  and  were  organised  by  the  project  or  respective  civil  society 
organisations  (CDA,  WDA  or  GRO)  to  plan  or  evaluate  the  progress  in  one  of  the 
project's  components.  They  also  perceived  it  as  keenness  to  contact  the  project,  or  their 
respective  GRO,  whenever  they  wanted  to  demand  certain  services  or  to  complain  about 
the  bad  quality  of  some  services.  Effective  participation  in  implementation  meant  that 
they  cut  the  sewerage  trenches  in  front  of  their  houses  on  time  and  according  to  the 
project's  specifications,  regardless  of  whether  they  did  the  cutting  themselves  or  hired 
labourers. 
Conspicuously,  the  majority  of  the  residents  (87%)  perceived  their  participation 
in  implementation  as  having  been  effective.  All  HoHs  who  participated  effectively  in  the 
evaluation  of  the  project,  had  also  been  consistent  and  participated  effectively  in  the 
planning  and  implementation  of  the  project.  Participation  in  evaluation  or  planning  took 
place  either  formally,  by  attending  one  of  the  project's  workshops  or  community 
hearings,  or  informally  by  expressing  their  opinion  either  to  the  Project  Management  Unit 
or  to  their  respective  community  organisations,  including  the  NCC  or  the  CDA.  Based 
on  HoHs'  assessment  of  participation  in  each  stage,  three  respondent  patterns/clusters 
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became  evident  (active,  less  active  and  not  active),  which  had  unique  combinations  of 
attributes  (Table  8.2).  While  cluster  1  comprised  HoHs  who  perceived  their  participation 
as  effective  during  all  of  the  project's  stages  (active  group:  27  cases  representing  25%  of 
all  respondents),  cluster  2  represented  HoHs  who  perceived  their  participation  as  more 
effective  during  the  implementation  than  during  the  planning,  while  their  participation 
was  limited  or  non-existent  in  the  evaluation  (less  active:  31  cases  representing  some 
30%),  and  cluster  3  consisted  of  those  who  participated  only  in  the  implementation 
phase,  including  a  small  proportion  (18%)  who  did  not  participate  at  all  (not  active:  50 
cases  representing  45%). 
Table  8.2:  Nasriva-  Clusters  of  narticination  during  the  nroiect 
Degree  of  participation  (Cluster  1)  (Cluster  2)  (Cluster  3) 
during:  Active  group  Less  Active  Not  Active 
Column  %  Column  %  Column  % 
Planning 
-  Effective  96  77  00 
-  Limited  04  23  00 
-  None  00  00  100 
Implementation 
-  Effective  100  100  72 
-  Limited  00  00  10 
-  None  00  00  18 
Evaluation 
-  Effective  100  00  00 
-  Limited  00  35  00 
-  None  00  65  100 
All  Groups  (No.  )  (27)  (31)  50 
The  personal  characteristics  of  each  group's  members  reveal  the  contingencies  -- 
that  enhanced  or  prevented  participation.  Older  people  (45  years  old  or  more),  who  had 
also  lived  longer  in  the  area,  were  more  likely  to  participate  more  actively  in  the  project; 
even  so  only  28%  of  the  older  people  were  `active'  as  against  19%  of  the  younger.  These 
differences  were  not  significant  statistically  (cliff  square  at  p-level  0.24).  Neither  was 
education  a  significant  factor  in  enducing  participation,  as  similar  proportions  of  all  levels 
were  represented  in  the  active  group  (p-level  0.38).  Of  course  older  people  were 
expected  to  have  less  education,  as  basic  education  (preparatory  school  until  age  15) 
became  compulsory  only  in  the  1970s;  younger  people  had  better  chances  of  higher 
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education.  Similarly,  it  was  not  surprising  that  as  female  HoHs  (10%  of  the  survey 
population)  were  more  likely  to  be  illiterate  or  to  have  little  education,  half  of  them  were 
`not  active',  while  the  adult  children  of  the  others  represented  them  in  meetings  and 
making  complaints.  An  important  indication  related  to  participation  was  that  the  majority 
of  HoHs  (95%)  were  keen  on  educating  their  children;  almost  half  of  the  adult  children  in 
Nasriya  were  either  technical  or  trade  school  graduates,  while  nearly  15%  were 
university  graduates.  The  residents  of  Nasriya  have  the  aspirations  of  the  bourgeoisie,  the 
perseverance  of  pioneers,  and  the  values  of  patriots.  The  upgrading  project  gave  them  an 
opportunity  to  fulfil  part  of  these  aspirations,  and  they  endeavoured  to  improve  their 
social  attributes. 
Of  course,  some  HoHs  did  not  want  to  be  involved  in  solving  problems  in 
Nasriya,  especially  working  on  questions  of  planning  and  evaluation.  Many  HoHs 
interviewed  said  that  "even  if  we  had  wanted  to,  we  did  not  have  the  time  to  participate 
and  did  not  know  how  to  participate".  This  was  commonly  the  case  for  private  sector 
employees  and  the  self-employed  entrepreneurs  in  Nasriya;  only  19%  of  them  were 
classified  in  the  active  group  as  against  31%  of  the  public  employees.  It  was  reported 
that  some  of  them  even  hired  labourers  to  cut  the  trenches  instead  of  doing  this 
themselves.  Unlike  the  public  sector  employees  who  work  only  8.00am-2.00pm  in  Egypt, 
the  private  sector  employees  and  the  self-employed  entrepreneurs  work  for  longer  hours 
and  usually  for  two  shifts.  Thus  it  can  be  argued  that  they  had  less  free  time  to 
participate  in  the  project's  activities.  However,  no  association  between  occupation  and 
the  categories  of  participation  could  be  detected;  this  may  reflect  the  considerable  range 
of  occupations  within  both  the  public  sector  and  self  employment.  Support  for  this 
interpretation  stems  from  their  respective  income. 
The  less  active  group  had  the  highest  incomes  reported  among  the  three  groups 
(£E650/month),  as  well  as  the  highest  median  income  (£E320/month),  which  was  even 
higher  than  either  the  median  income  in  Nasriya  (£E300  /month)  or  the  average 
(£E286/month)  (Figure  8.1).  Private  sector  employees  and  some  self-employed 
entrepreneurs  may  earn  twice  as  much  as  public  sector  employees  in  Egypt.  However,  it 
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is  worth  noting  that  the  median  income  in  Nasriya  is  only  slightly  above  the  `food-based 
poverty  line'  and  below  the  `lower  income  poverty  line'  according  to  the  Egypt  Human 
Development  Report.  The  probability  of  earning  the  minimum  income  in  Nasriya  (£E18- 
60/month)  was  very  low,  corresponding  mostly  to  female  and  elderly  HoHs.  This  level  of 
income  often  indicates  dependence  on  state  social  assistance,  Sadat's  pension 
programme,  which  assists  elderly  people  or  single  mothers  who  are  not  eligible  for  any 
retirement  income. 
Figure  8.1:  Nasriya-  Income  by  clusters  of  participation 
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Total  cases  89,  missing  values,  19  cases,  deleted. 
Home  origin  was  significantly  associated  with  activating  or  suppressing  popular 
participation  (chi  square  significant  at  p-level  0.05).  People  coming  from  Luxor  were  the 
most  active;  the  first  Head  of  the  NCC,  Sheikh  Ahmed  Younes,  as  well  as  most  of  the 
council's  members,  were  originally  from  Luxor  or  its  surrounding  villages  and  therefore 
had  good  communication  with  their  own  populace  (Table  8.3).  Moreover,  most  of  the 
meetings  prior  to,  and  at  the  start  of,  the  project  took  place  in  one  of  the  Luxor-related 
community  centres,  which  encouraged  them  to  participate.  Many  HoHs  complained  that 
areas  of  Luxor  origin  were  favoured  with  more  activities  during  the  project.  The  first 
meeting  with  the  Governor  in  1988  was  in  the  Biadia  Community  Centre  and  the  first 
208 Chapter  8  Collective  Action  and  Community  Participation 
rehabilitated  community  centre  was  also  Biadia,  according  to  70%  of  HoHs  living  in 
other  areas.  The  Project  Co-ordinator  defended  this  by  arguing  that:  "Nubians  and 
people  of  Luxor  were  the  most  active  groups  when  the  project  started,  we  tried  to 
capitalise  on  this  fact  to  create  competition  among  different  groups"  (MF,  05-11-98).  In 
fact,  using  internal  social  division  as  a  stimulus  for  each  group  to  perform  better  than 
`others',  might  badly  affect  the  integration  and  social  solidarity  of  a  local  society  as 
whole. 
Table  8.3.  Nasriva-  Home  origin  by  clusters  of  oarticination 
(Cluster  1) 
Active  group 
(Cluster  2) 
Less  Active 
(Cluster  3) 
Not  Active 
Total 
Home  origin  Row  %  Row  %  Row  %  No.  % 
Luxor  50  08  42  26  100 
Ques  17  33  50  42  100 
Helal  00  23  77  13  100 
Nubians  18  64  18  1  11  100 
Other  31  31  38  16  100 
All  groups  (No.  )  (27)  (31)  (50)  108 
People  from  Ques  represented  39%  of  the  total  survey  population,  in  which  a  half 
were  not  active.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  almost  half  of  Ques  HoHs  were  private 
sector  employees  or  self-employed  entrepreneurs,  who  tended  to  participate  less. 
Likewise,  almost  two  thirds  of  Helal  were  either  self-employed  entrepreneurs  (54%)  or 
unemployed  (15%);  they  have  byres  and  horse  or  donkey  husbandry  adjacent  to  their 
houses,  and  all  household  members,  including  children,  help  in  animal  breeding,  milk 
production  and/or  transporting  goods  or  people  by  donkey  carts  or  horse  drawn  carriage. 
They  were  less  or  not  active.  Income  and  home  origin  were  indeed  interrelated;  the 
lowest  median  income  was  associated  with  Helal  and  the  Nubians  (£E200/month), 
although  the  minimum  income  of  the  Nubians  (£E100/month)  was  twice  as  that  of  Helal. 
Those  of  Ques  had  the  highest  median  value  reported  (£E300/month)  as  well  as  the 
highest  income  (£E650/month).  Although  Nubians  were  active  at  the  beginning  of  the 
project  as  the  Project's  Co-ordinator  suggested,  their  participatory  initiatives  declined 
until  they  had  completely  disappeared  by  the  time  the  project  withdrew;  64%  were 
classified  as  less  active  in  general.  They  lived  in  the  peripheral  area  of  Nasriya,  sector  9; 
-.  -I 
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land-titling  services  had  not  been  offered  to  them  because  of  municipal  institutional 
confusion,  up  to  the  time  of  the  survey.  They  are  not  represented  at  all  at  present  within 
the  CDA's  structure,  and  many  social  services,  which  were  previously  enabled  by  the 
project  in  their  Community  Centre,  Amberkab,  have  almost  certainly  stopped. 
Another  explanatory  dimension  for  variation  in  participation  concerns  the  internal 
geography  of  Nasriya.  A  sector's  spatial  location,  perpendicular  to  the  Kima  Canal  was 
inextricably  linked  with  the  home  origin  of  HoHs,  and  both  seemed  influential,  although 
the  association  between  location  and  participation  was  less  significant  statistically  (p- 
level  0.09).  The  inhabitants  of  the  middle  sectors  of  Nasriya  (sectors  4-6)  were  more 
active  than  those  living  in  the  peripheral  sectors  (north  sectors  1-3,  or  south  sectors  7-9). 
There  are  many  reasons  for  this  state  of  affairs.  The  project's  site-office,  the  Service 
Centre,  the  CDA's  office  and  the  Biadia  Community  Centre  were  all  located  in  the 
middle  part,  in  which  the  project's  efforts  to  mobilise  people  to  participate  in  the 
planning  and  evaluation  were  concentrated.  This  was  compounded  by  its  occupation  by 
people  from  Luxor,  who  tended  to  be  more  active.  Although  sector  nine  was  peripheral, 
it  belonged  to  the  less  active  group  simply  because  it  was  mainly  inhabited  by  the 
Nubians,  who  are  a  very  self-contained  community.  Sector  eight  scored  more  under  the 
`not  active'  category  because  it  was  mainly  inhabited  by  people  from  Helal  and  Ques, 
almost  one  third  of  each  community  lived  there.  The  community  representatives  failed  to 
persuade  a  large  proportion  of  the  residents  of  this  sector  to  rehabilitate  or  replace  an  old 
sewerage  network  which  was  constructed  by  themselves  prior  to  the  project. 
The  Project's  Administrator  attributed  this  situation  to  a  very  low  profile  of  self- 
initiatives  in  this  particular  section  of  sector  8  and  the  complete  absence  of  group  action. 
"We  tried  several  ways  to  encourage  the  residents  of  this  section  to  cut  trenches  so  that 
pipes  could  be  laid  out,  but  all  attempts  went  in  vain.  They  had  an  old  self-help  sewage 
network  which  was  badly  used  by  some  Helal  residents  for  animals'  waste  disposal  as 
well  as  sanitation.  Despite  our  technical  advice,  they  did  not  want  to  replace  this  old 
network.  Now,  it  is  completely  deteriorated,  but  it  is  too  late  because  the  project  is 
phasing  out"  (TA,  16-06-98).  Indeed,  almost  all  their  neighbours  from  Ques  and  Nubians 
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complained  that  Helal  residents  still  keep  animals  either  in  front  of  their  houses  or  in  an 
attached  byre,  which  cause  pollution  and  an  unpleasant  smell.  It  was  also  observed  that 
the  Helal  people  were  viewed  differently  in  Nasriya.  While  some  respondents  viewed 
them  derogatively,  because  they  deal  with  animals,  live  in  unhygienic  housing  conditions 
and  are  not  keen  on  educating  their  children,  other  residents  appreciated  their  role  as  the 
only  suppliers  of  many  services,  e.  g.  cheap  transportation,  milk  and  home-made  cheese. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  only  three  cases  who  refused  to  be  interviewed  during  the 
fieldwork  survey  were  located  in  this  sector  which  in  itself  could  be  attributed  to  the 
weak  relationship  between  them  and  the  project. 
Differences  in  spatial  elevation  was  expected  to  shape  the  degree  of  people's 
participation;  the  gap  between  the  active  and  the  not  active  groups  was  less  sharp 
among,  and  in  favour  of,  residents  living  in  the  upper  elevated  area.  Because  this  remoter 
area  was  deprived  of  many  services,  residents  worked  harder  to  improve  their  situation. 
"We  used  to  carry  clean  water  sometimes  even  from  the  railway  station.  The  water 
pressure  was  usually  low  and  the  public  taps  were  either  useless  or  busy.  We  never  threw 
away  our  waste  water.  It  was  very  important  for  any  one  who  wanted  to  construct  here. 
All  families  would  usually  offer  the  water  from  their  laundry  and  give  a  hand  to  their 
neighbour  in  construction",  commented  a  group  of  HoHs  living  in  the  upper  elevated 
area  of  Nasriya  (NGI1,07-04-98).  Being  poor  and  sharing  the  same  daily  problems, 
transformed  any  possible  conflictual  modes  of  participation  into  collaboration.  In 
contrast,  most  of  the  people  living  in  the  lower  area,  along  the  Kima  Canal  and  near  to 
the  urban  centre,  were  less  active  or  not  active  at  all.  Their  participation  was  limited 
during  the  implementation  stage  because  their  water  and  sewage  networks  were  built  by 
contractors  (the  main  off-line).  Consequently  their  participation  was  also  limited,  or  not 
at  all,  in  the  planning  and  evaluation  stages. 
As  the  spatial  distribution  table  shows  (Table  8.4),  the  highest  concentration  of 
the  active  group  (83%)  came  from  the  middle  sectors  (sectors  4,5  and  6)  of  the  upper- 
elevated  area  where  the  physical  need  for  basic  services  was  at  a  maximum,  and  the 
distance  to  the  project  management  unit  and  the  CDA  was  relatively  short.  This  was 
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followed  by  the  middle  sectors  of  the  centrally-elevated  area  (54%)  where  the  level  of 
physical  need  for  many  services,  especially  clean  water  and  access  to  health  and 
education  facilities,  was  lower  (nearer  to  the  Service  Centre  and  to  the  urban  centre  of 
the  city).  Meanwhile,  the  lowest  profiles  of  participation  occurred  on  the  North  periphery 
of  the  upper-elevated  area  (82%),  followed  by  the  South  periphery  of  the  lower-area 
(73%).  The  residents  of  the  former  area  were  the  latest  to  squat  in  Nasriya,  the  furthest 
from  the  project  management  unit  and  the  CDA,  and  were  less  assimilated  into  the 
project.  Those  in  the  latter  were  used  to  spoon-feeding  by  the  municipality  as  they 
occupied  state-built  housing  and  the  main  sewerage  and  water  off-lines  were  constructed 
by  a  contractor. 
Table  8.4:  Nasriva-  Sectors  and  elevation  differentiation  by  clusters  of  narticination 
(Cluster  1)  (Cluster  2)  (Cluster  3)  Total 
Active  group  Less  Active  Not  Active 
(%)  (%)  (%)  No.  % 
North  periphery/  09  09  82  (11)  100 
upper  area 
North  periphery/  43  07  50  (14)  100 
central  area 
North  periphery/  38  25  37  (08)  100 
lower  area 
Total  (No.  )  (10)  (04)  (19)  (33) 
Middle  sectors/  83  00  17  (06)  100 
upper  area 
Middle  sectors/  54  23  23  (13)  100 
central  area 
Middle  sectors/  12  38  50  (08)  100 
lower  area 
Total  (No.  )  (13)  (06)  (08)  (27) 
South  periphery/  10  50  40  (10)  100 
upper  area 
South  periphery/  11  48  41  (27)  100 
central  area 
South  periphery/  00  27  73  (11)  100 
lower  area 
Total  (No.  )  (04)  (21)  (23)  (48) 
Values  of  more  than  50%  are  in  Bold. 
Intervening  variables  of  property  stakes,  e.  g..  land  legal  status,  house  ownership 
and  housing  physical  condition  are  linked  closely  to  neighbourhood  status,  and  were  also 
explored.  Land  legal  status  did  not  influence  the  degree  of  participation;  the  proportion 
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of  the  active  group  (24%-  28%)  varied  little  between  the  three  statuses  of  land, 
notwithstanding  59%  of  those  living  in  legally  owned  plots  were  either  active  or  less 
active,  and  around  the  same  proportion  of  those  living  in  illegally  occupied  government- 
land  were  classified  as  not  active.  Although  most  of  the  `hekr'  leaseholders  were  either 
less  active  (24%)  or  not  active  (52%),  they  were  all  motivated  to  improve  their  living 
standards;  90%  of  them  had  wished  to  legalise  their  plots  before  but  were  unable  to 
because  of  shortage  of  money  and  had  to  wait  for  their  turn  in  the  house  loan  scheme. 
House  ownership  status  was  highly  significant  (p-level  0.01).  Although  a  similar 
proportion  from  both  statuses  belonged  to  the  active  group  (25%),  the  owner-occupiers 
were  less  likely  to  belong  to  the  non-active  group  than  were  the  tenants;  40%  as  against 
70%  respectively.  There  are  explanations  for  this  low  state  of  participation  amongst  the 
tenants;  because  rents  are  very  low  in  Nasriya,  compared  to  other  urban  areas  in  Aswan, 
owners  wanted  to  raise  rents  considerably  once  the  area  was  serviced.  They  are, 
therefore,  loath  to  give  tenants  a  declaration  of  ownership  consent  which  allows  the 
work  to  go  ahead.  A  three  room  house  in  Nasriya  could  be  leased  for  £E20-60/month 
(£4-10),  depending  on  its  location,  physical  condition  and  the  length  of  contract,  which  is 
almost  a  third  of  the  housing  cost  in  `formal'  areas  in  Aswan.  Thus,  tenants  are  under 
threat  of  being  evicted  by  landlords  who  try  actively  to  circumvent  the  Landlord-tenant 
Relationship  Law.  They  do  not  carry  out  the  annual  maintenance  of  the  house,  thus  its 
physical  condition  deteriorates;  then,  with  the  support  of  a  friend  or  a  relative  working  in 
the  municipality,  they  obtain  a  decree  of  demolition,  forcing  the  tenants  to  evacuate. 
Obviously,  this  fear  of  eviction  does  not  promote  high  levels  of  participation  in  any  long- 
term  planning  and  decision  making  processes. 
The  last  intervening  variable,  the  physical  condition  of  housing,  was  the  most 
significant  in  enducing  participation  (p-level  0.001).  People  living  in  good  housing  were 
far  less  likely  to  belong  to  the  not  active  group  than  those  living  in  bad  condition  (37%  as 
against  only  84%  respectively).  Those  living  in  fair  housing  conditions  were  distributed 
almost  equally  among  the  three  clusters.  Unsurprisingly  more  than  half  of  those  living  in 
bad  housing  conditions,  as  expressed  by  themselves  and  confirmed  by  the  researcher 
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during  the  interview,  were  also  tenants,  while  93%  of  those  living  in  good  house 
conditions  were  owner-occupiers.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  family  size  was  not  a 
factor  in  determining  the  quality  of  house  condition.  While  60%  of  people  living  in  good 
housing  conditions  had  a  family  size  corresponding  to  the  average  household  size  in 
Nasriya  (6-8  persons),  almost  the  same  proportion  of  households  living  in  bad  conditions 
were  smaller. 
8.3-  The  institutionalisation  of  sustainability  (1995-1998): 
It  has  been  argued  that  successful  NGOs  should  be  able  to  make  a  contribution  to 
the  rolling  back  of  the  state  (Wood  1997).  This  contention  resulted  in  a  dilemma.  On  the 
one  hand,  it  is  commonly  assumed,  by  those  who  view  NGOs  as  based  exclusively  in  civil 
society,  that  this  rolling  back  can  really  strengthen  the  role  of  citizens  to  influence  state 
actions.  On  the  other  hand,  such  a  rolling  back  contributes  more  to  the  identification  of 
the  private  sector  as  the  main  provider  of  essential  goods  and  services  for  the  entire 
population,  including  the  poor  and  disadvantaged  (Hulme  and  Edwards  1997).  In  this 
case  civil  society  organisations  are  closely  linked  to  the  market  or  commercial  sector 
where  protecting  market  advantages  is  more  important  than  reducing  the  exploitation  of 
low-income  households  (Mitlin  1997).  The  New  Policy  Agenda,  discussed  in  Chapter  2, 
has  attempted  to  strike  a  balance  in  which  non-profit  making  civil  society  organisations, 
including  NGOs  and  CDAs,  can  best  be  seen  as  a  counter-weight  to  state  and  market 
powers:  opening  channels  of  communication  and  participation,  providing  training 
grounds  for  activists  and  Grassroots  Organisation  (GROs),  promoting  pluralism, 
protecting  human  rights  and  alleviating  poverty  (Robinson  1993).  Yet,  five  areas  of 
competence  are  required  for  civil  society  organisations  in  order  to  ensure  that  they  are 
developmentally  effective  and  organisationally  viable:  appropriate  organisational  set  up, 
leadership  and  human  resources,  managing  through  achievement,  external  relationships, 
and  mobilising  sustainable  financial  resources  (Fowler  1997).  Given  these  doctrines,  and 
building  on  the  `accountable  bureaucratic  capacity'  framework  outlined  in  Chapter  3,  it 
can  be-  argued  that  an  effective  role  for  civil  society  organisations  in  sustaining 
development,  enhancing  democratisation  and  protecting  citizens'  rights  cannot  be 
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achieved  without  three  assumptions:  accountable  and  fair  representation  in  civil  society 
organisations,  reciprocal  and  active  participation  by  the  citizens  concerned,  and  effective 
public  sector  performance  behaviour  and  appropriate  ethics. 
Evidence  from  Nasriya  suggests  that  the  last  phase  of  the  project  (1995-1998) 
aimed  basically  to  accomplish  the  targets  of  the  New  Policy  Agenda  through  the  Nasriya 
Community  Development  Association  (CDA),  the  Women's  Development  Association 
(WDA)  and  their  electoral  system.  The  last  phase  targeted  issues  of  sustainability  so  that 
the  maintenance  of  the  activities  implemented  could  be  assured,  as  well  as  to  continue 
enabling  women  and  the  disadvantaged  to  improve/determine  their  life  choices.  The  GTZ 
has  recognised  that  the  CDA  can  play  a  critical  role  in  both  reducing  poverty  directly  and 
in  strengthening  democracy,  which  would  ensure  that  inclusive  development  strategies 
are  continued.  The  existing  electoral  system  of  the  CDA  members  (1998)  passed  through 
several  stages  until  it  reached  what  is  currently  thought  to  be  its  optimal  representation. 
It  started  with  the  project's  inception  in  1988  when  an  organisation  model  was  designed 
and  supported  by  a  government  decree.  This  took  the  form  of  a  Community  Council 
(NCC,  or  Majlis  Ahali  in  Arabic)  comprising  elected  representatives  out  of  which  a 
chair,  a  deputy,  a  treasurer  and  other  executive  committee  members  would  be  elected 
(GTZ  1992:  31). 
The  NCC  established  committees,  which  became  responsible  for  the  flow  of 
information  between  it  and  the  inhabitants.  Moreover,  each  specialised  committee  had  an 
additional  role  to  mobilise  the  inhabitants  and  discuss  the  feasibility  of  proposals  with  the 
community.  However,  after  four  years  of  operation,  it  was  recognised  that  the 
establishment's  procedures  were  top-down  and  the  constituencies  from  which  the  NCC 
was  elected  corresponded  to  an  abstract  territorial  division  which  did  not  allow  for  the 
representation  of  different  community  organisations  in  the  area.  The  NCC's 
arrangements  tended  to  by-pass  existing  community  structures  and  formulated  elite 
grouping;  it  was  dominated  by  people  coming  from  Luxor.  The  weaknesses  of  the  first 
NCC  escalated  when  its  Head,  Sheikh  Ahmed,  started  to  favour  his  relatives  and  people 
coming  from  the  same  village-  Biadia,  Luxor.  Moreover,  he  failed  to  keep  a  balance 
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between  his  increasing  responsibilities  and  popularity  in  the  area,  with  all  its  associated 
infatuations,  and  the  expected  integrity  from  his  side  when  dealing  with  senior 
government  officials,  including  the  Governor,  commented  the  Mayor  of  Aswan  (MA,  01- 
04-98).  However,  although  the  NCC  did  not  represent  all  the  residents  of  Nasriya  fairly, 
the  first  people's  mobilisation  and  participation  owed  its  success  to  a  large  extent  to  the 
popularity  and  assertiveness  of  its  Head. 
These  sort  of  problems  were  largely  overcome  once  it  was  realised  that  the 
project  was  producing  results  and  a  new  type  of  representation,  including  a  new 
community  organisation  model,  was  proposed.  It  was  declared  that  the  overall  goal  was 
to  build  up  community  cohesion  and  self-administration  in  tandem  with  the  technical 
infrastructure  supply.  Therefore,  it  was  necessary  to  look  for  ways  in  which  local  self- 
administration  could  be  conceived  and  realised,  which  in  turn,  would  carry  on 
independently  after  the  programme  which  had  been  partially  initiated  and  funded  by  the 
project.  "The  project  team's  task  was,  therefore,  to  act  in  an  advisory  and  supportive 
function  in  setting-up  local  self-administration"  (GTZ  1992:  31).  To  achieve  such  a 
target,  an  organisational  framework  of  a  Community  Development  Association  (CDA) 
and  a  Women's  Development  Association  (WDA)  was  established  and  legalised  in  1992 
and  1996  respectively.  Each  included  an  elected  Steering  Committee  or  Board,  articles  of 
association,  official  accounts  and  statutes.  In  contrast  to  the  former  NCC,  which  was 
imposed  on  the  community  from  above,  the  new  associations  were  not  established  solely 
by  government  decree  but  in  co-operation  with  their  respective  communities,  and  were 
thus  readily  accepted  by  the  majority  of  the  population.  Local  leaders  were  keen  to 
ensure  that  these  associations  would  represent  all  the  residents  in  an  unbiased  way  and  to 
register  them  officially  under  the  public  law. 
By  its  registration,  the  CDA  obtained  financial  independence  and  is  only 
answerable  to  the  Department  of  Social  Affairs.  All  further  planning  for  the  area  has  to 
deal  with  it  and  must  be  carried  out  with  its  consent  and  co-operation.  The  CDA's 
current  organisation  includes  eight  committees,  each  headed  by  one  of  the  Board 
members.  Membership  is  open  to  any  adult  resident  in  Nasriya.  The  CDA's  registered 
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members  (230  in  1993  and  about  1000  in  1998)  form  a  General  Assembly,  which  meets, 
annually,  and  members  of  each  sector  elect  one  representative  to  the  Board  (2  each  for 
sectors  eight  and  nine  because  of  their  sizes).  In  addition,  the  General  Assembly  elects 
two  members,  with  relevant  experience  and  a  good  reputation  in  the  area,  directly  to  the 
Board.  As  men  were  expected  to  dominate  this  type  of  representation  (nominated  sector 
representatives  are  often  men  in  Nasriya),  active  female  members  at  the  General 
Assembly  were  allowed  to  join  the  Women's  Committee  directly  and  to  elect  two 
persons  to  represent  them  directly  on  the  Board.  These  15  Board  members  elect  a 
Chairperson  (Figure  8.2). 
Figure  8.2:  Nasriya-  Organisational  structure  of  the  CDA 
Chair  of  the  CDA 
Adniinisfrätion 
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Secretary 
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1000  fee  paying  members  in  1998 
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Elects  11  representatives  for  the  9  sectors  in 
Nasriya,  in  addition  to  2  respected  individuals 
with  relevant  experience.  Any  active  female 
member  can  join  the  Women's  Committee 
directly. 
Source:  Author 
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Increasing  numbers  of  young  women  joined  the  General  Assembly  (1992-1996), 
causing  a  core  of  female  members  of  the  Women's  Committee  to  press  for  a  Women's 
Development  Association  (WDA);  this  has  become  the  second  formally  registered 
umbrella-NGO  in  Nasriya.  Although  the  WDA  currently  works  independently,  offers  a 
wide  range  of  advice  and  training  and  participates  in  all  major  meetings  concerning 
development  in  the  area,  its  sustainability  is  questionable.  The  situation  of  the  WDA  was 
different  to  that  of  the  CDA;  while  the  WDA  was  still  phasing  up  to  act  independently 
(1996-1998),  the  project  had  to  phase  out,  thus  it  did  not  have  the  luxury  of  a  trial 
period.  "I  had  the  sense  that  the  project  staff  had  not  been  empowered  by  the  gender 
training  they  received,  and  consequently  questioned  its  relevance  to  the  project,  at  times 
seeing  gender  as  a  project  component  thrown  at  them  by  Eschborn  [the  city  of  the  GTZ 
Head-office]",  said  GTZ's  short-term  Consultant,  long  term  resident  in  Egypt  (KM,  05- 
08-99).  Indeed,  the  project  lacked  long-term  local  personnel  with  a  theoretical  grounding 
in  gender  and  experience  in  introducing  gender  concepts  at  the  local  level.  Moreover,  the 
establishment  of  the  WDA  and  the  construction  of  the  Women's  Centre,  absorbed 
increasing  amounts  of  the  project's  time  and  money,  which  was  criticised  by  the  CDA 
and  other  project  components.  This  is  a  structural  problem  typical  to  newly-established 
NGOs  working  in  the  same  area,  mainly  about  money,  power,  influence,  and  sometimes 
of  the  patriarchal  domineering  attitude  of  the  CDA,  according  to  GTZ's  short-term 
Consultant  for  community  development  (GGh,  19-01-98).  This  structural  problem 
confined  gender  interventions  to  those  with  the  WDA,  and  set  gender  in  opposition  to 
other  aspects  of  the  project,  particularly  the  CDA  (Box  8.1). 
Box:  S.  1:  Nasn  a-  Difficulties  of  establishing  a  collaborative  programme  of  UAD 
When  I  came  on  board  as  the  gender  consultant  in  the  last  year  of  the  project,  there  was 
a  distinct  lack  of  transparency  in  the  relationship  between  the  project  and  the  WDA, 
which  exacerbated  WDA's  already  highly  dependent  relationship  with  the  project,  as  the 
provider  of  all  technical,  material,  financial,  and  human  resource  support. 
We  worked  with  the  WDA  on  how  to  develop  programmes,  implement  feasibility 
studies,  develop  budgets,  and  manage  a  centre,  and  they  made  great  strides  in  that  last 
year.  But  due  to  budgetary  constraints  at  GTZ  they  had  to  go  it  alone.  Although  they 
could  have  greatly  benefited  from  periodic  evaluation  of  preliminary  programming  in 
order  to  ensure  the  quality  and  sustainability  of  programmes. 
Source:  Key  Informant  (KM,  05-08-99). 
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Indeed,  changing  attitudes  about  the  participation  of  women  in  a  conservative 
Muslim  society  has  been  a  sensitive  issue  on  ideological  grounds.  Gender  is  not  the  same 
thing  as  women  in  development,  as  it  takes  a  comprehensive  approach  to  development, 
looking  at  both  females  and  males,  their  social  roles  and  power  relationships,  and  how  to 
support  and  improve  the  overall  developmental  structure.  When  gender  was  perceived  by 
many  CDA  Board  members  as  working  with  women  to  the  exclusion  of  men,  or  as 
subverting  young  women's  Islamic  ideology,  as  CDA  Board  members  accused  the  GTZ 
short-term  Consultant  of  doing  during  the  first  gender  sensitisation  workshop  in  1996, 
the  process  was  understood  as  one  of  `women  in  development'  (WID),  an  outdated 
paradigm  in  DAs'  strategies,  superseded  by  `gender  and  development'  (GAD).  The  CDA 
and  WDA  decided  to  hold  regular  round  table  sessions  in  order  to  agree  a  common  goal, 
overcome  mutual  mistrust  and  enhance  co-operation  and  co-ordination.  This  has  clarified 
the  aims  of  WDA  and  women's  empowerment.  Traditional  conceptions  have  not  been 
erased  by  GTZ's  perception  of  modernisation,  but  are  being  refashioned  as  a  hybrid, 
which  entails  `cultural  (re)creation'  (Escobar  1995).  These  discussions  led  to  many 
parents  allowing  their  daughters  to  attend  evening  meetings,  talk  in  public  meetings,  and 
to  travel  alone  in  Egypt  and  abroad  for  the  first  time  (one  of  the  WDA  members 
participated  in  the  Habitat  Summit,  Istanbul,  1996). 
However,  the  most  serious  challenge  presently  threatening  WDA's  sustainability 
is  getting  out  of  a  dependent  relationship,  to  develop  programmes  that  address  the  needs 
of  the  local  community  and  to  cover  the  costs  of  their  implementation.  While  financial 
sustainability  may  be  secured  in  the  future  through  membership  fees  and  shop  rental  in 
the  Women's  Centre,  at  present  it  is  dependent  on  assistance  from  government  and 
NGOs;  the  WDA  has  recently  linked-up  to  the  post-ERSAP  Social  Fund's  training 
programme.  This  should  enhance  their  skills  to  develop  effective  programmes  that 
address  the  needs  of  women  in  Nasriya,  as  well  as  feasibility  studies,  budgeting  and 
management  to  run  the  Women's  Centre.  If  the  WDA  manages  to  garner  the  respect  of 
the  community  through  its  programmes  and  services,  it  will  then  be  seen  as  something 
more  than  `Banat  el  Mashroua'-  (the  20  little  girls  of  the  project  who  have  formed 
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WDA's  core  staff  and  represented  its  most  vocal  supporters  from  the  outset),  as 
perceived  by  some  residents.  This  is  crucial  to  ensure  the  long-term  sustainability  of  the 
WDA/Women's  Centre. 
8.3.1-  The  present  role  of  the  CDA  and  its  performance: 
Although  a  wide  range  of  municipal  organisations  have  been  involved  in  the 
planning  and  implementation  stages  of  initiatives,  the  responsibility  for  ongoing 
management  of  many  activities  has  been  devolved  to  community  organisations,  the  CDA, 
the  WDA  and  the  local  community  centres  (Table  8.5).  On  the  government  side,  the 
ACC  has  taken  over  responsibility  for  the  ongoing  operation  and  maintenance  of  water 
and  sewerage  facilities,  the  administration  of  land  titles  and  the  development  of  East 
Nasriya. 
Table  8.5:  Nasriya-  Responsibilities  for  provision  and  subsequent  management  of 
facilities 
Institution  involved  Institution  now 
Facility/service  with  people  in  responsible  for 
planning  and  running  and 
implementation  sustainability 
Water  supply  and  sewage  networks  Housing  Directorate  Aswan  City  Council- 
Aswan  Water  Authority 
Waste-disposal  system  Aswan  City  Council  Aswan  City  Council 
Nasria  Service  Centre  Housin  Directorate  CDA 
Nasriya  Women's  Centre  Housing  Directorate  WDA 
Local  community  centres  Social  Directorate  Community  Centres 
Improved/additional  schools  and  school  Housing  and  Education  Directorate 
facilities  Education 
Directorates 
Sports  areas  Youth  Directorate  CDA 
Enhances  community  organisation  Social  Directorate  CDA,  WDA 
Establishment  of  social  programmes  at  the  Social  Directorate,  CDA,  WDA 
CDA's  and  community  centres'  levels  the  Woman  and 
Childhood  Centre 
Establishment  of  a  revolving  fund  for  Financing  CDA,  WDA  and  Social 
house  improvement  and  income  generation  Directorate  Directorate 
loans 
Offering  of  land  titles  through  a  land-sale  Aswan  City  Council  Aswan  City  Council 
programme 
East  Nasri  a  extension  UDLMU  Aswan  City  Council 
Source:  Fieldwork 
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One  of  the  most  significant  findings  of  the  survey  centres  on  the  role  of  the  CDA 
in  opening  channels  of  communication  and  participation,  providing  training  for  activists 
and  GROs,  promoting  pluralism  and  establishing  effective  poverty  alleviation 
programmes.  Internal  communication  is  sustained  by  means  of  the  CDA's  representative 
structure.  Sector  representatives  are  responsible  for  communication  with  the  residents 
and  community  centres  in  their  geographical  area  of  responsibility,  as  well  as  presenting 
their  demands  and  complaints  at  the  Board's  meetings.  In  addition,  the  CDA  has 
published  and  distributed  an  illustrated  leaflet  explaining  its  activities  as  well  as  a  regular 
newsletter  to  the  community  centres  in  Nasriya  in  an  attempt  to  increase  membership. 
Communications  have  also  been  established  with  the  local  press  and  the  TV  channel  of 
Aswan,  and  several  programmes  have  already  been  presented  about  Nasriya  and  the 
CDA's  activities. 
External  communication  is  sustained  by  means  of  the  CDA's  power  and 
responsibilities.  While  the  project  has  been  phasing  out  gradually,  the  GTZ  has  made  an 
effort  to  supply  the  CDA  members  with  the  necessary  power  to  deal  with  local 
institutions,  and  to  enable  them  to  run  most  of  the  activities  by  themselves.  This  power 
resulted  from  the  formalisation  of  accounts  and  statutes,  increasing  the  volume  of  pump- 
priming  funds,  and  strengthened  links  with  senior  government  officials  and  prominent, 
consultants  not  only  in  Aswan  but  also  in  Cairo  and  Egypt  generally.  The  CDA  currently 
plays  a  major  role  in  maintaining  communications  at  external  level  with  institutions  in 
Aswan  and  Cairo,  and  has  even  started  to  exchange  experiences  with  similar 
organisations  in  other  cities  within  Egypt. 
The  CDA  also  maintains  a  bottom-up  flow  of  people's  opinions,  complaints  and 
demands  and  arranges  regular  meetings  with  the  municipal  officials  concerned  where 
problems  are  discussed  and  decisions  are  either  taken  or  forwarded  to  a  superior  level. 
Mindful  of  the  absence  of  such  structures  elsewhere  in  Aswan,  the  CDA's  leadership 
uses  its  closeness  to  senior  government  officials  in  Aswan,  including  the  Governor,  to 
expand  effective  operations  and  advance  new  projects  that  require  an  organised 
community  representation.  The  position  of  the  CDA  has  been  further  strengthened  by  the 
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fact  that  its  Chair  represented  and  presented  the  Nasriya  project  as  an  example  of  `good. 
practice'  at  the  Habitat  Summit  in  Istanbul  in  1996  and  at  many  other  conferences.  This 
has  supplied  the  CDA  with  international  recognition  and  further  clout. 
Special  attention  has  been  given  to  the  provision  of  practical  training  in 
intermediary  capacity-building  of  the  community.  The  GTZ  and  the  CDA's  principles  of 
good  practice  have  targeted  the  promotion  of  active  and  representative  citizen 
participation  so  that  community  members  can  meaningfully  influence  decisions  that  affect 
their  lives.  The  CDA  and  WDA  are  jointly  responsible  now  for  supplying  training  in  a 
sustainable  manner  for  both  young  activists  and  women  (e.  g.  vocational  training, 
computer  skills,  domestic  management  etc.  ).  Dialogue  with  other  similar  CDAs  and 
WDAs  in  Egypt  has  also  been  advantageous.  It  has  established  a  network  for  exchanging 
experience  in  fund  raising,  problem  solving,  dissemination  of  training  materials  and 
undertaking  new  viable  activities. 
The  promotion  of  pluralism  and  of  democratic  action  has  been  seen  as  the  key  to 
a  flourishing,  complex  and  ever-changing  system.  It  has  been  argued  that  the  New  Policy 
Agenda  of  DAs  is  not  monolithic  and  details  may  vary  from  one  DA  to  another  as  long 
they  accord  with  neo-liberal  economics  and  liberal  democratic  principles  (Robinson 
1993).  The  survey  revealed  that,  in  contrast  to  Ismailia's  experience,  GTZ  collaborated 
with  the  CDA  in  establishing  a  sustainable  vehicle  for  `democratisation'  and  `leadership' 
as  an  essential  component  of  a  thriving  civil  society.  This  was  achieved  by  giving  citizens 
a  positive,  inclusive  role  in  the  policy  process,  and  involving  a  larger  number  of  them  in 
the  public  decision-making  and  governance  processes. 
The  GTZ  further  empowered  the  CDA  by  supplying  it  with  increasing  volumes  of 
pump-priming  funds  to  pursue  poverty  alleviation  and  income-generating  activities,  and 
to  take  on  structural  forms  that  could  enhance  the  likelihood  of  access  to  other  funds. 
The  CDA  acts  now  as  a  non-profit-seeking  `third  sector',  located  between  the  public  and 
private  sectors,  and  supplies  services  to  fill  a  gap  in  the  government's  supply  system.  An 
example  is  the  basic  clinical  and  first  aid  services  at  the  Service  Centre  which  are  offered 
almost  at  cost-price.  About  62%  of  respondents  interviewed  declared  that  they  prefer  to 
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get  their  health  care  at  the  Service  Centre.  Meanwhile,  other  services  supplied  in  the 
Service  Centre,  such  as  a  children's  club,  a  pharmacy,  a  bakery,  shops, 
telecommunications  and  typing  services  as  well  as  various  training  courses  are  all 
targeting  service-supply  rather  than  profit-maximisation.  Access  to  loans  and  micro- 
credit  is  the  most  direct  action  towards  genuine  poverty  alleviation.  During  the  last  phase 
of  the  project,  the  GTZ  supplied  the  CDA  with  £E1.2  million  (£207.000)  to  establish  a 
revolving  fund  for  the  provision  of  individual-based  credit  for  micro-enterprises,  self- 
employment,  house  improvement  and  to  enable  residents  to  buy  land  and  construct  in  the 
new  development-area  of  East  Nasriya. 
Although  the  World  Bank  estimates  that  in  the  early  1970s  about  1.5%  of  the 
total  income  for  development  NGOs  world-wide  was  derived  from  official  donors,  and 
that  this  had  sharply  risen  to  around  30%  by  the  mid-1990s  (ODI  1995:  1),  this  was  not 
the  case  in  Nasriya;  the  GTZ  only  donated  seed  corn  finance,  offered  the  required 
training  and  made  sure  that  the  CDA  could  manage  it  properly  before  its  withdrawal. 
The  CDA  established  a  financial  system  through  which  sustainable  funding  could  be 
locally  generated.  Although  each  inhabitant  is  charged  a  nominal  annual  fee  to  remain  a 
member  of  the  association  (£E5.0  or  £0.80),  this  constitutes  only  a  small  proportion  of 
its  budget.  The  money  generated  from  rentals  in  the  Service  Centre  not  only  covers  the 
operation  of  CDA's  services,  but  also  the  salaries  of  doctors,  nurses,  trainers  and  other 
supportive  staff,  in  addition  to  the  maintenance  of  the  building  and  frequent  purchase  of 
new  medical  and  audio-visual  equipment.  The  CDA's  annual  budget  is  now  about  £E1.3 
million  (£224.000),  roughly  equal  to  the  total  annual  expenditure  of  Aswan  Governorate 
on  development-related  projects  in  the  entire  East  Quarter  (180.000  inhabitants)  in  which 
Nasriya  is  located. 
In  the  context  of  community  economic  development  theory,  such  a  sustainable 
policy  has  changed  perceptions  and  choices  regarding  community  resources,  markets, 
rules,  and  decision-making  capacity.  People  have  the  resources  to  look  after  their  own 
welfare,  either  by  providing  services  themselves  or  by  mobilising  to  obtain  the  services 
that  they  need  from  the  state.  The  dimensions  of  time,  space,  marginalised  socio- 
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economic  groups,  and  dynamic  economies  have  indeed  broadened  the  concept  of 
sustainable  development  beyond  the  more  traditional  physical  definition.  The  impact  of 
this  policy  on  society  has  many  more  advantages  than  public  `provision'  and/or  basic 
needs  `protection'.  The  idea  of  new  knowledge  and  re-framing  issues  is  offered  as  a 
method  to  create  new  options.  Generally  speaking,  this  broadened  concept  has  proved  to 
be  financially  sustainable  (Dichter  1997)  and  possesses  potential  to  be  scaled-up  quickly. 
However,  this  policy  is,  in  fact,  double-edged.  The  GTZ  provided  increased 
volumes  of  official  aid  to  the  CDA  which,  in  turn,  operationalised  the  economic  and 
political  dimensions.  This  has  raised  questions  regarding  the  nature  and  distribution  of 
power  within  society.  While  funds  have  supplied  the  CDA  members  with  the  necessary 
power  to  deal  with  local  institutions  and,  consequently,  enabled  them  to  run  their  own 
activities  independently,  it  can  be  argued  that  this  power  has  been  a  result  of  the  capital 
possessed  by  the  CDA  rather  than  its  own  status  and  the  sort  of  activities  it  has  been 
running.  Moreover,  its  possession  of  such  capital  has  positioned  the  CDA  in  competition 
with  the  government  agencies.  The  CDA  currently  acts  as  both  `prince  [state]  and 
merchant  [market]',  according  to  Nerfin's  (1987)  terminology,  in  which  its  relationship 
with  the  `people'  has  granted  it  a  greater  public  legitimacy  than  the  government  and  its 
structured  managerial  features  have  permitted  reasonable  levels  of  cost  control  and 
efficiency.  As  a  result,  government  control  over  the  CDA's  operation  of  the  poverty 
reduction  programme  has  been  increased;  the  budget  has  to  be  reviewed  annually  by  the 
Ministry  of  Social  Affairs,  and  the  bank  account  has  been  audited  several  times  by  the 
Central  Agency  of  Auditing.  While  such  intervention  to  control  and  regulate  civil  society 
organisation  is  common  in  Egypt,  it  is  justified  as  a  measure  of  policy  dialogue  and  a  tool 
for  readjustment  if  financial  errors  occur  rather  than  control,  commented  the  Mayor  of 
Aswan  (MA,  01-04-98).  Indeed,  this  vision  represents  the  central  government's  policy: 
"If  NGOs  were  left  alone  they  would  not  be  able  to  function,  or  at  least  they  would  not 
function  as  effectively  as  when  they  are  backed  by  the  government",  said  the  Minister  of 
Social  Affairs  (Al-Ahram  Weekly:  4  June  1998).  One  of  the  challenges  facing  Egypt  now 
is  to  strike  a  balance  between  maintaining  authoritarian  control  to  instil  security  and 
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embracing  civil  society  organisations  as  a  means  of  enhancing  prosperity.  Because  the 
latter  embodies  a  risk  that  some  extremist  organisations  might  masquerade  as  law  abiding 
civil  society  interests,  several  measures  to  examine  the  performance,  accounts  and 
members  of  NGOs  have  been  instituted. 
Finally,  accountability  underlies  any  discussion  of  democratisation  and  public 
sector  ethics.  The  public  has  a  right  to  know  how  their  respective  civil  society 
organisations  use  the  power  and  resources  entrusted  to  them.  The  form  of  CDA's 
representation  in  Nasriya  seemed  to  coerce  its  members  into  maintaining  contact  with 
their  constituents,  informing  them  of,  and  protecting,  their  legitimate  rights.  The  Chair  of 
the  CDA  placed  special  emphasis  on  the  ability  of  the  CDA  to  play  an  `in-betweenness' 
role,  as  Blair  (1997:  25)  calls  it,  where  the  CDA  lies  between  the  state  on  one  side  and 
the  individual  or  family  on  the  other  (MS,  28-5-98).  However,  the  survey  revealed  an 
area  of  citizen  confusion  regarding  both  the  administrative  order  and  the  levels  of  the 
hierarchy  to  which  complaints  . 
had  to  be  addressed,  as  well  as  the  utilisation  of 
community  representatives  as  mediators.  While  most  of  the  respondents  interviewed 
were  conscious  that  complaints  had  to  be  addressed  first  to  the  East  Quarter,  only  29% 
mentioned  that  they  would  first  complain  to,  or  seek  support  from,  their  community 
representative.  Besides,  only  56%  of  the  survey  respondents  knew  about  the  precise 
purpose  and  activities  carried  out  by  the  CDA  and  its  geographical  location,  whereas  one 
third  were  familiar  with  their  political  representatives  at  the  area  level.  Although  such 
figures  reflect  considerable  accountability  for  CDA  performance,  they  reveal  a  gap  of 
_ 
communication  between  the  citizens  and  their  respective  CDA  representatives,  which  is 
discussed  in  the  following  Chapter  in  detail. 
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8.4-  Conclusions: 
The  dilemma  of  how  to  cover  the  costs  of  implementing  social  development 
programmes  in  a  low-income  area  is  a  particularly  challenging  one.  The  policy  context  of 
self-help  in  Nasriya  has  many  significant  characteristics.  On  the  one  hand,  local 
government  in  Aswan  and  the  GTZ  have  benefited  from  applying  the  `self-help' 
approach  through  the  saving  of  scarce  person-power  resources  and  thus  expenses,  by 
having  the  NCC,  and  later  the  CDA,  undertake  tasks  they  would  otherwise  have  had  to 
do  themselves.  These  included  issues  of  people's  mobilisation  and  organisation, 
determining  local  improvement  priorities  and  policing  collective  activities.  Local 
government  has  also  benefited  from  the  promotion  of  social  development  by  increasing 
local  self-reliance,  making  political  capital  by  demonstrating  that  the  people  and  the 
government  have  been  working  hand-in-hand,  and  increasing  political  and  social  justice 
by  co-opting  a  strong  community  leadership. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  were  a  host  of  reasons  expressed  by  the  people,  who 
had  been  active  participants  during  the  project,  as  to  why  community  participation  was 
deemed  desirable  by  them.  Some  of  the  main  benefits  they  confidently  perceived  referred 
to  the  reduction  of  the  project  costs  and,  therefore,  of  the  repayments  they  made  to  buy 
land.  Participation  also  ensured  that  the  improvements  proposed  would  correspond  to 
their  priorities,  and  that  the  links  with  their  CDA  or  relevant  community  centre  would 
persist  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  GTZ.  Moreover,  it  was  understood  that  effective 
participation  would  enhance  the  chance  of  establishing  some  local  autonomy,  reducing  - 
the  dependency  on  outside  agencies.  Finally,  there  was  a  belief  that  participation  would 
provide  local  society  with  the  basis  for  local  community  politicians  and  foster  strong 
relationships  with  city  politicians. 
Although  the  evidence  reveals  that  not  every  resident  wants  to  be  involved  in 
solving  problems,  every  citizen  who  participates  in  the  evaluation,  participates  in  all  other 
stages,  while  it  is  not  true  that  everyone  who  participates  in  the  implementation,  will 
participate  in  the  other  stages  as  well  (Table  8.6).  This  is  significant  in  the  context  of 
self-help  in  practice,  because  it  highlights  the  need  for  upgrading  projects  to  mobilise 
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both  the  less  and  non-active  groups,  while  sustaining  and  utilising  the  efforts  of  those, 
who  are  more  active. 
Table  8.6:  Degree  of  citizens'  participation  according  to  their  clusters  and  the  stage  of 
the  ungradina  nroiect 
Cluster  of 
participation 
Participate  in 
evaluation 
Participate  in 
planning 
Participate  in 
implementation 
Non  Active 
-  -  xx 
Less  Active 
-  xx  xxx 
Active  xxx  xxx  xxx 
(xx  )  Effective  participation  (xx)  Limited  (-  )  None 
Nasriya  community  has  been  empowered  through  organised  efforts  to  increase 
control  over  resources  and  related  institutions  by  groups  and  movements  which  hitherto 
had  been  excluded.  The  form  of  the  CDA  representation  in  Aswan  seems  to  coerce  its 
members  into  maintaining  contact  with  their  people  and  protecting  their  rights.  They 
learnt  from  the  mistakes  of  the  NCC.  When  the  first  organisational  model  for  the  CDA 
was  developed  in  1992,  it  involved  a  fairly  large  number  of  the  existing  community 
centres  and  engaged  the  previous  leader  of  the  NCC  as  a  symbolic  mediator  in  solving 
conflicts  and  disagreement  between  different  tribes.  The  CDA  is  currently  able  to 
determine  and  undertake  new  projects,  and  implement  and  manage  them  successfully  on 
its  own.  The  CDA  changes  are  grounded  in  local  life  and  priorities  while  incorporating 
resources  from  outside  the  neighbourhoods.  That  has  not  only  shifted  the  relationships 
between  key  actors  in  community  building  efforts  significantly,  but  also  created  a  long 
succession  of  charismatic  local  leaders,  thus  enhancing  sustainability. 
Unlike  the  CDA,  which  evolved  naturally  and  had  passed  through  a  sufficient 
period  before  the  withdrawal  of  the  upgrading  project,  it  was  essential  for  the  WDA  to 
establish  itself  as  an  independent  development  association  as  soon  as  possible  and  before 
the  completion  of  the  project  and  the  withdrawal  of  its  GAD  consultant.  But  while  the 
project  was  phasing  out,  the  WDA  was  still  trying  to  phase  up.  Hence  it  was  dependent 
on  support  from  the  GTZ  to  implement  its  programmes,  as  there  was  no  way  the  local 
women  community  could  pay  the  kind  of  rates  the  WDA  would  need  to  charge,  nor  the 
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real  expenses  needed  to  run  the  several  activities  included  in  the  newly  established 
Women's  Centre  and  to  make  them  self-sustaining.  The  WDA  needs  to  take  care  not  to 
move  from  one  dependent  relationship  to  another,  and  this  requires  leadership  and  vision. 
A  successful  WDA  will  need  to  have  persons  on  the  board  and  among  its  ranks  that  have 
strong  ties  to  business,  development,  NGO,  and  governmental  circles  in  order  for  it  to 
develop  and  survive.  Obviously,  the  skills  needed  to  run  the  Women's  Centre  and  cover 
costs,  are  quite  different  from  those  needed  to  do  simple  development  activities. 
It  is  evident  that  participation  and  sustainability  are  equated  with  co-operation, 
and  incorporation  into  pre-determined  activities  by  the  inhabitants.  In  a  truly 
participatory  approach,  all  those  affected  must  have  a  role  to  play  at  all  stages  of  the 
development  processes;  certain  groups,  e.  g.  the  poorest  or  the  disadvantaged,  should  not 
be  bypassed  any  more  because  they  might  be  the  most  active  ones  during  an  upgrading 
project.  Experience  shows  that  inclusive,  or  even  `put  first',  is  much  better  than 
exclusive.  It  is  important  to  make  a  distinction  between  voluntary  and  coercive 
participation,  particularly  when  extensive  material  incentives  are  employed  to  ensure  co- 
operation.  The  sustainability  of  community  participation  seems  even  more  complex;  its 
processes  should  be  analysed  within  a  wider  political  context,  which  is  the  focus  of  the 
next  Chapter. 
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Participation  means  active,  not  passive,  involvement  and  the  transformation  and 
positioning  of  the  urban  poor  as  politically  co-opted  legitimisers  of  decisions  affecting 
their  own  life  chances.  Successful  popular  participation  means  citizens'  translation  of 
participation  and  being  active  during  a  project's  life  sufficiently  to  ensure  sustainable 
political  participation  (World  Bank  1994).  If  citizens  are  not  mobilised  politically,  even 
though  they  find  the  government's  economic  development  activities  and  agenda 
objectionable,  they  may  be  "candidates  for  exit,  the  ultimate  withdrawal  from  the 
community"  (Sharp  and  Bath  1993:  221),  and  thus  alienated  and  politically  apathetic. 
Hirschman  (1970)  argued  that  apathetic  citizens  are  usually  waiting  for  someone  else  to 
take  action  and  to  deal  with  their  problems.  Yet  citizen  apathy  or  withdrawal  diminishes 
the  responsiveness  of  practitioners  and  the  legitimacy  of  legislators. 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  only  way  out  of  this  dilemma  is  to  restore  democratic 
principles  by  giving  citizens  a  positive,  inclusive  role  in  the  policy  process,  and  involving 
a  larger  number  of  them  in  public  decision  making  and  governance  processes  (Mayfield 
1996).  Involving  citizens  in  governance  can  develop  greater  understanding  of  the  role  of 
government  in  society,  the  complexities  of  policy  development,  the  difficulties  of 
achieving  consensus  among  diverse  interests  and  the  nature  of  the  public  administration 
(Turner  and  Hulme  1997).  Hitherto,  narrow  and  restrictive  citizen  involvement  processes 
placed  people  in  the  position  of  contesting  actions  of  government  instead  of  participating 
in  decision  making  and  problem  solving  activities.  Now  the  important  questions  are  how 
to  gauge  the  political  involvement  and  activation  of  citizens  in  DCs'  low-income  areas, 
and  how  to  involve  the  less  active  ones  in  the  governance  processes  if  they  are 
disinterested. 
In  Egypt,  most  citizens  of  low-income  areas  have  never  been  involved  in  formal 
political  processes  and  therefore  cannot  be  candidates  for  exit;  the  state's  policies  of 
political  exclusion  limit  and  control  mass  political  participation,  while  legitimacy  is 
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conceived  in  terms  of  providing  goods  and  services  (Singerman  1997).  Citizens  are  left 
to  participate  through  `informal'  networks  of  collaborative  action  at  neighbourhood 
level,  which  reinvigorate  their  communal  and  familial  networks.  Although  the  Nasriya 
approach  attempted  to  promote  democratic  principles  by  offering  a  larger  number  of 
opportunities  to  participate  effectively  in  the  policy  process  of  local  development,  which 
many  citizens  did,  the  deeper  question  concerns  the  `transformative'  potential  of 
participation  (World  Bank  1994). 
This  Chapter  evaluates  the  reality  of  post-project  community  empowerment.  To 
This  is  assessed  through  examining  the  transformative  potential  of  participation,  i.  e.  the 
translation  of  participatory  practices  during  the  project  into  potential  political 
participation.  The  latter  includes  formal  membership  of  civil  society  organisations, 
participation  in  local  and  national  democratic  processes,  citizen  demand  making  and 
relationship  with  local  government,  as  well  as  communal  and  familial  `informal'  networks 
of  collaborative  actions  to  facilitate  access,  or  provide  alternatives,  to  the  formal 
resources  of  the  state.  `Informal'  networks  are  examined  through  the  transformation  of 
sub-communities  in  Nasriya  from  use-value  conflictual  modes  to  sustained  collaborative 
modes  of  participation  and  problem-solving.  These  are  the  crux  of  sustainability 
arguments  and  the  key-areas  to  understand  the  reality  of  self-reliance  and  administration 
at  community  level. 
9.1-  Mobilising  formal  participation: 
Formal  participation  in  local  and  national  democratic  processes  may  be  gauged  by 
citizen  electoral  involvement  at  the  CDA,  Aswan  Popular  Local  Council  (PLC)  and  the 
Egyptian  Parliament  levels,  as  well  as  by  their  familiarity  with  their  representatives  at 
each  level.  The  familiarity  of  citizens  with  their  representatives  and  the  means  for 
contacting  them  are  the  minimal  requirements  for  a  claim  to  participate  actively  in 
governance  (Turner  and  Hulme  1997).  It  has  been  argued  that  citizen  mobilisation  to 
participate  in  the  democratic  processes  cannot  be  secured  by  legislation  that  does  no 
more  than  restraining  the  government's  own  executive  arm  (Cranston  1967).  "One  has 
the  right  to  vote  only  if  one's  vote  is  counted  and  given  effect  in  a  system  of  collective 
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decision  that  determines  policy,  leadership  and  authority"  (Woldron  1998:  309). 
Accordingly,  individuals  are  mobilised  into  group-based  political  action  and  problem- 
solving  activity  on  the  basis  of  their  assessment  of  the  impact  of  the  proposed  policies  or 
existing  arrangements  (Hirschman  1970;  Olson  1971;  Sharp  and  Bath  1993).  However, 
`political  awareness'  extends  beyond  the  familiarity  of  citizens  with  their  representatives 
and  the  means  for  contacting  them  for  assistance,  to  cover  areas  of  knowledge,  attitudes, 
and  resources  (Jones  1980).  Both  a  perception  of  need  for  assistance,  and  political 
awareness  are  required  to  activate  high  levels  of  citizen  interaction  with  officials  and 
representatives,  while  broader  longer-range  issues  in  the  developmental  sphere  are 
required  to  mobilise  citizens  for  a  transformative  form  of  participation  (Sharp  and  Bath 
1993:  220). 
The  CDA  acts  as  the  parent  civil  society  organisation  in  Nasriya.  Although  it  is 
conunitted  to  a  wide  range  of  objectives  to  increase  the  well-being  of  residents, 
grassroots  support  has  remained  weak.  Despite  several  publicity  campaigns  by  the  CDA 
to  encourage  a  larger  proportion  of  adult  residents  to  become  members,  membership  did 
not  exceed  1000  (with  15%  women)  until  1998,  representing  only  6-8%  of  the  eligible 
residents.  While  this  figure  increased  almost  four  times  between  1993  and  1998,  it  is  still 
low,  which  necessitates  a  close  scrutiny  of  the  real  impact  of  the  project  arrangements  to 
institutionalise  sustainability,  and  the  extent  to  which  the  project  instilled  the  concept  of 
community  participation.  The  survey  revealed  that  only  56%  of  HoHs  knew  the  precise 
purpose  of  the  CDA,  its  activities,  and  its  geographical  location.  Moreover,  a  quarter  of 
them  (14%)  discredited  the  existing  Board  of  the  CDA  because  it  was  not  seen  to  fairly 
represent  all  home  origins  in  the  last  election.  "People  of  Ques  and  Luxor  occupy  most 
of  the  Board's  seats  and  twist  its  priorities  to  favour  their  own  people",  was  a  complaint 
heard  several  times  from  HoHs  who  were  not  convinced  that  the  CDA  representation 
and  operation  was  equitable.  Although  Nubian  and  Helal  are  minorities  in  Nasriya, 
representing  only  about  20%  of  the  population,  their  respondents  claimed  that  both 
groups  were  not  represented  at  all  in  the  last  election,  a  criticism  which  was  found  to  be 
Cý 
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true  during  the  fieldwork  survey.  But  it  is  also  true  that  60%  of  them  declared  that  they, 
did  not  participate  in  the  last  election  of  the  CDA's  Board  in  1998. 
Although  the  CDA  is  still  in  its  first  phase  of  well-establishment  and  getting 
known  by  Nasriya  residents,  which  takes  time,  community  support  for  it  may  decline  in 
the  future  due  to  a  widespread  distrust  of  its  existing  structure;  this  is  diminishing  the 
consensus  between  supporters  and  groups  as  well  as  individuals'  political  activities  and 
participation.  The  first  step  required  to  avoid  this  situation  is  to  drop  issues  of  home 
origins  and  ethnicity  and  focus  instead  on  genuine  community  development.  "I  can  see 
this  is  materialising  slowly  but  surely",  asserted  Professor  Salah  Arafa  of  the  American 
University  in  Cairo,  and  the  GTZ  Community  Development  Consultant  for  Nasriya  (SA, 
04-06-98).  Only  one  third  of  HoHs  interviewed  (32%)  were  familiar  with  their 
representatives  in  the  CDA  (knew  their  names).  Moreover,  only  16%  who  were  members 
of  the  CDA,  considered  that  their  votes  `counted',  that  they  would  affect  the  CDA's 
decision-making  system,  leadership  and  authority,  and  thus  voted  in  the  last  election.  Of 
course  those  of  Ques  and  Luxor,  had  been  active  and  voted  so  as  to  support  their 
relatives,  and  thus  maintain  the  existing  network  of  patron-clientelism  in  the  CDA's 
power  hierarchy  and  relations,  as  noted  earlier.  This  may  account  for  the  fact 
participation  rates  were  much  lower  than  the  knowledge  respondents  had  of  their 
representatives  and  voting  behaviour  in  and  to  the  Popular  Local  Council  and  the 
Egyptian  Parliament  (Figure  9.1). 
Figure  9.1:  Nasriya-  Citizens'  formal  participation 
Know  CDA  reps.  32% 
Vote  at  CDA  16% 
Know  PLC  reps.  54% 
Vote  at  PLC  35% 
Know  Parliament  reps.  54% 
Vote  at  Parliament  36% 
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The  familiarity  of  respondents  with  their  representatives  (knowledge) 
corresponded  to  their  electoral  behaviour.  All  respondents  voting  at  any  level  were 
familiar  with  their  representatives,  and  many  of  them  had  been  in  touch  with  their 
representatives.  Those  who  did  not  vote  in  the  last  election  at  the  Popular  Local  Council 
(65%)  or  the  Parliament  (64%)  held  very  negative  views  of  the  government's  rigging  of 
elections.  They  claimed  that  it  would  make  no  difference  whether  they  went  or  not 
because  the  elected  politicians  had  been  selected  already.  Bearing  in  mind  the 
bureaucratic  difficulties  they  often  face  (as  discussed  in  Chapter  5),  they  were  not  even 
keen  on  the  issuing  of  voting  cards.  However,  such  views  were  completely  discounted  by 
the  people  who  voted.  "During  Popular  Local  Council  and  Parliament  elections, 
candidates  coming  from  my  home  area  [Ques]  would  usually  arrange  campaigning, 
mobilise  people,  introduce  their  agenda  and  arrange  means  of  transportation,  so  that 
every  eligible  vote  belonging  to  the  social  group  would  count",  said  Head  of  the  Shaghab 
Community  Centre.  "If  every  citizen  became  indifferent  and  did  not  use  his  right  to  vote, 
no  alteration  of  one's  rights  and  duties  would  occur  in  our  society",  he  added  (AW,  20- 
05-98). 
The  respondents  familiarity  with  their  political  representatives  and  their  electoral 
participation  may  be  classified,  by  the  same  procedures  as  people's  participation  during 
the  project.  The  respondents  are  clustered  into  three  groups,  `activists',  `watch-dogs' 
and  `free-riders',  terms  conceptualising  citizenship  along  a  continuum  of  desire  to  affect, 
or  to  avoid  and  ignore,  the  local  public  policy  process.  These  allow  the  major  forces  that 
cause  and  shape  participation  to  be  analysed,  shedding  light  on  the  conditions  for 
political  mobilisation,  the  characteristics  of  each  cluster  and  the  direction  of  citizen 
involvement.  The  three  terms  originated  from  contrasting  two  models  of  governance, 
`reinventing  government'  versus  `citizen  owners'  or  `active  citizenship'  (Schachter 
1997).  `Reinventing  government'  is  a  way  of  creating  change  through  passive  managerial 
and  consumerist  techniques,  which  yields  less  active  citizens  or  `free-riders'.  Active 
citizenship  concerns  involves  purposive  action  to  influence  public-sector  decision 
making,  often  out  of  concern  for  the  public  interest  as  well  as  private  gain.  Hence,  the 
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activist  is  placed  at  the  other  end  of  the  continuum  and  defined  as  "a  person  deeply, 
involved  in  a  variety  of  community  issues  and  organisations.  The  activist  cares  about  the 
community  and  wants  to  have  a  positive,  lasting  impact"  (Box  1998:  74).  Active  citizens 
may  shape  the  political  agenda  and  deliberate  on  the  ends  that  the  government  should 
pursue  as  well  as  evaluating  how  well  particular  public-sector  programmes  work.  An 
active  public  is  essential  for  increasing  agency  effectiveness  and  responsiveness. 
In  contrast,  the  term  `free-rider'  is  taken  from  the  economic  study  of  public 
services  and  is  often  associated  with  those  who  receive  free  service  paid  for  by  others 
(Olson  1971).  Interchangeably,  it  is  used  to  mean  "a  person  who  pays  little  attention  to 
community  affairs  and  allows  others  to  do  the  work  of  citizenship,  the  work  of  studying 
and  discussing  issues  and  helping  to  make  decisions  about  local  public  policy"  (Box 
1998:  73).  This  person  is  obviously  a  `consumer'  of  public  services  and,  therefore, 
located  at  the  end  of  the  continuum.  Of  course  the  two  extreme  positions,  `active 
citizenship',  versus  `consumerist  free-riding  citizenship'  tend  to  be  less  absolute  in  the 
real  world;  in  the  middle  is  the  `watch-dog'  who  is  attentive  to  community  matters  but 
becomes  involved  in  only  a  few  key  issues  of  direct  interest  (Lowery  et  al.  1992:  76).  As 
Table  9.1  illustrates,  political  activists  participated  in  at  least  two  levels  of  elections  and 
knew  their  representatives  (31  cases  representing  29%  of  all  respondents).  The  watch- 
dogs,  who  knew  the  candidates  but  did  not  vote  at  all  levels,  comprised  36%  of  the 
respondents,  while  the  free-riders  were  either  not  active  at  all  or  participated  at  only  one 
level,  the  CDA  (38  cases  representing  35%). 
Table  9.1:  Nasriya-  Clusters  of  political  participat  ion  after  the  project 
Know  representatives/  (Cluster  1)  (Cluster  2)  (Cluster  3) 
voted  in  elections  Activists  Watch-dogs  Free-riders 
Column  %  Column  %  Column  % 
Know  representatives  at: 
-  CDA  level  58  20  15 
-  Local  council  100  72  00 
-  Parliament  97  72  00 
Vote  at: 
-  CDA  level  39  08  05 
-  Local  council  100  10  00 
-  Parliament  97  23  00 
All  Groups  (No.  )  (31)  (39)  (38) 
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Although  it  has  been  argued  that  the  activists  are  the  group  most  engaged  in, 
deliberation  to  influence  urban  governance  and  the  decision-making  processes  over 
issues  related  to  their  lives,  it  is  acknowledged  that  individuals'  behaviour  is  shaped  by 
multiple  influences.  People,  as  `actors',  are  always  situated  in  particular  conjunctions  at 
particular  periods,  with  the  context  of  their  actions  contributing  to  their  sense  of  identity 
(Sayer  1985;  1989).  Thus  it  was  not  surprising  that  there  was  no  clear  pattern  among 
HoHs  in  which  voting  at  a  certain  level,  determined  voting  at  all  other  levels  as  well. 
Even  the  most  active  group,  the  activists,  were  inconsistent  in  their  political 
participation.  While  all  of  them  voted  in  the  last  election  of  the  Aswan  Local  Council  (27 
cases),  less  voted  at  the  Parliamentary  level,  and  only  a  third  of  them  voted  at  the  CDA 
level.  The  important  questions  concerned  whether  or  not  active  people  during  the 
project's  planning,  implementation  and  evaluation  have  remained  politically  active 
afterwards,  and  why,  if  they  have  not. 
As  Table  9.2  shows,  the  transformative  potential  of  participation,  from  being 
active  during  the  project  into  activists  after  the  project,  was  inconclusive.  Those  active 
group  during  the  project  were  divided  almost  equally  between  the  activists,  watch-dogs 
and  free-riders,  while  most  of  the  less  active  group  during  the  project  were  found 
activists  (52%)  instead  of  becoming  watch-dogs.  Even  more  than  half  of  the  not  active 
group,  who  were  expected  to  be  free-riders,  were  either  activists  (10%)  or  watch-dogs 
(46%).  The  association  between  the  degree  of  participation  in  the  project  and  formal 
political  behaviour  was  insignificant  statistically  (Chi  square  at  p-level  0.195). 
Table  9.2:  Nasriva-  Participation  during  the  oroiect  by  clusters  of  nolitical  narticination 
Participation 
during  the 
(Cluster  1) 
Activists 
(Cluster  2) 
Watch-dogs 
(Cluster  3) 
Free-riders 
Total 
project  No.  % 
Active  37%  33%  30%  27  100 
Less  active  52%  22%  26%  31  100 
Not  active  10%  46%  44%  50  100 
All  groups  (No.  )  31  (39)  38  108 
Although  this  table  reveals  that  the  translation  of  the  `active  citizens'  during  the 
project  into  `activists'  in  the  formal  political  arena  was  not  linear,  the  impact  of  the 
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upgrading  project  should  not  be  dismissed.  The  majority  of  respondents  were  not 
politically  acquiescent;  a  large  section  were  `activists',  who  participated  in  the  CDA's, 
Popular  Local  Council's  and  Parliament's  elections  and  knew  their  representatives,  or 
`watch-dogs',  who  were  more  likely  to  know  their  representatives  than  to  actually  vote. 
Only  one  third  of  HoHs  were  classified  as  `free-riders',  who  participated  at  only  one 
level  in  the  formal  political  arena,  the  CDA.  The  following  section  attempts  to  reveal 
variables  which  may  explain  why  individuals  are,  or  are  not,  mobilised  into  active  formal 
participation. 
9.2-  Explanations  for  degree  of  participation: 
In  order  to  understand  who  is  politically  active  and  who  is  not,  and  why,  the 
clusters  of  political  participation  are  examined  against  the  same  sets  of  personal 
variables,  which  were  used  before  to  shed  light  on  participation  during  the  project.  The 
data  reveal  that  although  many  younger  people  (less  than  45  years),  had  become 
marginally  more  active  than  during  the  project,  they  were  still  less  likely  to  be  activists 
(24%)  than  the  older  group  (31%)  (Table  9.3).  The  association  between  age  and  political 
participation  was  insignificant  statistically.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  younger 
HoHs  were  most  likely  to  be  watch-dogs,  and  less  likely  to  belong  to  the  free-riders, 
perhaps  because  of  the  better  education  most  of  them  had  received. 
Table  9.3:  Nasriya-  Aye  by  clusters  of  political  participation 
(Cluster  1)  (Cluster  2)  (Cluster  3)  Total 
Characteristics  Activists  Watch-dogs  Free-riders 
No.  % 
Age: 
-  45  year  old  or  more  31%  32%  37%  71  100 
-  Less  than  45  24%  43%  33%  37  100 
All  groups  (No.  )  (31)  (39)  (38)  108 
Education  did  seem  to  activate  political  participation,  producing  a  highly 
significant  chi-square  value  at  (p-level  0.0006).  Higher  education  was  closely  associated 
with  active  political  participation;  48%  of  those  who  had  received  secondary  to 
university  education  were  activists  compared  to  only  6%  of  the  illiterates.  This  might 
also  explain  why  public  sector  employees  were  more  politically  active  than  those  in  the 
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private  sector  or  self-employed  entrepreneurs  in  Nasriya,  with  over  a  third  of  them. 
(35%)  being  classified  as  activists  (Table  9.4). 
Table  9.4:  Nasriva-  Education  and  occupation  by  clusters  of  political  narticination 
(Cluster  1)  (Cluster  2)  (Cluster  3)  Total 
Characteristics  Activists  Watch-dogs  Free-riders 
No.  % 
Education: 
-Illiterate  06%  36%  58%  36  100 
-  Literate  to  basic  school  36%  34%  33%  47  100 
-  Secondary  to  university  48%  40%  12%  25  100 
All  groups  (No.  )  (31)  (39)  (38)  108 
Occupation: 
-  Public  employee  35%  38%  27%  45  100 
-  Private  sector  or  self- 
employed  entrepreneurs  15%  56%  29%  27  100 
-  Pensioner,  unemployed 
or  housewife  30%  20%  50%  36  100 
All  groups  (No.  )  (31)  (39)  (38)  108 
There  was  a  major  shift  as  well  in  the  behaviour  of  the  private  sector  employees 
and  the  self-employed  entrepreneurs  in  Nasriya;  their  previous  tendency  was  to  be  less 
active  (33%)  or  not  active  (48%),  but  the  majority  were  either  political  activists  (15%) 
or  watch-dogs  (56%).  Of  course  the  `formal'  political  arena  has  a  great  impact  on  the 
daily  business  of  self-employed  entrepreneurs  and  therefore  it  was  in  their  interest  to 
participate  effectively;  the  association  between  occupation  and  formal  political  behaviour 
produced  a  significant  chi  square  value  at  (p-level  0.05). 
Income  also  was  a  significant  factor  in  inducing  higher  levels  of  political 
participation  (a  chi-square  value  of  16.82,  significant  at  p-level  0.05).  The  activists  had 
the  highest  incomes  reported  among  the  three  groups  (£E650/month)  and  the  highest 
median  value  (£E300/month),  though  the  latter  is  similar  to  that  recorded  by  the  watch- 
dogs  and  corresponds  to  the  general  average  of  Nasriya  as  whole.  Meanwhile,  the  free- 
riders  had  the  lowest  incomes  (£E18-500/month)  as  well  as  the  lowest  median  value 
(£E200/month),  although  the  range  was  large  (Figure  9.2) 
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Figure  9.2:  Nasriya-  Income  by  clusters  of  political  participation 
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Home  area  again  seemed  to  play  a  role  in  activating  political  participation, 
although  not  a  statistically  significant  one  (p-level  0.08).  Unlike  their  previous  level  of 
participation  during  the  project,  people  coming  from  Luxor  were  not  the  most  active 
group  (Table  9.5).  Being  the  largest  group  in  Nasriya,  it  seemed  that  people  of  Ques 
have  become  better  organised  at  all  electoral  levels;  after  taking  most  of  the  CDA's  seats 
previously  held  by  people  from  Luxor,  better  `self-mobilisation'  took  place  during 
elections  for  both  the  Aswan  Local  Council  and  the  Parliament.  Moreover,  because 
almost  half  of  the  respondents  coming  from  Ques  were  private  sector  employees  or  self- 
employed  entrepreneurs,  who  tended  to  be  more  politically  active,  31%  were  activists 
compared  to  only  17%  active  during  the  project. 
The  other  notable  difference  concerned  the  Nubians;  46%  of  them  were  political 
activists  compared  to  only  18%  during  the  project.  The  Nubians  have  been  culturally  and 
economically  distressed  since  some  16  thousand  of  their  families  who  used  to  live  south 
of  Aswan  went  through  a  major  relocation  programme,  prior  to  the  construction  of  the 
High  Dam  and  the  formulation  of  Lake'  Nasser  in  the  1960s,  which  submerged  their 
238 Chapter  9  Mobilising  the  Citizen 
villages  (NCSCR  1985).  They  moved  to  newly-established  villages  north  of  Aswan  and, 
many  came  to  live  with  their  relatives  in  Nasriya.  As  has  been  hypothesised,  such  a 
distressed  climate  encourages  a  high  degree  of  collaboration  and  solidarity  (Sharp  and 
Bath  1993:  225),  which  increases  the  transformative  potential  of  participation.  Many 
Nubians  explained  with  pride  their  cohesive  community  spirit  and  keenness  to  reinforce  a 
sense  of  common  identity  through  sticking  together  and  supporting  their  political 
representatives,  especially  at  the  national  level. 
Table  9.5:  Nasriva-  Home  origin  by  clusters  of  political  participation 
Home  origin 
(Cluster  1) 
Activists 
(Cluster  2) 
Watch-dogs 
(Cluster  3) 
Free-riders 
Total 
No.  % 
Luxor  27%  50%  23%  26  100 
Ques  31%  26%  43%  42  100 
Helal  08%  69%  23%  13  100 
Nubians  46%  36%  18%  11  100 
Other  31%  13%  56%  16  100 
All  groups  (No.  )  (31)  (39)  (38)  108 
Spatial  location  might  be  expected  to  influence  the  degree  of  formal  participation, 
considering  the  greater  accessibility  of  lower  and  middle  sectors  to  the  locales  of  political 
institutions  and  meetings.  Spatial  location  perpendicular  to  the  Kima  Canal,  middle 
sectors  or  north  and  south  peripheries,  showed  a  specific  pattern  of  citizen  activism  and 
political  participation,  most  probably  related  to  the  social  distribution  of  home  origin, 
though  this  was  not  significant  statistically  (p-level  0.24).  While  a  half  of  HoHs  living  in 
the  middle  sectors  were  classified  as  free-riders,  a  higher  proportion  of  those  living  in  the 
north  (67%)  or  in  the  south  (71%)  were  classified  as  activists  or  watch-dogs.  In  contrast, 
location  by  spatial  elevation  differentiation  seemed  more  influential,  though  was  again 
not  significant  in  statistical  terms  (p-level  0.09). 
While  most  people  living  in  the  lower  area  were  activists  (37%)  or  watch-dogs 
(37%),  those  living  in  the  upper  elevated  area,  with  less  education  and  income,  were 
predominantly  free-riders  (52%)  or  watch-dogs  (41%).  Living  in  a  remote  area  without 
basic  services  raised  objective  needs  which  made  them  participate  very  actively  during 
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the  project,  but  the  mechanisms  for  more  abstract  participation  were  probably  not  so  well 
grasped.  Respondents  living  in  central  Nasriya  were  divided  almost  equally  between  the 
activists,  watch-dogs  and  free-riders. 
Variables  of  land  legal  status,  house  ownership  and  housing  physical  conditions 
(property  stakes)  are  strongly  linked  to  personal  characteristics  and  spatial  location,  and 
were  thus  expected  to  influence  the  degree  of  political  mobilisation  and  formal 
participation  in  Nasriya.  Land  legal  status  seemed  to  influence  political  activation;  70% 
of  those  living  on  legally  owned  plots  were  either  activists  or  watch-dogs,  whilst  around 
the  same  proportion  of  those  living  in  illegally  occupied  government-land  were  free- 
riders  and  none  of  them  was  activist.  Although  most  of  the  `hekr'  leaseholders,  the  quasi 
legal  articulation  of  land  supply,  were  either  watch-dogs  (41%)  or  free-riders  (33%), 
they  were  all  motivated  to  improve  their  life  standards  as  discussed  earlier.  Obviously, 
those  living  on  illegally  occupied  land  were  the  new  comers  to  Nasriya,  mainly  settled  in 
the  upper  elevated  areas,  the  poorest  and  the  least  educated,  hence,  were  the  least 
politically  active  group.  However,  there  were  only  7  cases  of  the  latter  in  the  sample  and 
therefore  the  association  between  land  legal  status  and  political  participation  was  too 
weak  to  be  statistically  significant. 
In  contrast,  house  ownership  status  was  very  influential  (chi-square  significant  at 
p-level  0.003).  The  owner-occupiers  were  more  likely  to  be  politically  active  than  the 
tenants;  32%  as  against  only  17%  respectively  (Table  9.6).  Tenants  tended  to  belong  to 
the  lowest  income  group  in  Nasriya  in  general  (65%  earned  the  median  value  or  below), 
and  appeared  earlier  to  be  less  politically  active.  Thus  61%  of  the  tenants  were  classified 
as  free-riders  and  22%  as  watch-dogs.  Nevertheless,  because  tenants  were  aware  of  the 
different  means  that  landlords  use  to  try  to  evict  them,  with  the  support  of  a  friend  or  a 
relative  working  in  the  municipality,  the  majority  interviewed  had  no  faith  in  formal 
institutions  and  associated  municipal  officials  with  favouritism  and  corruption.  Clearly 
this  `mistrust'  does  not  promote  high  levels  of  political  participation  in  any  formal 
institution  or  decision  making  processes. 
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Table  9.6:  Nasriva-  House  ownership  and  condition  by  clusters  of  political  participation 
(Cluster  1)  (Cluster  2)  (Cluster  3)  Total 
Characteristics  Activists  Watch-dogs  Free-riders 
No.  % 
House  ownership: 
-  Owner-occupiers  32%  40%  28%  85  100 
-  Tenants  17%  22%  61%  23  100 
All  groups  (No.  )  (31)  (39)  (38)  108 
Housing  condition: 
-  Good  36%  36%  28%  56  100 
-  Fair  30%  42%  28%  33  100 
-  Bad  05%  21%  74%  19  100 
All  groups  (No.  )  (31)  (39)  (38)  108 
Housing  physical  condition,  was  also  very  important  (chi-square  11.18,  at  p-level 
0.003).  HoHs  living  in  good  housing  conditions  were  much  more  likely  to  become 
politically  active  than  those  living  in  bad  conditions;  36%  as  against  only  5%  respectively 
(Table  9.6).  Apparently,  higher  income  groups  were  more  able  to  legalise  their  land 
status  (buy  the  land  and  acquire  a  clear  land-title),  procure  an  official  building  permit  and 
either  improve  or  reconstruct  their  houses.  As  expected,  most  of  the  respondents  living 
in  fair  housing  condition  (42%)  belonged  to  the  watch-dogs. 
9.3-  Citizens'  need  awareness: 
In  order  to  predict  the  direction  of  community  activation  in  Nasriya  and  the 
extent  to  which  it  might  lead  to  sustainability,  two  additional  criteria  of  citizens'  formal 
activation  are  examined:  citizens'  need-awareness,  and  relationship  with  the  municipality. 
Citizens  showed  quite  high  levels  of  consciousness  regarding  individual  contacting 
government  institutions  and  complaints  (Table  9.7).  Almost  all  HoHs  interviewed  (96%) 
knew  which  administrative  body  they  belonged  to  (East  Quarter),  regardless  of  the 
cluster  of  `formal'  political  participation  they  belonged  to.  Moreover,  88%  of  them  were 
quite  familiar  with  the  administrative  hierarchy  and  had  dealt  before  with  the 
municipality.  They  had  also  been  in  frequent  contact  with  various  departments  of  local 
government  to  resolve  any  major  physical  problems  that  had  occurred  in  their  areas. 
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Table  9.7:  Nasriya-  Types  of  citizen's  formal  and  informal  activation/participation 
Individuals  Group-based 
Formal  political  -  Familiarity  with  political  -  Electoral  campaigning. 
participation  representatives.  -  Direct  democracy  efforts. 
-  Voting.  -  The  CDA  and  the  WDA  type  of 
representation 
Formal  and  informal  -  Individual  contacting  -  Organised  demonstration/protest. 
protest  and  government  institutions.  -  Neighbourhood  organisation. 
complaints  -  Complaints.  -  Lobbying/demand  making. 
-  Organisational  litigation. 
Informal  activation,  -  Volunteer  work.  -  Established  social  control  and  self- 
social  solidarity,  -  Communal  and  familial  regulation  measures. 
collective  action  and  solidarity.  -  Over  39  registered  and  unregistered 
problem-solving  community  centres  (GROs). 
-  Group-based  operation  and 
co-production. 
Source:  Author-  Adapted  from  Sharp  and  Bath  (1993:  215) 
Obviously,  those  who  had  not  dealt  before  with  the  municipality  (12%),  had 
neither  legalised  their  land  and  house  status  nor  had  they  legal  infrastructure  connections. 
They  had  also  never  contacted  any  of  the  local  government  entities  before  to  resolve 
physical  problems  affecting  the  infrastructure  networks,  no  matter  whether  it  was  a 
minor  blockage  or  a  major  break  down.  While  some  might  solve  the  minor  physical 
problems  themselves,  many  adopted  an  indifferent  position  and  left  the  problem  to 
deteriorate.  This  situation  was  quite  notable  in  specific  areas  throughout  Nasriya, 
specially  at  the  southern  periphery.  Although  those  who  solved  problems  themselves 
might  be  seen  positively  as  a  type  of  `informal'  community  collaborating  for  group-based 
problem-solving,  it  can  also  be  argued  that  all  those  who  have  never  dealt  before  with  the 
municipality,  even  though  they  found  the  government's  development  agenda 
objectionable,  obstruct  the  processes  of  bottom-up  construction  of  collaborative  planning 
with  the  local  government,  thus  decreasing  agency  effectiveness. 
People's  awareness  of  the  administrative  hierarchy  and  their  rights,  was  not  an 
indication  of  their  satisfaction  with  the  bureaucracy.  The  assessment  of  HoHs  of  the  co- 
operation  and  attitude  of  the  municipality  in  Aswan  ranged  widely.  Although  nearly  one 
third  of  the  respondents  described  the  officials'  assistance  as  helpful,  a  tenth  considered 
them  unco-operative.  Approximately  one  half  associated  civil  servants  with  red  tape, 
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favouritism,  corruption  and  arrogance  in  descending  order.  Although  a  considerable 
number  of  those  who  had  dealt  before  with  the  bureaucracy  had  no  complaints  of  the 
service  (41%),  over  a  quarter  (27%)  claimed  that  they  had  to  bribe  some  municipal 
officials,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  order  to  get  work  done.  Nearly  the  same  proportion 
complained  of  long  bureaucratic  procedures  and  their  time  consumption,  but  only  6% 
claimed  to  have  suffered  from  mistreatment  or  inequality. 
However,  the  inhabitants  of  Nasriya  were  aware  of  the  sort  of  problems  facing 
the  municipality,  which  enabled  them  to  be  in  a  position  to  judge  their  officials, 
notwithstanding  that  many  of  them  had  been  vulnerable  and  had  experienced  quite 
alarming  misbehaviour  from  some  public  servants  in  Aswan.  Indeed,  there  are  no 
common  standards  for  public  servants'  behaviour  and  therefore  the  conduct  of  officials 
should  be  legitimately  subject  to  public  scrutiny:  "Practices  differ  from  country  to 
country  on  such  issues  as  accepting  gifts  or  other  benefits,  declaring  ownership  of  shares 
or  property,  personal  or  business  relationships,  and  participation  on  private  boards" 
(OECD  1997).  As  one  of  the  three  assumptions  needed  for  an  effective  role  of  civil 
society  organisations  in  sustaining  development,  enhancing  democratisation  and 
protecting  citizens'  rights,  is  efficient  public  sector  performance  and  appropriate  ethics, 
these  issues  are  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  next  Chapter. 
9.4-  Informal  networks  and  activation: 
The  Nasriya  residents  use  traditional  ethics  and  `informal'  networks  as  a  way  to 
bypass  the  corruption,  repression,  and  ineptitude  of  the  government.  The  citizens  have 
reinvigorated  their  `informal'  networks  to  facilitate  access,  or  provide  alternatives,  to  the 
`formal'  resources  of  the  state,  because  of  the  deficiencies  of  an  overly  bureaucratised 
and  largely  authoritarian  society.  Individuals,  families  and  groups  try  to  supply  services 
through  co-production  systems.  Informal  and  traditional  networks  represent  and  further 
the  interests  of  the  groups  who  have  little  access  to,  or  influence  over,  the  formal 
political  processes.  They  do  not  displace  the  formal  power  of  the  state;  they  constitute  a 
separate  and  independent  system  filling  the  gaps  of  the  excluded,  as  the  first  step  to 
change.  "God  does  not  develop  a  society,  unless  members  start  the  changes  themselves", 
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according  to  many  HoHs  referring  to  a  `Hadith'  (saying)  of  the  Prophet  Mohammed. 
This  strong  moral  code  not  only  configures  citizens'  protest,  demand-making  and 
organised  litigation,  but  also  directs  their  collaborative  activation  and  `informal' 
networks,  which  are  as  important  as  their  formal  forms  of  political  participation  (Table 
9.7).  They  are  also  crucial  for  self-administration  and  sustainability  at  the  individual, 
household,  social  group  and  community  levels. 
At  the  individual  level,  79%  of  the  survey  respondents  belonged  to  one  of  the  39 
registered  or  unregistered  neighbourhood  centres  (GRO)  in  Nasriya,  pay  its  annual  fees 
and  contributions  for  its  maintenance,  and  frequently  participate  in  its  activities.  In 
addition,  89%  of  those  interviewed  had  regularly  volunteered  for  a  wide  range  of 
activities,  including  helping  their  neighbours  in  good  and  hard  times,  and  giving  a  hand  in 
the  construction  or  physical  improvement  of  the  community  services  in  the  area, 
including  their  own  neighbourhood  centres.  Meanwhile,  76%  of  all  respondents  affirmed 
that  their  help  would  extend  to  any  neighbour  in-need,  and  is  not  exclusively  for  their 
own  extended  family,  relatives,  clan  or  religion  members.  All  those  who  had  volunteered 
before  had  also  donated  money,  at  least  once  before,  to  construct  a  new  mosque  or 
community  centre,  or  to  improve  one  of  the  existing  facilities  in  the  area. 
Solidarity  and  collaboration  were  most  notable  at  the  household  level,  whether  in 
nuclear  or  extended  families.  More  than  half  of  the  HoHs  interviewed  (56%)  asserted 
that  they  would  extend  the  house  vertically  and  allow  their  progeny  to  live  with  them 
when  they  got  married.  However  this  tendency  seemed  to  vary  in  nature;  while  Nubian  - 
HoHs  usually  allow  their  daughters  to  share  the  house  with  them  for  a  while  until  their 
husbands  get  an  independent  house,  other  groups  allow  only  their  adult  sons  to  share  the 
house  with  them  for  good  (the  total  number  of  multi-family  extended  houses  represented 
33%  of  the  total  survey  population).  The  other  form  of  family  solidarity  was  economic; 
almost  half  the  HoHs,  who  had  offspring  living  with  them,  claimed  that  they  would 
usually  receive  financial  contributions  from  their  adult  children  every  month  or  a 
contribution  linked  to  the  household  expenses,  e.  g.  buying  food  or  drinks,  paying  some 
of  the  monthly  bills  or  contributing  to  house  maintenance.  Such  contributions  were 
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difficult  to  quantify.  Even  those  who  did  not  receive  any  contribution  linked  this  to  the 
unemployed  status  of  their  descendants  and  not  to  the  disloyalty  of  their  adult  children  or 
extended  family  members. 
The  social  groups  in  Nasriya  have  also  established  control  and  self-regulation 
measures.  All  community  leaders  agreed  that  the  rule  in  the  case  of  disputes  is  to  avoid 
the  intervention  of  people  other  than  close  relatives  or  those  from  the  same  social  group, 
if  the  conflict  is  among  those  from  the  same  home  origin;  it  should  be  resolved  in  the 
nearest  community  centre  if  it  is  between  individuals  from  different  home  origins  (AA, 
05-11-98;  AH,  21-03-98;  AW,  20-05-1998;  FN  15-10-98;  MK  29-09-98;  MS,  28-5- 
1998;  and  ZA,  15-02-1998).  Each  group  is  self-regulating,  capable  of  solving  its  own 
problems  internally  by  peaceful  means.  To  take  a  case  outside  the  community  is 
considered  an  admission  of  failure  for  the  whole  community.  The  survey  revealed  very 
low  rates  of  violence,  bullying,  drug  abuse,  theft  or  robbery,  while  murder  was  almost 
unheard  of.  Community  leaders  attributed  that  to  two  distinctive  traits  of  the  average 
resident's  personality  in  Nasriya:  honesty  and  a  belief  in  peaceful  coexistence.  They  all 
also  agreed  that  the  upgrading  project  enhanced  these  attributes  and  stopped  other  sorts 
of  conflicts;  people  used  to  fight  because  of  discharging  their  sewage  in  the  streets.  The 
upgrading  project  reduced  conflicts  over  their  basic  needs,  such  as  clean  water  and 
subsidised  food. 
At  community  level,  volunteerism  and  co-production  have  been  inclusive, 
regardless  of  the  citizen's  socio-economic  status,  group  or  gender.  Contrary  to  some  - 
western  evidence  that  volunteers  are  more  likely  to  be  from  higher  income  groups 
(Thomas  1986;  Sharp  1990),  it  is  common  ideology  in  Muslim  societies  that  every  one, 
including  women  and  the  poor,  should  volunteer  to  his/her  best  to  help  those  in  more 
need.  This  was  evident  in  the  prevailing  spirit  of  togetherness,  co-existence  and  help 
given  to  anyone  in-need  in  absolute  secrecy.  Volunteerism  and  `informal'  collective 
actions  were  particularly  evident  in  the  upper  elevated  area,  where  incomes  were  lower, 
and  amongst  the  women  and  the  poorest  in  Nasriya.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  residents  in 
the  upper  elevated  area  were  not  politically  active  in  `formal'  terms  (familiarity  with 
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political  representatives,  voting,  and  citizen-initiated  contacting),  they  were  quite 
dynamic  in  a  communal  sense,  including  social  consolidation  and  group-based  problem 
solving.  Confronting  frequent  crises,  such  as  snake  bites  and  scorpion  stings,  encouraged 
a  closeness  beyond  mere  sociability  and  formed  strong  patterns  of  neighbourliness  and 
social  consolidation,  was  the  impression  got  during  interviewing  a  group  of  HoHs  living 
there  (NGI1,07-04-98).  Nonetheless,  the  majority  of  people  interviewed  (65%)  claimed 
that  their  volunteer  activities  were  not  limited  to  their  social  group  but  also  for 
neighbours,  friends  and  any  benevolence  needed  in  the  area  (Table  9.7). 
The  other  vivid  example  of  the  successful  transformative  participation  of  citizens 
into  collaborative  modes  of  `informal'  activity  arose  from  an  incident  in  the  more 
elevated  area  between  sectors  seven  and  eight.  "Although  all  of  us  [households  of  the 
area]  cut  the  trenches  and  laid  out  the  sewerage  pipes,  we  could  not  be  connected  to  the 
main  sewage  network  until  1998.  There  were  three  houses  obstructing  any  possible 
connection,  and  because  of  the  nature  of  the  area  [steep  slope,  and  narrow  and  irregular 
alleys],  the  project  could  not  find  any  other  alternative.  As  we  knew  that  the  project  was 
about  to  leave,  we  started  to  collect  £E70  from  each  of  the  450  houses  affected  in  this 
area.  This  enabled  us  to  buy  new  three  houses  elsewhere  in  the  area,  reaccommodate  the 
families  and  knock  down  the  houses  obstructing  the  connection.  Therewith  we  connected 
our  local  network  with  the  main  sewerage  network  of  Nasriya  ourselves,  and  constructed 
the  required  manholes  according  to  the  project's  specifications  and  under  their 
supervision",  said  a  group  of  people  living  in  this  area  (NGI2,05-12-98).  This  incident 
asserts  that  citizens  had  strengthened  their  own  capacities  to  achieve  change  themselves 
in  societal  perspectives.  Community  self-organisation  now  works  as  a  foundation  to 
support  citizens  to  take  on  limited  roles  within  specific  services,  facilitate  accesses  to  the 
formal  resources.  Although  these  types  of  activities  start  `informally',  they  have 
potentials  to  scale  up  quickly,  build  community  confidence  to  enter  gradually  the 
decision-making  processes,  and  provide  both  the  opportunity  and  support  necessary  to 
enable  dialogue  to  develop  ultimately. 
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Gender  transformative  participation  and  `informal'  activation  have  also  been  most 
notable.  All  female  HoHs  interviewed  pointed  out  that  they  rely  highly  on  the  ties  of 
family  and  neighbourhood  whenever  help  is  needed.  They  explained  how  all  women 
neighbours  co-operate  during  good  and  bad  times  to  form  familial  and  informal  networks 
for  social  and  economic  support.  For  instance,  if  any  wedding  is  to  take  place  in  their 
area,  money  and  gifts  are  usually  collected  and  given  to  the  bride;  neighbours  assist  in 
constructing  a  temporary  wedding  stage  in  one  of  the  local  streets,  and  food  and  drinks 
are  continuously  offered  by  all  women's  in  the  neighbourhood  to  all  guests.  Sympathetic 
support  and  financial  assistance  are  also  given  during  funeral  processions  and  the  period 
of  condolence. 
The  material  side  of  women  communal  problem-solving  was  most  lucent  in  the 
area  of  Nubians  in  sector  nine.  "After  the  project's  efforts  to  operate  and  sustain  a 
proper  solid-waste  disposal  programme  in  the  area  had  all  gone  in  vain,  we  had  to  take 
action.  We  all  met  in  the  Amberkab  Community  Centre  and  decided  to  operate  our  own 
small-scale  project.  We  hired  a  domestic  refuse  collector,  using  a  donkey  cart,  who  now 
comes  once  a  week  knocking  door  by  door  to  collect  our  domestic  wastes.  We  pay  him 
only  two  pounds  because  we  do  not  produce  huge  quantities  every  week.  All  plastic 
containers  and  tins  are  reused  while  organic  waste  is  recycled  as  fuel  for  our  domestic 
stove",  proudly  said  Um-Shehrzad,  Mother  of  Shehrzad,  representing  Nubian  women  in 
the  area  (UmS,  18-09-98).  This  type  of  collaboration  indicates  a  collective 
transformation  to  sustained  collaborative  modes  of  participation,  and  must  be 
distinguished  from  a  totally  passive  consumerism  form,  which  only  seeks  to  maximise 
individual  self-interest. 
Henceforth,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  participatory  upgrading  project  has 
contributed  to  strengthen  community  cohesion,  social  consolidation  and  solidarity  among 
the  Nasriya  residents.  This  was  evident  in  so  much  as  80%  of  people  interviewed 
asserted  that  they  are  now  more  attached  to  the  area  and  do  not  intend  to  go  back  to 
their  home  origin  or  elsewhere  in  the  future.  Although  the  20%  who  were  less  committed 
were  a  relatively  small  proportion,  they  were  asked  for  the  reason  they  might  leave.  The 
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explanations  they  offered  included  in  descending  order:  lack  of  some  services  in  the  area. 
(schools,  open  green  spaces  and  solid-waste  system);  the  poor  image  held  by  some  native 
urban  dwellers  of  them  as  informal  squatters  (which  might  affect  their  pride  and  hinder 
the  marriage  of  their  daughters);  the  desire  to  resettle  in  the  East  Nasriya  new 
development  (because  their  houses  were  too  small  to  accommodate  their  extended 
families,  and  to  have  better  access  to  the  new  community  services  supplied  there);  a 
preference  to  go  back  to  their  home  origin  when  they  became  old  (in  order  to  die  and  be 
buried  there  according  to  their  tradition  and  customs);  or  because  they  lived  in  the 
remote  elevated  areas,  very  far  from  the  urban  centre  where  their  jobs  were  located. 
To  establish  the  extent  to  which  people  are  attached  to  Nasriya  after  the 
upgrading  project  and  how  far  they  can  avoid  land  speculation  by  themselves,  even  with 
little  legislative  intervention  from  the  state,  all  respondents  were  asked  a  hypothetical 
question  as  to  whether  they  would  sell  their  houses  if  someone  offered  a  `good  price'. 
Nearly  three  quarters  asserted  that  they  would  never  sell  their  houses  even  under  these 
conditions.  This  was  a  good  indicator  that  land  speculation  has  been  to  a  large  extent 
averted  in  Nasriya.  Of  course  tenants  (19%)  were  not  asked  because  they  were  not 
allowed  to  sell  the  houses  they  rented.  However,  even  half  of  those  who  showed 
readiness  to  sell  (4%)  remained  tenacious  and  attached  to  Nasriya.  They  wanted  to  do 
this  so  that  they  could  buy  a  better  house  elsewhere  in  Nasriya,  or  to  construct  a  new  one 
in  the  new  extension  of  East  Nasriya.  They  also  viewed  the  area  as  improving  over  time 
and  predicted  that  development  would  continue  in  the  future.  The  other  half  were  those 
who  either  wanted  to  return  to  their  home  area  or  preferred  to  rent  a  flat  in  the  urban 
centre  instead. 
9.5-  Conclusions: 
The  experience  of  Nasriya  has  revealed  that  the  evaluation  of  political  activities 
and  the  potential  of  transformative  participation  in  squatter  settlements  during  and  after 
upgrading  involves  a  complex  analysis  of  actors,  interests  and  values.  The  society's  basic 
microstructures-  namely  household  characteristics,  networks  of  households  and  related 
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formal  and  informal  social  networks  connecting  the  workplace  and  community  life, 
comprise  the  primary  units  of  material  and  cultural  reproduction  and  have  great  impact  in 
shaping  society's  knowledge  and  building  the  practical  awareness  of  its  members'  daily 
life.  Collective  action  and  the  dynamics  of  `community-governance  networks'  are 
embedded  in,  and  spring  out  of,  this  awareness.  Nasriya's  experience  revealed  many 
important  issues.  A  real  participatory  bottom-up  approach  can,  to  a  large  extent,  succeed 
in  transforming  a  certain  segment  of  the  society  from  recipients  into  proactive  partners, 
while  those  disillusioned  by  the  experience  of  formal  political  institutions  revert  back  to 
themselves  and  strengthen  their  `informal'  networks.  The  Nasriya  organisation  has 
succeeded  in  transforming  the  relationship  between  its  citizens  and  the  systems  outside 
their  boundaries.  Citizens  have  participated  `formally'  and  `informally'  at  different  levels, 
motivated  by  the  individual's  characteristics,  group  values  and  political  interests. 
Despite  the  elite  state  institutions  and  their  measures  of  exclusion,  control  or 
regulation  over  the  urban  poor  and  their  civil  society  organisations,  the  majority  of 
citizens  in  Nasriya  have  not  been  politically  acquiescent  or  free-riders.  A  large  section  of 
the  population  have  indeed  participated  in  electoral  activities  and  been  quite  familiar  with 
their  political  representative.  Many  citizens  have  been  activists,  acted  as  a  counter-force 
in  the  overall  political  dynamic  and  influenced  the  selection  of  their  political 
representatives,  government  personnel  and  the  actions  they  take.  Those  activists  have 
been  engaged  in  deliberation  to  influence  public-sector  decision  making,  animated,  at 
least  in  part,  by  concern  for  the  public  interest.  Through  active  participation  in  organising 
electoral  campaigning  and  voting,  they  shape  the  political  agenda,  they  deliberate  on  the 
ends  that  governments  should  pursue,  as  well  as  evaluating  how  well  particular  public- 
sector  programmes  work. 
Community  participation,  in  its  ultimate  form,  is  a  struggle  to  give  rights  to 
communities  and  to  enhance  the  power,  the  self-confidence  and  the  self-respect  of  the 
community  as  whole.  The  result,  which  in  this  instance  refers  to  local  development,  is 
extended  to  issues  of  citizens  political  participation  and  sustainable  development  when 
official  urban  upgrading  is  involved.  Although  the  society,  as  whole,  has  been  active  and 
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possessed  a  high  degree  of  collective  control  over  their  daily-life  issues,  even  before  the, 
commencement  of  the  upgrading  project,  not  every  citizen  was  politically  active.  As 
Figure  9.3  summarises,  there  is  a  complexity  of  variables  working  at  different  levels,  at 
different  times  and  in  different  spatial  locations  that  shape  and  direct  citizens' 
participation  during  an  upgrading  project,  and  the  sustainability  of  their  political 
participation  afterwards. 
Background  variables  (characteristics  of  individual  citizens),  which  may  explain 
the  motives  for  citizens'  active  political  participation,  do  not  necessarily  indicate  the 
same  impact  in  activating  participation  during  the  upgrading  project.  Younger  HoHs 
tended  to  be  more  politically  active  outside  the  project;  they  had  better  chances  for 
higher  education,  which  was  significant  in  activating  political  participation.  Although 
higher  income  also  indicated  higher  levels  of  political  participation,  it  did  not  necessarily 
indicate  that  the  lower-income  group  or  the  poorest  were  the  least  active  during  the 
project.  In  contrast,  the  objective  needs  of  the  poorest,  and  those  living  in  the  remote 
elevated  areas,  for  basic  services  and  assistance  made  them  participate  very  actively 
during  the  project. 
But  this  type  of  need-oriented  physical  participation  was  not  translated  into 
`formal'  political  participation  afterwards.  Active  political  participation  was  related  to  a 
set  of  intervening  variables  related  to  legalised  land  status,  house  ownership  and  housing 
physical  condition,  which  has  implications  in  the  policy  context  of  urban  upgrading.  The 
importance  of  this  group  analysis  centres  on  its  examination  of  the  motives  and 
characteristics  of  each  group  to  shape  its  action  despite  their  shared  experience  of 
oppression,  disadvantage  and  exclusion. 
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Figure  9.3:  Nasriya-  Summary  of  the  variables  influenced  citizens  participation  in  the  project, 
their  political  participation,  and  chance  for  formal  and  informal  sustainability. 
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It  can  be  concluded  that  the  transformation  of  the  active  citizens  during  the 
project  into  activists  in  the  `formal'  political  arena  is  not  linear.  Individuals  may  be 
mobilised  into  active  political  participation  on  the  basis  of  supporting  candidates  coming 
from  the  same  clan  or  area  of  origin,  or  on  the  basis  of  their  objective  assessment  of  the 
impact  of  proposed  policies  to  increase  their  income,  e.  g.  the  motives  for  self-employed 
entrepreneurs  to  participate  politically.  However,  the  direction  of  community  activation- 
as  predicted  through  citizens'  need-awareness,  relationship  with  the  municipality  and 
community  `informal'  collaboration,  indicates  a  collective  transformation  to  sustained 
collaborative  modes  of  participation.  As  people's  self-identity  had  been  for  long  devalued 
and  individuals  had  been  largely  powerless  to  change  in  formal  terms,  citizens 
strengthened  their  own  capacities  to  achieve  change  themselves  in  societal  perspectives. 
Community  self-organisation  now  works  as  a  foundation  to  increase  understanding, 
support  citizens  to  take  on  limited  roles  within  specific  services,  provide  alternative 
solutions  to  those  suggested  by  practitioners,  build  confidence  to  enter  gradually  the 
decision-making  processes,  and  to  provide  both  the  opportunity  and  support  necessary  to 
enable  dialogue  to  develop  ultimately.  This  form  of  community  collective  action,  though 
it  starts  informally,  must  be  distinguished  from  a  totally  passive  consumerism,  which  only 
seeks  to  maximise  individual  self-interest. 
A  large  section  of  society  in  Nasriya  has  been  identified  with  the  CDA's  activities 
and  is  now  increasing  in  number  and  becoming  more  able  in  qualitative  terms  to  build  on 
its  development  experience.  Formal  and/or  informal  networks  have  been  established, 
payment  capacity  and  community  involvement  in  the  maintenance  of  all  the  services  and 
social  infrastructure  gained  are  guaranteed,  which  suggests  they  will  be  sustained. 
Meanwhile  indicators  of  the  community  propensity  to  continue  their  collective  actions 
and  group-based  problem-solving  also  seem  positive.  Participation  has  given  people  a 
`voice';  the  participatory  approach  of  Nasriya  and  its  land  management  concept  have 
succeeded  in  preventing  land  speculation  without  the  need  for  sophisticated  regulations. 
However,  citizens'  activation  alone  cannot  deliver  urban  development;  it  requires  a 
concomitant  transformation  of  local  government,  which  is  examined  in  the  next  Chapter. 
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The  paradigm  shift  from  `things'  to  `people'  and  from  `top-down  supply'  planning 
to  `bottom-up  demand'  participation  has  caused  professionals'  interactions  with  people  to 
shift  from  providing/controlling  to  enabling/empowering  (Chamber  1995:  32).  In  practice, 
it  seems  that  the  tools  required  to  implement  such  a  shift  have  not  been  accessible  in  many 
cities  throughout  DCs.  Therefore,  it  is  argued  that  successful  participation  requires  major 
consensus  with  respect  to  transformation  from  normal  `professionalism,  bureaucracy, 
careers  and  training',  which  combine  in  top-down  standardisation  and  pressures  for 
speedy  action,  into  an  enabling  professionalism,  a  decentralised  bureaucracy,  and  more 
innovative  methods  and  responsive  rules  in  careers  and  training  (Nelson  and  Wright  1995; 
Chamber  1995:  33). 
Although  ERSAP  in  Egypt  could  be  considered  an  economic  success,  the 
challenge  the  government  is  facing  now  is  to  shift  the  country  from  its  legacy  of  statist 
economic  structures  and  deeply-rooted  bureaucratic  traditions  to  a  responsive  and 
accountable  government  (Mayfield  1996).  Macro  stabilisation  has  already  been  achieved; 
the  next  stage  is  deep  structural  reform,  especially  at  the  local  government  level.  But, 
institutionalised  policies  and  programmes  for  the  sustainable  development  of  human 
settlements  require  strong,  open  and  accountable  local  government  institutions  working  in 
partnership  with  all  interested  parties.  This  necessitates  a  clear  identification  of  the  post- 
ERSAP  problems  and  constraints  facing  local  governments  and  their  policy  perspective 
regarding  low-income  areas  and  squatter  settlements  in  general.  Local  capacity-building, 
including  improvement  and  progress  in  any  organisational  environment  require  that  the 
problems  and  constraints  be  identified  and  analysed  first  in  terms  of  what  can  and  should 
be  changed. 
This  chapter  aims  to  investigate  the  extent  to  which  accountable  bureaucratic 
capacity  to  manage  urban  affairs  admits  an  effective  role  for  civil  society.  Special 
emphasis  is  placed  on  the  implications  for  participatory  processes  in  general,  and  the 
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reality  of  the  democratic  relationships  between  the  legislative  and  administrative  systems. 
This  is  followed  by  an  examination  of  the  extent  to  which  the  Ismailia  and  Aswan  projects 
have  changed  municipal  operational  systems  in  these  cities,  and  the  main  institutional 
obstacles  these  projects  have  faced  when  following  the  paradigm  shift  in  planning  and 
capacity-building.  The  final  section  examines  whether  the  capacities  acquired  by 
government  departments  have  been  sustainable  and  transferable  to  other  projects  at 
national  level  and  draws  conclusions  on  the  reality  of  institutionalising  collaborative  urban 
upgrading  in  Egypt. 
10.1-  Local  government  performance  and  accountability: 
Bureaucratic  structure  covers  a  multitude  of  factors  relating  to  its  mechanisms  and 
organisation  and  its  urban  governance  processes,  which  not  only  influence  its  capacity  to 
facilitate  efficient  governance,  but  also  shape  the  cultural  behaviour  patterns  of  its 
practitioners.  Most  multilateral  DAs  pinpoint  a  major  challenge  in  Egypt  as  being  the  need 
to  move  from  a  centralised,  state-planned  economy,  to  a  more  decentralised,  market- 
oriented,  system  (Licari  1997,  World  Bank  1999).  The  structural  organisational  challenge 
in  Egypt  must  go  beyond  this  reliance  on  purely  economic  dimensions,  as  they  repeatedly 
neglect  recent  debates  on  urban  changes  and  the  key  importance  of  the  institutional  and 
cultural  dimensions  of  the  processes  under  way.  The  repercussions  of  over-centralisation 
and  low  fixed  salaries  disempower  local  government  from  meeting  the  challenge  of 
collaborative  urban  governance  and  the  institutionalisation  of  urban  upgrading  in  Egypt 
(Figure  10.1).  While  over  centralisation  has  produced  rigid  patterns  of  hierarchical 
structures,  low  fixed  salaries  have  contributed  to  the  establishment  of  inappropriate 
patterns  of  client-interaction  and  the  imposition  of  top-down  rules,  procedures  and 
institutional  forms.  The  paradox  of  centralisation  in  Egypt  is  that  it  is  practised  at  all  scales. 
While  local  governments  often  conform  to  central  directives  and  take  no  action  without 
specific  instructions  from  Cairo,  Governors  hold  substantial  power  at  the  local  level  to 
deal  with  religious  conflicts,  diverse  ethnic  loyalties,  neighbourhood  clashes,  and  the  ever- 
present*threat  of  food  shortages,  including  administrative  disruptions  in  the  distribution  of 
food  staples. 
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Figure  10.1:  Egypt-  Institutional  constraints  to  accountable  bureaucratic  capacity 
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In  spite  of  the  moves  towards  decentralisation  (Chapter  5),  central  government 
still  has  tight  control  over  the  local  government  system,  which  makes  it  difficult  for 
groups  outside  the  single-party  organisation  to  enter  into  effective  negotiation  with  the 
administrative  or  legislative  bodies.  The  participation  of  public  interest  groups  in  the 
budgeting  process,  for  instance,  is  limited  to  the  inputs  they  provide  to  the  elected 
representatives  at  the  local  and  national  level,  i.  e.  the  Popular  Local  Councils  (PLCs)  at 
the  local  level  and  in  the  People's  Assembly  (Mayfield  1996:  148).  Because  fiscal  planning 
is  the  responsibility  of  the  Ministry  of  Planning  and  its  subsidiary  departments  at  the 
Governorate  level  (Article  64-  Regulations  of  Law  43),  local  departments  at  the 
Governorate  level  and  below  are  required  to  develop  their  plans  in  a  way  that  is  consistent 
with  the  more  general  plans  prepared  at  higher  levels  in  the  administration.  Moreover,  the 
centre  has  the  power  to  impose  its  decisions  upon  the  local  leaders,  since  over  96%  of 
total  government  revenue  is  still  collected  centrally  in  Egypt. 
Likewise,  the  overall  urban  planning  strategies  are  defined  at  the  centre  by  the 
Ministry  of  Housing  and  Utilities  and  its  General  Organisation  for  Physical  Planning 
(GOPP).  They  set  housing  policies,  and  allocate  funds  to  the  Governorates  and  provincial 
administration,  which  have  very  limited  delegated  powers.  This  is  practised  all  over  Egypt 
even  in  Governorates  with  the  larger  budgets  under  the  Local  Services  and  Development 
Fund  (LSDF),  such  as  Ismailia.  "Governorates  are  responsible  for  selecting  sites  and 
implementing  projects,  but  they  have  little  freedom  in  changing  the  use  of  funds"  (AA,  27- 
11-98).  This  fact  excludes  meaningful  local  initiative.  Although  the  Local  Administration 
Law  (43/1979)  describes  extensively  the  power  conferred  upon  local  units,  central 
government  has  the  power  to  oppose  any  decision  made  by  the  local  units  which  may 
interfere  with  its  own  policy. 
Thus  urban  governance  processes  need  to  move  from  a  centralised  allocation  of 
functions  and  responsibilities,  top-down  communication  and  rigid  hierarchical  authority  to 
an  autonomous  and  collaborative  system  of  governance  based  on  mutual  partnership  with 
civil  society.  Mayfield  (1996)  suggested  a  set  of  what  might  initially  be  perceived  as 
mutually  exclusive  conditions:  the  need  for  central  government  co-ordination  and  control 
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as  well  as  the  demand  for  local  participation  and  civic-empowerment.  The  tensions 
generated  by  these  two  interacting  forces  reflect  the  ideological  need  to  impose  a  common 
national  vision  and  standard,  generally  conceptualised  in  legal-rational  terms  of 
constitutional  mandates  and  modern  systems  of  collaborative  urban  governance.  Mayfield 
argued  that  the  model  of  `reflective  tensions'  could,  idealistically,  be  operationalised  as  a 
process  of  decision-making  by  which  the  political  leadership  of  a  given  provincial, 
regional,  or  village  community  would  be  able  to  reflect  and  act  on  the  issues  of  their 
political  environment  in  ways  that  solve  problems,  introduce  meaningful  change,  and 
establish  legitimate  responsible  community. 
Centralisation  at  the  local  level  is  widely  reflected  in  Governor-centred  urban 
politics.  The  Local  Administration  Law  allows  Governors  in  Egypt  to  review  any 
decisions  or  measures  taken  by  executive  authorities  downwards  in  the  administrative 
hierarchy.  The  Executive  Council  at  the  Governorate  level,  headed  by  the  Governor,  has 
the  power  to  supervise  any  Executive  Council  below  it,  e.  g.  at  district,  city  and  village 
levels.  Governors  can  veto  measures  that  might  seem  illegal  and  are  also  responsible  for 
appointing  subordinate  executive  officers  at  the  local  unit  level.  It  was  observed  that  while 
all  line  ministries  are  represented  in  each  Governorate  and  provide  members  for  the 
Governorate's  Executive  Council,  some  government  functions  are  controlled  directly  by 
Governors  while  others  fall  within  the  remit  of  line  ministries.  Moreover,  although  the 
Directors  of  Governorate-level  departments  or  line  ministries  are  responsible  for 
appointing  and  transferring  junior  employees  within  their  departments,  they  are  required 
to  obtain  formal  approval  from  the  Governor  for  decisions  regarding  more  senior  posts, 
which  often  entail  time  consuming  bureaucratic  procedures.  Governors  chair  many 
executive  committees  within  their  Governorates,  and  if  not,  they  appoint,  control  or 
dismiss  the  committee's  Chair  freely. 
Although  the  law  considers  Governors  as  the  key-administrators  in  the  local 
government  framework  and  empowers  them  to  take  many  decisions,  they  may  misuse  this 
power  out  of  personal  interest,  lack  of  experience  or  because  of  uncertainty  as  to  the 
reaction  of  central  government.  Many  urban  plans  have  been  kept  in  drawers  without  any 
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attempt  to  implement  them  because  Governors,  often  retired  army  generals,  were 
indecisive  and  hesitated  to  approve  them.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  plans  should  be 
presented  and  approved  first  by  the  PLCs,  directors  of  urban  planning  units  cannot  skip 
the  verbal  permission  of  the  Governors  to  present  the  plans  to  the  PLCs.  "You  cannot  be 
an  overt  activist  if  you  work  with  the  Governor"  (FD,  17-01-98).  Thus  while  specialists 
need  to  be  objective  and  state  facts  and  the  implications  of  these  facts,  they  have  to 
consider  how  to  tailor  facts  for  different  audiences.  Such  rigid  hierarchical  authority 
patterns  reinforce  the  Governor,  while  discouraging  the  assumption  of  responsibility  by 
their  subordinates.  On  the  other  hand,  the  system  works  well  under  experienced  and 
decisive  Governors,  speeding  up  urban  projects  and  disseminating  experience  (Box  10.1). 
Thus  the  fate  of  urban  upgrading  projects  are  largely  decided  by  Governors,  who  are  also 
responsible  for  co-ordination  with  DAs  working  within  the  Governorate's  premises. 
Undoubtedly,  concentrating  power  in  one  person,  without  establishing  efficient 
institutional  systems  advocating  democracy,  does  not  help  the  sustainability  process,  no 
matter  how  charismatic  or  competent  this  political  leader  is. 
Box  10.1:  Egypt-  Examples  of  the  positive/negative  ettect  of  (iovernors  in  urban  policies 
"  Positive  support:  The  Governors  of  Aswan  were  proud  of  the  Nasriya  project's  achievements, 
they  ensured  that  central  authorities  and  their  colleagues  were  made  aware  of  them  through 
invitations,  the  hosting  of  meetings  and  the  presentation  of  Nasriya  as  good  practice  in  relevant 
national  and  international  occasions.  Ismailia's  Governors  also  used  their  clout  to  negotiate 
with  central  authorities,  to  seek  innovative  ways  to  facilitate  the  project's  operation  and  to 
ensure  the  co-operation  of  line  ministries  and  local  government  departments. 
"  Negative  reaction:  The  Physical  Master  Plan  and  legal  framework  of  Tanta  city,  a  joint 
venture  with  the  GTZ  in  1986,  failed  to  include  the  development  concept  for  Tal  El-Haddadin 
area  because  the  Governor  refused  to  accept  the  concept  of  gradual  upgrading  and  renewal  of 
the  existing  squatter  settlement. 
Source:  Key  Informants  (SM,  02-04-98;  HE,  17-12-98;  HS,  08-05-96). 
This  is  also  reflected  in  the  reality  of  the  democratic  relationships  between  the 
legislative  and  administrative  systems  at  the  local  level.  Acting  as  chief  executives  of  local 
governments  and  the  representatives  of  the  President,  Governors  engage  in  politics  and 
co-opt  or  compromise  to  secure  the  state's  desired  policy  outcomes.  They  perform  as  the 
princely  arbiter  of  local  disputes,  and  often  overruling  PLCs.  Formal  meetings  and 
discussion  are  dominated  by  them  and  their  particular  agendas  (AH,  21-03-98).  Because 
Governors  are  freely  appointed  and  dismissed  by  the  Head  of  the  State,  they  always  try  to 
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satisfy  the  central  government  rather  than  the  demands  of  PLCs.  This  means  that  elite 
politicians  and  practitioners  do  not  see  public  policy  making  as  an  important  enterprise 
that  deserves  time,  careful  thought,  or  opportunities  for  citizen  representatives  to  express 
themselves  and  to  be  heard.  Moreover,  Governors  have  substantial  authority  and  power  to 
issue  a  wide  range  of  decrees  without  referring  to  the  PLCs.  They  also  have  the  right  to 
reject  any  decision  taken  by  the  citizen  representatives  if  it  contradicts  their  plans,  and 
may  repeal  the  PLCs  `in  case  of  need'  (AH,  21-03-98).  Elected  citizen  representatives 
have  limited  opportunities  to  participate  because  involvement  is  only  open  in  purely 
functional  areas,  as  with  planning  and  infrastructure  review,  which  require  specialised  or 
professional  knowledge  (ZA,  15-02-98).  Such  undemocratic  relationships  do  not  make 
many  elected  citizens  feel  welcome  to  participate.  Thus  the  whole  system  of  local 
government  is  only  tolerated  in  this  legislative  and  planning  culture.  Most  PLCs  act  as 
registry  offices  for  the  decisions  of  the  Governorate's  authorities  rather  than  as  assemblies 
where  decisions  are  debated.  Surely  this  overall  setting  for  public  dialogue  jeopardises  the 
aim  of  self-determination  and  any  control  over  local  public  life  by  the  citizens  themselves. 
The  other  constraint  to  accountable  bureaucratic  capacity,  low  fixed  salaries  in  a 
climate  of  privatisation  and  elimination  of  consumer  subsidies,  erodes  employee 
motivation,  urges  experienced  professionals  to  seek  better-paid  jobs  elsewhere,  and 
prompts  many  others  to  hold  two  jobs.  The  type  of  expertise  required  for  setting  up  and 
implementing  a  participatory  urban  upgrading  is  that  held  by  senior  technical  personnel 
with  good  training  and  long  experience,  but  the  experienced  planners  have  been  attracted 
by  the  higher  salaries  offered  by  rich  Arab  countries  or  the  private  sector.  Most  of  the 
senior  planners  interviewed  in  Ismailia  and  Aswan  have  a  second  job,  working  evening- 
shifts  at  private  consultancy  offices.  Surveyors  and  inspectors  work  as  carpenters, 
electricians,  plumbers,  painters,  or  taxi-drivers.  Although  it  is  evident  to  senior 
administrators  that  this  reduces  the  productivity  levels  of  their  subordinates,  the  practice  is 
tolerated  as  a  norm:  "The  best  income  any  of  us  may  earn  is  only  £E400/month 
[£70/month],  therefore  I  cannot  ban  any  subordinate  from  seeking  a  second  job",  said  the 
UDLMU's  Director  (EM,  05-01-99).  Although  the  second  job  may  bring  in  three  times  as 
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much  as  the  official  one,  officials  do  not  leave  since  the  governmental  job  offers  free 
health  care,  insurance,  a  pension  and  social  prestige. 
The  Egyptian  planners  and  engineers  actually  charged  with  the  elaboration  of 
physical  master  plans  and  detailed  planning  in  municipalities  are  neither  motivated  nor 
experienced,  nor  capable  of  drawing  up  comprehensive  plan  or  even  implementing  and 
controlling  what  has  been  planned.  This  reinforces  centralisation  as  the  deficiency  is  made 
up  by  GOPP.  But  GOPP  has  managed  to  prepare  physical  master  plans  for  only  about  25 
of  the  150  cities  in  Egypt  since  it  has  been  established  in  the  1970s  (SS,  30-05-96).  Most 
of  these  plans  were  done  in  co-operative  ventures  with  international  donors  such  as 
UNDP,  GTZ  (Germany),  IAURIF  (France),  DFID  (UK),  and  USAID  (USA). 
Furthermore,  municipalities  in  many  of  these  cities  are  not  able  to  embark  on  any  further 
detailed  planning  or  specific  action  proposals  (FM2,23-10-96).  Although  the  urban 
planning  law  allows  municipalities  to  hire  private  consultant  offices  to  prepare  general 
detailed  plans,  the  limited  budget  available  for  urban  planning  schemes  from  the  central  or 
local  government  prevents  the  practice. 
"Low  and  stagnant  governmental  salaries  make  employees  vulnerable  to 
corruption,  which  is  widespread  in  municipalities",  admitted  the  Minister  of  Information 
(Mayo:  31  August  1998).  Belatedly,  authority  seem  to  appreciate  the  negative  effects  of 
low  pay  in  terms  of  bureaucratic  inefficiency  and  the  establishment  of  inappropriate 
patterns  of  client-interaction.  The  existing  system  of  civil  society  incorporation  is  certainly 
neither  accountable  nor  equitable  and  is  even  more  disenfranchising.  When  officials 
working  in  state  stores  divert  subsidised  construction  materials  to  the  black  market,  the 
public  is  forced  to  subsidise  the  fortunes  of  black  marketeers  and  fewer  commodities  are 
available  for  the  needy  poor  in  squatter  settlements  (Singerman  1997).  When  building 
inspectors  take  bribes  to  ignore  the  building  code  and  buildings  collapse,  the  public  is 
deprived  of  basic  security.  When  powerful  landlords  encourage  building  inspectors  to 
declare  a  house  unsafe  so  that  they  can  evict  the  tenants  and  raise  the  rents,  as  is  Nasriya, 
they  deprive  ordinary  people  of  a  place  to  live.  When  landlords  land  speculators  do  the 
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same  in  Ismailia  so  they  can  sell  the  property  on  the  booming  real  estate  market,  they  also 
deprive  the  urban  poor  of  a  place  to  live. 
Such  practices  empower  private  entrepreneurs  over  the  mass  of  the  citizens. 
Richer  individuals  may  also  be  empowered;  municipal  officials  in  an  Engineering 
Department,  Land  Properties  Sections  (el  Arnlak),  may  enable  better-off  people  to  `jump 
the  queue'  and  buy  a  plot  in  a  new  land  sub-division  project,  or  ignore  the  illegal 
occupation  of  state-owned  land  by  a  wealthy  person.  Inspectors  are  bribed  to  allow 
changes  to  an  approved  design  during  implementation.  Some  staff  in  Utilities  Sections  (el- 
Marafek),  are  bribed  to  make  illegal  connections  of  water  and  sewage  for  a  landlord  with 
an  elapsed  licence.  Other  behaviour  is  purely  corrupt  in  that  it  only  benefits  the  official. 
Some  staff  in  Organisation  and  Licenses  Sections  (el-Tanzeem),  deliberately  impose  red- 
tape  in  order  to  force  the  applicants  to  ask  them  to  prepare  the  design  or  to  modify  it,  so 
they  can  get  some  cash,  according  to  9%  of  the  Nasriya  respondents  and  a  group 
interviewed  in  Ismailia  (IGI1,17-10-96).  Staff  in  charge  of  giving  final  licences  are  bribed 
to  give  their  approval.  Technicians  ignore  breakdowns  until  they  get  illegal  `speed' 
money.  If  residents  want  the  garbage  to  be  collected  regularly,  they  had  better  pay  the 
municipal  cleaners.  When  poor  people  are  obliged  to  bribe  the  underpaid  junior  official, 
whose  multitude  of  minor  transactions  are  not  easily  monitored  by  government  assessors, 
bribery  will  function  as  an  additional  tax  or  `service  charge'  (Lowder  1989:  125). 
Although  corrupt  influence  may  `speed'  implementation  so  that  it  short-circuits 
bottlenecks,  and  it  can  offer  cheaper  options,  it  will  always  tend  to  favour  the  `haves' 
rather  than  the  `have  nots'-  particularly  where  the  stakes  are  larger  (Johnston  1989). 
There  are  many  shades  of  corruption  in  urban  institutions  in  Egypt.  Certainly  the  elite 
benefit  both  in  the  short  and  long  term.  But,  under  conditions  of  extreme  scarcity  the 
poor,  too,  may  benefit  at  least  in  terms  of  day-to-day  survival.  The  unanswerable  question 
is-  who  can  be  blamed,  the  briber  or  the  `beriberi',  the  deprived  resident  in  a  squatter 
settlement  who  desperately  bribes  an  underpaid  civil  servant  to  get  illegal  infrastructure 
connections  or  to  turn  a  blind  eye  while  a  new  poor  comer  starts  the  process  of 
informality.  In  the  short  term,  the  poor  person  was  exploited  twice,  first,  when  the 
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government  could  not  offer  him  a  cheap  plot  to  build  a  shelter,  and  second,  when  scarce 
money  was  spent  on  a  bribe  for  a  basic  service.  In  the  long  term,  he  may  manage  to  give 
his  plot  a  degree  of  legality  until  an  upgrading  scheme  can  take  place.  But,  as  many 
respondents  reported  from  Nasriya,  once  municipal  inspectors  are  bribed,  information  is 
passed  to  their  work  colleagues  about  the  case  and  its  location,  and  they  keep  threatening 
the  same  household  one  after  another.  It  is  a  network  of  blackmail  (NGII,  07-04-98; 
NGI2,05-12-98).  In  the  short  term,  the  low-paid  municipal  official  earned  some  support 
for  his  life,  but  in  the  long  run,  he  loses  his  integrity  and  self-respect.  In  fact,  society  has 
lost  both,  in  the  short  and  long  run.  This  is  a  side  effect  of  the  ERSAP's  measures  which  is 
seldom  discussed  for  it  is  the  personal  vulnerability  of  some  municipal  officials,  in  the 
present  climate  of  harsh  economic  reform  and  stumbling  institutional  adjustment  in  Egypt, 
which  is  to  a  large  measure  responsible. 
Elite  bias  prevails,  housing  supply  is  presently  largely  directed  to  satisfy  the 
demands  of  better-off  people,  while  lower-income  people,  even  those  fully  employed  in 
formal  sector  industry,  are  unable  to  obtain  housing  and  services  at  prices  they  can  afford 
(GG,  26-11-98).  The  physical  impact  of  these  combined  factors  is  seen  in  increased  over- 
crowding,  with  concomitant  stress  on  informal  settlements'  development,  typically 
without  access  to  sufficient,  if  any,  infrastructure  and  other  services  (Eiweida  1997).  The 
government's  role  is  limited  to  the  `formal'  sector.  It  involves  control  of  the  location  and 
design  of  all  houses  in  urban  areas  and  regulation  of  the  supply  of  subsidised  building 
materials,  which  are  only  available  to  those  building  to  full  standard  in  `formal' 
subdivisions  (EI-Batran  and  Arandel  1998).  Access  to  low-cost  land  supply  and  subsidised 
materials  is  controlled  by  patron-clientelism.  Consequently,  only  middle-  or  upper-income 
groups  can  afford  the  land  costs  involved  in  this  form  of  provision  to  the  detriment  of 
low-income  groups  whose  chances  are  blocked. 
In  this  environment,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  the  middle  and  lower  ranks  of  the 
state  machine  are  enmeshed  in  a  costly  and  inefficient  behavioural  culture,  according  to 
numerous  informants  (FM1,26-11-98;  FM2,23-10-96;  FM3,29-05-96;  MH,  06-06-96), 
which  has  grown  since  the  open-door  policy  of  Sadat  and  the  implementation  of  the 
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ERSAP.  Successive  national  governments  have  not  decided  about  whether  to  regulate  or 
liberalise,  to  support  or  resist.  The  failure  of  leadership  was  undoubtedly  decisive:  a 
corrupt  elite  can  hardly  provide  administrative  leadership  or  fail  to  demoralise  many 
honest  officials  at  lower  levels.  The  system  has  become  largely  incapable  of  rewarding  the 
efficient  or  penalising  under-performers.  Poor  urban  governance  will  continue  until 
practical  methodologies  for  capacity  assessment  of  the  whole  urban  sector  are  made  and 
strategic  capacity-building  policies  are  implemented  at  national  and  local  levels. 
10.2-  Project  input  to  municipal  capacity-building: 
Although  the  immediate  goals  of  the  Ismailia  and  Aswan  projects  were  to  provide 
their  respective  areas  with  physical  infrastructure,  the  development  of  a  capacity-building 
policy  for  local  government  bodies  was  a  primary  target  during  their  subsequent  phases. 
Their  local  capacity-building  programmes  focused  on  two  dimensions:  a)  criteria-driven 
measures,  including  institutional  reform  and  organisational  development,  and  b)  human 
resource  development,  including  appropriate  training  at  different  levels,  equipment  supply 
and  consensus-building.  A  specific  initiative  stemming  directly  from  both  projects  was  the 
establishment  of  the  Urban  Planning  Office  in  Ismailia  Governorate  (1981-date)  and  the 
Urban  Development  and  Land  Management  Unit  in  Aswan  Governorate  (1992-date), 
although  the  success  and  sustainability  of  their  actions  have  varied  widely  due  to  internal 
and  external  institutional  barriers. 
10.2.1-  Ismailia's  initiatives: 
Ismailia's  capacity-building  differed  during  its  setting  up  phase  (1981-1990)  and 
follow-up  phase  (1991-date).  The  technical  aid-assistance  DAs  (UNDP  and  DFID)  helped 
the  local  government  establish  an  Urban  Planning  Office  (UPO),  three  years  after  starting 
the  implementation  of  the  Hai  El-Salam  project,  to  function  at  the  Governorate  level  in 
1981.  The  intention  was  to  create  a  local  agency  which  would  have  the  technical  capacity, 
the  legal  basis  and  the  financial  and  human  resources  required  to  undertake  the  type  of 
development  initiatives  that  the  government  expressed  as  its  objectives  (HE,  17-12-98). 
The  DAs  proposed  that  the  UPO  should  have  general  planning  responsibilities,  ranging 
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from  squatter  upgrading  and  sites-and-services  to  money-generating  high-income  land 
subdivisions,  industrial  and  recreation  projects,  in  addition  to  a  development  responsibility 
in  key  locations  assigned  to  it  by  the  Governorate  itself.  This  proposal  was  supported  by 
the  Governor,  the  senior  staff  and  local  council  on  the  basis  of  the  success  of  the 
Demonstration  Projects  (Davidson  1990:  286).  The  Governor,  Mr  Abdel-Moniem 
Emmara  (1976-1991),  used  recent  amendments  in  the  Local  Administration  Law  No. 
43/1979  (which  strengthened  the  authority  of  Governors  by  reducing  the  administrative 
and  budgetary  controls  of  the  central  government  over  the  Governorates)  to  establish  the 
necessary  mechanisms  of  the  UPO,  including  the  powers  to  buy  and  selling  land  and  to 
invest  the  proceeds  in  infrastructure.  It  was  proposed  that  the  UPO  should  be  under  the 
supervision  of  an  Urban  Development  Committee  chaired  by  the  Secretary  General  of 
Ismailia  Governorate  and  comprising  nine  members  representing  line-ministries  and 
government  departments  concerned  in  Ismailia  Governorate.  It  was  necessary  to  establish 
the  UPO  as  an  independent  apparatus  in  order  to  by-pass  the  bureaucracy  of  the 
municipality,  which  had  been  not  able  to  carry  out  the  planning  demands  outlined  in  the 
Master  Plan's  proposals  in  1975  (FD,  17-01-98).  It  was  also  proposed  that  this 
Committee  could  draw  on  a  fund  generated  directly  by  land-sale  revenues  and  monitored 
by  the  Governorate's  auditors. 
These  proposals  were  very  much  supported  by  the  legislative  arm,  the  PLC,  and  as 
soon  as  the  Governor's  decree  (No.  200/1981)  was  endorsed,  announcements  were  made 
to  recruit  qualified  staff  on  a  long-term  contractual  basis.  "The  British  Consultants  helped 
the  newly  appointed  Director  to  select  the  staff,  and  we  had  to  go  through  tough 
interviews  in  the  early  1980s",  remembered  a  group  of  Urban  Planners  who  are  now 
senior  government  officials  in  the  UPO  (FM1,26-11-98).  After  supplying  the  UPO  with 
the  needed  equipment,  human  resource  development  was  seen  as  a  key  to  better  urban 
management  in  Ismailia,  as  well  as  improving  the  institutional  performance  of  both  the  Hai 
El-Salam  Project  Agency  and  the  Ismailia  UPO.  The  DAs  applied  three  main  methods  of 
human  resource  development:  on  job  training,  formal  generic  training  for  men  and 
women,  and  the  provision  of  guidebooks  and  urban  manuals  (Box  10.2). 
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box  my.:  ismaiiia-  rlexlule  strategy  of  numan  resource 
On-job  training:  Local  and  international  consultants  were  hired  to  offer  on  job  training  in 
specific  tasks,  and  to  help  the  local  government  staff  in  the  implementation  of  the  upgrading 
and  new  development  plans.  This  has  also  promoted  further  institutional  development.  "The 
consultants  were  able  to  work  closely  with  the  local  staff  and  then  withdraw  from  certain 
activities  when  they  were  being  handled  well.  Training  was  mainly  on  job  with  additional 
support  from  ad  hoc  evening  classes.  This  type  of  training  was  the  most  preferred  by  all  senior 
municipal  officials  interviewed. 
"  Generic  training:  `Formal'  training  was  supplied  through  regular  weekly  planning  seminars 
where  the  ideas  behind  the  practical  day-to-day  work  were  explained  and  discussed. 
"  Guidebooks:  The  production  of  an  `Urban  Projects  Manual'  by  two  of  the  project  consultants 
(Davidson  and  Payne  1983)  helped  a  great  deal  to  explain  the  process  of  design,  illustrate 
different  approaches  and  alternative  means  of  managing  urban  development,  discuss  relevant 
techniques,  and  to  disseminate  the  lessons  learnt  to  wider  local  and  national  levels. 
Source:  Davidson  and  Payne  (1983);  Davidson  (1984,1991);  Informants  (FM1,26-11-98). 
The  most  significant  institutional  innovation  associated  with  the  establishment  of 
the  Ismailia's  UPO  centred  on  its  financial  autonomy.  The  UPO  had  the  power  to  sell 
government-owned  land,  either  to  private  developers  by  auction  or  to  local  citizens  after 
preparing  land  subdivision  plans.  Revenues  could  be  used  as  an  effective  tool  to  increase 
the  resources  of  the  Urban  Development  Committee's  Fund  and  guide  further 
development  in  the  city  through  cross-financing  and  cross-subsidy  among  the  different 
development  projects  in  Ismailia  Governorate  in  general.  Further  revenues  have  been 
reused  in  a  wide  range  of  activities,  that  could  facilitate  the  reproduction  of  the  planning 
processes  (AA,  27-11-98;  FM1,26-11-98): 
"  Appropriate  pay:  All  staff  appointed  to  the  UPO  received  attractive  salaries  (at  least 
double  the  average  income  of  a  municipal  official  with  equivalent  length  of  experience); 
over-time  and  incentives  were  paid  directly  out  of  the  land-sale  revenues,  without 
_  imposing  any  financial  burden  on  the  central  government  budget  or  distressing  the  local 
resources  of  Ismailia  Governorate. 
Recruitment  flexibility:  Whenever  the  work  load  exceeded  the  ability  of  the  existing 
staff  of  the  UPO,  its  directorship  could  recruit  further  qualified  staff  on  a  short-term 
contractual  basis,  and/or  request  a  part  or  full-time  deployment/secondment  of 
individuals  working  in  other  government  institutions  in  Ismailia  and  pay  them  directly 
from  the  Fund,  sustained  the  Deputy-Director  of  the  UPO. 
Urban  (re)production:  The  UPO  had  the  authority  to  reuse  the  land  sale  revenues  in 
planning,  hiring  consultants,  arranging  architecture  and  planning  competitions,  bidding, 
directly  implementing  physical  infrastructure  and  low-income  housing  units,  and/or 
arranging  the  legal  procedures  required  for  selling  further  land  by  auctions  to  generate 
further  revenues  for  the  Fund. 
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"  Provincial  equilibrium:  Ismailia  was  the  only  Governorate  in  Egypt  in  which  some  of 
the  Fund's  money  could  be  lent  to  other  local  government  units  within  the  same 
Governorate  with  the  Governor's  formal  approval,  provided  that  these  units  paid  back 
the  loan  by  monthly  instalments  at  the  interest  rate  set  by  the  National  Central  Bank  for 
other  government  transactions. 
On  that  account,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  Ismailia's  first  phase  of  capacity- 
building  (1981-1990)  succeeded  in  establishing  priorities  for  urban  development  and 
decentralised  financial  strategies.  It  resulted  in  collaboration  between  the  administrative 
arm  of  the  local  government  and  the  legislative  popular  arm  to  collectively  promote  the 
initiation  of  adequate  mechanisms,  actualising  policy  reforms  and  enabling  legislation, 
which  were  required  to  ensure  good  urban  governance.  Several  municipal  officials 
interviewed  in  Ismailia  attributed  the  success  of  this  institutional  reform  particularly  to  the 
leadership,  clout  and  cognisance  of  its  previous  Governor,  Mr  Emmara  (1976-1991), 
regarding  the  legislative  tools  and  decrees  needed  to  start  up  the  reform  processes.  "We 
used  to  see  him  at  any  time  in  our  offices,  discussing  the  urban  plans  with  us  and  the 
British  consultants  and  making  sure  that  we  receive  decent  incentives.  He  also  used  to 
walk  in  the  squatter  and  informal  settlements  talking  with  people  or  praying  with  them  in 
their  local  mosques  especially  on  Fridays.  This  supportive  behaviour  fortified  our  morale 
and  motivation  to  work  even  harder"  (FM1,26-11-98).  Beside  these  personal  attributes, 
the  fact  that  the  Governor  was  also  a  native  Ismailian  with  a  professional  background 
made  him  even  more  aware  of  the  local  structures,  socially  and  administratively,  and 
increased  his  popularity,  especially  amongst  the  native  dwellers  and  the  PLC.  Indeed,  this 
popularity  enhanced  his  clout  with  the  central  government  as  a  local  leader  who  was  able 
to  keep  `peace  and  order'  in  a  post-war  zone  while  enhancing  development,  which  further 
empowered  him  to  overcome  the  bureaucratic  inertia  of  the  existing  organisational 
structures  at  both  the  central  and  the  local  government  levels.  No  wonder  he  was 
promoted  in  1991  to  work  at  the  cabinet  level,  got  a  PhD  and  became  Egypt's  Chair  of 
the  Supreme  Council  of  Youth  and  Sports. 
But  the  Governor  was  not  working  alone.  The  UPO's  former  team  leader,  Ms 
Habiba  Eid  (1985-1989),  who  had  been  the  previous  Director  of  the  Hai  EI-Salam  and 
Abu  Atwa  demonstration  projects  (1981-1984),  had  also  an  important  role  in  supporting 
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the  Governor  and  in  bypassing  normal  administrative  procedures.  Her  ability  to  assist  the 
different  interest  groups  in  reaching  consensus  on  priorities  and  actions  was  crucial 
(Khoury  1996).  All  the  local  and  foreign  consultants  interviewed  asserted  that  Ms  Eid's 
personality  and  leadership  had  enabled  her  to  push  further  and  to  incorporate  different 
associations.  This  specific  role  of  charismatic  leadership  is  significant  in  terms  of  soft- 
infrastructure  and  governance  style  in  the  context  of  consensus-building. 
"  Soft  infrastructure:  Despite  her  excellent  experience  and  qualifications,  she  did  not 
seek  any  senior  political  status  and  therefore  was  not  seen  as  a  political  threat  to  any 
senior  official  in  the  Governorate.  This  helped  her  a  lot  to  take  free  actions,  employ  the 
existing  webs  of  formal  and  informal  relations  and  to  get  all  stakeholders'  support. 
"  Governance  style:  Ms  Eid  never  used  words  such  as  `corruption',  she  expressed 
herself  in  a  rather  more  subtle  way;  her  predecessor  used  to  take  the  credit  for  any 
success  to  himself  and  never  used  the  word  `we',  emphasising  an  individualistic 
approach  rather  than  a  team-work  managerial  attitude.  Although  he  was  a  dynamic 
individual,  this  did  not  help  to  promote  the  aims  of  sustainability  and  resulted  in  a  quite 
low  profile  of  trust,  freedom  to  act,  motivation  and  knowledge  resources. 
In  fact,  charismatic  leadership  is  a  very  important  tool  for  the  success  and  progress 
of  any  urban  project  in  Egypt,  not  only  for  the  consensus-building  it  involves,  but  because 
the  institutional  system  is  driven  by  individuals  rather  than  by  pre-set  goals  or  the 
accomplishment  of  results.  This  was  evident  in  1990,  the  processes  relied  on  her  and 
almost  totally  collapsed  as  soon  as  she  left  Ismailia  to  work  in  Cairo.  Despite  the 
production  of  several  urban  plans  that  suited  all  income  and  social  strata,  the  Auditing 
Department  criticised  the  decentralised  financial  strategies  of  the  Governorate's  semi- 
autonomous  projects,  such  as  Hai  El-Salam  and  the  UPO,  because  the  number  of  such  -- 
projects  (26)  made  their  monitoring  and  auditing  processes  almost  impossible.  They 
proposed  instead  to  combine  all  these  small  funds  into  three  main  ones:  a  LSDF,  an 
Economic  Housing  Fund,  and  a  Land  Reclamation  Fund,  all  of  which  would  be  headed  by 
the  Governor  himself.  These  proposals  reflected  instructions  made  by  the  Governors' 
Council  in  early  1990,  which  forbade  the  sale  of  any  government  land  not  directly 
administered  by  the  municipality  concerned.  The  Governor  was  thus  obliged  to  issue  a 
new  decree  (No.  513/1990)  which  abrogated  the  previous  decree  (No.  200/1981),  the 
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Urban  Development  Committee  was  dissolved,  and  all  land-sale  revenues  were 
automatically  directed  to  the  LSDF.  Subsequent  institutional  confusion  prevailed. 
Soon  after  this  decree  was  issued  and  the  Governor  was  promoted  to  the  cabinet 
level,  his  successor,  Dr  Ahmed  El-Goa'ilee  (1991-1996)  issued  another  decree  (No. 
512/1991)  to  re-establish  the  Urban  Development  Committee.  It  was  to  be  chaired  by  the 
General  Director  of  Housing  and  comprise  twenty  members  representing  line-ministries, 
general  offices,  the  PLC,  as  well  as  the  Mayors  of  the  five  Districts  of  Ismailia 
Governorate  and  the  Mayors  of  the  three  Quarters  of  Ismailia  city.  But,  unlike  its 
predecessor,  the  new  executive  regulations  comprised  many  strict  administrative  and 
financial  articles  to  monitor  and  control  the  planning  processes,  rather  than  to  facilitate  the 
bureaucracy.  Unfortunately  most  of  the  28  articles  were  either  unrealistic  or  did  not 
consider  the  existing  capabilities  of  the  UPO  and  municipalities  concerned.  Whilst  Article 
6,  for  instance,  affirmed  that  the  Urban  Development  Committee  had  to  meet  at  least 
twice  a  month,  it  actually  only  meets  once  a  year  (OA,  26-11-98).  The  impact  of  such 
institutional  restructuring  and  bureaucratic  complications  has  had  a  negative  effect  on  the 
UPO's  performance  during  its  second  phase  (1991-date). 
Although  this  phase  had  targeted  issues  of  sustainability,  the  withdrawal  of  the 
British  consultants  on  the  completion  of  the  technical-aid  assistance  to  Ismailia 
Governorate  reduced  the  capacity-building  processes.  UPO  suffered  from  significant 
reductions  in  the  rates  of  overtime  and  incentives  given  to  all  the  UPO's  staff.  Although  'a 
ratio  of  2.5%  of  the  value  of  any  land  sold  by  auctions  was  previously  paid  as  incentives  - 
to  the  planners  and  surveyors  who  did  the  job,  an  increasing  number  of  employees 
working  for  other  government  departments  in  Ismailia,  including  the  auditors  themselves, 
started  to  demand  a  share  of  this  money,  based  on  a  web  of  favouritism  and  patron- 
clientalism.  This,  of  course,  left  very  little  for  the  people  who  really  did  the  job.  "I  have 
been  working  for  17  years  now  and  still  only  earn  a  monthly  income  of  £E600,  with  a 
10%  annual  increase  to  keep  pace  with  the  inflation  rate.  Although  this  amount  is  almost 
double  what  any  municipal  official  would  generally  earn,  it  is  by  no  means  enough  to 
cover  my  family's  expenses.  Although  I  obtained  a  post-graduate  degree  in  1984,1 
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received  neither  ascension  nor  promotional  increase  in  my  salary.  Many  of  my  colleagues, 
who  work  for  the  private  sector  now,  some  of  whom  have  even  less  experience  than  me, 
earn  at  least  three  times  as  much  as  I  earn.  We  used  to  rely  a  great  deal  on  overtime,  the 
incentives  and  bonuses  generated  from  the  land-sales,  but  all  such  additional  stipends  have 
sharply  declined  from  £E450/month  in  the  1980s  to  less  than  £E80/month  now"  (GG,  26- 
11-98).  Indeed,  with  the  impacts  of  the  ERSAP  in  increasing  prices  whilst  eliminating 
many  consumer  subsidies,  a  salary  of  £E600/month  is  not  enough  for  an  average  middle- 
class  educated  family  with  children  at  school  in  urban  Egypt. 
Moreover,  the  UPO  was  not  allowed  to  recruit  any  new  qualified  employees  on  a 
contractual  basis  under  ERSAP.  Instead,  some  staff  would  be  seconded  from  the 
Municipality  on  a  short-term  deployment  basis  on  the  approval  of  the  Governor,  whenever 
there  was  an  increase  in  the  work  load  and  additional  members  were  required.  "But  these 
individuals  are  neither  self-motivated,  nor  qualified  for  the  type  of  planning  we  carry  out. 
They  usually  end  up  as  dead-wood  occupying  our  offices  which  is  not  good  for  the  work 
environment"  (FM1,26-11-98).  Finally,  according  to  the  Governor's  decree  (512/1991), 
a  special  Financial  Unit  was  established  within  the  Governorate's  structure  to  monitor  and 
audit  all  land-sale  revenues,  including  the  UPO's  budget  and  expenses.  But  because  this 
Unit  is  suffused  with  a  bureaucratic  attitude,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  purchase  any  new 
equipment  or  surveying  devices  as  soon  as  they  are  needed,  which  has  further  obstructed 
the  planning  production  processes. 
The  only  initiative  which  survived  all  this  institutional  chaos  is  the  LSDF;  it  had 
some  £E20  millions  [£5.27  millions]  in  its  account  by  1998.  But  it  can  also  be  argued  that 
the  LSDF  has  survived  because  the  UPO  was  only  producing  money-generating  high- 
income  subdivisions,  rather  than  low-income  sites-and-services  based  on  the  experience 
gained  in  Hai  El-Salam.  The  urban  poor  lacked  legal  access  to  land  resulting  in  the 
spontaneous  creation  of  large  numbers  of  `informal'  and  `squatter'  settlements  beyond  the 
city  boundaries  during  the  1990s'  liberalisation,  such  as  Abu  Halous  and  El-Kilo  Etnain. 
The  demands  of  all  inhabitants  for  services  has  also  increased,  while  the  institutional 
framework  to  manage  the  city  has  aggravated  many  urban  problems.  Despite  the 
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launching  of  the  UNDP-funded  Sustainable  Ismailia  Project  (SIP)  (1993-date),  which 
marked  the  beginning  of  a  new  phase  of  local  capacity-building  in  Ismailia  Governorate 
(Together  Foundation  and  UNCHS  1998),  and  the  return  of  Ms  Eid  as  its  Director,  the 
SIP  has  also  resulted  in  many  urban  conflicts,  referred  to  here  as  the  `Four  Ps'  (Box  10.3). 
Box  10.3:  DAs'  supremacy  and  contradictory  capacity-building  approaches 
"  Policy  contention:  This  is  evident  in  the  overlapping  of  functions  in  addition  to  frequent 
problems  of  decision  reverse  of  land  use,  e.  g.  from  a  park  to  a  hospital,  due  to  external 
pressures  from  the  Governorate  level 
"  Power  insurgence:  The  supremacy  of  the  SIP,  acting  as  a  typical  external  technical  and 
administrative  know-how  `intelligence'  and  supported  by  discursive  regime  of  power- 
knowledge  and  excessive  capital,  has  been  all-encompassing  and  completely  replaced  the 
UPO's  local  powers  in  acting  as  the  Governor's  favourite  consultative  arm. 
"  Patronage  conflict:  Observations  in  1996  and  1998  revealed  that  while  the  SIP  office  has 
moved  to  the  newly  constructed  Governorate's  building,  working  next  door  to  the  Governor's 
office  and  is  well  furnished  and  equipped,  the  UPO  remained  in  the  old  building  where  the  work 
environment  has  sharply  deteriorated. 
"  Personnel  loss:  The  most  active  planners  of  the  UPO  have  moved  to  work  for  the  SIP  on  full 
or  part  time  basis  attracted  by  higher  salaries  and  better  chances  to  attend  training  courses  and 
conferences  abroad,  which  has  further  drained  the  UPO  of  its  qualified  staff. 
Source:  Fieldwork  survey 
Not  surprisingly,  most  of  UPO's  staff  have  lost  the  incentive  to  work  as  hard  as 
before  and  almost  all  of  them  presently  have  a  second  job  (FM1,26-11-98).  "We  have  lost 
both  the  moral  and  the  financial  support,  so  why  should  we  continue  working  hard?  We 
only  work  now  to  conciliate  our  own  conscience"  (GG  and  NM,  26-11-98).  Of  course,  all 
these  institutional  repercussions  can  only  draw  one  conclusion:  the  UPO's  position  as  an 
independent  and  self-financed  agency  has  been  progressively  undermined,  transforming  it 
into  a  typical  municipal  pro-forma  institution,  a  system  which  the  technical  aid-assistance 
DAs  tried  to  avoid.  The  UNDP  policy  of  intervention  has  been  contradictory;  it  only 
provided  second  level  institutional  solutions,  which  did  not  address  the  conceptual, 
cultural  and  financial  complexities  underlying  the  intervention  processes  and  the  people 
involved.  Despite  the  success  of  the  SIP  in  identifying  the  urban  environmental  issues  and 
implementing  several  strategies  through  co-ordinated  interventions  with  the  public,  private 
and  community  sectors  (Khoury  1996),  such  an  external  fund  will  only  last  for  one  or  two 
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years.  Unless  serious  action  is  taken  to  improve  the  performance  and  work  conditions  of  , 
the  permanent  UPO  institution,  it  will  continue  to  decline  in  efficacy  and  efficiency. 
10.2.2-  Aswan's  initiatives: 
The  difference  between  Ismailia's  and  Aswan's  capacity-building  approaches 
centred  on  the  latter's  initiatives  to  build  public  participatory  grounds  from  the  start.  It 
would  appear  once  again  that  the  base  on  which  these  institutions  was  erected  was 
insufficiently  conceptualised  within  a  strategic  capacity-building  policy  at  the  national  and 
local  government  levels.  Awareness  of  the  need  for  a  new  planning  and  management 
entity  arose  shortly  before  the  completion  of  the  Nasriya  project's  first  phase  in  December 
1991.  A  ZOPP  workshop  was  held  with  all  stakeholders  concerned  and  the  municipal 
officials  identified  the  `core  problem'  themselves  as:  "Urban  management  in  Aswan  is 
insufficient  for  sustainable  development"  (ZOPP  1991).  This  was  a  very  important 
breakthrough  in  the  context  of  municipal  capacity-building  in  general;  the  first  step 
required  to  promote  any  institutional  reform  and  management  development  is  to  admit 
that  there  is  a  problem  and  to  define  its  causes  (Peltenburg  et  al.  1996).  Subsequently,  the 
`problems  tree'  identified  eight  detailed  causes  (GTZ  1991),  which  can  be  grouped  into 
the  structural,  the  organisational  and  the  environmental  variables  of  accountable 
bureaucratic  capacity. 
"  Structural:  Institutional  capacities  were  inadequate  as  compared  to  the  development 
needs  in  Aswan,  physical  planning  instruments  were  not  sufficiently  applied,  and  there 
was  no  appropriate  system  for  land  management. 
"  Organisational:  No  systematic  project  planning  was  applied,  and  the  flow  of 
information  concerning  planning  and  implementation  was  slow  and  inaccurate. 
"  Environmental:  There  was  a  lack  of  knowledge  regarding  people's  needs,  hence 
infrastructure  and  community  facilities  were  insufficient,  and  low-income  urban 
housing  in  Aswan  was  inadequate  in  quantitative  and  qualitative  terms. 
This  was  a  turning  point  for  the  Nasriya  project,  to  enter  a  new  phase  aimed  at 
municipal  capacity-building.  While  the  first  project's  aim  was  to  make  `urban  management 
in  Aswan  sufficient  for  sustainable  development',  the  new  phase  was  more  specific  and 
aimed  to  `improve  sustainable  target  group-oriented  urban  planning  and  management 
systems  and  to  apply  them  in  selected  areas  in  Aswan'.  The  project  was  thus  renamed 
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`Urban  Development  Aswan',  so  the  second  phase  (1992-1995)  was  to  develop  and  test 
an  Urban  Development  Unit,  land  management  instruments  for  extension  areas  in  East 
Nasriya,  land  management  instruments  for  urban  upgrading  areas,  and  instruments  to 
facilitate  the  self-help  improvement  of  housing,  while  enhancing  the  municipal  capacity  to 
implement  and  sustain  upgrading  schemes  (GTZ  1991).  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Urban 
Planning  Law  3/1982  gave  the  responsibility  of  urban  planning  and  development  to  the 
municipalities,  it  was  not  possible  to  establish  the  proposed  Unit  within  the  structure  of 
the  Engineering  Department  in  1992;  its  centralised  financial  system  neither  allowed  the 
appointment  of  new  staff  nor  the  establishment  of  the  required  office  and  its  outfitting. 
Neither  were  there  qualified  staff  in  the  Engineering  Department  to  carry  out  the  expected 
tasks  of  the  proposed  Unit.  Thus,  a  decision  was  made  to  by-pass  the  municipal 
structures;  but  instead  of  establishing  a  semi-autonomous  agency  similar  to  Ismailia's 
UPO,  a  Governor's  decree  (222/1991)  was  issued  to  establish  the  Unit  within  the  Housing 
Directorate's  structure  without  any  separate  financial  budget  or  the  necessary  powers  to 
buy  and  sell  land  and  reinvest  the  proceeds  in  infrastructure.  Although  the  Unit  operated 
within  the  Housing  Directorate  for  more  than  two  years,  during  which  it  established  itself 
as  a  needed  entity  among  other  local  institutions  in  Aswan  and  produced  several  new 
development  and  upgrading  plans,  there  was  a  clear  conflict  and  overlap  between  the 
urban  policy  makers  (the  Unit)  and  the  executors  (the  Housing  Directorate)  which  made 
this  institutional  arrangement  inappropriate. 
A  ZOPP  workshop  was  held  in  1994,  and  the  stakeholders  themselves  identified 
many  institutional  problems  that  the  Unit  had  been  facing;  all  were  typical  of  many  other 
planning  institutions  in  Egypt.  These  included  ambiguity  as  to  the  real  task  of  the  Unit  and 
absence  of  proper  co-ordination  and  co-operation  with  other  relevant  governmental 
institutions.  Consequently,  the  Unit  suffered  from  a  lack  of  basic  information  and  maps  to 
start  the  work  despite  their  availability  in  other  Governorate  entities.  Moreover,  planned 
tasks  could  not  be  fulfilled  because  new  tasks  were  continuously  added  while  professional 
staff,  skills  and  knowledge  were  still  limited.  The  absence  of  a  budget  to  buy  office 
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materials,  survey  tools  or  to  pay  overtime  and  bonuses  did  not  encourage  qualified  staff  to 
stay  in  the  Unit  (GTZ  1994:  19). 
Accordingly,  a  decision  was  made  in  1996  to  transform  the  Unit  into  a  semi- 
independent  apparatus  working  as  one  of  the  Governor's  Affairs  Offices  (Decree  No. 
5/1996).  A  separate  annual  financial  budget  was  allocated  from  the  Governorate's  budget 
(£E10,000)  and  additional  part-time  staff  have  been  seconded  to  it.  But  this  budget  was 
too  small  to  carry  out  all  the  tasks  of  the  Unit.  In  fact,  this  re-establishment  process  was 
only  a  placation  measure  because  "the  GTZ  did  not  offer  any  adequate  technical  advice  as 
to  how  to  solve  the  real  problems  identified  during  the  workshop,  to  prepare  clear  job 
descriptions  for  its  staff,  or  to  establish  a  financial  system",  said  the  Unit's  previous 
Director  (KE,  05-12-96).  By  1997,  the  number  of  Urban  Planners  working  for  the  Unit 
dropped  from  six  to  three,  and  the  technical  staff  (draftsmen,  surveyors  and  secretary) 
from  eight  to  four.  It  was  also  suffering  from  "disorganised  work  conditions,  poor 
payment  of  its  staff,  lack  of  prospects,  and  lack  of  monitoring  and  evaluation  programmes 
which  all  contributed  to  worker  apathy  and  irresponsibility"  (JK,  08-02-98).  The 
Governor  changed  the  Unit's  directorship  three  times  in  1998,  after  the  GTZ  had  made 
several  complaints  that  the  Unit  was  not  driven  by  pre-set  goals.  Such  a  post-hoc 
rationalisation  further  destabilised  the  institution. 
Despite  all  of  these  deficiencies,  the  need  for  such  a  planning  institution  by  the 
local  government  in  Aswan  saved  it  from  a  complete  break  down;  fieldwork  revealed  that 
the  Unit  is  still  working  on  a  range  of  development  projects  even  after  the  completion  of 
the  Nasriya  project  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  GTZ's  financial  support  in  December  1998. 
The  Unit  has  been  involved  in  monitoring  the  upgrading  of  33  squatter  settlements  in 
Aswan  Governorate  through  the  National  Programme  of  Urban  Upgrading  (NPUU)  with 
a  total  budget  of  £E220  millions  (£57.9  millions).  The  efficacy  of  this  programme  is 
discussed  later.  The  Unit  has  also  been  responsible  for  preparing  Borderlines  and 
Structure  Plans  for  all  the  cities  and  villages  of  Aswan  Governorate  with  the  technical 
assistance  of  the  Danish  International  Development  Assistance  DA,  DANIDA  (1996- 
date).  However,  the  sustainability  of  the  Unit  is  still  questionable;  it  does  not  have  enough 
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qualified  staff,  it  suffers  from  frequent  shortages  of  finance  to  cover  its  daily  expenses,  and 
lack  of  financial  incentives  for  the  staff.  Despite  its  institutionalisation  within  the 
administrative  structure  of  Aswan  Governorate  and  the  strong  commitment  of  its 
members,  they  complain  that  it  is  always  difficult  to  maintain  their  focus  on  project-related 
activities  due  to  the  huge  amount  of  further  tasks  coming  randomly  from  above. 
The  second  dimension  of  local  capacity-building,  human  resource  development, 
started  soon  after  the  GTZ  equipped  the  UDLMU  with  the  needed  pick-up  vehicle, 
drawing  and  survey  equipment,  furniture,  a  photocopier  and  typewriters.  A  wide  range  of 
training  programmes  were  organised  and  offered.  These  were  designed  to  supply 
government  officials  with  technical  skills  as  well  as  new  work  attitudes  and  behaviour. 
After  sending  many  individuals  to  join  some  training  courses  in  Cairo,  it  was  found  that 
the  perceived  inputs  were  limited  and  irrelevant  to  local  problems.  Alternatively,  on  job 
training  was  revealed  to  be  more  realistic,  interactive  and  productive.  It  was  not  only  with 
a  view  to  cost-saving  but  also  to  allow  an  increasing  number  of  people  to  join,  especially 
women  who  could  not  travel  because  of  family  commitments  or  tradition.  Several 
consultants  were  hired  at  local,  national  and  international  levels  and  some  municipal 
officials  from  the  Engineering  Department  and  Housing  Directorate  (as  the  responsible 
executors)  also  joined  the  training  processes.  After  the  readjustment  of  the  Aswan  General 
Plan  in  1993,  the  on  job  training  programme  was  extended  to  give  examples  as  to  how  to 
elaborate  detailed  plans  for  areas  targeted  for  new  extensions,  e.  g.  East  Nasriya,  including 
land  use  planning,  urban  upgrading,  land  management  policies  and  community 
participation.  It  had  always  been  a  target  to  show  trainees  how  to  achieve  the  best  results 
with  the  limited  resources  they  had  in  hand  (JK,  08-02-98).  Exchange  experience  with 
similar  schemes  in  other  DCs  had  also  proved  to  be  a  very  good  tool  in  giving  insights  into 
possible  radical  changes  in  the  local  capacity-building  policies.  Under  a  programme  called 
`South-South  Dialogue',  GTZ  sponsored  two  trips  to  Amman,  Jordan  and  Dakar  and  St. 
Louis  in  Senegal.  Each  trip  comprised  about  ten  municipal  officials  representing  the 
UDLNW,  Aswan  Governorate  and  the  engineering  department,  and  mainly  focused  on 
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exchanging  experiences  and  lessons  learnt  in  issues  of  urban  planning  and  squatter 
upgrading  with  community  participation. 
Despite  these  human  resource  initiatives,  a  crucial  obstacle  to  the  Unit's  efficiency 
is  the  institutional  confusion  and  the  low  capacity  of  local  government  in  Aswan  to  attract, 
motivate  and  retain  qualified  staff  through  appropriate  pay,  career-development 
opportunities,  and  sufficient  operational  budgets.  This  is  due  to  the  absence  of  a  legal 
financial  decree  that  can  generate  revenue  and  control  costs.  They  only  have  a  small 
annual  budget  which  hardly  covers  their  daily  requirements  of  paper  and  maintenance. 
Although  the  planning  costs  of  all  large-scale  projects  elaborated  by  central  agencies  are 
paid  for  by  the  Governorate  (e.  g.  the  GOPP  is  paid  for  the  planning  of  Aswan  New  City), 
the  Unit  is  not  paid  for  any  planning  work  it  achieves.  This  discrepancy  is  very 
discouraging  for  the  Unit's  staff  and,  therefore,  its  qualified  members  are  not  willing  to 
continue  working  there,  which  hugely  jeopardises  its  sustainability.  Of  course  the  GTZ, 
acting  as  a  technical  aid-assistance  according  to  a  specific  set  of  criteria,  insisted  on 
investing  only  in  institutional  reform,  equipment  supply,  know-how  and  training  issues.  It 
refused  to  pay  any  incentives  for  the  local  staff  or  to  recruit  additional  qualified  staff  on  a 
long  term  basis,  so  that  the  system  would  not  collapse  after  the  withdrawal  of  its  financial 
assistance. 
Meantime,  the  Egyptian  contribution  was  limited  to  office  space.  The  unit  does  not 
have  financial  security,  and  this  means  it  cannot  develop  long  term  programmes  and  is 
dependent  on  funded  requests  from  above.  Moreover,  pay  levels  are  not  commensurate 
with  either  its  members'  responsibilities,  their  skills,  or  pay  offered  in  the  private  sector. 
Consequently,  staff  morale  is  low  and  able  people  leave;  the  fact  that  three  directors  were 
appointed  in  quick  succession  in  1998  suggests  that  the  problem  was  seen  by  the 
Governor  as  personal,  rather  than  structural.  Typical  of  many  local  government 
organisations  in  Egypt,  the  Aswan  Governorate  failed  to  find  other  financial  resources  to 
deal  adequately  with  the  recruitment  and  maintenance  needs  at  the  local  level.  Its  financial 
insecurity  ties  its  future  to  the  Governor's  support.  Unlike  the  scenario  in  Ismailia,  which, 
to  a  certain  extent,  succeeded  in  bringing  about  institutional  reform  and  organisational 
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development  that  could  be  semi-autonomous  and  self-sustained  in  financial  terms,  the 
GTZ  neither  learnt  from  that  experience  nor  actualised  a  sustainable  policy  of  capacity- 
building  in  Aswan  within  the  UDLMU.  It  can  also  be  argued  that  local  organisations  in 
Aswan  lacked  the  legislative  knowledge  needed  for  a  successful  reform,  notwithstanding 
they  were  open  to  implement  any  of  the  GTZ  technical  proposals  or  ZOPP  results. 
10.2.3-  Municipal  capacity  to  incorporate  participation: 
Another  objective  of  Aswan's  capacity-building  initiatives  was  to  change  municipal 
attitudes  to  participation,  encourage  gradual  system  adaptation,  and  the  dissemination  of 
the  experience  and  the  lessons  learnt.  Although  the  project  used  a  Project  Management 
Unit  (PMU)  located  outside  mainstream  government  departments  and  comprising 
seconded  staff,  so  as  to  circumvent  the  complex  bureaucratic  structures  and  to  facilitate 
the  inception  and  implementation  of  the  project,  the  experience  of  Nasriya  suggests  that 
effective  participatory  initiatives  can  lead  to  changes  in  municipal  attitudes  and  increases 
in  productivity  directly  or  indirectly.  Most  of  the  capacity-building  efforts  of  the  project 
went  into  the  development  of  the  human  resources  of  this  special  PMU  with  the  aim  of 
achieving  the  project's  physical  and  community  development  objectives.  Although  these 
efforts  have  had  little  direct  influence  on  the  capacity  of  mainstream  government 
departments  and  their  officials,  there  have  been  various  indirect  impacts  on  municipal 
capacity  through  staff  returning  to  parent  departments  with  experience  of  participation, 
particularly  those  who  returned  to  senior  positions;  interest  generated  by  the  project  and 
its  impact  on  government  national  upgrading  programmes;  and  the  role  played  by  - 
community  representatives,  among  other  civil  society  organisations,  in  `promoting' 
aspects  of  the  project  approach  elsewhere.  Gradually,  as  the  project  evolved,  government 
officials  came  to  value  participation  not  only  for  its  cost-sharing  aspects  but  also  for 
developing  local  consensus  in  urban  planning  schemes  (McCommon  1995:  20).  Aswan 
officials  and  PLC  often  organise  community  forums  now  as  the  first  step  in  developing 
upgrading  policies  or  master  plans  for  new  areas. 
Nasriya  project  intervention  for  changes  in  capacity-building  had  based  itself  on 
gradual  policy/system  adaptation.  The  GTZ  had  been  functioning  as  a  catalyst  which 
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would  always  require  co-ordination,  integration  and  political  support.  The  personal  belief 
of  the  Governors  of  Aswan,  Mr  Kadry  Osman  (1984-1991)  and  Mr  Salah  Mesbah  (1991- 
1999),  in  the  project's  philosophy  and  their  ultimate  support  have  contributed  significantly 
to  mediate  with  the  central  government  and  articulate  specific  local  regulations  (by-laws) 
that  could  meet  the  project's  requirements.  They  comprehended  that  Nasriya's  initiatives 
were  driven  by  goals  and  required  flexibility,  responsiveness  and  clarity  in  dealings  with 
civil  society.  Such  political  assiduity,  effective  leadership  and  administrative  readiness  to 
make  change  laid  a  solid  foundation  to  instigate  changes  in  the  government  structures  and 
adapt  the  systems  to  facilitate  the  project's  participatory  approach,  which  concerned 
interrelated  strands,  as  follows: 
"  Financial  exemptions:  On  signing  the  project  agreement  by  both  governments,  all 
activities  financed  directly  by  the  German  side  were  exempted  from  going  through  the 
usual  tender  and  bidding  procedures  and  from  tax  or  vat  charges  on  invoices. 
Furthermore,  direct  contracting  for  implementation,  materials  and  equipment 
procurement  was  allowed.  This  saved  money  and  time  and  allowed  the  project  to  deal 
with  local  contractors  and  suppliers.  It  also  gave  the  project  a  window  between 
materials  supply  from  the  market  and  implementation  by  self-help  which  was  crucial  to 
participants. 
"  Incentives:  The  low-pay  problem  was  evident  at  the  beginning  of  the  Nasriya  project 
but  was  quickly  eradicated  by  the  Governor.  He  issued  a  decree  by  which  all 
government  employees  seconded  to  the  project  would  earn  a  monthly  incentive  to  the 
value  of  50-80%  of  their  basic  salaries.  Additional  overtime  payments  were  also  made 
available.  The  latter  was  necessary  to  enhance  the  communication  between  the 
project's  staff  and  those  working  residents  who  were  only  available  in  the  evening. 
"  Bureaucratic  devolution:  The  Aswan  City  Council  supplied  the  area  with  an  on-site 
land-sales  office  hosted  in  the  Service  Centre  and  operated  by  a  local  municipal  official, 
which  encouraged  increasing  numbers  of  leaseholders  (hekr  owners)  to  participate  and 
legalise  their  plots.  Municipal  surveyors  were  also  available  to  help  the  residents  in 
implementing  house  connections  and  improvements. 
"  Semi-autonomous  fund:  A  special  housing  fund  was  established.  The  Governor 
managed  to  get  the  government's  approval  to  issue  a  decree  by  which  a  large  share  of 
money  generated  from  land-sales  in  Nasriya  would  go  back  to  the  project's  budget. 
This  completely  covered  the  Egyptian  government's  contribution  to  the  project  thus 
obviating  any  further  burden  on  the  central  government,  but  was  not  replicated  at  the 
Governorate  level  through  the  UDLMU,  similar  to  the  LSDF  of  Ismailia. 
The  Governor  perceived  community  empowerment  as  both  a  perception  by  the 
holder  and  others,  as  well  as  the  power  to  accomplish  desires.  Despite  the  fact  that  the 
NGOs  Law  banned  any  sort  of  official  co-operation  with  unregistered  community  centres, 
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the  project  was  permitted  to  work  with  any  community  centres  in  the  area,  60%  of  which 
were  not  registered  with  the  Social  Affairs  Department  at  the  beginning  of  the  project. 
Registration  was  perceived  by  the  community  as  a  costly  measure  which  would  usually 
require  a  bank  account,  a  formal  managerial  system  and  give  the  Social  Affairs  Directorate 
the  authority  to  audit  their  accounts  (ZA,  15-02-98).  It  is  worth  noting  that  physical  and 
administrative  improvements  in  unregistered  community  centres  only  started  to  take  place 
after  permitting  the  project  to  deal  with  them.  Nonetheless,  all  civil  society  organisations 
were  exempted  from  paying  the  building  permit  fees  (£E1200)  only  because  they  were 
making  such  improvements  by  `self-help'  according  to  the  design  prepared  by  themselves 
and  the  project's  architect.  In  1996  the  CDA  offered  a  room  to  the  Social  Directorate  to 
establish  its  East  Quarter's  Department  within  the  Service  Centre,  which  further  narrowed 
the  gap  between  different  community  centres  in  Nasriya  and  the  government.  Now,  almost 
all  community  centres  are  registered  and  have  become  eligible  for  further  state  and  donor 
financial  assistance  and  equipment  supply. 
Local  government's  recognition  that  the  improvement  of  existing  housing  stock  in 
the  so-called  `informal'  settlements  is  not  an  impossible  task,  that  it  is  cost-saving  and  can 
raise  political  capital  through  community  participation,  encouraged  the  government 
officials,  led  by  the  Governor  himself,  to  play  an  active  role  in  promoting  the  participatory 
approach  of  Nasriya  and  to  disseminate  the  lessons  learnt.  At  national  level,  the  Governor 
of  Aswan  presented  the  Nasriya  project  at  a  very  large  conference  before  the  initiation  of 
the  NPUU  (1992-date).  The  conference's  aim  was  to  discuss  the  lessons  learnt  from 
previous  pilot  projects  implemented  in  Egypt;  it  was  chaired  by  the  Prime  Minister  and 
attended  by  the  Governors  of  the  eleven  Governorates  in  which  the  programme  was 
planned  to  take  place  at  the  time.  Moreover,  the  Local  Development  Committee  of  the 
People's  Assembly  and  several  members  of  the  National  Ministerial  Committee  of  the 
Shrouk  programme  (1994-date),  which  aims  to  improve  the  quality  of  life  in  3,542 
villages,  had  been  invited  by  the  Governor,  introduced  to  the  Nasriya  project  and  walked  a 
long  distance  through  the  area  before  they  laid  the  foundation  for  the  Shrouk  programme. 
Following  on  Nasriya's  footsteps,  a  civil  society  organisation  has  been  established  to  run 
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the  programme,  and  the  payment  capacity  and  the  propensity  of  the  villagers  to  generate 
local  investments,  such  as  the  donation  of  a  piece  of  land  to  construct  community  services, 
have  become  the  preconditions  for  initiating  the  programme  in  any  village  (SE,  16-10-96). 
Exchange  experience  between  Governorates  was  also  most  notable.  "When  the 
Governor  of  Giza  recognised  the  difficulties  that  his  senior  staff  were  facing  to  get  the 
Boulak  El-Dakrour  project  initiated  [another  GTZ  urban  upgrading  project  in  Giza  (1996- 
date)],  he  sent  a  senior  delegation  to  Aswan  to  learn  from  the  Nasriya  experience",  said 
the  Governor  of  Aswan  (SM,  02-04-98).  Headed  by  the  Secretary  General  of  Giza  and 
the  GTZ  Project  Advisor,  the  commission  included  the  Mayor  of  Giza  and  all  the  senior 
municipal  officials  concerned.  Members  of  the  delegation  gained  insight  into  the  issues 
from  their  equivalent  officials  in  Aswan  as  to  how  they  adapted  government  structures  and 
systems  to  facilitate  the  project's  bottom-up  approach.  Likewise,  when  the  GTZ  initiated 
another  urban  upgrading  project  in  a  very  large  squatter  settlement  in  Cairo,  Manshia'at 
Nasser,  in  1997,  many  of  the  Nasriya  staff  and  CDA  members  were  invited  to  share  their 
experience  and  attend  several  planning  workshops  sponsored  by  the  GTZ  office  in  Cairo 
(DS,  18-12-98).  These  examples  reveal  significant  contributions  to  enhance  horizontal  and 
vertical  inter-agency  co-operation.  It  is  a  common  practice  in  capacity-building 
interventions  that  certain  organisational  cultures  may  strongly  resist  innovation,  to  acquire 
knowledge,  to  appreciate  creativeness  or  to  take  risks.  In  such  case  individual  training 
may  not  be  very  effective  and  exchange  experience  with  similar  schemes  is  more  helpful. 
At  international  level,  the  General  Director  of  the  Housing  Directorate  and  the 
Nasriya  Project,  the  Head  of  the  CDA  and  a  WDA  Board's  member  presented  the  project 
in  several  conferences  (e.  g.  Shelter  and  Organisation-  Cairo  1992,  Habitat  City  Summit- 
Istanbul  1996  and  Sustainable  Cities-  Ismailia  1998).  Similar  to  the  Hai  EI-Salam  project, 
a  video  tape,  a  booklet,  a  web  site,  and  several  reports,  leaflets,  posters,  media  articles, 
TV  programmes  and  academic  papers  have  been  published  discussing  the  project  and  its 
approach.  These  have  been  a  means  for  extending  general  capacity-building  in  Egypt  and 
abroad  via  access  to  new  information  technologies  and  the  media.  However,  the  following 
section  will  examine  the  extent  to  which  these  capacity-building  measures  have  succeeded 
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in  changing  the  government's  responses  towards  low-income  settlements  in  Egypt,  and 
whether  or  not  an  institutionalised  system  of  participatory  upgrading  has  been  established 
within  the  NPUU. 
10.3-  The  institutionalisation  of  collaborative  upgrading: 
Despite  the  insights  demonstrated  by  the  Hai  El-Salam  and  Nasriya  projects,  it  is 
argued  here  that  centralised  decision-making  processes  and  the  costly  behavioural  culture 
discussed  above  account  for  government  apathy  towards  squatter  settlements  and  the 
lower-income  people  who  live  in  them.  Indeed,  informal  development  was  largely 
`invisible'  to  government  officials  until  1993.  The  government  adopted  a  laissez-faire 
attitude,  the  services  were  minimal  and  provided  only  after  citizen  protest.  The  official 
approach  was  that  `illegal'  settlements  should  be  cleared  and  replaced  by  government 
housing,  a  view  held  initially  by  some  municipal  officials  in  Aswan  prior  to  the  Nasriya 
upgrading  project,  explained  the  first  Project  Director  (AO,  23-10-96).  Despite  the  issue 
of  Law  135  in  1981,  which  outlined  procedures  for  the  regularisation  of  informal  areas 
(Seralgeldin  1991),  and  the  implementation  of  three  pilot  participatory  projects  through 
co-operative  ventures  with  the  British,  American  and  German  DAs  in  the  1970s  and 
1980s,  government  housing  policy  remained  unchanged. 
The  government  only  espoused  a  systematic  approach  to  urban  upgrading  in  1993, 
when  the  danger  of  inhabitants  of  squatter  and  informal  areas  being  swayed  by  the  rhetoric 
of  religious  fundamentalists  was  appreciated.  The  National  Programme  for  Urban 
Upgrading  (NPUU)  aimed  to  upgrade  523  informal  settlements  in  11  Governorates  (3  in 
Lower  Egypt  and  8  in  Upper  Egypt),  and  spent  £E1.2  billions  (£226  million)  during  1993- 
96.  The  1996/97  fiscal  plan  included  a  further  £E171  million  (£30  million)  to  start  new 
projects  in  other  cities.  Despite  this  expenditure,  the  1999/00's  figures  suggest  that  an 
additional  budget  of  £E3.1  billions  (£534  million)  is  required  to  complete  the  task  of 
upgrading  all  informal  settlements  in  Egypt,  1034  settlements  in  24  Governorates  (Rose 
Al-Yousif:  24  September  1999).  The  NPUU  provided  squatter  areas  with  basic  physical 
infrastructure,  i.  e.  water,  sanitation,  electricity,  road  networks  and  a  limited  supply  of 
large  solid  waste  bins.  House  connections  to  the  infrastructure  networks  were 
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implemented  by  households  under  the  technical  supervision  of  Engineering  Departments., 
While  the  NPUU  does  represent  a  quasi-acceptance  of  the  existence  of  informal 
development  and  a  change  in  the  government's  belief  in  upgrading  policies,  it  is  at  best 
post-hoc  rationalisation;  it  was  more  likely  a  political  response  to  the  spread  of 
fundamentalist  religious  ideology  in  informal  settlements,  which  was  accompanied  by 
intensification  of  repression  against  terrorism  (Egyptian  Consultative  Council  1994).  The 
modus  operandi  of  the  programme  has  been  a  top-down  approach  of  service  provision, 
which  admitted  very  little  or  no  chance  of  public  participation.  The  government  assigned 
the  planning  job  to  `professional'  staff  in  the  Ministries  of  Housing  and  Local 
Development,  trained  in  conventional  housing  techniques,  they  had  little  idea  as  to  how  to 
incorporate  popular  participation  and  civil  society  in  their  planning.  Thus  it  is  argued  that 
the  NPUU  has,  in  fact,  negative  side  effects  which  will  need  to  be  confronted. 
The  government  did  not  appreciate  that  self-help  upgrading  programmes  are 
`different'  and  require  special  approaches  to  deal  with  different  problems;  the  scheme  was 
limited  to  a  `once  off  approach  of  one  or  two  fiscal  years  in  each  Governorate  and  the 
issues  of  cost  recovery  were  not  targeted.  After  short  and  limited  tendering  procedures, 
large  construction  companies  carried  out  the  work  under  the  supervision  of  local 
authorities.  Clearly  this  gave  the  beneficiaries  no  chance  to  participate  in  the  planning, 
decision  making  or  implementation  processes.  Moreover,  it  was  hard  to  believe  that 
millions  of  pounds  had  been  spent  in  several  `NPUU-upgraded'  areas  in  Aswan,  Cairo  and 
Ismailia;  garbage  was  heaped  everywhere,  the  narrow  streets  were  full  of  uncovered 
sewerage  `manholes',  many  households  were  unable  to  pay  for  `formal'  infrastructure 
connections,  and  everyone  complained  how  difficult  it  was  to  make  a  living.  The  woes  of 
poverty  were  seen  not  only  in  the  squalor,  but  in  the  spread  of  diseases,  high  illiteracy 
rates  and  child  labour.  Despite  upgrading,  71  per  cent  of  the  children  in  Mounira  El- 
Gharbiya  and  Ezbet  El-Mufti  (Imbaba,  Giza  Governorate),  which  witnessed  one  of  the 
worst  battles  between  the  government  and  Islamist  militants  in  1992,  have  never  been  to 
school,  and  have  worked  from  an  early  age  (Al-Ahram  Strategic  Report  1995).  Hence  it  is 
argued  that  the  government's  inability  to  provide  adequate  housing  and  services,  as  well 
281 Chanter  10  Accountable  Bureaucratic  Capacity 
as  the  political  vacuum  left  by  political  parties  within  squatter  and  informal  areas,  will 
continue  to  enable  militant  Islamist  groups  to  assimilate  willing  members  as  they  strive  to 
fill  the  gap  in  service  supply. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  now  evident  that  the  blanket  promises  of  secure  tenure 
given  by  the  state  and  the  provision  of  structured  infrastructure  from  above  through  the 
NPUU  have  impacted  negatively  on  the  propensity  of  the  target  groups  to  contribute, 
which  is  one  of  the  preconditions  for  generating  investment  to  embark  on  and  sustain 
urban  upgrading  projects.  Although  the  state's  recognition  of  informal  and  squatter  areas 
alleviated  the  fear  that  `illegal'  houses  might  be  cleared  one  day,  the  provision  of 
infrastructure  gave  de  facto  security  of  tenure,  which  made  many  residents,  especially  the 
poorest,  reluctant  to  pay  for  either  the  land  or  the  improvements,  once  these  areas  had 
been  upgraded,  as  observed  in  Tabya,  Aswan  Governorate.  Top-down  infrastructure 
provision  without  engaging  the  `awareness'  of  beneficiaries,  raising  their  socio-economic 
status  and  intensifying  community  self-reliance  by  means  of  effective  participation  and  job 
creation,  similar  to  the  community  initiatives  that  the  Nasriya  project  tried  to  introduce, 
has  led  to  false  expectations  of  tenure  security.  Observations  in  Aswan,  Ismailia  and  Cairo 
show  that  once  improvements  in  infrastructure  have  taken  place,  squatters  are  gradually 
replaced  by  higher  income  groups  (FM1,26-11-98;  EM,  05-01-99;  HM,  20-01-98).  Many 
poor  squatters  are  pressured  by  speculators  to  sell  their  land,  as  in  Hai  El-Salam,  but 
although  happy  with  some  cash  in  hand,  they  squat  again  on  nearby  state-owned  lands. 
Payne  (1997)  links  such  a  situation  to  the  complex  set  of  psychological  and  cultural 
factors  associated  with  urban  land,  which  go  beyond  economic  rationale.  Indeed,  in  a 
climate  of  post-ERSAP  deprivation,  squatter  dwellers  use  land  as  a  sacred  trust,  which  is 
either  protected  on  a  customary  basis  for  their  children  to  extend  vertically,  or  used  as  a 
commodity  to  be  exploited  or  exchanged  like  any  other. 
Moreover,  the  NPW  ignored  all  the  lessons  learnt  from  the  previous  pilot 
participatory  projects;  it  proposed  to  clear  12  slum  areas  in  Cairo,  4  in  Giza,  9  in 
Alexandria  and  56  in  other  cities  throughout  Egypt  (Egyptian  Parliament  1993:  4;  Rose 
Al-Yousif  24  September  1999).  The  government  described  such  settlements  as  physically 
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precarious,  and  suffering  from  a  range  of  social  pathologies,  such  as  a  high  crime  rate,  and 
brittle  and  friable  social  relations.  Cairo's  Governor,  for  instance,  denounced  settlers  as 
squatters  who  `deformed'  Cairo's  image  by  building  slums  everywhere.  He  insisted  that  he 
would  "save  the  big  city  from  these  human  pollutants  by  uprooting  them.  ... 
[and] 
glamorise  the  heart  of  the  city  by  removing  slums  which  are  a  scar  on  the  city's  face" 
(Egyptian  Gazette:  10  February  1998).  The  continuous  failure  of  the  government  to  meet 
its  housing  deficits  for  low-income  people  has  led  it  to  lurk  in  the  dark  until  the  people 
themselves  have  solved  the  problem  only  to  denounce  them  as  squatters  distorting  Egypt's 
image.  The  government  has  claimed  that  house  improvement  does  not  have  a  high  priority 
among  slum  dwellers,  leading  it  to  assert  that  upgrading  policies  are  not  likely  to  succeed. 
As  Figure  7.6  suggested,  governmental  perception  of  slum  settlements  as  `atrocious 
housing',  only  results  in  `reactionary  palliative  policies'  (Eiweida  1997). 
Of  course  when  the  government  announced  in  1998  its  intention  to  clear  the  first 
of  these  areas,  Manshia'at  Nasser,  which  accommodated  among  others  the  largest  society 
of  garbage  collectors  in  Egypt  and  their  families,  the  Zabbalin,  the  people  were  in  a  state 
of  terror  and  anxiety,  and  vehemently  rejected  relocation  even  if  it  was  to  a  better  area 
(DS,  18-12-98).  Although  the  GTZ  was  already  working  to  upgrade  the  area,  the  basic 
fact  that  the  ability  of  a  bureaucracy  to  play  a  dynamic  role  in  the  upgrading  process  is 
inextricably  linked  to  levels  of  trust  and  confidence  between  the  local  government  and  its 
residents  partners  was  ignored.  Neither  GROs  nor  MPs  in  Manshia'at  Nasser  were 
consulted.  The  1.5  million  residents  wondered  why  the  government  had  left  them 
undisturbed  for  so  many  years.  They  accused  the  government  of  "rubbing  its  cheeks  on 
the  shoulders  of  wealthy  investors  and  businessmen  who,  loosening  the  strings  of  their  fat 
wallets,  demanded  to  buy  the  area  in  order  to  build  modern  communities  and  investment 
projects",  at  one  of  the  GTZ  public  hearings  in  the  area.  Sharp-minded  investors  allegedly 
tried  to  seize  Manshia'at  Nasser  because  of  its  strategic  location.  Despite  the  DA's 
initiatives  to  (re)construct  the  confidence  between  squatter  settlers  and  the  government, 
undemocratic  urban  governance  raised  doubt  and  resistance,  and  discouraged  the 
establishment  of  any  meaningful  mass  involvement  in  the  development  goals  of  the  state. 
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Because  the  government  believed  that  clearance  was  the  only  approach  to  solve  the 
environmental  problems  posed  by  slums,  it  was  soon  in  a  dilemma  as  to  how  to  curb  the 
riots  and  where  to  resettle  the  displaced.  The  relocation  plan  was  cancelled  after  the 
inhabitants  appealed  to  the  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  "to  intervene  quickly,  and 
take  into  consideration  the  social  dimension  during  the  process  of  planning  and  developing 
the  quarter,  which  should  be  coherent  with  the  existing  situation  which  dates  back  to 
1960. 
... 
We  have  confidence  in  your  sense  of  justice,  and  that  you  will  restore  our 
confidence,  reassurance,  stability  and  will  not  render  our  families  homeless"  (Al-Osbou: 
November  1998).  The  centralisation  of  decision-making  is  highlighted  in  this  approach  to 
the  Head  of  the  state  to  resolve  a  local  problem.  The  government's  response  towards 
`informal',  squatter  and  slum  settlements  will  always  flounder  in  a  sea  of  uncertainty 
because  the  decisions  of  Egypt's  senior  policy-makers  lack  clarity  and  priorities  are  vague 
and  shifting.  Decisions  are  taken  within  the  organisational  context  of  the  state,  according 
to  the  present  state-centred  models  of  governance  in  Egypt,  which  involve  the  excessive 
imposition  of  rules,  procedures  and  unsuitable  institutional  forms  to  group  collaboration. 
Residents  of  squatter  and  informal  settlements  are  unlikely  to  take  the  present  government 
seriously;  they  know  that  any  threat  will  gradually  wither  until  it  dies  away  completely, 
and  further  squatters  will  continue  to  build  new  homes  unless  the  housing  deficit  is  solved. 
It  is  doubtful  whether  collaborative  upgrading  policies  will  ever  be  institutionalised  in  such 
conditions. 
10.4-  Conclusions: 
Egypt's  urban  administration  system  does  not  work  effectively.  It  is  formal  and 
complex,  which  has  restricted  its  response  to  rapid  urban  growth  and  the  needs  of  low- 
income  residents.  There  are  structural  organisation  problems,  behavioural  culture 
constraints,  and  a  lack  of  confidence  and  rapport  with  the  masses  in  post-ERSAP  Egypt. 
The  economic  and  political  environment  does  not  encourage  municipal  officials  to  commit 
themselves  to  their  proper  work.  Lack  of  planning  capacity  and  culture,  at  both  the  central 
and  local  levels,  restrict  local  government  performance.  The  implementation  of  the  four 
institutional  and  organisational  key  dimensions  to  good  governance,  outlined  by 
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multilateral  organisations,  are  therefore  almost  impossible  at  the  present  time.  The  public 
sector  has  failed  to  manage  urban  affairs  or  to  be  accountable.  There  is  no  clear  set  of 
rules  or  legal  framework  for  development  known  in  advance,  information  is  not  publicly 
available  and  transparency  is  questionable.  The  system  as  a  whole  needs  to  change  from  a 
bureaucratic  one,  based  on  conformity  to  rules  and  regulations,  to  a  management  system 
based  on  problem  solving  and  achieving  set  goals.  Local  Government  needs  to  be 
reformed  and  transformed  from  a  centralised  to  a  decentralised  system.  Although 
legislation  has  empowered  Governors  to  deal  with  a  wide  range  of  local  problems,  they 
need  to  delegate  power  further  to  local  government  administrators  and  to  enhance  citizens 
participation  by  means  of  tolerating  and  respecting  the  supremacy  of  PLCs  in  acting  on 
behalf  of  the  citizens  they  represent. 
It  must  be  recognised  that  consciousness  raising  and  capacity-building  are  needed 
to  enhance  the  consensus  that  development  is  served  by  an  integrated  process  of  political 
and  economic  stability,  good  governance  and  popular  participation.  That  requires 
investment  in  people,  reliance  on  civil  society,  concern  for  the  environment  and  a  vigorous 
of  the  private  sector.  Shifts  in  administrative  thinking  will  require  a  totally  new  set  of 
administrative  and  managerial  role  definitions,  with  a  new  set  of  expectations  and 
reward/incentive  systems,  before  changes  can  be  realised.  This  is  a  long-term  process  of 
development  which  will  never  be  implemented  without  a  strategic  capacity-building 
policy,  at  macro,  national,  and  micro,  local,  levels  and  better  human  resources  directed  by 
a  competent  administrative,  financial  and  legal  system.  A  fundamental  goal  of  capacity 
building  is  thus  to  enhance  the  ability  to  evaluate  and  address  the  crucial  questions  related 
to  policy  choices  and  modes  of  implementation  among  development  options,  based  on  an 
understanding  of  environmental  potential  and  limits  and  of  needs  perceived  by  the 
secondary  stakeholders  concerned.  Congruous  models  of  upgrading  must  thus  be 
presented  and  discussed  with  different  institutions  concerned  in  an  effort  to  improve  their 
professional  capacity  for  upgrading  and  assimilate  successful  insights  in  their  long-term 
policies.  The  above  institutional  deficiencies,  in  addition  to  the  vulnerability  of  the  urban 
system  to  confront  the  changes  accompanying  liberalisation,  have  also  restricted  DAs' 
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local  capacity-building  initiatives  in  Ismailia  and  Aswan.  The  frequent  changes  in  local, 
government's  policies  in  Ismailia,  as  well  as  the  contradictory  agendas  of  the  donors 
involved,  have  weakened  the  efficacy  of  established  institutions,  increased  confusion 
among  stakeholders  concerned  and  reduced  the  impact  of  training  programmes.  In  spite  of 
the  fact  that  the  initiatives  of  GTZ  in  Aswan  Governorate  to  implement  a  local  capacity- 
building  strategy  started  almost  a  decade  after  the  launching  of  Ismailia's  programme,  it 
seemed  that  the  lessons  of  institutional  reform  were  not  learnt.  As  with  Ismailia's  UPO, 
the  survival  of  the  Urban  Development  and  Land  Management  Unit  (UDLMU)  of  Aswan 
Governorate  was  also  very  uncertain  by  the  end  of  1998. 
The  government  has  not  comprehended  that  collaborative  urban  upgrading,  rather 
than  top-down  physical  provision  or  `slum  clearance',  extends  economic  opportunities  to 
those  most  in  need,  the  urban  poor.  It  produces  a  low-cost  housing  system,  usually  in 
locations  which  enable  the  inhabitants  to  retain  the  maximum  disposable  income.  It 
preserves  communities  which  have  many  internal  linkages  to  support  households  and  the 
group.  `Slum  clearance',  on  the  other  hand,  is  sociably  disruptive  and  economically 
unfeasible  in  Egypt.  Even  when  this  action  clears  land  for  profitable  commercial 
developments,  those  displaced  by  slum  clearance  rarely  receive  appropriate 
accommodation  for  their  life  style;  they  return  and  resume  squatting,  often  in  the  same 
place  or  nearby,  which  will  eventually  require  another  massive  capital  injection  for 
upgrading.  The  establishment  of  dialogue  between  `squatters'  and  municipal  officials  is  a 
necessary  starting  point  for  institutionalising  collaborative  upgrading;  it  provides  forums  in 
which  experiential  and  professional  knowledge  can  be  shared.  However,  this  dialogue  is 
often  uncomfortable  for  the  latter  are  unused  to  being  questioned  by  their  clients.  Despite 
the  `theoretical'  notion  of  collaborative  governance  to  increase  citizen  participation  in 
public  decision-making,  there  are  challenges  associated  with  developing  such  dialogue  and 
deliberation  particularly  between  those  who  may  be  defined  as  `free-riders',  those  who 
have  been  deliberately  excluded,  and  municipal  officials,  who  are  gate-keepers  to  the 
services  needed.  Within  this  power  imbalance,  citizens  who  speak  out  may  put  themselves 
at  risk  and,  therefore,  always  need  the  `informal'  support  of  their  peers. 
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Development  is  the  central  metaphor  which  links  non-profit  making  DAs  and 
civil  society  organisations  with  the  other  two  key  agents  which  have  been  addressed 
throughout  this  research-  namely  national  and  local  government-  in  the  context  of 
sustainable  and  institutionalised  urban  upgrading  policies  and  community  participation. 
the  research  has  revealed  that  the  reliance  on  overly  simplified  economic  concepts  in 
recent  debates  on  urban  changes  has  tended  to  neglect  the  key  importance  of  the 
institutional  dimensions  to  the  processes  under  way.  Informal  and  squatter  settlements 
are  the  products  of  failed  policies,  bad  governance,  inappropriate  regulation.  and  client 
interaction  patters,  and  dysfunctional  land  markets  and  financial  systems.  Each  of  these 
failures  adds  to  the  toll  on  people  already  deeply  burdened  by  poverty  and  constraints 
the  opportunity  for  human  development. 
Successful  upgrading  project  may  lay  the  foundation  for  further  developments 
and  foster  vigorous  types  of  municipal  capacity  for  participation.  The  research  suggests 
that  micro  and  macro-level  initiatives  need  to  be  integrated,  with  the  need  to  influence 
the  national  policies  being  taken  into  account  in  the  design  of  local  initiatives.  Initiatives 
must  be  flexible;  participation  evolves  throughout  a  project's  duration.  While 
`community  consultation'  and  `cheap  labour'  may  respond  to  the  early  focus  on  `ends', 
they  can  lay  the  foundation  for  more  complex  forms  of  `delegated  power'  and 
`community  control'.  Only  then  participation  can  foster  empowerment  and  can  have  a 
transformative  potential  to  mobilise  citizens  into  participation  in  the  democratic 
processes.  The  important  implications  are  that  the  power  relationships  between 
members  of  a  community  as  well  as  between  them,  the  state  and  local  government 
institutions  can  change  over  time.  However,  community  self-reliance  can  only  be 
achieved  through  gradual  concessions  from  above,  matched  by  gradual  intensification  of 
citizen  participation.  Collaborative  urban  upgrading  is  partial  at  best  if  it  is  restricted  to 
an  infrastructure  network  and.  house  connections;  the  developmental  components  need 
to  involve  policy  adaptation  and  effective  community  self-administration. 
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11.1-  Urban  development  and  governance: 
The  first  objective  of  the  research,  to  conceptualise  a  pertinent  framework  that 
can  investigate  local  government  accountability,  citizen  political  participation  and  the 
level  of  capacity-building  needed  for  a  collaborative  model  of  urban  governance  in  DCs, 
has  revealed  that  the  discussion  and  analysis  of  development  can  be  based  on  syllogism: 
while  development  is  perceived  differently  by  different  disciplines,  and  contemporary 
critique  is  `confused',  it  is  best  analysed  as  a  discourse  of  power.  Urbanisation  is 
inevitable,  and  can  be  considered  as  an  attribute  of  development,  in  that  cities  offer 
greater  opportunities  and  the  promise  of  a  better  life.  However,  the  imposition  of 
ERSAP  neo-liberal  development  has  had  less  positive  outcomes  in  the  economic,  socio- 
cultural  and  environmental  arenas  at  all  geographic  scales.  The  gap  between  rich  and 
poor  countries  and  strata  has  widened,  while  development  directed  by  market  principles 
is  unable  to  address  the  problems  of  increasing  poverty  and  socio-economic  exclusion. 
The  impact  in  a  great  many  DCs  can  be  seen  in  the  failure  of  top-down  central  planning 
to  solve  the  problems  of  uncontrolled  urbanisation,  while  housing  deficits  and 
environmental  degradation  are  suffered  by  the  poor. 
The  conceptualisation  of  the  'development-urbanisation  relationship  must 
integrate  the  issues  of  civil  society  empowerment,  participation  as  an  end  and 
collaborative  urban  governance.  These  are  complex  processes;  they  require  strong,  open 
and  accountable  local  government  institutions  working  in  partnership  with  all  interested 
parties  to  (re)produce  adequate  and  `sustainable'  urban  policies,  as  well  as 
`institutionalised'  programmes  for  the  upgrading  of  low-income  settlements. 
Collaborative  urban  (re)development  requires  the  establishment  of  democratic  forms  of 
governance  in  DCs  to  replace  patron-clientelism,  imperious  public  servants,  army 
intervention  and  prolonged  authoritarian  military  regimes.  Partnership  and  good 
performance  of  local  government  are  crucial  for  the  prosperity  of  any  modern  society. 
But,  DCs'  local  governments  are  facing  profound  challenges  not  only  as  a  result  of  the 
shifting  global  context,  but  also  due  to  their  internal  bureaucratic  culture  and  structural 
organisational  settings,  which  impede  efficiency. 
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A  framework  of  `accountable  bureaucratic  capacity'  has  been  proposed  here, 
. 
which  can.  be  used  to  evaluate  local  government  accountability.  Local  government  is,  in 
fact,  a  function  of  four  key-dimensions:  the  structural  and  organisational,  the 
behavioural,  client-interaction,  and  the  economic,  political  and  public  environment.  The 
framework  distributes  responsibility  between  central  and  local  governments  equally,  and 
stresses  the  role  of  citizens  and  civil  society  organisations  in  participating  in  political  life. 
Capacity-building  builds  on  criteria-driven  measures,  consensus-building  and 
participatory  grounds.  It  is  argued  that  civil  society  organisations  cannot  contribute  to 
development,  democratisation  and  the  protection  of  citizens'  rights  without  accountable 
and  fair  representation  in  their  decision-making  structures,  reciprocal  and  active 
participation  by  the  citizens  concerned,  and  effective  and  ethical  public  sector 
performance.  While  it  is  appreciated  that  this  `rational'  institutional  concept  is  not  easy 
to  achieve  in  many  DC  cities,  it  is  believed  that  those  `individuals'  who  shape  the 
structural  forces  of  existing  local  governments,  do  have  the  power  to  change  the  present 
institutional  deficiencies. 
The  analysis  of  the  political  and  urban  post-ERSAP  challenges  in  DCs  as 
exemplified  by  Egypt,  the  second  objective  of  this  research,  revealed  that  the  present 
regime  is  subject  to  political-cultural  quandaries,  as  well  as  urban  challenges  above  those 
repeatedly  discussed  in  the  literature,  because  of  internal  (administrative)  and  external 
(DAs  conflicting  aims)  institutional  deficiencies.  Privatisation  and  financial  liberalisation 
effects  vary  according  to  the  segment  of  society.  ERSAP  focused  on  the 
macroeconomic,  medium-term  and  long-term  growth,  and  only  lately  on  social  policies 
to  minimise  the  effect  of  these  economic  reforms  on  the  poor.  Whilst  international 
financial  institutions  evaluated  the  measures  directed  at  the  first  as  `to  a  large  extent 
successful',  they  criticised  measures  directed  at  the  others.  Finance  remains  highly 
centralised,  social  transition  is  slow  and  the  government  still  restrains  liberal  pluralism. 
The  rise  of  fundamentalist  religious  and  social  movements  in  response  to  urban  and 
regional  biases,  especially  in  rural  Upper  Egypt,  has  raised  dilemmas  of  whether  to 
maintain  authoritarian  control  in  the  name  of  security,  or  to  embrace  civil  society 
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organisations  as  a  means  of  enhancing  democratisation  and  prosperity.  The  state  controls 
societal  interest  groups  so  as  to  restrict  the  number  who  would  demand  to  participate  in 
policy-making  processes.  State  jurisdictions  are  tailored  to  foster  control;  they  work 
against  an  independent  civil  society  concerned  with  maintaining  democracy  and  ensuring 
that  the  government  is  accountable  and  effective  at  city  level.  When  these  political- 
cultural  and  urban-economic  `situations'  were  examined  against  the  variables  of 
`accountable  bureaucratic  capacity',  it  became  evident  that  institutional  decentralisation, 
institutional  reform  to  establish  strong,  open  and  accountable  local  government 
institutions  working  in  partnership  with  all  interested  parties,  and  the  enhancement  of  a 
more  open  and  pro-active  society  are  required. 
11.2-  Collaborative  urban  upgrading: 
The  DA  support  confronts  such  challenges,  as  explored  through  two  DA-funded 
upgrading  projects,  the  third  objective,  differed  in  scope  and  in  the  resources  they 
devoted  to  promoting  participation  and  developing  community  and  municipal  capacities 
(Figure  11.1).  Participatory  experiences  had  not  been  well-conceptualised  in  the  1970s 
when  the  Hai  El-Salam  project  was  initiated.  The  project's  success  was  to  insert  informal 
sector  housing  practice  into  an  official  project.  While  the  project  succeeded  in  physical 
structural  terms,  its  approach  to  participation  was  limited  to  consultation.  It  neither 
enhanced  the  beneficiaries'  awareness,  raised  community  self-reliance  and  civic- 
empowerment,  nor  promoted  pluralism.  This  was  evident  in  the  low  response  rate  and 
`mistrust'  of  HoHs,  which  clearly  jeopardises  sustainability.  The  project's  philosophy 
towards  land  management  has  also  given  rise  to  enormous  technical  and  administrative 
problems  now.  The  Hai  El-Salam  case  study  revealed  that  there  are  various  side  effects 
of  the  granting  of  tenure  which  should  be  confronted  by  effective  legislation.  This 
deficiency,  in  addition  to  underestimation  of  population  mobility,  has  had  several 
repercussions  resulting  in  the  continuous  replacement  of  beneficiaries  by  higher  income 
groups.  Land  legislation  did  not  involve  collaborative  policy  making,  resulting  in  land 
tenure  policies  which  have  reinforced  land  value  inflation  and  absorbed  funds  better  spent 
in  more  productive  economic  uses. 
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Figure  11.1:  Summary-  Comparative  evaluation  of  two  urban  upgrading  approaches 
Hai  El-Salam: 
Conventional  and  expensive  infrastructure  networks  built  by 
contractors.  Costly  maintenance  carried  out  by  local  government 
Physical  entities  embedded  in  top-down  structures. 
upgrading 
Nasriya: 
The  community's  participation  reduced  the  cost  of  social  and  physical 
infrastructure.  The  only  failure  Evas  the  solid  waste  disposal  system. 
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Hai  EI-Salam: 
Land  supply  for  lower  income  groups  was  expected  but  not  supported 
by  effective  legislative  means.  Despite  successful  cross-subsidy,  the 
Door  were  gradually  replaced  by  higher  income  groups. 
Nasriya: 
Affordable  and  sustainable  living  spaces  for  the  target  beneficiaries 
was  provided.  Speculation  has  been  averted  by  effective  legislation 
and  resident  attachment  to  the  area. 
Hai  El-Salam: 
Participation  was  limited  to  consultation  with  community 
representatives,  though  it  was  possible  on  an  arbitrary  basis. 
Nasriya: 
A  `community  consultation'  and  `cheap  labour'  approach  at  the 
start,  led  gradually  to  `delegated  power'  and  `community  control'. 
Hai  EI-Salam: 
GROs  have  been  unable  to  participate  in  capitalistic  urban  markets. 
No  assistance  to  establish  a  `united'  civil  society  organisation. 
Nasriya: 
Assistance  to  establish  a  CDA;  representation  of  all  residents  through 
an  elected  assembly.  Effective  organisational  counterpart  to  local 
Hai  El-Salam: 
Superficial:  physical  improvement  but  not  by  the  target  groups. 
Replacement  by  higher  income  groups. 
Nasriya: 
Deep:  transformation  of  a  large  segment  from  `recipients'  into 
proactive  `partners'  engaged  in  maintenance,  while  the  community, 
as  a  whole,  reinvigorated  its  informal  and  traditional  networks. 
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While  Aswan's  Nasriya  project  (1987-1998),  also  transformed  an  `informal" 
settlement.  physically,  its  existing  socio-economic  structures  were  maintained  by  enabling 
community  participation  in  the  infrastructural  improvement.  Participation  in  planning  was 
considered  by  the  initiator,  the  secondary  stakeholders  and  the  primary  beneficiaries  as 
essential  to  ensure  appropriate  proposals.  The  work  was  implemented  through  `self-help' 
and  claimed  with  pride  by  the  participants,  who  asserted  that  the  co-operative  skills 
learnt  were  invaluable  in  further  construction  activities.  The  Nasriya  project  showed  that 
not  only  are  participatory  approaches  welcomed  by  community  beneficiaries  but  that  the 
capacity  of  local  government  can  be  gradually  improved.  The  project  also  demonstrated 
how  vernacular  architecture  and  use  of  local  construction  materials  can  foster 
`modernity'  and  embrace  intellectual  and  technological  progress.  The  Governor  of 
Aswan  perceived  these  achievements  as  indications  that  the  project's  goals  have  been 
achieved. 
11.3-  Participation  and  civil  society  empowerment: 
Nasriya  supplied  the  empirical  example  to  illustrate  community  perceptions  of 
participation,  the  fourth  objective.  Nasriya  inhabitants  were  neither  unorganised  nor 
apathetic  prior  to  the  project.  Their  action  and  political  activation  forced  the  local 
government  to  reconsider  its  urban  policies,  prompted  by  the  rise  of  terrorism  and 
religious  movements  at  the  time.  Community  perceptions  of  participation  10  years  after 
differed;  participation  was  perceived  primarily  as  practical  work  with  a  tangible  outcome. 
It  was  evident  that  while  almost  all  `active'  HoHs  viewed  their  participation  as  effective 
throughout  the  project's  phases;  the  `not  active'  only  did  so  during  the  implementation 
phase,  while  the  `less  active'  had  a  limited  role  in  the  planning.  Personal  attributes  shed 
light  on  the  membership  of  these  groups. 
Those  from  the  same  home  area  as  the  Head  of  the  early  civil  society  organisation 
working  in  Nasriya  at  the  time  were  more  likely  to  be  `active'.  The  `less  active'  had  on 
the  whole  higher  household  incomes,  but  many  were  self-employed  and  lacked  time  to 
participate  personally  even  in  the  implementation  phase.  The  inactive  were  mainly  tenants 
or  those  who  were  used  to  spoon-feeding  from  the  municipality  as  they  occupied  state- 
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built  housing  and  the  main  infrastructure  off-lines  serving  them  were  constructed  by 
contractors.  This  analysis  of  groups  is  necessary  for  upgrading  projects  to  highlight  the 
need  to  mobilise  the  less  and  not  active  groups,  while  sustaining  and  utilising  the  efforts 
of  the  active. 
Post-project  community  empowerment,  the  fifth  objective,  was  assessed  through 
the  linkage  between  participation  during  the  Nasriya  project  and  formal  political 
participation  as  well  as  `informal'  collaborative  action.  The  translation  of  the  `active 
citizens'  during  the  project  into  `activists'  in  the  formal  political  arena  was  not  linear. 
Individuals  were  mobilised  into  political  active  participation  on  the  basis  of  supporting 
candidates  coming  from  the  same  clan  or  home  origin,  or  on  the  basis  of  their  objective 
assessment  of  the  impact  of  proposed  policies  just  to  increase  their  own  profits,  e.  g.  the 
motives  for  self-employed  entrepreneurs  to  participate.  However,  the  impact  of  the 
upgrading  project  prevailed,  the  majority  of  citizens  were  not  politically  acquiescent;  a 
large  section  were  `activists',  who  participated  in  the  CDA's,  Popular  Local  Council's 
and  Parliament's  elections  and  knew  their  representatives,  or  were  `watch-dogs', 
although  they  were  more  likely  to  know  their  representatives  than  to  actually  vote.  Only 
one  third  of  HoHs  were  classified  as  `free-riders',  who  participated  at  only  one  level  in 
the  formal  political  arena,  the  CDA. 
A  variety  of  variables  directed  citizens'  formal  participation.  Political  activism 
was  associated  more  clearly  with  personal  characteristics.  The  `activists'  were  on  the 
whole  younger  with  higher  household  incomes  and  higher  education.  Self-employed  - 
entrepreneurs  were  over-represented,  which  may  explain  their  significantly  higher 
average  income.  Active  political  participation  was  also  influenced  by  a  set  of  `intervening 
variables'  related  to  property  stakes.  The  `activists'  had  on  the  whole  legal  land  status, 
and  were  owner-occupiers  living  in  good  housing  conditions.  However,  the  lack  of 
formal  participation  might  be  construed  as  confident  self-reliance  of  excluded  citizens- 
both  formally  in  terms  of  actual  constraints  on  their  citizenship  rights,  or  through 
organisation  which  makes  it  difficult  for  them  to  realise  the  substantive  rights  of 
citizenship-  rather  than  as  apathy  or  lack  of  capacity.  Informal  kin,  ethnic  and  traditional 
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neighbourly  support  networks  are  the  norm  and  highly  active  in  Nasriya's  culture.  The 
experiences  of  exclusion,  negligence  and  disadvantage  intensified  the  significance  of 
identity  as  a  factor  defining  both  the  motivation  to  act  collectively-  to  develop  groups  in 
which  identities  can  be  formed  and  expressed,  and  the  objectives  pursued  by  such 
groups. 
The  Nasriya  project  has  achieved  a  considerable  degree  of  success  in  empowering 
the  community  as  a  whole,  to  enhance  citizens'  self-administration  processes  and  to 
provide  channels  through  which  they  can  access  government  resources  and  services,  in 
the  context  of  civil  society.  The  organisations  acquired  legal  frameworks,  articles  of 
association  and  statutes  as  well  as  access  to  funds.  The  main  means  was  the  Community 
Development  Association  (CDA)  representing  almost  all  the  sub-communities, 
attempting  to  avoid  the  mistakes  of  its  predecessor  which  had  been  exclusive.  The  CDA 
is  currently  responsible  for  co-ordinating  the  communities'  activities,  opening  channels  of 
communication  and  participation,  providing  training  for  activists  and  GROs,  promoting 
pluralism  and  establishing  effective  poverty  alleviation  programmes.  However,  the 
present  democratic  structure  does  not  satisfy  all  groups. 
The  dissatisfaction  of  female  members  of  the  CDA  was  instrumental  in  the 
demand  for  independent  Women's  Development  Association  (WDA).  The  future  of  the 
WDA  is,  however,  questionable;  being  established  at  the  end  of  the  project.  Training 
was  limited,  no  permanent  qualified  staff  were  employed  by  the  project  during  the 
establishment  phase,  and  in  particular  there  was  considerable  rivalry  between  the 
organisations.  The  successful  applicability  and  replicability  of  gender  initiatives  requires 
personnel  with  a  strong  theoretical  grounding  in  gender,  along  with  an  equally  strong 
record  of  practical  implementation/adaptation  of  gender  concepts  at  the  local  level. 
However,  the  project  did  give  a  considerable  boost  to  women  of  all  ages,  despite  raising 
men's  traditional  prejudices.  The  WDA  is  still  dependent  financially  but  is  a  strong 
bulwark  against  women's  disempowerment  within  the  neighbourhood. 
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11.4-  Municipal  capacity-building: 
The  sixth  objective  of  this  research  has  investigated  local  government 
accountability  and  evaluated  municipal  capacity-building  approaches  in  Ismailia  and 
Aswan.  Egypt's  urban  administration  system  does  not  work  effectively.  Structural 
organisational  variables,  particularly  economic  centralisation,  preclude  the  establishment 
of  collaborative  urban  governance.  The  confining  traditions  are  that  power  is  dependent 
on  relations  with  those  in  the  higher  echelons,  and  the  key  to  effectiveness  and 
promotion  is  procedural  and  a  question  of  conformity  to  rules,  rather  than  goal- 
achievement  or  risk-taking.  While  over  centralisation  has  produced  rigid  patterns  of 
hierarchical  authority,  low  fixed  salaries  have  contributed  to  inappropriate  client- 
interaction,  which  has  further  weakened  the  organisational  structure  of  the  bureaucracy. 
Although  the  legal  framework  allows  municipalities  to  prepare  and  adjust  the  technical 
planning  processes  at  the  local  level,  this  is  difficult  owing  to  shortages  of  qualified  staff, 
problems  of  co-ordination  and  information  exchange  between  organisations,  and  the  lack 
of  a  planning  `culture'  within  local  governments. 
Ismailia  and  Aswan  projects  tried  different  approaches  to  establish  efficient 
capacity-building  programmes,  but  were  faced  by  similar  institutional  obstacles  within 
this  bureaucratic  climate.  Their  capacity-building  initiatives  involved  activities  with 
multiplier  effects,  the  training  of  municipal  officials,  and  networking  to  improve  urban 
management  performance  (Figure  11.2).  Both  initiatives  tried  to  by-pass  the  existing 
municipal  structures  and  introduced  new  criteria-driven  measures  by  means  of 
establishing  quasi-independent  urban  institutions.  The  interest  and  political  will  of  both  of 
Ismailia's  and  Aswan's  Governors  permitted  these  institutional  reform  processes.  Similar 
human  resource  development  strategies  were  introduced  and  applied,  which  relied  on  the 
co-ordination  of  the  various  administrative  and  public  sectors,  with  the  technical  and 
financial  support  coming  from  the  DAs  concerned. 
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Figure  11.2:  Summary-  Comparative  evaluation  of  two  local  capacity-building  strategies 
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Ismailia: 
The  DAs  proposed  the  establishment  of  the  UPO  with  general  planning 
responsibilities,  which  was  supported  by  local  senior  staff  and  the  PLC 
on  the  basis  of  the  success  of  the  Demonstration  Projects. 
Aswan: 
Awareness  of  the  need  for  a  new  planning  and  management  entity 
arose  shortly  before  the  completion  of  the  Nasriya  project's  first  phase. 
Stakeholders  identified  the  `problem-objective'  themselves. 
Ismailia: 
Purely  financial;  semi-autonomous  fund  generated  directly  by  land-sale 
revenues  and  monitored  by  the  Governorate's  auditors.  Revenues 
facilitate  planning  reproduction. 
Aswan: 
Semi-independent  apparatus  is  one  of  the  Governor's  offices. 
The  UDLMU  lacks  financial,  legislative  and  administrative  support. 
Ismailia: 
On  job  training  in  specific  tasks  by  local  and  international  consultants, 
regular  weekly  planning  seminars  and  an  `Urban  Projects  Manual'. 
Aswan: 
On  job  training  programmes  with  special  emphasis  on  participatory 
urban  upgrading,  formal  training  courses,  and  exchange  experience 
with  similar  schemes  in  other  DCs. 
Ismailia: 
Land-sale  revenues  enabled  the  UPO  to  buy  drawing  and  survey 
equipment,  furniture,  photocopiers  and  computers. 
Aswan: 
The  DA  equipped  the  UDLMU  with  a  pick-up  vehicle,  drawing  and 
survey  equipment,  furniture,  a  photocopier  and  typewriters. 
Ismailia: 
Academic  papers,  a  booklet,  leaflets,  posters,  media  articles,  TV 
programmes  and  several  reports  have  been  published.  The  project  was 
presented  in  Istanbul  1996  (Habitat,  Sustainable  Cities)  as  `good 
practice'. 
Aswan: 
In  addition  to  the  above,  local  government  officials,  led  by  the 
Governor,  actively  promoted  the  participatory  approach,  especially 
to  the  central  government. 
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Ismailia  had  financial  autonomy  because  the  UPO  had  the  power  to  sell 
government-owned  land,  while  the  revenues  increased  the  resources  of  the  Urban 
Development  Committee's  Fund  and  guided  further  development  in  the  city  through 
cross-financing  and  cross-subsidy  within  the  Governorate.  Although  this  financial 
autonomy  had  the  potential  to  be  sustainable,  the  UPO  was  only  producing  money- 
generating  high-income  land  subdivisions  rather  than  low-income  sites-and-services 
based  on  the  experience  gained  in  Hai  El-Salam.  The  urban  poor  lacked  legal  access  to 
land  and  continued  to  squat  beyond  the  city  boundaries.  Although  both  local 
governments  benefited  from  the  establishment  of  urban  institutions,  their  sustainability  is 
uncertain  because  of  institutional  confusion  and  the  low  capacity  of  local  government  to 
attract,  motivate  and  retain  qualified  staff  and  sufficient  operational  budgets.  Their 
financial  insecurity  ties  their  future  to  Governor's  support,  as  were  many  of  the  project's 
instruments.  Aswan's  strength  was  collaborative;  all  stakeholders  identified  the  `core 
problem'  themselves.  Nasriya  showed  that  it  is  possible  to  respond  to  demand  through 
decision-making  processes  which  mainly  involve  senior  government  officials  and 
representatives  of  international  agencies  if  they  are  willing  to  listen  to  local  people  and 
take  their  concerns  into  account  when  developing  proposals.  The  long-term  impact  of 
the  Nasriya  process  is  that  senior  officials,  including  the  Governor,  are  now  used  to 
holding  regular  meetings  with  CDA  and  WDA  Boards,  to  allow  open  dialogue  about 
policy  issues  and  to  take  decisions  that  are  responsive  to  community  concerns. 
As  the  Nasriya  project  management  unit's  staff  were  seconded  from  local 
government  departments,  the  latter  may  benefit  from  the  knowledge,  skills  and  attitudes 
developed  in  the  course  of  the  project  to  the  extent  which  they  allow  scope  for  the 
development  of  participatory  processes.  The  UDLMU,  for  instance,  has  improved 
planning  capacity  at  the  local  level  and  has  done  so  in  a  way  which  incorporates 
participatory  elements.  Moreover  Nasriya  have  probably  raised  official  awareness  of  the 
positive  contribution  that  informal  settlements  can  make  to  urban  development,  a  step 
essential  to  meaningful  participation  in  urban  upgrading.  The  advocacy  of  the  Governor 
of  Aswan  has  helped  to  promote  the  Nasriya  approach  to  participatory  upgrading 
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amongst  other  senior  government  decision-makers.  However,  it  must  be  recognised  that 
even  when  policy  makers  are  committed  to  change,  it  may  be  blocked  by  the  lack  of 
interest  or  even  hostility  of  lower-level  bureaucrats.  The  development  of  participatory 
attitudes  and  procedures  is  best  seen  as  a  process,  but  such  efforts  to  change  the 
attitudes  of  municipal  officials  and  introduce  them  to  participatory  models  may  not 
overcome  their  fears  of  job  security  and  lack  of  motivation  resulting  from  poor  salaries. 
Thus  other  political  and  economic  factors  influence  changes  in  government  approaches, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  disaggregate  the  impact  of  these  different  factors. 
Consequently,  the  last  objective  of  the  research  has  evaluated  the  evidence  as  to 
whether  the  capacities  acquired  by  government  departments  have  been  sustainable  and 
transferable  to  other  projects  at  local  and  national  levels.  Although  there  is  enough 
evidence  to  show  that  decentralising  government  forces  are  still  active,  a  negative 
complexity  of  variables  operating  within  the  bureaucratic  framework  constrains  the 
institutionalisation  of  collaborative  urban  upgrading.  This  was  evident  during  the 
National  Programme  of  Urban  Upgrading  (NPUU,  1992-date).  Cities  of  24  Egyptian 
Governorates  included  1034  pockets  of  `informal'  and  `slum'  settlements,  which 
exemplified  the  failure  of  urban  development  to  solve  the  problems  of  housing  deficit, 
poverty  and  social  exclusion.  While  the  NPUU  did  represent  a  quasi-recognition  of  the 
existence  of  informal  development,  as  well  as  a  change  in  the  government's  belief  in 
upgrading  policies,  it  was  only  a  social  response  to  the  spread  of  fundamentalist  religious 
ideology,  particularly  in  informal  settlements,  which  accompanied  the  intensification  in 
the  repression  of  terrorism.  The  design  and  management  of  the  programme  took  a  top- 
down  approach  to  service  provision,  whilst  the  structural  organisational  constraints  on 
bureaucratic  capacity  provided  no  chance  for  public  participation  during  the 
institutionalised  processes.  Despite  the  application  of  many  insightful  capacity-building 
initiatives  through  Ismailia  and  Aswan  projects,  lessons  were  not  learnt,  the  upgrading 
process  was  dependent  on  central  national  policies,  and  `slum  clearance'  was  still  seen  as 
a  `solution'  by  many  policy-makers.  It  is  thus  doubtful  whether  collaborative  upgrading 
policies  can  be  institutionalised  under  the  present  structures. 
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11.5-  Policy  implications: 
`Accountable  bureaucratic  capacity'  requires  a  new  set  of  skills,  attitudes,  role 
orientations,  and  technical  capabilities.  A  crucial  dilemma  to  establish  institutionalised 
urban  upgrading  policies  is  the  need  to  distance  an  autonomous  and  collaborative  system 
of  governance  based  on  partnership  with  civil  society  from  centralised  allocation  of 
functions  and  responsibilities,  Governor-centred  decision-making,  top-down 
communication  and  rigid  hierarchical  authority.  The  roots  of  this  dilemma  lie  in  an 
administrative  system  structured  over  the  past  five  decades,  yet  reflective  of  a 
governmental  system  in  place  for  centuries.  DAs'  training  programmes  per  se  cannot 
change  these  realities  in  the  short  term;  there  is  a  need  for  strategic  capacity-building  at 
all  levels.  Fortunately,  there  are  numerous  Egyptian  officials,  chief  executives  and 
management  personnel  who  are  committed  to  improving  the  effectiveness  of  local 
administration  organisations  through  gradual  shifts  in  the  planning  and  administrative 
cultures.  Such  shifts  require  a  totally  new  set  of  administrative  and  managerial  role 
definitions,  with  a  new  set  of  expectations  and  new  reward/incentive  systems.  The  long- 
term  process  of  development  needs  a  better  trained  human  resource  base  directed  by  a 
competent  administrative  system,  and  that  the  system,  as  a  whole,  must  change  from  a 
bureaucratic  one,  based  on  conformity  to  rules  and  regulations,  to  a  management  system 
based  on  problem  solving  and  achieving  set  goals. 
Four  steps  are  recommended  to  Egypt's  government  and  its  development 
partners  to  establish  institutionalised  collaborative  urban  policies.  First,  in  order  to 
integrate  the  macroeconomic  and  financial  side  of  development  with  the  structural  and 
social  side,  the  government  needs  to  delegate  more  central  prerogatives,  to  devolve 
legislative  authority  and  to  grant  financial  autonomy  to  local  governments.  It  is  not 
necessary  for  the  government  to  deliver  many  of  the  services  it  currently  provides;  it 
should  act  as  an  `enabler'  and  ensure  that  services  are  provided  to  a  predetermined 
specification.  The  overall  transition  can  be  conceptualised  as  a  process  of  concession 
from  above  by  which  greater  civil  and  political  rights  are  gradually  extended.  At  the 
micro  level,  the  government  needs  to  redefine  the  local  administration  system  in  legal  and 
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organisational  terms  that  encourage  forms  of  democratic  sovereignty  and  an  empowered 
civil  society.  This  accords  with  the  implementation  of  a  comprehensive  municipal 
capacity-building  policy  so  that  partnership  at  all  levels  can  be  assured. 
Second,  legal  recognition  of  squatter  settlements  is  important  for  strengthening  a 
group's  ability  to  negotiate  and  transact  with  non-group  members.  It  is  a  valuable  tool 
for  protecting  the  group  against  undue  interference  from  government  and  other 
outsiders.  However,  this  recognition  can  also  have  detrimental  effects  if  it  is  carried  out 
by  institutional  forms  that  are  alien  to  communities,  or  if  it  is  not  supported  by  legislative 
means  which  reduces  the  excessive  imposition  of  rules  and  procedures.  Collaborative 
upgrading  policies  should,  among  other  things,  seek  to  stimulate  economic  development 
for  low-income  squatters,  to  weave  communities  within  a  metropolis  into  a  cohesive 
whole,  and  to  ensure  equal  access  to  public  services  and  workplaces  within  the 
framework  of  an  open  and  democratic  urban  governance  structure. 
Third,  awarding  a  key  role  to  civil  society  organisation  in  the  democratisation 
process  is  essential  to  the  success  of  `accountable  bureaucratic  capacity'.  Local  GROs 
should  be  seen  as  an  integral  component  of  a  thriving  civil  society  and  an  essential 
counterweight  to  state  power,  opening-up  channels  of  communication  and  participation, 
providing  training  for  activists,  and  promoting  pluralism.  Egyptian  NGOs  have  carried 
out  a  large  number  of  development  projects,  many  of  which  have  successfully  supported 
self-reliance  at  the  local  level,  integrating  `marginal'  populations  within  the  national 
economy.  However,  a  scrutiny  of  NGOs'  performance  in  Egypt  reveals  that  they  need  to 
be  more  responsive  to  the  demands  of  the  beneficiaries  by  evaluating  their  own  progress, 
learning  from  their  mistakes,  and  further  integrating  their  members  within  the  planning 
and  implementation  processes.  Hence,  further  support  from  international  DAs  in  specific 
areas  is  needed. 
Finally,  '  the  support  of  the  15  major  DAs,  which  presently  contribute  some 
US$2.3  billion  to  the  Egyptian  economy  every  year,  can  be  instrumental  in  the  above 
suggestions.  Besides  offering  the  technical  assistance  needed  for  the  adjustment  of  the 
macroeconomic  and  financial  side  of  development,  DAs  may  also  encourage  and 
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capacitate  civil  society  organisations,  including  local  NGOs  and  GROs,  to  become 
providers  of  social  and  economic  services  on  a  much  larger  scale.  However,  this  should 
not  weaken  local  NGOs'  and  GROs'  legitimacy  as  independent  actors  in  society,  divert 
their  accountability  away  from  grassroots  constituencies,  or  over  emphasise  short-term 
quantitative  outputs.  Governing  multi-lateral  organisations  concerned,  e.  g.  the  World 
Bank  and  the  IMF,  should  make  sure  that  the  foreign  aid  is  invested  where  most 
effective.  `Demand-orientation',  putting  the  needs  of  the  poor  at  centre  stage,  is  more 
helpful  than  `supply-orientation',  in  which  each  donor  provides  its  specialised  goods  and 
services  at  the  lowest  cost.  The  returns  of  demand-oriented  strategies  are  slower  but  are 
more  likely  to  be  sustainable.  Further  research  is  needed  to  compare  the  outcomes  of 
these  two  strategies  where  applied  in  different  case  studies.  Further  conceptual 
development  is  also  needed  to  in  the  transformative  potential  of  participation  and  its 
ability  to  make  community  development  and  empowerment  sustainable. 
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TARGET  GROUPS 
(Effective  head  of  households-  HoH  No..........  ) 
1-  GROs,  pluralism  and  self-administration  (Sustainability): 
1.1-  Do  you  belong  to  any  community  centre(s)  inside  this  area? 
Yes(  )  No(  ) 
IF  YES: 
1.2-  Which  and  what  are  its  obiectives? 
Name  of  the  association  Objectives 
.......................................... 
Social  assistance  ()  Helping  poor  and  disadvantaged  () 
.................................... 
Solving  conflicts  ()  Tribute  and  consolation  () 
Hostel  ()  Culture  ()  Religious  ()  Sport  ()  First  aid  () 
Clinic  and  health  care  ()  General  charitable  ()  Wedding  () 
..........................................  Feasts  and  general  occasions  ()  Illiteracy  programme  ()  Nursery  ) 
Other:  Please  specify:  .............................................................................. 
1.3-  What  are  the  main  achievements  accomplished  by  this  association.? 
Answer: 
................................................................................................... 
TO  ALL  RESPONDENTS: 
1.4-  Is  there  any  mother  association  to  represent  all  the  residents  of  the  area? 
Yes  ()  No  ()  Don't  know  () 
IF  YES: 
1.5-  What  is  its  name  and  what  are  its  objectives? 
Name  of  the  association  Objectives 
1.6-  Are  you  a  member? 
Yes  ()  No  ()  why  not?  ..................................................... 
TO  ALL  RESPONDENTS: 
1.7-  Have  you  ever  participated  in  any  voluntary  work  inside  or  outside  the  area? 
`Please  explain'. 
Answer  Purpose  Type  of  help  Beneficiaries 
Yes  () 
No  () 
1.8-  Are  there  any  different  social  groups  living  in  the  area? 
Yes  ()  please  name  them:  ..................................................................... 
No  ()  Don't  know  () 
1.9-  Are  there  any  conflicts  within  this  area?  How  are  they  usually  solved? 
Answer  Conflicts  between  Solutions 
Yes  ()  Children  hanging  around  ()  Police  () 
No  ()  Neighbours  ()  Neighbours  assistance  () 
Don't  know  ()  Families  ()  Elderly  people  assistance  () 
Teenagers  and  students  ()  Family  assistance  () 
Land  and  properties  ()  Community  centres 
Tribal  conflicts  ()  reconciliation  () 
Revenge  killing  ()  Other  ()  specify:  .............. 
Bullying  () 
Other  ()  specify:  .............. 
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Answer  With  whom 
At  home  (  )  With  family  (  ) 
Sitting  on  the  mastaba  (  )  With  neighbours  (  ) 
In  the  mosque  (  )  With  friends  (  ) 
In  open  space  (  )  With  work  colleagues  (  ) 
In  coffee  house  (  )  With  community  colleagues  (  ) 
In  the  community  centre  (  )  With  any  body  (  ) 
No  free  time  (  )  Alone  (  ) 
Other  ()  eci  :.......................................  Other  ()  specify:  .............  .......  ................... 
1.11-  Did  you  vote  to  choose  your  current  renresentatives? 
At  the  area's  level  Local  council  Parliament 
Yes(  ) 
No  ()  why: 
Yes(  ) 
No(  )wily: 
Yes(  ) 
No  (  )wh: 
IF  NO  AT  ANY  LEVEL: 
1  12-  Dn  you  know  vnur  renresentatives? 
At  the  area's  level  Local  council  Parliament 
Yes  () 
No  () 
Yes  () 
No  () 
Yes  () 
No  () 
2-  Relationship  with  the  municipality  (Sustain  ab  ifi!  y): 
2.1-  Who  do  you  contact  if  you  have  a  problem  regarding  a  utility  supply? 
Answer: 
.................................................................................................. 
2.2-  Where  do  you  get  your  health  care  services?  Why  and  how  much  is  the  cost  of 
each  attendance? 
Answer  Reason  Cost  (LE) 
General  hospital  () 
Health  insurance  clinic  () 
Service  centre  clinic  () 
Private  clinic  () 
Don't  need  any  () 
2.3-  What  is  the  attitude  of  the  municipal  bureaucracy  in  general? 
Co-operative  ()  Not  co-operative  ()  Rigid  routines  ()  Favouritism  () 
Corrupt  ()  Arrogant  ()  Inexperienced  ()  Don't  know  () 
Other  ()  Specify: 
................................................................................................... 
2.4-  Have  you  ever  dealt  with  the  City  Council  or  the  District? 
Yes  ()  what  for?: 
................................................................................ 
No  () 
IF  YES: 
2.5-  Have  you  ever  had  any  problem  with  them? 
Answer  Incident(s) 
Yes  ()  Mistreatment  ()  Prejudice  ()  Graft  () 
Not  at  all  ()  Inequality  ()  Time  consuming  () 
Refuse  to  answer  ()  Other  ()s  ecif  :.................................................................................... 
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3.1-  Are  there  any  problems  in  the  area  now  which  you  believe  need  attention? 
Yes  ()  `please  prioritise':  ...................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................. 
No(  )  Don't  know(  ) 
3.2-  Are  you  familiar  with  the  upgrading  project  which  took  place  in  the  area? 
Yes  ()  No  () 
IF  NO:  End  of  sections  3  and  4 
IF  YES: 
3.3-  What  were  the  most  successful  activities  that  the  project  achieved? 
Answer:  1) 
................ 
2) 
................ 
3) 
................ 
4) 
................ 
5) 
................ 
6) 
................ 
3  4-  Were  there  anv  nlanned  activities  that  vnn  think  the  nroiect  failed  to  achieve?  Whv? 
Answer  Unimplemented  activities  Reasons 
Yes  () 
No  ()  Don't  know  () 
3  5-  Were  there  anv  mistake  or  inannrnnriate  activities  that  the  nrniect  imnlemented?  Whv? 
Answer  Inappropriate  activities  Reasons 
Yes(  ) 
No  ()  Don't  know  () 
3.6-  Were  there  any  disagreements  between  the  project  and  the  community? 
Yes  ()  `please  explain':  ....................................................................... 
No  ()  Don't  know  () 
3.7-  Did  the  project  offer  loans  for  house  improvement? 
Yes  ()  what  happened?: 
........................................................................ 
No  ()  Other  ()  specify:  ............................................... 
3.8-  Did  the  project  offer  to  help  you,  or  any  of  your  household,  to  improve  income? 
Yes  ()  what  happened?: 
........................................................................ 
No  ()  Other  ()  specify:  ............................................... 
3.9-  What  did  the  project  offer  for  the  women  in  the  area? 
Answer: 
.................................................................................................... 
Nothing  () 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4-  Participation  and  self-initiatives(Action): 
4.1-  How  do  you  evaluate  the  narticination  of  your  community  with  the  following: 
Process  Answer 
Planning  of  the  project  -Very  effective  ()-  Limited  ()-  Not  at  all  () 
Implementation  -Very  effective  ()-  Limited  ()-  Not  at  all  () 
Evaluation  -Very  effective  ()-  Limited  ()-  Not  at  all  () 
IF  VERY  EFFECTIVE  OR  LIMITED: 
4.2-  In  which  activities  did  the  people  artici  ate?  How? 
Activities  How 
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Answer: 
................................................................................................... 
IF  LEWMD  OR  NOT  AT  ALL: 
4.4-  Did  you  try  to  solve  this  problem? 
Yes  ()  how?: 
........................................................................................ 
No  (  )why?: 
......................................................................................... 
TO  ALL  RESPONDENTS: 
4.5-  Who  chose  this  area  for  upgrading?  Why? 
Answer: 
............................................. 
Reason:........................................ 
Don't  know  () 
4.6-  Do  you  know  any  other  upgrading  schemes  in  the  city? 
Yes  ()  which?:  ..................................................................................... 
No  () 
IF  YES: 
4.7-  How  successful  was  yours  compared  to  them?  Whv? 
Answer  Reason 
Very  successful  () 
Successful  () 
The  same  () 
Less  successful  () 
No  comparison  () 
Don't  know  () 
5-  Plot  data  and  articulations  of  land-supply  (Possible  causal  factors): 
5.1-  What  was  the  initial  tvoe  of  your  land/house  sunnly?  and  what  is  it  now? 
Initial  vype  of  land/house  Existing  status 
Owned  house  on  owned  land  (  )  Owned  house  on  owned  land  () 
Owned  house  on  hekr  land  (  )  Owned  house  on  hekr  land  () 
Owned  house  on  occupied  land  (  )  Owned  house  on  occupied  land  () 
Rented  house  on  owned  land  (  )  Rented  house  on  owned  land  () 
Rented  house  on  hekr  land  (  )  Rented  house  on  hekr  land  () 
Rented  house  on  occupied  land  (  )  Rented  house  on  occupied  land  () 
Other: 
................................................. 
Other. 
IF  OWNER: 
5.2-  Do  you  rent  any  part  of  your  house? 
Yes  ()  No  () 
IF  NO: 
5.3-  Would  you  rent  part  of  your  house  to  some  one  offers  good  price? 
Yes  ()  No  ()  Don't  know  () 
IF  THE  LAND  IS  NOT  OWNED: 
5.4-  Have  you  ever  tried  to  legalise  your  land-status? 
Yes  ()  what  happened? 
........................................................................... 
No  ()  why?  ......................................... 
Cannot,  I'm  a  tenant  () 
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Yes(  )why? 
............................................................................................ 
No  ()  why?  ............................................................................................ 
TO  ALL  RESPONDENTS: 
5.6-  Land  and  house  cost 
Initial  costs  (LE)  Consequence  costs  (LE) 
Land::  Land  title: 
House:  House  improvement: 
Hekr:  House  extension: 
House  reconstruction: 
First  rent  rate:  Existing  rent  rate: 
6-  House  data  (causal  factors): 
6.1  -  How  was  your  house  constructed? 
By  the  By  With  With  Hired  Local  Other 
owner  yourself  family  neighbours  labours  contractor 
assistance  assistance 
()  ()  ()  ()  ()  )  () 
6.2-  Who  designed  this  house  for  vou? 
The  owner  Yourself  Relative  Contractor  Technician  Engineer  Other 
c)  c)  c)  c)  i)  c)  c) 
6.3-  Was  there  building  permission  for  this  house? 
Yes  ()  No  ()  Don't  know  () 
6.4-  How  would  you  describe  your  house's  condition? 
Good  ()  Fair  ()  Bad  ()  Very  bad  () 
6.5-  What  is  the  reason  that  your  house  is  in  this  condition? 
Yes  ()  why:  .......................................................................................... 
No  ()  Don't  know  () 
6.6-  House  data: 
No.  of  Materials  of  No.  of  No.  of  Years  of  House  connections 
floors  construction  flats  rooms  construction 
Water  Sewage  Elec.  Garbage 
Concrete  ()  Yes  ()  Yes  ()  Yes  ()  Yes  () 
Traditional  ()  No  ()  No  ()  No  ()  No  () 
Mixed 
6.7-  How  much  do  you  pay  monthl  y  for  the  following? 
Electricity  Water/sewage  Waste  disposal  Telephone  Maintenance 
6.8-  Have  you  ever  chanized  the  use  of  any  rooms  in  your  house?  What  and  whv? 
Answer  Changes  Reasons 
Yes  () 
No  () 
6.9-  Do  you  have  any  plans  for  extension  or  improvement  to  your  house  in  the  future? 
Yes  ()  what:  ..................................................................................... 
No  ()  Don't  know'(  ) 
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7.1-  Name  :...........................................  7.2-  Sex:  male  ()  female  () 
7.3-  Please  fill  in  the  following  data  about  all  members  in  the 
Person  Marital  status  Age  Education  Occupation  2nd  'ob  Income  Contribution 
-  Yourself 
.................  .......  ...............  ................. 
-  Your  spouse  -----  .......  ...............  .................  ...........  ........  .................. 
-  Your  children 
Other  members 
Total: 
IF  THE  RESPONDENT  IS  MARRIED: 
7.4-  Do  you  have  any  children  who  don't  live  here? 
Yes  ()  How  many:  .......................... 
No  () 
IF  YES: 
7.5-  Do  they  contribute? 
Yes  ()  No  () 
TO  ALL  RESPONDENTS: 
7.6-  How  many  persons  of  your  children/extended  family  will  you  allow  to  live  with 
you  in  this  house'!  Why'! 
Person  Reason 
7.7-  Do  you  find  your  household  income  sufficient  for  your  needs? 
Yes  ()  It's  just  sufficient  () 
No  ()  how  do  you  survive  then?  ............................................................ 
7.8-  What  is  the  best  way,  do  you  think,  to  help  you  to  improve  your  income? 
Answer: 
..................................................................................................... 
8-  Migration  /  Mobility  (causal  factors): 
a.  i  -  wnere  were  you  vorm 
Village: 
........................... 
Governorate: 
IF  THE  RESPONDENT  IS  A  MIGRANT: 
8.2-  When  did  you  leave  your  birthplace?  Wh  ? 
Year  Reasons 
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. 
Answer: 
..................................................................................................... 
8.4-  When  did  you  move  to  this  area?  Why  did  you  choose  it  specifically? 
Year  Reasons 
TO  ALL  RESPONDENTS: 
8.5-  Will  you  move  out  of  this  area  in  the  future?  Whv? 
Answer  Reasons 
Yes  ()  No  () 
It  depends  () 
8.6-  Would  you  sell  your  plot  if  some  one  offered  a  good  price? 
Yes  ()  No  ()  Cannot,  I'm  a  tenant  ()  Don't  know  () 
IF  YES: 
8.7-  Where  will  you  live  then? 
Elsewhere  in  the  area  ()  Out  of  the  area  ()  In  the  new  extension  () 
Back  to  home  origin  ()  Other  ()  Please  specify  ................................. 
9-  Additional  Comments: 
9.1-  What  are  your  ambitions/goals  in  life? 
Answer: 
..................................................................................................... 
9.2-  What  do  you  think  this  area  will  be  like  in  10  years? 
.................................................................................................................... 
Special  remarks  by  the  interviewer: 
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MUNICIPAL  OFFICIALS 
1-  Institutional  performance: 
1.1-  How  do  you  describe  the  excat  role  of  the  muncipality? 
Anwser  :................................................................................................... 
1.2-  What  is  exactly  your  job-describtion? 
Anws  er:..................................................................................................  . 
1.3-  What  sorts  of  bureaucracy  cause  major  roblems? 
Bureaucratic  problems  Results 
1.4-  Do  you  think  the  burucratic  system  is  centralisated? 
Yes  ()  No  ()  Don't  know  () 
IF  YES: 
1  S_  n,  v"  fhin4  this  rachfc  in  anv  nrnh1  rn  t  hnth  Inrrnl  nnrl  nntinnnl  levels? 
Answer  At  the  local  level  At  the  national  level 
Yes  () 
No 
1.6-  What  are  the  possible  benefits  gained  of  centralised  policies? 
At  the  national  level  At  the  local  level 
1.7-  What  red-tape  practices  do  you  think  cause  ma  or  obstacles? 
Red-tape  practices  Obstacles  resulted 
1.8-  What  types  of  corruption  and  inequity  occur  within  the  Egyptian  institutional  apparatus? 
1  9-  Tln  vnn  ciiff-r  from  nvrrctnfTina  nnrl  'dean-wnnri'  within  vnnr  denartment? 
Answer  Reasons  Proposals 
Yes  () 
No  () 
1.10-  How  far  is  the  existing  administrative  system  efficient  regarding  rewarding  and  penalising  its 
employees? 
Advantages  Disadvantages  Your  proposals  for  reforms 
11L  Tc  it  racv  to  opt  all  the  infnrmntinn  von  need  to  carry  rut  vnnr  recnnnsihilities  efficiently? 
Answer  Reasons  Proposals 
Yes  () 
No  () 
1.12-  Do  you  think  that  qualified  and  experienced  persons  are  still  willing  to  join  the  inunici  alities? 
Answer  Reasons  Proposals 
-Yes(  )  -No(  ) 
1  11_  Tln  vnii  have  ennnoh  nnalified  anri  exnerienced  staff? 
Answer  Reasons  Actions  and  measures  taken 
-Yes  ()  -No  () 
309 2-  Time  dimension  and  monitoring: 
2.1-  Who  is  responsible  for  monitoring  and  evaluating  various  types  of  upgrading  schemes  in  Egypt- 
e.  g.  a  co-o  eration  project,  'self-help'  project  or  state  project? 
Type  of  Project  Monitor  Gauge 
2.2-  What  can  beneficiaries  do  if  they  are  not  satisfied? 
2.3-  What  can  donors  do  if  they  are  not  satisfied? 
2.4-  What  can  state  institutions  do  if  they  are  not  satisfied? 
2.5-  Which  arm  of  Government  is  most  affected  by  the  schemes? 
2.6-  Is  it  evaluated  in  purely  cost  effective  terms,  or  in  moral  and  political  ones? 
Cost  effective  terms  ()  Moral  ()  Plitical  () 
Other  ()  please  specify:  ................................................................................ 
3-  Institutional  experience  in  regularisation  schemes: 
3.1-  What  previous  upgrading  projects  have  taken  place  in  the  city? 
Project  Duration  Site  choice  Planning  agency  Implementer 
(Who  chose  Iwh 
3.2-  How  do  von  assess  the  outcome  of  each? 
Project  Places  of  Reasons  Places  of  Reasons  General 
success  failure  assessment 
Excellent  () 
Good  () 
Bad  () 
3.3-  Which  institutional  body  must  be  -by  law-  responsible  for  the  upgrading  schemes  in  Egypt? 
3.4-  How  far  do  you  think  they  are  able  to  carry  out  such  a  renonsibilitv? 
Answer  Reasons 
Able  () 
Unable  () 
Unwilling  () 
4-  Choice  of  sites  to  regularise: 
4.1-  What  types  of  popular  settlements  exist  in  this  city? 
4.2-  Please  define  and  list  the  problems  of  each  type. 
Type  Definition-Features  Problems 
4.3-  What  are  the  origins  of  these  settlements?  `Please  prioritise'. 
4.4-  For  what  reasons  did  the  government  neither  control  their  growth  nor  upgrade  them  during  the 
past  time  until  the  National  Upgrading  Programme  was  launched  in  1992? 
Reasons 
310 4.5-  What  type  of  data  are  available  for  you  about  popular  settlements  located  in  your  area  of 
responsibility? 
4.6-  How  do  you  collect  these  data? 
4.7-  What  are  the  bases  of  identifying  targeted  areas  for  upgrading? 
4.8-  What  are  the  stages  of  identifying  targeted  areas  for  upgrading? 
4.9-  Who  does  carry  out  the  following  decisions/tasks: 
a)  Maping  of  all  popular  settlements? 
b)  Selecting  sites  for  upgrading? 
c)  Determining  the  upgrading  activities? 
d)  Co-ordinating  with  other  institutions  concerned? 
e)  Implementation? 
f)  Monitoring  and  evaluating? 
5-  Letal  framework  of  regularisation  schemes: 
5.1-  What  are  the  relevant  laws  which  control  the  formation  and  upgrading  of  squatter  settlements  in 
Egypt?  and  what  are  the  advantages  of  each  law  in  your  point  of  view? 
5.2-  What  are  the  defects  of  each  law  in  your  point  of  view? 
6-  Choice  of  beneficiaries: 
6.1-  How  do  you  evaluate  the  participation  of  local  representatives  within  the  following  urban  processes? 
Process  Answer 
Planning  -  Very  effective  (  )-  Reasonable  ()-  Limited  (  )-  Not  at  all  () 
Decision  making  -  Very  effective  (  )-  Reasonable  ()-  Limited  (  )-  Not  at  all  () 
Implementation  -  Very  effective  (  )-  Reasonable  ()-  Limited  (  )-  Not  at  all  () 
Evaluation  -  Very  effective  (  )-  Reasonable  ()-  Limited  (  )-  Not  at  all  () 
6.2-  What  precautions  are  taken  to  insure  that  only  existing  residents  benefit? 
6.3-  What  precautions  are  taken  to  protect  the  area  from  land  speculators? 
6.4-  Are  there  any  controls  to  prevent  beneficiaries  from  the  possibility  of  moving  away  or  selling 
their  plots-  or  part  of  them-  to  new  comers? 
6.5-  How  are  speculators  prevented  from  entering  the  implementation  processes? 
7-  Beneficiary  participation: 
7.1-  What  are  the  different  shapes  of  people's  representation  found  in  the  squatter  settlements? 
7.2-  To  what  extent  are  people's  opinion  considered  by  the  project  agency  during  the  following 
processes? 
Process  Answer 
Planning  -  Very  much  (  )-  Reasonable  (  )-  Limited  (  )-  Not  at  all  () 
Decision  making  -  Very  much  (  )-  Reasonable  (  )-  Limited  (  )-  Not  at  all  () 
Implementation  -  Very  much  (  )-  Reasonable  (  )-  Limited  (  )-  Not  at  all  () 
Evaluation  -Very  much  (  )-  Reasonable  (  )-  Limited  (  )-  Not  at  all  () 
311 7.3-  What  are  the  procedures  to  resolve  disagreements  between  beneficiaries  and  the  authority? 
7.4-  Who  are  the  `brokers'  who  can  interpret  the  various  views  of  those  involved? 
7.5-  How  decisions  are  taken  within  the  projects? 
7.6-  What  is  the  role  of  the  city  local  council? 
7.7-  To  what  extent  do  you  believe  that  the  local  council  represents  the  people? 
Absolute  representation  ()  Partial  ()  Not  absolute  () 
7.8-  To  what  extent  do  you  believe  that  the  local  council  takes  decisions  freely? 
Absolutely  free  ()  Partially  infuenced  ()  Absolutely  infuenced  () 
7.9-  Do  you  believe  that  the  new  amendments  on  the  Local  Administrative  Law  will  improve  the 
efficiency  representation  and  performance?  why? 
7.10-  Who  is  actually  involved  in  formulating  the  state  views? 
8-  Recuperation  of  investment: 
8.1-  Where  do  the  resources  to  finance  upgrading  schemes  come  from? 
8.2-  How  are  these  budgets  generated? 
8.3-  Should  beneficiaries  contribute  to  pay  back  the  cost  of  upgrading? 
8.4-  How  far  can  land  sale  programmes  help  to  generate  substantial  finance  for  project  activities? 
8.5-  What  measures  are  taken  to  recuperate  investments? 
8.6-  Was  the  land  sale  concept  an  important  component  during  the  previous  experience  in  upgrading? 
8.7-  What  financial  systems  can  ensure  the  continuity  of  upgrading  in  the  city? 
8.8-  By  whom  are  these  systems  evaluated? 
9-  Legality  of  tenure  and  role  in  the  land/housing  market: 
9.1-  What  are  the  side  effects  of  granting  tenure  and  what  measures  can  avoid  negative  consequences? 
Various  side  effects  Measures  considered 
9.2-  What  measures  can  avoid  the  invasion  of  legalised  areas  by  higher  income  groups  and  the 
displacement  of  poorer  people,  especially  tenants? 
9.3-  How  can  further  squatting  be  avoided  as  a  result  of  blanket  promises  of  secure  tenure? 
9.4-  What  legal  position  is  envisaged  for  these  areas  in  the  future? 
9.5-  Can  they  be  subdivided,  rented  or  sold?  -  and  if  so,  to  whom? 
9.6-  Should  the  process  be  controlled?  -  and  if  so,  by  whom  and  how? 
9.7-  Is  it  legal  to  supply  an  informal  area  with  infrastructure  networks  and  house  connections  without 
transforming  it  first  into  a  legal  one  through'a  regularisation  project  and  land-sale  programme? 
what  are  the  consequences? 
312 Answer  Reasons 
10-  Personal  data: 
10.  i- 
-  Name=:  2-  Institution  and  Department: 
-  Education:  4-  Occupation: 
-  Years  of  experience:  6-  Rank  of  employment: 
*  You  may  not  mention  your  name  if  you  wish. 
10.2-  How  many  subordinates  do  you  head? 
10.3-  What  managerial  system  do  you  follow  to  direct  your  subordinates? 
10.4-  On  what  u  radin  projects  have  you  artici  ated? 
Project:  Project  components  Duration:  Responsibilities: 
10.5-  How  much  is  your  average  onthly  income  including  any  overtime  or  incentives? 
Basic  salary  Constant  allowances  (Badalat)  Incentives,  overtime,  etc. 
10.6  -  What  is  the  approximate  annual  increase  rate  in  your  salary? 
10.7-  How  much  could  you  earn  in  the  private  sector? 
10.8-  Do  you  have  a  second  job?  Why? 
10.9-  What  is  the  approximate  percentage  of  your  subordinates  having  a  second  job? 
10.10-  What  do  you  think  of  the  practice  of  municipal  officials  carrying  out  work  on  the  side  for 
citizens  dealing  with  the  municipality? 
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KEY  INFORMANTS 
AA,  05-11-98  (Aswan-  community  leader).  Mr  Ahmed  Abdel-Atey  is  a  Nasriya  CDA  Board 
member,  Head  of  the  Environment  and  Solid-Waste  Committee  and  Head  of  the  Biadia 
Community  Centre.  Mr  Abdel-Atey  is  originally  from  Luxor. 
AA,  27-11-98  (Ismailia,  senior  municipal  official).  Mr  Abdel-Hamid  Amer  is  the  Deputy- 
Director  of  Ismailia  Urban  Planning  Office  (UPO).  Mr  Amer  has  been  working  for  the  UPO  for 
more  than  10  years. 
AH,  21-03-98  (Aswan-  community  leader/elected  politician).  Mr  Adly  Hassan  is  the  Helal 
community  leader  in  Nasriya,  and  a  member  of  Aswan  Popular  Local  Council.  He  works  as  a 
public  employee  in  the  Social  Affairs  Department,  Aswan.  Despite  his  active  political 
participation  in  the  Aswan  Local  Council,  Mr  Hassan  terminated  his  membership  in  the  CDA  in 
1998  and  decided  to  devote  all  his  voluntarily  work  to  his  own  people  and  Community  Centre. 
"There  are  several  lobbies  now  within  the  CDA  and  its  current  constituency  neither  represent  all 
home  origins  in  Nasriya  nor  are  they  the  best  community  leaders  to  represent  the  Nasriya 
residents.  ... 
Helal  tried  several  times  before  to  be  represented  within  the  CDA  but  every  time  we 
found  resistance.  ... 
I  cannot  work  alone  and  even  if  all  my  group  worked  together  and  insisted  to 
join  the  CDA  constituency,  serious  conflicts  and  disputes  might  be  created.  ",  Mr  Hassan  said. 
AH,  06-09-98  (Aswan-  senior  municipal  official).  Mr  Abbass  Hegazy  was  the  Nasriya  Project's 
Egyptian  Director  (1991-1998).  He  now  works  as  the  General  Director  of  Housing,  Aswan 
Governorate  (1992-date). 
AO,  23-10-96  (Aswan-  senior  municipal  official).  Mr  Abdel-Rahman  Sayed  Omar,  the  first 
Director  of  the  Physical  Planning  Office,  Aswan  Governorate,  (1987-1988),  and  also  the  first 
Director  of  the  Nasriya  Project  (1988-1989).  Mr  Omar  has  been  instrumental  to  the  success  of  the 
GTZ  and  the  GOPP  in  the  preparation  of  the  Aswan  Physical  Master  Plan  (1986-2017)  because 
of  his  24  years  experience  in  Aswan  Regional  Planning  Office.  He  also  worked  for  a  few  months 
as  the  UDLMU  Director  in  1996,  but  he  was  removed  by  a  Governor's  decree  after  a  professional 
disagreement.  This  was  a  focus  meeting  attended  by  other  officials  in  Aswan  (FM2,23-10-96). 
CP,  12-08-99  (Glasgow-  academic).  Chris  Philo  is  a  Professor  at  the  Department  of  Geography, 
University  of  Glasgow.  Professor  Philo  wrote  widely  about  landscapes  and  environments  within 
the  UK,  the  social  geography  of  `outsiders'  particularly  in  rural  areas  fields  of  political  and 
cultural  geography.  He  is  a  co-author  in  "Cloke  et  al.  (1991)  Approaching  Human  Geography:  An 
Introduction  to  Contemporary  Theoretical  Debates". 
314 DS,  18-12-98  (Ismailia-Cairo-London,  DA  expert).  Mr  David  Sims  is  one  of  the  founders  of  the 
Hai  E-Salam  Project  and  now  a  partner  in  Clifford  Culpin  and  Partners.  Mr  Sims  has  more  than 
twenty  years  of  experience  in  urban  upgrading  and  sites-and-services  policies.  He  led  a  team  of 
experts  in  Ismailia  to  assist  with  the  preparation  of  detailed  project  plans  and  offer  training  for  the 
newly  appointed  planners  of  the  Ismailia  Physical  Planning  Office.  Since  1997,  Mr  Sims  has  been 
involved  once  again  in  urban  upgrading  in  Egypt  to  support  local  development  agencies  and  local 
consultants  for  city-level  planning,  project  design,  implementation  and  management  throughout 
the  Manshia'at  Nasser  Project  (a  co-operative  venture  administered  by  Cairo  Governorate  and 
GTZ  1997-date).  Similar  to  Nasriya,  Manshia'at  Nasser  is  a  mountainous  area  located  on  flanks 
of  El-Mokattam  hill,  East  of  Cairo.  The  first  settlement  took  place  in  1961  when  the  government 
cleared  the  Darrasa  area  from  shacks  to  construct  what  is  now  known  as  the  El-Khaledeen  Park. 
Unsurprisingly,  the  ejected  inhabitants  had  no  other  option  but  to  move  to  the  nearest  uninhabited 
area,  Manshia'at  Nasser.  Now,  the  population  there  is  almost  a  million. 
EM,  05-01-1999  (Aswan,  senior  municipal  official).  Mr  Essa  Mabrouk  is  the  Director  of 
Aswan's  Urban  Development  and  Land  management  Unit  UDLMU  (1998-date).  Mr  Essa 
Mabrouk  also  participated  in  a  focus  meeting  in  1996  (FM2,23-10-96). 
IGI1,17-10-96  (Ismailia,  HoHs  group  interview).  Ismailia  Group  Interview  No.  1.  This 
interview  took  place  with  three  HoHs  living  in  Hai  E-Salam;  Mr  Mahmoud  Ahmed,  53  years  old, 
literate,  originally  from  Faques,  EI-Sharkiya  Governorate,  migrated  to  Hai  El-Salam  in  1975  to 
work  in  the  Sinai  Reconstruction  Apparatus  and  he  is  now  retired;  Mr  Faheem  Abdel-Rady,  72 
years  old,  illiterate,  originally  from  El-Baliyana,  Souhag  Governorate,  left  his  home  origin  in  1948 
to  work  in  a  cement  Factory  in  Kafr  El-Dawar  and  was  transferred  to  work  in  Ismailia  in  1977,  he 
is  now  retired;  and  Mr  Sadik  Mohamed,  73  years  old,  literate,  originally  from  Tookh,  Monufiya 
Governorate,  left  his  home  origin  in  the  1940s  to  work  in  Alexandria  and  migrated  to  Ismailia  in 
1955  to  work  in  the  army  as  a  gardener. 
FD,  17-01-98  (Ismailia-Cairo-Rotterdam,  DA  expertlacademic).  Mr  Forbes  Davidson  is  the 
Head  of  the  Urban  Management  Department,  Institute  for  Housing  and  Urban  Development 
Studies  (IHS),  the  Netherlands.  Mr  Davidson  has  twenty-five  years'  experience  in  urban  and 
regional  planning,  urban  management,  land  management  institution  building,  institutional 
assessment,  low  income  housing,  capacity  building,  training  and  project  management.  He  was  one 
of  the  first  Planning  Consultants  working  for  the  British  firm,  Clifford  Culpin  and  Partners,  to 
elaborate  the  Physical  Master  Plan  of  Ismailia  (1975-2000)  and  the  development  strategy  of  the 
Hai  E-Salam  Project  in  the  1970s.  Mr  Davidson  wrote  many  journal  articles,  book  sections  and  an 
urban  manual  about  the  Ismailia  experience.  Meeting  took  place  in  the  Flamenco  Hotel,  Cairo. 
315 FM1,26-11-98  (Ismailia,  senior  municipal  officials  focus  meeting).  Focus  meeting  No.  1  with  4 
government  officials  working  for  the  Ismailia  Urban  Planning  Office  (UPO).  The  meeting  was 
attended  by-Mr  Gouma  M.  Gouma  (GG,  26-11-98),  Mrs  Naiema  Moheb  (NM,  26-11-98),  Mr 
Osama  Abdel-Aziz  (OA,  26-11-1998),  and  Mr  Sadek  Shebabe  (SS,  26-11-98).  Meeting  took 
place  in  the  UPO. 
FM2,26-11-98  (Aswan,  senior  municipal  officials  focus  meeting).  Focus  meeting  No.  2  with  3 
government  officials  working  for  the  Aswan  Urban  Development  and  Land  Management  Unit 
(UDLMU).  The  meeting  was  attended  by  Mr  Abdel-Rahman  Sayed  Omar  (AO,  23-10-96),  Mr 
Essa  Mabrouk  (EM,  05-01-99),  and  Mr  Khalid  El-Agmey  (KE,  05-12-96). 
FM3,29-05-96  (Cairo,  academics  focus  meeting).  Focus  meeting  No.  3  with  4  academics 
working  for  the  Faculty  of  Regional  and  Urban  Planning,  Cairo  University.  The  meeting  was 
attended  by  Professor  Abdel-Mohsen  Barada,  Dean  of  Faculty;  Professor  Hassan  Kotry,  Vice 
Dean;  Professor  Magdy  Rabic;  and  Professor  Tarek  Wafik.  The  meeting  was  also  attended  by  Dr 
Stella  Lowder  (Thesis  Supervisor).  Meeting  took  place  in  the  Dean's  office. 
FM4,04-04-98  (Aswan,  gender  and  development).  Focus  meeting  No.  4  with  the  Board  and  all 
members  of  the  Nasriya  Women  Development  Association  (WDA).  Participation  observation  in  a 
meeting  that  took  place  between  the  WDA  and  Professor  Ralph  Mills  (the  Aga  Khan  Prize  for 
Architecture-  Technical  review  mission),  in  the  aftermath  of  nominating  the  Nasriya  project  for 
this  prestigious  Award.  The  women's  team  presented  the  objectives  of  the  WDA,  roles  performed, 
problems  encountered  and  their  plans  of  sustaining  development  after  the  withdrawal  of  GTZ. 
FN,  15-10-98  (Aswan,  community  leader).  Mr  Fadl-Allah  Nour  is  a  Nubian  community  leader. 
He  used  to  be  the  Head  of  the  Aberkab  Community  Centre. 
GG,  26-11-98  (Ismailia,  senior  municipal  official).  Mr  Gouma  M.  Gouma,  is  an  Urban  Planner 
in  the  Ismailia  Urban  Planning  Office  (1981-date).  He  who  worked  for  several  years  for  the  Hai 
El-Salam  project  before  he  became  the  Director  of  the  El-Safa  Upgrading  Project-  a  similar 
project  that  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  Hai  El-Salam.  Mr  Gouma  also  participated  in  a  focus 
meeting  on  the  same  day  (FM1,26-11-98). 
GGh,  19-01-98  (Aswan-Berlin,  DA  expert/academic).  Mr  Gennaro  Ghirardelli  is  a  GTZ's 
German  Community  Development  Consultant  for  Nasriya  (1988-1998).  Mr  Ghirardelli  believes 
that  the  Egyptian  society  is  still  to  a  large  extent  characterised  by  peasant  culture.  A  long  period 
as  an  oppressed  colony  resulted  in  a  suppressed  society  reluctant  to  rebel  and  express  its  opinion 
freely.  People  are  aware  of  corruption  and  routine  but  very  little  action  is  taken  for  reform. 
Meanwhile,  the  passive  attitude  of  some  inhabitants  of  squatter  settlements  in  Egypt  can  be  due  to 
their  harsh  economic  life,  the  high  occupancy  rate  of  housing  and  a  conviction  that  the  government 
316 does  not  care  about  them.  The  question  which  is  more  important  than  how  far  inhabitants  are 
familiar  with  their  representatives  concerns  -what  they  do  if  they  feel  mistreated  or  disagree  with  a 
certain  project  or  the  municipality. 
HE,  17-12-98  (Ismailia,  local  DA  expert).  Ms  Habiba  Eid  is  a  former  Director  of  the  Hai  El- 
Salam  and  Abu  Atwa  demonstration  projects,  and  was  also  a  Director  of  the  Ismailia  Urban 
Planing  Office  (1985-1989).  Ms  Eid  is  currently  the  Director  of  the  UNDP-funded  Sustainable 
Isamilia  Project  (SIP),  she  is  also  an  elected  member  of  Ismailia's  Popular  Local  Council.  It  is 
worth  noting  that  all  consultants  who  were  interviewed  in  the  course  of  this  research  agreed  that 
Ms  Eid  is  a  very  charismatic  leader.  "The  SIP  team  leader  also  had  an  important  role  in  bypassing 
normal  administrative  procedures.  Her  ability  to  assist  the  different  interests  groups  in  reaching 
consensus  on  priorities  and  actions  is  crucial.  Her  success  can  be  attributed  to  strong  leadership 
abilities  gained  through  long  experience  in  the  field  of  development  programmes  in  Isamilia" 
(Khoury  1996:  207). 
HM,  20-01-98  (Aswan-Cairo,  local  consultant).  Mr  Hany  Mineawy  is  well-know  Egyptian 
Architect  and  Planner.  He  was  the  GTZ's  short-term  consultant  for  the  East  Nasriya  extension 
and  the  Urban  Development  Unit  (1990-1998).  Mr  Mineawy  explained  that  the  most  worrying 
thing  for  them  was  the  different  language,  jargons  and  dialect  used  by  architects  and  technicians 
from  one  side  and  beneficiaries  from  the  other.  Hence,  he  did  not  want  to  present  a  manual 
including  technical  drawings  and  phrases  which  people  might  not  understand.  Alternatively, 
simple  drawings  and  text  were  elaborated  and  the  idea  of  presenting  such  a  work  as  a  theatre  play 
appeared  spontaneously.  A  meeting  with  the  CDA  and  the  WDA  to  discuss  the  idea  was  proposed. 
Mr  Mineawy  was  doubtful  after  presenting  the  idea  but  some  CDA's  members  asked  him  to  leave 
the  scenario  and  drawings  with  them  for  a  while.  A  few  weeks  after,  he  was  amazed  that  the  CDA 
had  proceeded  to  design  all  the  details  to  make  the  play  and  managed  to  perform  it  in  a  very  good 
manner.  The  play  used  the  model  house  as  a  case  study  of  gradual  construction  based  on  the  idea 
of  core-unit. 
HS,  08-05-96  (Aswan-Berlin,  DA  expert).  Mr  Hans  G.  Schild  is  a  German  Consultant  working 
in  Berlin,  partner  in  FPB  (Freie  Planungsgrouppe  Berlin  GmbH).  He  was  one  of  the  first  GTZ's 
long-term  planning  consultants  working  for  a  capacity-building  project  to  improve  the 
performance  of  the  General  Organisation  for  Physical  Planning  in  Cairo  (GOPP)  in  the  1980s. 
Through  on  job  training  programmes,  the  GOPP  staff  co-operated  with  the  local  officials  of 
Aswan,  Abu  Simble,  Edfu  and  Tanta  to  produce  the  Physical  Master  Plans  for  these  cities.  Mr 
Schild  has  also  contributed  to  the  initiation  of  the  Nasriya  project  and  worked  later  as  a  GTZ's 
short-term  Adviser  for  the  UDLMU  in  the  1990s  to  readjust  Aswan  Master  Plan  (1986-2017)  and 
to  prepare  the  planning  of  East  Nasriya. 
317 JK,  08-02-98  (Aswan-Berlin,  DA  expert/academic).  Dr  Jochen  Korfmacher  is  a  German 
Consultant  and  was  a  GTZ  short-term  Project  Adviser  for  the  Nasriya  project  (1992-1998). 
JL,  13-10-99  (Aswan-Copenhagen,  DA  expert).  Mr  Jacob  Lund  is  Senior  Technical  Adviser, 
Head  of  the  Danish  International  Development  Agency  (DANIDA),  Aswan  office  (1997-date).  Mr 
Lund  was  previously  involved  in  a  capacity-building  project  for  the  Aswan  Water  Authority.  One 
of  the  most  relevant  projects  Mr  Lund  is  involved  in  now  is  the  Aswan  Capacity-Building  Project. 
KM,  05-08-99  (Aswan-Cairo-USA,  DA  expert).  Mrs  Krista  Masonis  was  the  GTZ  Short-term 
Consultant  for  Women's  Development  during  Nasriya's  last  phase  of  institutionalisation  (1995- 
1998).  The  first  meeting  took  place  with  Mrs  Masonis  on  28th  May  1998  in  Aswan  where  she 
explained  the  general  strategy  of  the  Women  Development  Association  in  Nasriya,  and  a  another 
discussion  took  place  via  the  electronic  mail  in  August  1999  to  evaluate  the  situation  after  the 
withdrawal  of  the  GTZ. 
KE,  05-12-96  (Aswan,  municipal  official).  Mr  Khalid  El-Agmey  was  the  Director  of  Aswan's 
Urban  Development  and  Land  Management  Unit  (1995-1998)  and  works  now  in  the  Director  of 
the  Engineering  Department,  Edfu  District,  Aswan  Governorate.  Mr  El-Agmey  also  participated 
in  a  focus  meeting  in  1996  (FM2,23-10-96). 
KT,  15-05-98  (Aswan-Ismailia-London,  DA  expert).  Mr  Kevin  Tayler  is  a  British  Consultant, 
Director  of  GHK  Research  &  Training  Ltd.  Mr  Tayler  has  worked  for  the  British  DFID  in  several 
urban  development  and  capacity-building  projects  in  Egypt,  India  and  Pakistan  among  others.  Mr 
Tayler  and  the  Author  have  compiled  together  a  research  paper  for  the  DFID,  which  is 
incorporated  now  in:  "Plummer,  J.  (forthcoming).  Building  Municipal  Capacity  for  Community 
Participation.  A  Guidebook.  London,  DFID". 
MA,  21-10-96  (Aswan-  community  leader/municipal  official).  Mr  Mahmoud  Imam  is  a  CDA 
Board  member  and  Head  of  the  Infrastructure  Committee.  He  is  originally  from  Ques,  41  years 
old  and  came  to  Nasriya  in  1957  with  his  parents.  His  Father  came  to  work  for  the  Steel 
Company,  south-east  Aswan.  Mr  Imam  is  a  municipal  official  works  as  a  Building  Inspector  for 
the  Municipality.  He  works  voluntarily  for  the  CDA.  Mr  Imam  is  a  classic  example  of  the 
community  leaders  in  Nasriya  who  benefited  the  area  a  great  deal  through  their  municipal 
position. 
MA,  01-04-98  (Aswan,  senior  municipal  official).  Mr  Mostafa  Abbass  is  the  Mayor  of  Aswan 
(1996-date).  Mr  Abbass  has  worked  all  his  life  in  municipal  operations  in  Aswan  Governorate.  He 
also  worked  as  the  General  Director  of  Aswan  Governorate  Public  Relations. 
318 MAA,  02-10-98  (Aswan,  senior  municipal  official).  Mr  Mubarak  Ali  Ahmed  is  the  Vice  Mayor 
of  West  Quarter  in  Aswan  and  the  GTZ  sociologist  for  the  Nasriya  and  Tabya  Upgrading' 
Projects. 
ME,  19-12-98  (Cairo,  senior  policy-maker/academic).  Dr  Manal  El-Batran  is  the  Urban 
Development  Adviser  to  the  Egyptian  Minister  of  Housing  (1997-  date).  Dr  El-Batran  wrote 
widely  about  urbanisation  processes,  land  management  and  informal  housing  in  Egypt.  She  also 
teaches  at  the  American  University  in  Cairo. 
MH,  06-06-96  (Cairo,  academic/local  consultant).  Dr  Milad  Hanna,  former  head  of  the 
Egyptian  Parliament  Housing  Commission,  is  a  prominent  housing  expert  working  in  Egypt.  Dr 
Henna  is  now  a  member  of  the  Supreme  Council  of  Culture  as  well  as  President  of  Egypt's 
Commission  for  Scientific  Culture.  He  has  for  many  years  championed  the  rights  of  the  poor  to 
decent  housing  and  wrote  several  book  and  articles  regarding  this  issue.  Nonetheless,  Dr  Hanna 
has  assisted  to  promote  Egypt's  unity,  between  Muslims  and  Copts,  and  the  reinforcement  of  civic 
responsibilities  throughout  his  various  capacities,  whether  through  writings,  as  President  of  the 
Coptic  Tawfiq  Society  (one  of  the  oldest  voluntary  work  organisations  in  Egypt),  or  as  the 
founder  of  organisations  promoting  human  rights  in  the  Arab  World.  Therefore,  "Milad  has  been 
nominated  by  UNESCO  Director-General  Federico  Mayor  for  the  1998  International  Simon 
Bolivar  Prize"  (Al-Ahram  Weekly  22-10-1998).  Meeting  took  place  in  Dr  Hanna's  house  in  Cairo 
and  was  attended  by  Dr  Stella  Lowder  (Thesis  Supervisor). 
MK,  29-09-98  (Aswan,  community  leader).  Mr  Mahmoud  Khatary  is  a  community  leader 
among  people  from  Khatariya,  Ques,  living  in  sector  eight.  He  used  to  be  the  Head  of  the 
Khatariya  Community  Centre  and  the  Head  of  the  Employment  Committee  of  the  early  Nasriya 
Community  Council  (1987-1992).  Mr  Mahmoud  criticised  Nasriya's  first  Community  Council 
and  directorship  on  the  basis  of  their  favouritism  of  people  coming  from  Luxor,  and  the  current 
CDA,  as  it  favours  those  coming  from  Ques  and  living  in  the  central  sectors  of  Nasriya. 
MF,  05-11-98  (Aswan,  DA  local  expert).  Mr  Mohamed  Foda  was  the  Nasriya  Project  Co- 
ordinator  almost  since  the  beginning  of  the  project  (1988-1998).  He  is  an  Architect  and  had 
worked  before  for  USAID  in  their  Heiwan  Upgrading  Project,  Cairo. 
MS,  28-05-98  (Aswan,  community  leader).  Mr  Mahmoud  Sabry  is  the  Chair  of  the  CDA.  He  is 
a  government  employee  at  Aswan  Governorate  Diwan  and  meantime  a  member  in  the  Popular 
Local  Council.  Mr  Sabry  is  one  of  the  new  generation  who  took  the  lead  of  the  CDA  after  the 
NCC  was  dissolved. 
319 NGI1,07-04-98  (Aswan,  HoHs  group  interview).  Nasriya  Group  Interview  No.  1.  This 
interview  took  place  with  five  HoHs  living  in  the  upper  elevated  area  of  sector  two.  They  were  a 
mix  of  people  coming  from  Ques  and  Helal. 
NGI2,05-12-98  (Aswan,  HoHs  group  interview).  Nasriya  Group  Interview  No.  2.  This 
interview  took  place  with  four  HoHs  living  in  the  upper  reaches  of  an  area  located  between  sectors 
seven  and  eight.  They  all  migrated  originally  from  Ques  or  its  surrounding  villages  (one  came 
from  El-Emaish  and  one  came  from  Danfik).  They  explained  the  processes  through  which  the 
community  organised  itself  and  collected  money  to  construct  a  sewerage  connection  the  project 
could  not  do  because  three  houses  obstructed  the  designed  course  for  the  connection. 
NM,  26-11-98  (Ismailia,  municipal  official).  Mrs  Naiema  Moheb  is  an  Urban  Planner  in  the 
Ismailia  Urban  Planning  Office  (1981-date).  She  has  been  involved  in  a  large  number  of 
upgrading  and  urban  development  projects  in  Ismailia  Governorate  and  was  also  the  Director  of 
the  small-scale  industries  scheme  in  Ismailia.  This  interview  was  part  of  a  focus  meeting  (FM1, 
26-11-98). 
OA,  21-03-98  (Aswan-Berlin,  DA  expert/academic).  Professor  Omar  Akbar,  was  the  Nasriya 
project  German  GTZ  Project  Adviser  (1988-1998).  Professor  Akbar  was  instrumental  to  the 
success  of  the  project  specially  during  its  first  phase  which  witnessed  a  lot  of  conflicts  over 
resources  and  decision  making.  He  introduced  the  concept  of  community  participation  smoothly 
and  did  not  leave  the  project  until  the  community  was  to  a  large  extent  empowered.  No  wonder  he 
works  now  in  a  very  prestigious  position  in  Germany-  Director,  Bauhaus  Institute  of  Architecture, 
Dessau. 
OA,  26-11-98  (Ismailia,  senior  municipal  official).  Mr  Osama  Abdel-Aziz,  is  an  active  Urban 
Planner  in  Ismailia's  Urban  Planning  Office  and  one  of  its  founders.  He  was  interviewed  in  1996 
during  the  pilot  survey,  accompanied  the  researcher  during  his  visits  to  the  Hai  El-Salam  area  and 
the  SIP  office  and  participated  in  a  focus  meeting  (FM  I,  26-11-98). 
RS,  03-03-98  (Aswan-Hamburg,  DA  expert).  Mr  Rowlf  Shifner,  was  a  GTZ  Project  Adviser 
for  the  Aswan  Solid-Waste  Management  Project.  The  interview  aimed  to  investigate  the  problems 
that  faced  the  project  and  its  experience  with  the  Nasriya  CDA  and  why  this  activity  failed. 
SA,  04-06-1998  (Aswan-Cairo,  DA  local  expert/academic).  Professor  Salah  Arafa  is  a  staff 
member  of  the  American  University  in  Cairo,  and  a  GTZ's  Community  Development  Local 
Consultant  for  the  Nasriya  Project.  Professor  Arafa  is  an  Egyptian  authority  in  community 
development  and  civil  society  organisations.  Beside  the  several  development  projects  he  is 
involved  in,  he  also  administers  the  Egyptian  Coalition  of  NGOs  and  work  with  several  bilateral 
320 and  multilateral  donor  agencies  working  in  Egypt.  Meeting  took  place  on  the  aeroplane  behveen 
Aswan  and  Cairo. 
SE,  16-10-96  (Cairo,  senior  policy-maker).  Mr  Saureh  El-Shazly  is  a  Development  Adviser  to 
the  Egyptian  Minister  of  Rural  Development  (1993-date).  He  is  also  a  GTZ  Local  Consultant  for 
development  and  municipal  capacity-building  initiatives,  including  Nasriya  (Aswan),  Boulak  El- 
Dakrour  (Giza)  and  Manshia'at  Nasser  (Cairo)  projects. 
SK,  26-11-98  (Ismailia,  senior  municipal  official).  Mr  Sayd  Keylani  is  the  Hai  El-Salam  PMU 
Director. 
SM,  02-04-98  (Aswan,  Governor-President's  regional  representative).  H.  E  Salah  Mesbah  is 
the  Governor  of  Aswan  (1992-date),  meeting  took  place  on  at  the  Governor's  office,  Aswan.  The 
following  long  quotation  was  recorded  while  the  Governor  was  presenting  the  experience  of  the 
Nasriya  Project  to  Professor  Mills  Tetty  of  the  Aga  Khan  Award  for  Architecture,  who  was  on  a 
mission  to  evaluate  the  project  after  it  had  been  nominated  for  the  Award. 
SS,  30-05-96  (Cairo,  senior  policy-maker).  Mr  Shawky  Shaban  is Vice  Chair  of  GOPP,  Cairo. 
The  meeting  was  attended  by  Dr  Stella  Lowder  (Thesis  Supervisor).  Meeting  took  place  in  the  his 
office  at  GOPP. 
SS,  26-11-98  (Ismailia,  senior  municipal  official).  Mr  Sadek  Shebabe  is  an  Urban  Planner  in  the 
Ismailia  Urban  Planning  Office  (1981-date).  Besides  his  work  in  the  Hai  El-Salam  Project,  Mr 
Shebabe  also  lives  in  the  area,  he  was  also  interviewed  in  1996  during  the  pilot  survey  in  Ismailia 
and  participated  in  a  focus  meeting  in  1998  (FM  1,26-11-98). 
TA,  16-06-98  (Aswan,  DA  local  expert).  Mr  Taher  Abdel-Basit  was  the  Nasriya  Project's 
Administrator  (1987-1998)  and  was  one  of  the  first  social  and  urban  surveyors  who  helped  the 
German  and  Egyptian  consultants  at  the  beginning  of  the  project. 
UmS,  18-09-98  (Aswan,  female  community  leader).  Um-Shehrzad,  Mother  of  Shehrzad,  is  a 
very  active  Nubian  woman  representing  all  women  in  sector  9.  She  is  widow,  a  mother  of  4  boys 
(34,31,18  and  15  years  old)  who  share  the  house  with  her  and  two  married  daughters  now  living 
outside  Nasriya.  One  of  them,  Shehrzad,  was  one  of  the  most  active  members  of  the  early 
women's  committee  at  the  time  of  the  Nasriya  Community  Council,  to  whom  the  success  of 
women's  activities  in  sector  nine  is  always  attributed.  After  Shehrzad  was  married  and  left  the 
area,  her  mother  replaced  her  but  in  informal  manner.  "I  have  been  living  here  for  some  forty 
years  now  since  I  got  married  in  1960.  My  husband  used  to  work  as  a  driver  during  the 
construction  of  the  High  Dam  and  we  both  constructed  this  house  block  by  block.  I  was  very  keen 
to  educate  all  my  children  and  never  thought  about  getting  married  again.  Nov,  all  I  wish  is  to  see 
321 my  18  and  15  years  old  sons  well  educated  and  all  of  the  children  happily  married.  ",  said  Um- 
Shehrzad. 
YS,  27-10-96  (Ismailia,  community  leader).  Mr  Younes  Sabit  is  the  Head  of  the  Abna'a  El- 
Sharkiya  community  centre.  Working  as  a  GRO,  this  community  centre  is  one  of  the  largest  civil 
society  organisation  located  in  Hai  El-Salam  area. 
ZA,  15-02-98  (Aswan,  community  leader/elected  politician).  Mr  Zain  Al-A'abedeen  is  a 
community  leader,  Head  of  the  Naga'a  Hamady  Community  Centre  and  Director  of  the  Middle 
East  Press,  Aswan  Branch,  and  elected  member  of  Aswan  Popular  Local  Council.  It  was  observed 
during  the  fieldwork  survey  that  the  Naga'a  Hamady  Community  Centre  was  undoubtedly  the 
most  active  centre,  still  running  a  clinic,  a  nursery,  a  first  aid  unit,  the  literacy  programme  and 
many  social  charitable  activities.  Although  they  got  the  same  attention  and  financial  support  from 
the  upgrading  project,  they  managed  to  maintain  the  activities  and  raise  further  funds,  continuing 
the  physical  improvement  and  extension  of  the  Centre.  Mr  Al-A'abedeen  explained  the  financial 
and  administrative  systems  of  the  Centre,  the  difficulties  they  faced  to  run  all  the  activities  and 
how  they  co-operate  with  both  the  CDA  and  local  institutions  in  Aswan.  Mr  Al-A'abedeen  did  not 
join  the  CDA  Board  because  he  did  not  agree  with  its  last  constitution. 
ZA,  05-04-98.  (Aswan,  Women's  community  leader).  Mrs  Zienab  Abdien  is  the  Head  of  the 
Nasriya  Women  Development  Association  (WDA).  Mrs  Abdien  explained  in  this  meeting  how  the 
women's  team  was  incorporated  in  all  process  of  design,  tendering,  and  implementation  of  the 
Women's  Centre.  The  WDA  established  a  special  committee  for  the  construction  of  the  Centre  in 
1997,  which  was  responsible  for  the  delivery  of  materials,  selecting  local  contractors  and 
labourers,  and  supervising  the  work  with  the  project's  consultant  so  that  they  would  know  the 
technical  background  of  the  building,  which  could  help  them  for  the  maintenance  of  it  in  the 
future. 
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